Title: Volume FOIA 061

Release Date: 2014-03-20

Text: 19361

Volume 61 of 111
SJAR ROT
FOIA Version

VERBAT IM 1

RECORD OF TRIAL2

(and accompanying papers)

of
(Name: Last, First, Middie initiai) (Sociai Security Number) (Rank)
Headquarters and
Headquarters Company,
United States Army Garrison U-S- Army FCDIJC Ml/er: VA 22211
(Unit/Command Name) (Branch of Service) (Station or Snip)
By
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
Convened by Commander

(Titie of Con vening Authority)

UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
(Unit/Command of Con vening Authority)

Tried at

Fort. Meade, MD on see below

(Piace or Piaces of Triai) (Date or Dates of Triai-9

Date or Dates of Trial:

23 February 2012, 15-16 March 2012, 24-26 April 2012, 6-8 June 2012, 25 June 2012,

16-19 July 2012, 28-30 August 2012, 2 October 2012, 12 October 2012, 17-18 October 2012,
7-8 November 2012, 27 November - 2 December 2012, 5-7 December 2012, 10-11 December 2012,
8-9 January 2013, 16 January 2013, 26 February - 1 March 2013, 8 March 2013,

10 April 2013, 7-8 May 2013, 21 May 2013, 3-5 June 2013, 10-12 June 2013, 17-18 June 2013,
25-28 June 2013, 1-2 July 2013, 8-10 July 2013, 15 July 2013, 18-19 July 2013,

25-26 July 2013, 28 July - 2 August 2013, 5-9 August 2013, 12-14 August 2013,

16 August 2013, and 19-21 August 2013.

1 insert ?verbatirri or ?surrimari'zeo? as appropriate. This form be used by the Army and Navy for verbatim records of triai

2 See inside back co ver for instructions as to preparation and arrangement.

DD FORM 490, MAY 2000 PREWOUS OBSOLETE Front Cover

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Wecome, then,to the conclusion that asamatter ofFirst Amendment doctrine,Wikileaks is entitled to the
protection available toawide range of members of the fourth estate,from fringe pamphleteers to the major press
organizations of the industrial information economy.Asamatter ofFirst Amendment values,what is being protected by this refusal to privilege theNewYorkTimes over Wikileaks is the continued access of the public toa
steady flow of truthful, publicly relevant information about its government's inner workings. As the networked
from individual bloggerslikeInstapundit,lFN2^6^ to
publicspheredevelops,asamorediversesetofactors
nonprofits like the Sunlight Foundation, 1^FN2^7^ small commercial online publications like Talking Points
Memo,1F^2^^^ and large decentralized groups of political activists like Daily Kos orTownhall.com 1FN2^^^-come to play an ever larger role in the construction of the public sphere, 1FN260^ the functional importance of
divorcing the constitutional protection from the degree to which the actor isafamiliar part of the twentieth century model of mass media increases.
Wecannot afford asapolity to create classes of privileged speakers and press agencies,and underclasses of
networked information producers whose products we take into the public sphere when convenient, but whom we
treat as susceptible to suppression when their publications becomeless palatable.Doing so would severely undermine the qualityofour public discourse and theproductionofthefunctionofthefourthestateinthenetworked information society. Fortunately, clarifying that this freedom extends to ^^every sort of publication which
affordsavehicle of information and opinion^^and that ^^ll^iberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper oramimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher^^ is notamatter
of policy discretion or moral belief.l^FN261^0ur ^3^3 constitution requires it, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has made this clear.
C.The Prospects ofProsecution:The Espionage Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Conspiracy.
Senator DianneFeinstein,Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for Assange's prosecution
under theEspionage Act of 1^17. 1FN262^ News reports suggest more specifically that the lustice Department
considered,and perhaps continues to consider as of this writing,conspiracycharges associated either withthe
Espionage Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, oradifferent provision pertaining to publication of classi
fiedmaterialsasinchoateliabilitypredicatedontheprimary liability of BradleyManning. l^FN263^The intuition behind such an approach is fairly obvious.Imagine thatareporter suspects that the Governor of the State of
Ruritania is corrupt, and is selling mining rights in the state for large personal payments. The reporter could not
break into the house of one of the contractors, looking for documentation of the payments, and hope to defend
againstaburglary charge by claimingajournalist's privilege.The same would be true of vicarious liability if the
journalist were to hireaprofessional burglar to do the job.These laws of general applicability apply to journal
ists asto others,and theincidentaleffectonfreedomofspeechputstheminthemorerelaxedframeworkof
United Statesv.O'Brien review.1FN264J
There islittle doubt that the govemment has the power to prosecute its own employees,particularly those
whoseemploymentrelatestonationalsecurity and whohave access to classifiedinformationby dint of their
public employment,for revealingclassified materials. 1FN26^^ Specifically,one could imaginePfc. Manning
being charged underavarietyofprovisions,lFN266^rangingfrom^7^3(e)ofthe Espionage Act, which prohib
its any person from willfully communicating ^^any document...relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of
any foreign nation;^^l^FN267^ to l^U.S.C. ^^^2,which specifically prohibits disclosure ofdiplomatic cables,
1FN26^^ to the provisions ofthe Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ^364 ^^^CFAA^^),which would appear to cover

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Manning's having exceeded his authorized access to government computers willfully intending to transmit classified information that ^^could be used to the injury of the United States,or to the advantage of any foreign nation^^toaperson not authorized to receive it.1FN26^^ That Manning can be prosecuted, or that anyone who had
hacked in to government computers from the outside could be,1FN270^ even if the intent is to publish and deliver the material to the press,lFN271^is not legally controversial.What is controversial is the idea that this initial
liability can form the basis ofliability for thejournalist or publisher who publishes the information.
It is well settled thatajoumalist who passively receives illegally obtained information is privileged to publish it.Both NeilSheehan,theNew YorkTimes reporter whoreceived thePentagon Papers from Daniel Ellsberg,1FN272^ and FredVopper, the radio commentator whose broadcast of illegal telephone intercepts pertaining to local school and union negotiations was the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in Bartnickiv.Vopper,
1FN273^ clearly received materials from someone whoviolatedcriminallaw inthe acquisition andtransfer of
the materials.If the^^receipt of stolen goods^^rationale were applicable,or i f inchoateliability (such as aiding
andabettingorconspiracy) weretriggeredby suchpassivereceipt,thejoumalistsinthese cases wouldhave
been liable.
Passive receipt of illegally obtained materials is, then, not subject to prosecution.1^FN274^ What, then, are
wetomake of the spacebetweenhiringaburglar,orbribingapublicemployeetobreach her obligations of
secrecy,on the one hand, and passive receipt ofabrown paper envelop in the mail,on the other hand7 What are
we to make ofajournalist who is contacted byapotential source,meets her inacafe once or twice; hears her
out;listenstoher complaints,fears,and anxieties;promises her anonymity,and arrangesfor another meeting
when the materials can be delivered7 What of the journalist who receives one set of documents in the mail, and
then isrequiredby the sourcetomeet that sourceagaintoreceivefurther caches ofdocuments7 What if the
joumalist sees the source wavering, believes that publication itself would be legal and politically significant, and
encourages the source: ^^1 know this ishardto do,but you're doing theright thing; what you'veuncoveredis
really important and the public hasaright to know^^7 Casting the shadow of potential criminal liability on these
kinds of conversations would createasignificant chilling effect on joumalists and journalism,and, as Professor
Stone has argued against the background of theNew YorkTimes case conceming NSAeavesdropping, likely
causes too greataloss of press^36^freedom tojustify except under extremelylimited conditions that include
the joumalist knowing both that the information would cause imminent harm and that it did not have high public
valuelFN27^1
Tobuildaprosecutionof Assange onthefoundationofthisgrayareawouldpresentgraveriskstopress
freedom. As we have seen, distinguishing between Assange and other joumalists is not feasible without effect
ively excluding core pillars of the emerging networked public sphere and the networked fourth estate. The kind
of gray area that would have to be probed to expand liability throughaconspiracy theory would cover behaviors
that areadaily part of journalists'lives as theycontact and cultivate sources. As Glenn Greenwald explains,it
would cover contacts that NewYorkTimes reporters developed while reporting on the NSA eavesdropping pro
gram,during which they promisedadozenofficials anonymity,as well as the Washington Post's communications with sources about the CIA black sites.1FN276^ Moreover, buildingaconspiracy claim on the testimony
of Manning,who would be consideredaco-conspirator, after thelatter had spent over eight months in solitary
confinement, should give pause to any court adjudicating suchacase. If journalists who cultivate sources and
promise anonymity,or who appealtotheir sources that transmitting theinformationtheyaretransmitting isa
public service,canbe prosecuted criminally underaconspiracy theory,on the testimonyof sources held under
conditions ofextreme duress,then the only real protectionjournalists have is the political clout oftheir employ
ers. That is insufficient to secure the press freedom necessary for an informed and engaged public that is at the

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very foundation ofthe First Amendment's distinct protection ofthe institution ofthe press.
D.Legal Responses to Extralegal Public-Private Actions to RestrainWikileaks
What the govemment could not achieve through law within the boundaries ofthe Constitution,it arguably
tried to achieve through extralegal avenues,1FN277^ in particular, through pressure on skittish private companies more concerned with preserving their public image with consumers than preserving their customers'continued accesstotheir facilities. Asystemthat depends on privately-ownedcriticalcommunicationssystems and
privately-run payment systems is clearly susceptible to an indirect violation ofcivil rights.^FN27^J This is not,
fundamentally,anew threat. Blacklisting during McCarthyismwasaparticularly extreme form of economic per
secution of political undesirables, achieved not directly by government, but throughapublic-^36^ private partnership between Senator McCarthy's hearings,the House Un American Activities Committee,privatelist compilers,andtheprivateemployers whoadhered tothem.Therest is an all-too-familiar story of repression and
persecution overadecade that was not one of the finest hours in the annals of American political freedom.Most
recently,the resort to an extralegal public-private partnership was used asameans to circumvent constitutional
privacy protections and became the subject of litigation in Heptingv.AT^TCorporation,l^FN27^^ where cus
tomers sued AT^Toveritseollaboration with the federal government inimplementingillegal wiretaps. The
company was given retroactive immunity by Congress in the FISA Amendments Act of200^,lFN2^0^ and the
case against it was subsequently dismissed.1FN2^1^
The basic framework is clear.What makes the networked public sphere generally,and the networked fourth
estate in particular, especially democratic, open, and diverse, is the relatively large role that decentralized, non
traditionalspeakers andjoumalists canplay. 1FN2^2^ These online media and citizen speakers arenewlyen
abled by the widespread availability oflow-cost machines and platforms for speech.The susceptibility of the basic infrastructure,or platform providers,to public pressure of the kind we saw developing around theWikileaks
embassy cablesreleasethereforerepresentsathreat not tothe fourthestateingeneral,but specifically tothe
politically weak, technically-dependent on widespread information, communications, and payment utilities elements of the networked economy. Inthe print environment,accessibility to the mails asacommoncarrier was
central;inthephysical,soapboxworld,accesstostreetsandparksindispensable. What the Wikileaks cables
case emphasizes is the extent to which the networked environment is made up of private speech spaces, and in
particular the susceptibilityofthesekinds of spacestoademonizationattackpatternby the opponents of the
speaker—both within the govemment and outside it.
i. Suits against officials
Because the pressures involved in this kind ofpublic-private partnership need not be forceful or explicit, but
rather can act subtly and indirectly, it would be extremely difficult to bring action against the govemment or its
officials.ABivens action against this kind of subtle request toathird party ^367 provider would be all but impossible,1FN2^3^ particularly given the attitude that the right wing of the Court exhibits toward the continued
existence ofaprivate right of action against federal officials for civil rights violations.lFN2^4^Moreover,the
few cases that havelooked at ^^regulation by raised eyebrow^^or^jawboning^^suggest that the barrier for courts
treating informal government pressure on private actors as state action sufficient to trigger First Amendment re
view, even where it is intended to achieve results that could not be achieved directly by the regulator, is far from
trivial.1FN2^^^ Amore likely,but still difficult,avenue might be suit for tortious interference with contractual
relations against the participating government officials themselves, in this case, perhaps against Senator Lieber-

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man.lFN2^6^Here,aplaintiff must show that^l)the defendant knew of the contractual relationship, ^2) intentionally and ^3)improperly interfered withthe relationship,^4)thatinterventioncausedthepartycontracting
with the plaintiff to terminate or impair the contractual relations, and^^) the plaintiff suffered damage.1^FN2^7^
It would be trivial to establish elements one, two, and five. Determining whether scolding companies about their
patriotic duty would be ^^improper,^^ and whether indeed it was the intervention that ^^caused^^ EveryDNS,
Amazon, MasterCard,Visa, or PayPal to terminate their contracts withWikileaks or Assange,would be the difficult part. However, action along these lines, however tentative, appears to be the primary legal avenue available to disrupt the extralegal avenues of enforcement that we observe in theWikileaks event and others like it.
Moreover,aslongasthe actioncansurviveamotionto dismiss,sothat the parties canreachdiscovery, the
threat of public disclosure of govemment pressure on companies to deny service to members of the networked
fourth estate could provide a measure of deterrence to improper extralegal efforts to circumvent the First
Amendment requirements for obtaining an injunction by hamessing private companies to shut down the undesirable speakers.Nonetheless, it seems that legal avenues against the govemment itself, barringadirect^^smoking
gun^^ type communication from the Executive to the private actors, would be diflrcult to sustain.
ii. Suits Against the Private Partners
One potential path to temper the threat of extralegal action from service providers of critical platform services—like DNS service, datahosting,orpayment systems—is tobringsuit against thecommercial firms for
wrongful denial of service.Clarifying the existence ofalegal duty to customers to ^36^ continue service absent
aclearcontractualviolation on the part of the customer orasignificantnecessityonthe part of the provider
would give service providers the cover they need to resist government requests for aid in extralegal suppression
of inconvenient publications, and provide an adequate public explanation for continued service to an unpopular
customer that would avert the market pressure to comply.Afirm asked to stop pointing its DNS server to the offending material or to remove it from its cloud hosting service can answer both the govemment official and the
complaining public: ^^Tmsorry;lhavealegal obligation to continue to provide this service unlesslgetacourt
order telling me to stop providing the service.That is an answer that is complete and adequate legally, politically,and culturally.Recognizingalegal duty would not mean that suits would be forthcoming left and right; recognizing the right would by itself, in large measure,prevent the harm to begin with.
The most direct path to suchacause of action would be to argue an implied contractual obligation not to unreasonably,or without good faith,withhold service.The services we are speaking of are all in consumer markets, subject to standard contracts. Amazon's hosting service contract, for example, includes termination provisions, both for cause and at wilL Most pertinent here would be provisions for termination for cause, that give the
company the right to terminate service effective immediately if ^^(vii) we receive notice or we otherwise determine,in our sole discretion,that you may be usingAWS Services for any illegal purpose or inaway that violates
thelawor violates,infringes,or misappropriates the rights of any third party;^viii) we determine,incur sole
discretion,that our provision of anyof the Services to you is prohibited by applicable law, or has become impracticalor unfeasiblefor any legalor regulatory reason.^^1^FN2^^^ The termswere changed on December 6,
2010, the week following termination ofWikileaks's services; copies of earlier versions in thelntemet Archive
areunreachable. lFN2^^^Thevagueness of the combination of ^^inour sole discretion^^and ^^impracticable or
unfeasibleforany legalor regulatory reason^^essentially invite thekindofgovemment pressure that Senator
Lieberman apparently applied to Amazon. This is precisely the kind of contract of adhesion that provides room
foracourt to exercise its judgment as to whether the term should be applied.At least where the Restatement is
concerned, these terms should be construed against the drafting party,1FN2^0^ and are subject to an obligation
of good faith.lFN2^1JIt is hard to imagineacourt striking this kind of provision down as,in general,uncon-

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scionable,lFN2^2^ but the obligation^36^ of good faith may provide sufficient basis foracourt to review and
constrainaservice provider from cutting off critical services toaclient,when it is done to suppress their speech
rather than because there is genuine illegal behavior. Asamatter of public policy,it is conceivable that sucha
right would be tailored to denial of service that undermines the facilities of the press, although one suspects that
such special treatment of the press under generally applicable law,like contract law,would not beaparticularly
attractive path. 1FN2^3^
An alternative approach may be to developatort claim modeled ontortious interference with prospective
economic advantage.1FN2^4^ In the case of volunteer organizations likeWikileaks,the economic advantage or
contractualrelation aspect maybe somethingofastretchinasuit against the provider, as opposedtoasuit
against the government official.1F^2^^^ The other elements ofthe tort can, under the right facts, be present: intent to bring about an interference,arelationship ^between the networked journalists and their readers) that the
providerseekstointerferewith—indeed sever and which is advantageous to the journalist. For members of the
networked press who are of the small commercial type,there is no difficulty in establishing this.It might bea
mild stretch to argue thatadonation-dependent organization like Wikileaks,which depends on reaching its audience,hasapecuniary interest in continued access to its materials and website.Intentional efforts to prevent that
communication, and thus to harm the network journalists'pecuniary advantage, are sufficient. No actual malice,
in the sense of ill will toward the party interfered with, is required. 1FN2^6^ Certainly such an effect would be
trivial to establish in the case ofMasterCard,Visa,and PayPal,whose denial ofservice was clearly intended to
prevent Wikileaks from using their payment services to receive donations that sustain the organization. The hard
part here would be to establish the intent requirement, and that the claims of violation of terms of service were
pretextual.Despite the difficulty, this kind of factual dispute would make discovery necessary and,with it, the
salutary effects of shining a light on back channel communications between government and private actors
aimed to ^^disrupt and degrade^^ the operations ofmembers ofthe networked fourth estate.1FN2^7^
The private law solutionsloffer here are small steps in the direction of solvingabasic problem: core facilities and infrastructure necessary to communicate^37^ effectively in the networked environment can be arbitrarily
denied by their private owners.By looking at currently available means in tort and contract lawlaim to underscore the necessity of achievingabasic outcome—the introduction ofaright to communicate and not tobe un
reasonably excluded from services critical to achieving that end. In the early republic and since, basic mailing
privileges overacommon carrier mail system playedafoundational role in the development of the fourth estate
in the United States. 1F^2^^^ As capitalcosts of production rose, carriage was transposed into public interest
obligations for radio and television. But when privately deployed cable and satellite met the neoliberal revival of
the Reagan era, the concept ofcommon carriage began to fall out offavor, and ^^the public interest^^ found itself
on the defensive. Most recently, even where the case for common carriage of Internet service was most clearly
indicated legally and economically,in the last mile to the home, the FCC shied away from treating broadband
carriage to the home as common carrier service. 1FN2^^^ The basic problem presented by the denial-of-service
attacks onWikileaks is that some of the core facilities necessary to enable precisely those actors who make the
networked environment open, participatory,and available for critical insight are susceptible to arbitrarydenial
of service by private providers.This power that private actors have, given these actors'incentives to avoid offending thepublicat large,createsanewversionofthemucholder vulnerability of speechto ostracism and
boycott, one that is particularly effective against the new players that depend on these critical infrastructures. To
counterthis vulnerability, weneedamenuoflegalconstraintsthatwillpreserve the ability to communicate
against unreasonabledenials of service. Inan environment where light-weight, lowcost, lowretummodels,
both commercial and nonprofit, play an important role, we leam from this case that private payment systems are

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alsoacorecomponentofthenew infrastructure, alongsidehosting services, logicaladdressing,andcarriage.
Given the range and diversity ofessential facilities, it is possible that these very humble foundations in contracts
and tort law willofferamore general basis for developingasystem of legalconstraints that will be robust to
manipulation and control by govemment actors in particular, and less susceptible to shut down by skittish
private actors more generally.
Part IV. From Mass-Mediated to Networked Fourth Estate
The constitutional analysis of theWikileaks case must be informed by an understanding of the emerging
shape of the networked fourth estate.The attack onWikileaks,in particular the apparent fear of decentralization
that it represents, requires us to understand the current decline ofthe traditional ^371 model ofthe press and the
emergence of itsnew,networkedform. At core,themulti-system attackon Wikileaks,including massmedia
coverage and framing, is an expression of anxiety about the changes that the fourth estate is undergoing. This
anxiety needs to be resisted, rather than acted upon, i f we are to preserve the robust, open model of news production critical to democracy in the face of economic and technological change.

A.The Crisis ofthe Mass-Mediated Fourth Estate
The American fourth estate is in the midst ofaprofound transformation,whose roots are in the mid-l^^Os,
but whose rate, intensity,and direction have changed in the past decade.1FN300^ The first element of this trans
formation includes changes intemal to the mass media increasing competition for both newspapers and television channels,and the resulting lower rents to spend on newsrooms,and the fragmented markets that drove new
strategies for differentiation.Many of the problems laid at the feet of the Intemet-fragmentation of the audience and polarizationof viewpoints,in particular—have their rootsinthis element of the change.The second
element oftransformation was the adoption ofthe Intemet since the mid-l^^Os.The critical change introduced
by the network was decentralized information production, including news and opinion, and the new opportunities for models based on neither markets nor the state for financing to playanew and significant role in the production ofthe public sphere.1FN301^
As Paul Starr showed inThe Creation of the Media, the middle of the nineteenth century sawafundamental
shift inthe cost structureof journalism. 1FN302^ Starrhademphasizedtherise of thelarge,professionalized
newsroom.1FN303^ lames Beniger, identifying the same trend, emphasized the high capital costs ofthe electric
press,automated setting, and paper folding machines.1FN304^ Regardless ofthe relative importance and causal
relations between organizational and technical innovations,it is quite clear thatacomhination of technological
andorganizationalchangesbeganadynamicthat, withinafewdecades,cametoreplacetheparty pressand
postal service patronage systems that preceded it.The modelof high physicalcapital and high fixed-cost labor
investments created the basis for the rise of major advertising-supported dailies that typified the first half of the
twentieth century.These high costs, coupled with the relatively high proportion of the cost related to physical
distribution,created significant barriers to entry in local news markets.Over the course ofthe twentieth century,
local newspapers had become local monopoly businesses.1FN30^^ By 1^^4,the average market share ofthe top
and in medium-sized cities just over ^3^. By 2006, the mar^372 newspaper in small towns was close to
ket share of thelargest newspapers insuchtowns wasover^7^. Inlargecities, that share was around60^
throughout this period.lFN306JThe absence of competition, in turn, sustained unusually high rents. 1FN307^
This ability to extract rents and use them to subsidize newsrooms had begun to change just before the emer-

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gence of the Internet into widespread use.As early asl^^O,Warren Buffet's annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway
shareholdersstated withregard tohismediaholdings: ^^Whilemany mediabusinesses willremaineconomic
marvels in comparison with American industry generally,they will prove considerably less marvelous than I , the
industry,or lenders thought would be the case onlyafew years ago.^^1FN30^^ The main cause of this change,
which he saw as part ofalongterm secular trend rather thanaeyclical downturn,was that ^^the number ofboth
print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. Asaconsequence,advertising dollars are
more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of our major media investments....^^lFN30^^Ayear later he explained further: ^^The
fact is that newspaper,television, and magazine properties have begunto resemble businesses more than franchises in their ^373 economic behavior.^^lFN310^ What he called an^^economicfranchise^^is what we would
sometimes callpossessing market power:being able to demand and obtain high prices for its product, getting
high rents, and being relatively free of competitive pressures on the quality of the product or the management.
lFN311^He concluded:
Until recently,media properties possessed the three characteristics ofafranchise and consequently
could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information
and entertainment ^their primary interest being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to
find them....The result is that competition has intensified,markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some—though far from all of its franchise strength.1FN312^
His conclusion foreshadows the media industry woes in the years that followed them:cost cutting,often at
the expense of newsrooms, and failures of management and financing deals, like those of theTribune company.
^^In contrast,^^continues Buffet,
^^abusiness^^eams exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or
serviceistight.Tightnessinsupply usuallydoes not last long. With superior management,acompany
may maintain its status asalowcost operator foramuch longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the
possibilityofcompetitive attack. Andabusiness,unlikeafranchise,canbe killed by poor management.
1FN313^
The dispersionof attention and increasingcompetitionthat Buffet observed before thelnternet age meant
that there weremore outlets that consumers couldgotothatsimplydid not provide news.Thetelevision six
o'clock news was no longerafixture; nor was the front page of the local paper.The ease with which Americans
need not confront news at all,together withthe incentives to provide news that would attractalessinformed
^374 and politically engaged audience, likely contributed to the observed decline in the level ofknowledge of
Americans exposed primarily to, say, moming broadcast news shows or local television news about public af
fairs. 1FN314^ Audience dispersion alsomeant that there was an opportunity to capture narrower market segments than were most profitable during the more concentrated period.Where there is only one outlet, providing
content that is highly mobilizing t o 3 0 ^ of the audience but alienates70^isabad strategy. You gain strong
commitment to 30^,but i f you arealocal monopoly,those 30^ have no realoptions and would have bought
your product anyway,while the70^who might have boughtabland informative media product will be tumed
offby,say,ahighly partisan screed. lFN31^^Thesameisnot true whenoneisfacedwithafieldof.for example,seven media outlets of roughly similar coverage.Now,if one outlet is able to mark itself as uniquely rep
resentative of asignificant minority of the population, it can generate for itself anaudience segment within
which itcan enjoy thekindsoffranchiseeconomicsBuffethaddescribedthemediaindustry as losing. This
^together with the contemporaneous elimination of the faimess doctrine) 1FN3161 is why Rush Limbaugh's
show,launched in 1^^^,became not onlyeconomically viable,but economically advantageous,astrategy fol-

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lowed with enormous success by Fox News eight years later.
In combination,these changes within the industrial organization of American mass media were leading to
disinvestment in newsrooms, audience fragmentation, and the emergence of right-wing media that used polarization asadifferentiation strategy.The two major criticisms of the networked public sphere fragmentation and
polarization—are at least as muchtheproductof industrial structure changesinternaltothe commercial mass
media as they are the product of an asserted ^^DailyMe^^ Internet culture, lFN317^the extent of whose actual
empirical existence continues tobe amatter for investigation, not assertion. Boththe disinvestment and the
niche targeting placed significant pressure on the will and ability of many outlets to commit to and pursue serious journalism consistent with professional norms.
At the same time, the Internet rapidly shifted from being primarilyaresearch and education platform toa
core element of our communications and information environment.The defining characteristic of thcNet was
the ^37^ decentralization of physical and human capital that it enabled. 1FN31^^ In l^^^,acute observers of the
digital economy saw Encarta as the primary threat to Britannica in the encyclopedia market, and the epitome of
what the new rulesfor the digitaleconomy required. lFN31^^Thataradicallydecentralized, non-proprietary
project, in which no one was paid to write or edit and that in principle anyone could edit,would compete with
the major encyclopedias was simply an impossibility. And yet, ten years later,Wikipedia was one of the top six
orsevensiteson thenet, whileEncartahadclosed itsdoors. Peerproductionandotherformsofcommonsbased,non-market production becameastable and important component of the information production system,
1FN320^ an observation not lost on business writers, lFN321Jand,increasingly,govemments.lFN322^ lust as
free and open source software became an important complement to and substitute for some proprietary software
models; just as photography,lFN323^cookbooks,lFN324^ travel guides,lFN32^^restaurant and consumer reviews, 1^FN326^ and video 1FN327^ came to develop important components of their industrial organization that
were based on peer production and social production more generally, so too has been the case with news reporting and opinion.Ifthe first GulfWar was the moment ofthe twenty-four-hour news channel and CNN,then the
IranianReformmovementof200^ was the moment of amateur videoreportage,as videostakenby amateurs
were uploaded toYouTube, and from there became the only significant source of video footage of the demon
strations available to the major intemational news outlets.Most recently,theTunisian revolt was in part aided
by amateur videos of demonstrations,^376 uploaded toaFacebook page of an activist, LotfiHajji,and then re
transmitted around the Arab world byAlIazeera;lFN32^^ and video taken by protesters was mixed with that
taken by professional joumalists to depict the revolt in Egypt. But the networked public sphere is constructed of
much more, and more diverse, organizational forms than ad hoc bursts of fully decentralized activity.
B. The Emerging Networked Fourth Estate
As of the end of the first decade of the twenty-first eentury,it seems that the networked public sphere is constructed of several intersecting models of production whose operation to some extent competes with and to some
extent complements each other.One central component of the new environment is comprised of core players in
the mass media environment. However, these now haveaglobal reach and have begun to incorporate decentral
ized elements within their own model.It is perhaps not surprising that CNN,the NewYorkTimes,NBC News
andMSNBCNews,the WallStreet lournal,Fox News,the Washington Post, and theLos AngelesTimes are
among the top-ranked news sites on the Internet. 1^F^32^^ But alongside these are major international sites. The
publicly-funded BBC and theU.K.nonprofit the Guardian playalarge role alongsideU.S.commercial media.
The Guardian's editor-in-chiefclaimed to have 36 or 37 million readers per month, in comparison to the paper's

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daily circulation of about 2^3,000.l^FN330^These major players are,in tum, complemented by the online presence of smaller traditional media platforms and sources from other countries,accessed by U.S.readers through
Yahool and Google News, both among the top news sites in the world.TheWikileaks case presents quite well
how central these large, global online news organizational players are, but it also shows how, because they are
all in the same attention market, it is harder for any one of them to control access to the news. One of the stra
tegically significant moves that Assange made was precisely to harness these global mass media to his cause by
providing them with enough exclusivity in their respective national markets to provide them with economic benefits from publishing the materials, and enough competition in the global network to make sure that none of
them could,if they so chose,bury the story.The^377 global nature of the platform and the market made this
strategy-byasmall player withasignificant scoop both powerful and hard to suppress.
Alongside the broader reach of these traditionaloutletsinanew medium,we are seeing the emergence of
other models of organization,which were either absent or weaker in the mass media environment. Remaining,
foramoment,within the sites visible enough to make major Internet rankings lists, the Huffington Post,acommercial online collaborative blog, is more visible in the United States than any other news outlet except for the
BBC,CNN,and the NewYorkTimes.l^FN331^There are, of course, other smaller scale commercial sites that
operate on advertising, like the Drudge Report,Pajamas Media, orTalking Points Memo.These formasecond
element in the networked public sphere. Talking Points Memo, for example, has an Alexa reach and rank somewhere between the Baltimore Sun and the Atlanta loumal Constitution, 1FN332^ although it hadastaff of only
eleven people as of mid-200^.1^FN333^
Athird model that is emerging to take advantage of the relatively low cost of distribution, and the relatively
low capital cost of production,of news is the nonprofit sector.Here,Ido not mean the volunteer, radically decentralized peer-production modek but rather the ability of more traditionally organized nonprofits to leverage
their capabilities in an environment where the costs ofdoing business are sufficientlylower than they were in
the print and televisionerathat they cansustaineffective newsrooms staffedwithpeoplewho,like academic
faculties,are willing to sacrifice some ofthe bottom line in exchange for the freedom to pursue their professionalvalues.One example is ProPublica,afoundation-supported model for an otherwise classic-style professional
newsroom. lFN334j Asimilarapproachunderlies thejournalistie awardwinninglocal reporting workof the
Center for Independent Media, founded in 2006 and renamed in 2010the American Independent News Network.
This organization,as of this writing, fundsanetwork of localindependent nonprofit media in Colorado,Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, and New Mexico.lFN33^^Arelated model is the construction of university-based centers
thatcanspecializein traditional media roles. Aperfect example^37^ofthis isFactCheck.org,basedin the
Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, which plays a crucial watchdog role in
checking the veracity ofclaims made by political figures and organizations.1FN336^
Alongside these professional-journalism-focused nonprofits,we are seeing other organizations usingacombinationof standard nonprofit organization with peer production to achieve significant results in the public
sphere.An excellent example of this model is offered by the Sunlight Foundation,which supports both new laws
that require government data to be put online, and the development ofweb-based platforms that allow people to
look at these data and explore government actions that are relevant to them.l^FN337^LikeWikileaks did before
the most recent events. Sunlight Foundation focuses on making the raw data available for the many networked
eyes to read.UnlikeWikileaks,its emphasis is on the legal and formal release of government data and the construction of technical platforms to lower the cost of analysis and construct collaborative practices,so as to make
it feasible for distributed social practices and people with diverse motivational profiles, embedded in diverse organizational models, to analyze the data.

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In addition to the professionals based in large-scale global media, small-scale commercial media, high-end
national andlocal nonprofit media outlets,and other nonmedia nonprofits,we also see emerginganew party
press culture.OverlO,000 Daily Kos contributors have strong political beliefs,and they are looking to express
them and to search for information that will help their cause.1FN33^^ So do the contributors toTownhall.com
on the right, although the left-wing of the blogosphere uses large collaborative sites at this point in history more
than the right.lFN33^^For digging up the dirt onyour opponent's corruption,political ambition and contestation isapowerful motivator, and the platforms are available to allow thousands of volunteers to work together,
with the leadership and support ofatiny paid staff^paid, again,through advertising to this engaged community,
or through mobilized donations, or both).
Finally,although less discretely prominent than the large collaboration platforms like Daily Kos or Newsv
ine,^FN340^ and much more decentralized than any ofthe other models,individuals play an absolutely critical
role in this new information ecosystem. First, there is the sheer presence of millions of individuals with the ability to witness and communicate what they witnessed over systems that are woven into the normal fabric of networked life. This is the story of the Iranian reform videos, and it is of course the story of much more mundane
political reporting,from lohn McCain singing ^^Bomblran^^ ^37^ tothe tune ofaBeach Boys song to George
Allen's Macaca. Second, there is the distributed force of observation and critical commentary,as we saw in the
exposure of the error inthe CBS^Dan Rather expose.Third,there are the experts.For instance,academic eco
nomists like Brad DeLong, on the left, andTylerCowen, on the right, playedamuch greater role in debates over
the stimulus and bailout^which can be observed by looking at traffic pattems to their individual blogs during the
debates over thebailout)thanthey could haveamere decade ago. Collaborative websitesbyacademics, like
BalkinizationlFN341^or Crooked Timber, 1^FN342^ provide academics with much larger distribution platforms
to communicate, expanding the scope and depth ofanalysis available to policy and opinion makers.
The Wikileaks events need to be understood in the context of these broad trendsin the construction of the
networked fourth estate. Like the Sunlight Foundation and similar transparency focused organizations,
Wikileal^s isanonprofit focused on bringing tolight direct,documentary evidence about govemment behavior
so that many others, professional and otherwise, can analyze the evidence and search for instances that justify
publiccriticism. Liketheemerging party presses, it actsout ofpoliticalconvietion. Andlikesomany other
projects on the Net,it usesacombination of volunteerism,global presence,and decentralized action to achieve
its results.As such,Wikileaks presents an integral part ofthe networked fourth estate—no less than the protesters
who shoot videos on the streets ofTehran,Tunis, or Cairo and upload them to theWeb,or the bloggers who ex
posed the Rather^CBS story. Whatever one thinks about the particular actions ofWikileaks in the particular in
stance of the release of the embassy cables,the organization and effort put forth byWikileaks to bring to light
actual internal govemmentdocumentsbearingonquestionsofgreat public import isessentiallyanetworked
versionof thePentagonPapers and Roosevelt'sManwiththeMuck Rake. 1FN343^ Anattackon Wikileaks
-legalor extralegal,technicalor commercial—needs to be assessed from that perspective,and allows us to explore the limitations and strengths of the emerging networked fourth estate.
C. Mass Media Anxiety over the New Neighbors in the Networked Environment
ln 200^-2010,thestateofmassmedianewsreporting—newspapers in particular—and the financial future of
these organizations became a matterof substantial public debate. The Senate held hearings onthe future of
journalism,lFN344^andtheFederalTrade Commission launchedaseries of public^3^0 workshops under the
title How Will lournalism Survive thelnternet Age7 1F^34^^Arange of publications tried to understand what

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was happening to journalism, and what its future would look like. The New Republic, for example, ran a
thoughtful cover on the end ofthe age ofnewspapers,lFN346^NPR's On the Media carefully explored the sense
ofcrisis,lFN347^ and academics weighed in as welLlFN34^J
Many treatments,like those cited, were careful and thoughtfuLMuch of the debate, however,involved
name-calling ofthe ^^guy in his pajamas,^^ ^^echo-chamber ofthe blogosphere^^ variety.The core ofthe critique of
the networked forms ofthe press has been the same since Klein's memorable quote: the concem that the Intemet
and the blogosphere provide misinformation, while the traditional media are necessary to provide reliable invest
igative reporting. An event study that does not involveWikileaksoffersabaselineportrayalof what is,in fact,
the much more complex interaction between the traditional and networked components of the fourth estate, and
the distributionof responsible and irresponsiblejournalismonboth sides of that divide. It turns out that being
part of the mass media is no guarantee ofhigh quality and effective journalism; nor is being onlineaguarantee
of falsehood andecho-chamber effects.Thenewsystemwillhavehigh quality,effective participants ofeach
type,and low quality rumormongers on either side ofthe traditional^networked media divide.Understanding this
fact, as well as the dynamic that seems to lead serious writers on the traditional side to discount it, provides im
portant insight into the ways in which theWikileaks case,in tum,has been perceived.
On Novemberl7,2010the NewYorkTimes published an oped byThomasFriedman,Too Good to Check,
whose opening beautifully explains the whole:
On Nov.4,Anderson Cooper did the countryafavor. He expertly deconstructed on his CNNshow
the bogus rumor that President Obama's trip to Asia would cost ^200 millionaday.This was an important
^story.^It underscored just how far ahead ofhis time MarkTwain was when he saidacentury before the
Internet, ^Aliecantravel halfway aroundthe world while the truth isputtingon its shoes.^ But it also
showed that there is an antidote to malicious joumalism—and that's good joumalism.
^3^1 In case you missed it,astory circulated around theWeb on the eve of President Obama's trip that it
wouldcostU.S.taxpayers^200millionaday....lFN34^^
The quote tells the whole of the story. The villain is ^^thelnternet,^^ which enables the lie traveling halfway
aroundtheworld—in this case,from India to the U.S.public sphere—where it circulates around ^^theWeb.^^ The
hero is the expert journalist in an established news outlet who exposes the lie,airs his expose onamass media
outlet, and thereby administers the antidote.
There is only one problem with this story: it wasn't quite so. The initial source of the 200 million dollar per
day story was an established media outlet, the PressTrust of India; it was primarily followed by the right-wing
mass media in theUnited States,with one bloggerplayingakey importation role.^^Thelnternet,^^on the other
hand, was actually the first place where investigative joumalism occurred to debunk the falsehood.
A t l l : 2 ^ am ESTon November 2,2010, New DelhiTelevisionlFN3^01postedastory with the byline of the
PressTrust of India, India's equivalent of the AP and Reuters,entitled US to spend ^200 mnaday on Obama's
Mumbai visit. 1FN3^1^ This story was linked to within the next twohoursby the Drudge Report, 1FN3^2^
MichelleMalkin'ssiteat 1:^3 pm, 1F^3^3^ as wellas three otherlower-visibility,right-wingblogs. 1FN3^4^
The afternoon and evening belonged to the mass media. That aftemoon. Rush Limbaugh repeated it on his radio
show.lFN3^^^ The story was repeated in the British Daily Mail 1FN3^6^ at about ^:00 ^3^2 pmEST,and that
evening, Mike Huckabee repeated the story on Fox News election coverage.1^FN3:^7^
By the end ofNovember 2nd,astory had been created by some oflndia's most respected news outlets, im-

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ported to the United States by two highly visible right-wing blogs, and then repeated and amplified by two major
right-wing mass media outlets—Fox News and Rush Limbaugh. Limbaugh's story actually revived and combined
the new 200 milliondollars meme with an earlier one: claiming that thepresident was taking40 airplanes.
1^FN3^^^ This story was picked up two days later by the same Doug Powers who later posted Michelle Malkin's
200-million-dollars-a-day story on his own blog.1FN3^^^ His post was picked up in an opinion column for the
WashingtonTimes on October 2^th,lFN360jbut this part of the story did not take off until combined with the
200 million dollars claim made by Limbaugh.
On November 3rd, the right-wing mass media propagation continued. Fox News'program Follow the Money
createdawhole segment, by Eric Boiling, repeating the claim with vivid images and the tag ^^TheObamas:The
NewAmerican Royalty7^^1FN361^That same evening, Sean Hannity's program repeated the claim and conductedapaneldiscussion around its inappropriateness given the election results and the financial condition of the
country.lFN362j Afew hours later. Representative Michele Bachmann repeated the accusation in an interview
on Anderson Cooper 360; the interview that ultimately led Cooper to investigate and refute the claim, on CNN
twenty-four hours later, on his November 4th show.1FN363^ But that refutation, the one to which Friedman paid
such high respects,was by no means the first.The initial refutation, on November3rd,was not in mainstream
mediabuton theNet. FactCheck.orgprovidedaclearbreakdownofthe sourceandflowof ^3^3 thestory.
1FN364^ Media Matters for America postedalong story in the afternoon ofNovember3rd,providingasimilar
flow and debunking of the story.lFN36^^Snopes.com also provided enough debunking either on November 3rd
or early November4th 1FN366^ tobelinkedtoby aNovember4th, 3:16pm Wall Street lournalblogpost.
1FN367^ By the end ofNovember 3rd, only Internet-based reporting was doing the ^^goodjournalism^^ work; the
only established media working thestorywereeither purposefully repeating themisstatement—inthecase of
Fox News—or being used by right-wingpoliticians to propagate the slander, as in Bachmann's interview on
Cooper's show.
ByNovember4th,the tide of the story was turning.Glenn Beck started the day by repeating the slander.
1FN36^^ But an increasing number of blogs and mainstream outlets were picking up the White House and
Pentagon denials.Over the course ofthat day,the Media Cloud database identified thirteen blogposts within the
politicalblogosphere that continued to support and propagate the story,and fourteenblogposts that pointed to
the critique and refutations of the story. 1FN36^^ Interestingly,severalof theblogpostsunderscoring anddisseminating the debunking reports were right-wing blogs: HotAir,lFN370^InstapunditlFN371^^although these
sites framed the debunking with: it's not our fault we believed this bunk given Obama's reputation for extravag
ance), and Outside the Beltway.1FN372^
In the mainstream,USAToday,theWashington Post, theWall Street loumal, and the Kansas City Star all
had various versions ofthe refutation ^3^4 in their web-based versions. At 10:00pm that night, Anderson
Cooper airedalong segment that specifically emphasized the vacuity of the sources,and the central role that the
right-wingconservatives Limbaugh, Beck, Don Imus, and Michael Savage—played in repeating and amplifying
thelie. 1^FN373^ Itwas indeedagood pieceof joumalism. Its story capturedtheright tone of how thestory
emerged,why it was unreliable,and who repeated thelie.Cooper then went to his ^^databoard^^and explained
how the 200-million-dollar claim could not possibly be true, given what we know from public sources about the
daily cost ofthe war in Afghanistan and what we know based on an old GAO report about the costs ofBill Clinton's Africa trip in 1^^^. All of these pieces of evidence, down to the comparison to the
1^0-million-dollar-a-day cost of the Afghan war and the GAOreport on Clinton's trip,had already been reported
over twenty-four hours earlier by FactCheck.org. Cooper played an enormously important role in giving voice to
and amplifying the excellent research that was done by FactCheck.Given the continued importance of mass me-

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diaoutlets in reaching very large audiences,that isindeed an important rolefor someone withamassmedia
voice to play.It is certainlyanecessary counterweight to the kind of propagandist reportage that Fox News and
talkradioemploytosolidify their brand and retaintheir franchise,as well as perhapsto support the owner's
politics. But the story is emphatically not one where ^^thelntemet^^ spreads lies and professional joumalism combats them.
The story of these three days in November 2010offers some insight into the emerging stmcture of the global,networked fourth estate.It identifiesamore complex relationship than simply either ^^good professionals vs.
bad amateurs^^or ^^pure-hearted, net-basedjournalists vs.acorrupt mainstream media.^^Itrevealsanetworked
alternative to the more traditional model of media checks and balances. Here,publication by an Indian outlet
wasglobally visible; ^^thelnternet,^^orratheroneentrepreneurialright-wingblogger,movedthat information
quickly, and the network and its relationship to mass media created and elevated the memes. But the networked
environment also included nonprofit academic and professional groups ^FactCheck.org; Media Matters), as well
asasmall commercial professional publisher ^Snopes),all of whom were able to check the reporting and criticize it. And theNet included over two dozen sites that sifted through the original and the refutation.The mass
media, in tum, took both the false and the correct story lines, and in each case amplified them to their respective
audiences.
^3^^D. MassMedia Anxiety Playedout inthe WikileaksCaseEndangerstheNetworked Fourth Estate visavis the State,and Makes CooperativeVentures Across the Divide Challenging
The concern that the incumbent news industry has exhibited in the past two years over the emerging compel
itors in the networked information environment, played out in the way Friedman ascribed blame for the
200 milliondollaraday story,was also on display in the way that American newspapers dealt withWikileaks
after the release of the embassy cables.This anxiety has two practical consequences.The first is that the kind of
cooperative venture that Wikileaks entered into with the major newspapers was clearly difficult to manage. The
cultural divide between established media players and the scrappy networked organizations that make up important parts of the networked fourth estate makes working together difficult, as the published reports from the media partners in this enterprise clearly reveak
The second practical consequence is that, in seeking to preserve their uniqueness and identity,the traditional
media are painting their networked counterparts intoacorner that exposes them to greater risk of legal and ex
tralegal attack.As we saw in the analysis of the legal framework, fromaconstitutional law perspective,the way
inwhichthetraditional media respondto,andframe, Wikileaks or other actorsinthe networked fourthestate
does not matteragreat deal.But from the practical perspective of what is politically and socially feasible fora
government to do, given the constraints ofpublic opinion and the internalized norms ofwell-socialized elites in
democratic countries,the more that newspapermen,in their effort to preserve their own identity,vilify and se
gregatetheindividuals and nontraditionalcomponents of the networked fourth estate,the more they put those
elements at risk ofsuppression and attack through both legal and extralegal systems.
i.ADiffieult Relationship
Two major pieces in the NewYorkTimes exemplify the effort to assert the identity of the traditional media
as highly professional,well organized, and responsible by denigrating the networked alternative.The first wasa
Tom Friedman op-ed piece published on Decemberl4,2010.In it, Friedman wrote:

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The world system is currently being challenged by two new forces:arising superpower, called China,
andarising collection of superempowered individuals, as represented by theWikiLeakers, among others.
What globalization, technological integration and the general flattening of the world have done is to su
perempower ^3^^ individuals to such adegree thatthey canactually challenge any hierarchy—froma
global bank toanation state—as individuals.1FN374^
He explains:
Asfor the superempoweredindividualssomeare constructive,some are destructive. Ireadmany
WikiLeaks and learned some useful things. But their release also raises some troubling questions.Idon't
want to live inacountry where they throw whistle-blowers in jaiLThat's China.Butlalso don't want to
live inacountry where any individual feels entitled to just dump out all the internal communications ofa
government orabank inaway that undermines the ability to have private,confidential communications
that are vital to the functioning of any society.That's anarchy.1FN37^^
Asafactual matter,^^acountry where they throw whistleblowersinjail^^ is, infact, the United States.
l^FN376^^^They,^^read^^we Americans,^^ have been keeping BradleyManning,the only whistleblower involved
in this case,in solitary confinement for months. lFN377^But the important insight from this op-ed is the expressed fear of anarchy and the fear that the decentralized network,with its capacity to empower individuals to
challenge their govemments or global banks, is not democracy, but anarchy. The fact that the individual in question did not in fact ^^dumpoutall the internal communications ofagovemment,^^butratherpartneredwithmajor
traditional news outlets,including theTimes,to do so,is eliminated from the oped.By mischaracterizing what
Wikileaks in fact did and labeling those imagined actions ^^anarchy,^^ Friedman is able to paint it as the danger
OUS ^^other^^;just like China,adecentralized, open network isadangerous threat to what he concludes is the only
thing standing between us and either anarchy or authoritarianism: ^^a strong America.^^lFN37^^
More revealing yet is an ^,000-word essay by NewYorkTimes executive editor Bill Keller inaNewYork
Times Magazine cover storyonlanuary 26, 2011. lFN37^^Parts of the essay, particularly around its middle,
seem intended to emphasize and legitimate the fourth estate function of theTimes itself against critics who argue that theTimes should not have published the materials.Keller writes,for example:
Afree press inademocracy can be messy.But the altemative is to give the governmentaveto over
what its citizens are allowed to ^3^7 know. Anyone who has worked in countries where the news diet is
controlled by the government can sympathize withThomasIefferson's oft-quoted remark that he would
rather have newspapers without govemment than govemment without newspapers.1FN3^0^
But any close reading ofthe essay makes crystal clearthat acentral purpose it serves is to separate
WikileaksfromtheTimes,andtoemphasize the Times'professionalism, care, andorganizational rationality
while denigrating the contribution and reliability ofWikileaks.Immediately in the first paragraph,Keller refers
to^^an organization called WikiLeaks,asecretive cadre of antisecrecy vigilantes.^^l^FN3^1^Compare this to the
Times'own characterization ofWikileaksamere ten months earlier as ^^a tiny online source of information and
documents that governments and corporations around the world would prefer to keep secret,^^lFN3^2^ or to the
200^ Pentagon Report's detailed analysis of Wikileaks asawebsite dedicated to ^^exposl^ing^ unethical practices,
illegal behavior, and wrongdoing within corrupt corporations and oppressive regimes,^^or the Pentagon Report's
claim that ^^Wikileaks.org supports the US Supreme Court ruling regarding the unauthorized release of the
Pentagon Papersby Daniel Ellsberg,which stated that^onlyafree and unrestrained press caneffectivelyex
pose deception in government.^^^lFN3^3^Afew paragraphs later, Keller then emphasizesWikileaks'mistake in
releasing the editedversionof the Collateral Murder video,writing:^^ll^n its zealtomake the videoaworkof
antiwarpropaganda, WikiLeaks alsoreleasedaversionthatdidn'tcallattentiontoanlraqi who wastotinga

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rocket-propelled grenade and packaged the manipulated version under the tendentious rubric ^Collateral
Murder.^^^ ^FN3^4^ This sentence repeats the Fox News accusation against the edited version, ignoring the fact
that the opening slide of the edited footage states,^^Although some of the men appear to have been armed, the
behavior of nearly everyone was relaxedl,^^^lFN3^^^ and the interpretive disagreement at the time about whether what the pilots thought was an RPG was in fact so.1FN3^6^ Later, Keller writes: ^^TheTimes was never asked
to sign anything or to pay anything. For WikiLeaks, at least in this first big venture, exposure was its own re
wardl,^^^ implying that perhaps, in the long term,Wikileaks'intentions were to profit from its relationships with
the ^3^^ press.Atadifferent point, Keller implies,without pointing to any evidence, that Wikileaks volunteers
hacked into theTimes'computers duringarocky period of the relationship.1FN3^7^
Beyond Wikileaks as an organization, it is clear that Assange and theTimes hadavery bad relationship, and
Keller peppers the essay witharange of what reads more like gratuitous name-calling than substantive criticism.
Inthefirst paragraph, Keller introduces Assange as ^^aneccentricformer computer hacker of Australian birth
and no fixed residence.^^lFN3^^^ Keller then introduces and frames Assange by describing the impressions of
the first Times reporter who met him:
Assange slouched intoThe Guardian office,aday late....^^He was alert but disheveled, likeabag
lady walking in off the street,wearingadingy,light-colored sport coat and cargo pants, dirty white shirt,
beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed around his ankles.He smelled as ifhe hadn't bathed
indaysBlFN3^^1
Afew paragraphs later, Keller recounts:
Schmitt told me that for all Assange's bombast and dark conspiracy theories,he hadabitofPeter Pan
inhim. Onenight, whenthey wereallwalkingdownthestreetafterdinner,Assangesuddenly started
skipping ahead of the group. Schmitt and Goetz stared, speechless. Then, just as suddenly, Assange
stopped, got back in step with them and returned to the conversation he had interrupted.1FN3^0^
Bycomparison,theGuardian, which had as difficult and stormyarelationship with Assange as did the
Times, introduced Assange in its editor's equivalent ofKeller's overview essay very differently: ^^Unnoticed by
most of the world,lulian Assange was developing intoamost interesting and unusualpioneerinusing digital
technologies to challenge corrupt and authoritarian states.^^ lFN3^1j As Der Spiegel put it, inreporting on
Keller's essay: ^^For some time now,lulian Assange has been sparring with NewYorkTimes Executive Editor
Bill Keller.Assange claims the paper didn't publish the ^3^^ material in its entirety and made too many concessions to the White House before going to print. Now,Keller is fighting back.^^l^FN3^2^
These kinds of jabs make separating out the personal animosity from aspects of the essay that reflect structural,systemic concems difficult.Nonetheless,it is possible to observe in the pieceaclear core theme: asserting
acategorical distinction between the NewYorkTimes as an institution and organizational form and the decent
ralized, networked form represented by Wikileaks.Keller says,^^Weregarded Assange throughout asasource,
not asapartner or collaborator.^^ lFN3^3^He later concludes by repeating what appears to beacentral argument
of the essay: ^^Throughout this experience we have treated Assange asasource.Iwill not say ^asource, pure and
simple,^because as any reporter or editor can attest,sources are rarely pure or simple,and Assange was no ex
ception.^^ lFN3^4j Further, even when asserting that First Amendment values require that Wikileaks not be suppressed,Keller prefacesby restating: ^^Idonotregard Assange asapartner,andl would hesitateto describe
whatWikiLeaks does as joumalism.^^1FN3^^^ By contrast, the Guardian frames its own account of its relationship quite differently: ^^IT^he fruit ofDavies'eager pursuit of Assange would result in an extraordinary,if sometimes strained, partnership between a mainstream newspaper and WikiLeaks: a new model of co operation

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aimed at publishing the world's biggest leak.^^lFN3^6^It is certainly possible that the difference in framing reOectsjurisdictionalsusceptibility andthe advice ofcounsel;theTimes maybe trying to preempt possible CO
conspirator charges against it should the Department oflustice decide to proceed against Assange and Wikileaks
on suchatheory.lt seems more likely,however, that the difference reflects the Guardian's strategic embrace of
the networked models ofjournalism,on the one hand,and theTimes'continued rejection of the model.
The professional^reliable vs. unprofessional^unreliable dichotomy is repeated throughout Keller's essay in
more contextspecific instances. At one point he describesacertain problem theTimes reporters had with displaying the data: ^^Assange, slipping naturally into the role of office geek, explained ^3^0 that they had hit the
limits ofExcel.^^lFN3^7^ By contrast to Assange,who was merely like ^^the office geek,^^ Keller later describes
thechallengeof organizing thedataandexplainshow,^^lw^ithhelpfromtwo of TheTimes'sbest computer
mindsltheleadreporters^figured out how to assemble the material intoaconveniently searchable and secure
database.^^lFN3^^1When discussing the redaction efforts,Keller writes of theTimes'efforts:
Guided by reporters with extensive experience inthefield,we redacted the names of ordinary citizens,localofficials, activists,academics and others who had spoken to American soldiers or diplomats.
Weedited out any details that might reveal ongoing intelligence-gathering operations,military tactics or
locations ofmaterial that could be used to fashion terrorist weapons.1FN3^^^
KellerdoesrecognizeWikileaks'effortstoavoidharminginnocents,but thetoneis quite different. He
writes: ^^In the case of the Iraq war documents, WikiLeaks applied a kind of robo redaction software that
stripped away names(and rendered the documents almost illegible),^^and
there were instances in whichWikiLeaks volunteers suggested measures to enhance the protection of
innocents....WikiLeaks advised everyone to substituteadozen uppercase ^'s for each redacted passage,
no matter howlong or short.. ..WhetherWikiLeaks's^harm minimizations is adequate,and whether it
willcontinue, is beyond my power to predict or influence. WikiLeaks does not take guidance fromThe
NewYork Timesl^FN400^
When writing about responsible joumalism, Keller again focuses on differentiating between the traditional
media participants in the disclosure, and the networked elements, this time explicitly using Wikileaks as an an
chor for denigrating the networked fourth estate more generally:
IW^efelt anenormous moral and ethicalobligationto use the material responsibly. While we assumed we had little or no ability to influence what WikiLeaks did,let alone what would happen once this
material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogosphere, that did not free us from the need to exercise
care in our own joumalism.1^FN401^
The essay was written two months afterthe initial release. Keller, by this point, knew full well that
Wikileaks in fact did not release materials irresponsibly. Nor did anyone else in what he calls ^^the echo chamber
o f t h e ^ 3 ^ I blogosphere.^^ The assertionofdifference doesnot reflect an actualdifferencein kind relativeto
what was disclosed by one or another ofthe traditional media players.Instead,the aside largely seems to express
theTimes'own anxieties about Wikileaks and the more general genre that it represents for Keller.
This sense of self appears to have been complemented and reinforced by the Obama Administration. Comparing the Obama Administration'sresponse to Wikileaks tothat of theBush Administration's response to the
NSA eavesdropping story, Keller recounts:
l^T^he Obama administration's reaction was different. It was, for the most part, sober and professionaL

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TheObamaWhiteHouse, while stronglycondemningWikiLeaksfor making the documents public,did
not seek an injunction to halt publication.There was no OvalOffice lecture.On the contrary,in our dis
cussions before publication of our articles. White House officials, while challenging some of the conclu
sions we drew from the material, thanked us for handling the documents with care.1FN402^
This basic story line repeats itself in the Der Spiegel recounting. In describing their meetings with the Ad
ministration, Rosenbach and Stark state quite clearly: ^^The official fury ofthe us government was directed at
thepresumed source, BradleyManning, and, most of all, WikiLeaks. The govemment wasnot interested in
quarreling with the media organizations involved.^^l^FN403^1t appears as though the Administration either really
did not fear disclosure, as long as it was by organizations it felt were within its comfort zone, or it was using the
distinction and relative socialcultural weakness ofWikileaks to keep the established media players at the table
and, perhaps, more cooperative with the Administration's needs.
It is precisely in these descriptions of the relationship with the Administration, from both theTimes and Der
Spiegel, that we see the danger that mixing the press'own identity anxiety with reporting on the press presents
for the networked fourth estate.As one observes the multi-system nature of the attacks onWikileaks,as well as
its defenses, it becomes obvious that law is but one dimension in this multidimensional system of freedom and
constraint.As we saw in Part III,law,at least First Amendment law,is largely on the side ofWikileaks; no less
so than it is on the side of the NewYorkTimes or Der Spiegel.Law,however, is not the only operative dimension.The socialpolitical framing of the situation,alongside the potential constraints the govemment feels on its
legal chances and political implications ofattempting to prosecute, as well as the possibility ofusing the various
extralegal avenues we saw used in this case, haveareal effect on how vulnerable an entity is to all these various
forms of attack. Keller writes:
^3^2 As one of my colleagues asks:If Assange were an understated professorial type rather thana
characterfromamissingStiegLarssonnovel,andifWikiLeaks were not suffused with suchglib anti
pathy toward theUnited States,would the reactiontotheleaksbe quite soferocious7 And would more
Americans be speaking up against the threat of reprisals7 1FN404^
The question, of course, is what role traditional media players in the United States played in creating that
perception of Assange,and with it the license for what Keller described as the^^ferocious^^responses.Compare
Keller's ^^dirty white shirt^^ or ^^filthy white socks^^ description to Der Spiegel's description of Assange as
^^wearingawhite shirt and jacket and sportingathree-daybeard,was even paler thanusual and hadahacking
cough. ^Stress,^ hesaid,by way of apology.^^1^FN40^^ Similarly,Rosenbach and Starkdescribe Assange asa
man who is very difficult to work with but one with whom, after extensive interactions involving lawyers, dinner, and long negotiations over wine,adealcould be, and was, reached.Keller's vignettes describe someone
whowas only marginally saneand certainly malevolent. ElPaiseditorlavierMorenoclaimedthatthemany
hours ofameeting with Assange were insufficient toformarigorously-researchedprofile,but he could attest
that the discussion was purely focused onacommon publication calendar and on how critical it was to protect
names,sources,and dates that could put people at risk. 1FN406^ Keller and theTimes,then, are not innocent
bystanders in the perceptions ofAssange that made the response to him so ferocious, but primary movers. It was
theTimes,after all,that chose to runafront page profile of Assangeaday after it began publishing the Iraq war
logs in which it described him as ^^a hunted man^^who^^demands that his dwindling number ofloyalists use expensive encrypted cellphones and swaps his own the way other men change shirts,^^and^^checksinto hotels under false names, dyes his hair, sleeps on sofas and floors, and uses cash instead of credit cards, often borrowed
fromfriends.^^l^FN407^
What responsibility does the established press have toward the newcomers in the networked fourth estate not

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to paint them in such terms that they become fair game for aggressive, possiblylife-threatening, and certainly
deeply troubling pressures and threats of prosecution7 There isadirect intellectual line connecting Klein's ^^you
couldn't haveastarker contrast ^3^3 between the multiple layers of checks and balances, andaguy sitting in his
livingroominhispajamaswritingwhathethinks^^lFN40^j toKeller's^^bag lady walking in off the street,^^
1FN40^^ twice denied as^^a source,not asapartner.^^lFN410^ Incombinationwiththe Administration's clear
deferencetothe traditional media, on theonehand,and itsrepeateddenunciationsof, threats to,andmulti
systems attacks onWikileaks and Assange on the other, the need of the incumbent media organizations to assert
their identity and shore up their own continued vitality threatens emerging elements of the networked fourth estate.^^Multiple layers of checks and balances^^are merely one way of creating accountability; the social relations
among elite players that make these meetings feasible and that allow Keller to present cables to the administration are central aspects of what both the govemment and the incumbents of the fourth estate value, and it is the
absence of such relations in the new organizational forms run by social outsiders that is so threatening. The risk
is that the government will support its preferred media models, and that the incumbent mass media players will,
inturn,vilify and denigrate the newer models in ways that make them more vulnerable to attack and shore up
the privileged position of those incumbents in their role asamore reliable ally-watchdog.This threat is particu
larly worrisome becauseit comes as the economics of incumbent media forceustolook for newand creative
networked structures to fill the vacuum left by the industrial decline of mid twentieth century media models.
ii.Collaboration Between Networked and Incumbent Models oflournalism
The events surrounding Wikileaks mark the difficulties with what will inevitably becomeamore broadly applicable organizational modelfor the fourth estate.This new modelwill require increased integration between
decentralized networked and traditional professional models of information production, and concentration of attention.
On the production side,even looking narrowly at the question ofleaks,whatever else happens,spinoffs from
Wikileaks—OpenLeaks or BrusselsLeaks, efforts by established news organizations like Al lazeera and the New
York Times to create their own versions of secure, online leaked document repositories-markatransition away
from the model of the leak to one trusted joumalist employed byawell-established news organization.The advantages of this model to the person leaking the documents are obvious.Aleak to one responsible organization
may lead to non-publication and suppression of the story.The NewYorkTimes famously delayed publication of
^3^4itsstoryontheNSAdomestic eavesdropping programforayear. 1FN411^ Wikileaks has shownthat by
leaking to an international networked organization able to deliver the documents to severaloutletsin parallel,
whistleblowers can reduce the concern that the personal risk they take in leaking the document will be in vain.
Major news organizations that want to receive these leaks will have tolearn to partner with organizations that,
like Wikileaks, can perform that function.
Leaking is,ofcourse,but one ofmany ways in which news reporting can benefit from the same distributed
economics that drive open source development or Wikipedia.The usercreated images from the LondonUnderground bombing in 200^ broke ground for this modeLThey were the only source of images.During thelranian
reformmovementprotestsin 200^, videos and images created by users ontheground became the sole video
feed for international news outlets, and by the time of theTunisian and Egyptian uprisings in early2011,the integrationofthesefeedsintomainlinereportinghadbecomeallbut standard.lust asinopensourcesoftware
^^given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow,^^l^FN412^adistributed population armed with cameras and video
recorders,andadistributed population of experts and insiders who can bring more expertise and direct experience to bear on the substance of any given story,will provide tremendous benefits of quality,depth, and context

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to any story.
But the benefits are very clearly not only on the side oftraditional media integrating distributed inputs into
theirownmodel.Lookingspecifically at Wikileaks and the embassy cables shows that responsible disclosure
was the problem created by these documents that was uniquely difficult to solve in an open networked model.
The problem was not how to release them indiscriminately; that is trivial to do in the network.The problem was
not how to constructasystem for sifting through these documents and identifying useful insights.Protestations
of the professional press that simply sifting throughthousands of documents and identifying interesting stories
cannot be done by amateurs sound largely like protestations from Britannica editors that Wikipedia will never be
an acceptable substitutefor Britannica. At this stage of our understanding of the networked informationeconomy,we know full well that distributed solutions can solve complex information production problems.It was
the decisionto preserve confidentiality that made the usual approachto achieving largescale tasks inthe networked environment—peerproduction, largescale distributed collaboration unavailable. One cannot harness
thousands of volunteers on an open networked platform to identify what information needs to be kept secret. To
get around that problem,^3^^ Wikileaks needed the partnership with major players in the incumbent media sys
tem, however rocky and difficult to sustain it tumed out to be.
Another central aspect of the partnership betweenWikileaks and its media partners was achieving salience
and attention. There is little doubt that mass media continues to be the major pathway to public attention in the
United States,even as the role oflntemet news consumption rises.lFN413^Debates continue as to the extent to
which the agenda set through those organizations can, or cannot, be more broadly influenced today through nonmainstream media action. 1FN414^ Both the Wikileaks case and the brief event study of the
200-million-dollar-a-day story suggest that, ataminimum, ultimate transmission to the main agenda of the pop
ulation requires transmission through mass media.However importantasubject, i f it cannot ultimately make its
way to mainstream media, it will remain peripheral to the mainstream of public discourse, at least for the intermediate future. 1^FN41^^ Networked organizations needapartnership model withtraditionalorganizations in
large part to achieve salience.
As more mature sectors in which collaboration across the boundary between traditional organizational models and new networked models show,creating these collaborations is feasible but not triviafOpen source software is the most mature ofthese, and it shows both the feasibility and complexity ofthe interface between more
hierarchical and tightly structured models and Oat, networked, informal structures.1FN416^ The informality of
loose networks and the safety of incumbent organizations draw different people, with different personalities and
values; working across these differencesis not always easy.In looking at the Wikileaks case,it is difficuh to
separate out how much of the difficulties in the interface were systemic and how muchafunction of interpersonal antipathy,Assange's personality,and the ^3^6 Times'ambivalence about working withWikileaks.1^FN417^ In
thinking of the events asacase study,it is important not to allow these factors to obscure the basic insights: collaboration is necessary,it is mutually beneficial,and it is hard.
The networked fourth estate will be made up of such interaction and collaboration, however difficult it may
be initially. The major incumbents will continue to play an important role as highly visible, relatively closed or
ganizations capable of delivering much wider attention to any given revelation, and to carry on their operations
under relatively controlled conditions.The networked entrants,not individually,butasanetwork of diverse individuals and organizations, will have an agility, scope, and diversity of sources and pathways such that they
will,collectively,be able to collect and capture information onaglobal scale that would be impossible for any
single traditional organization to replicate by itself. Established news outlets find this partnership difficult to ad-

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just to.Bloggers have beencomplaining for years that journalists pick up their stories or ideas withoutgiving
thekind of attributionthey would normallygivetojournalistsinotherestablishedorganizations. Butjust as
software companies had to leam to collaborate with open source software developers,so too willthis industry
have to developits interactions. We already see outletslike the Guardian well ahead of the curve, integrating
what are effective expert blogs into their online platform as part of their menu of offerings.Wesee the BBC successfully integrating requests for photographs and stories from people on the ground in fast-moving news situations-although not quite yet solving the problem of giving the sourcesapersonality and voice ofacollaborat
ive contributor.One would assume that the networked components of the fourth estate will follow the same arc
thatWikipedia has followed: from something that simply isn't acknowledged, toajoke,toathreat, to an indispensable part oflife.
Conclusion
Astudy of the events surrounding theWikileaks document releases in 2010providesarich set of insights
about the weaknesses and sources of resilience of the emerging networked fourth estate. It marks the emergence
ofanew model of watchdog function, one that is neither purely networked nor purely traditional,but is rathera
mutualistic interaction between the two. It identifies the peculiar risks to, and sources of resilience of, the net
worked fourth estate inamultidimensional system of expression and restraint, and suggests the need to resolvea
major potential vulnerability-theability ofprivate infrastructurecompaniestorestrict speech withoutbeing
bound by ^3^7 the constraints oflegality,and the possibility that government actors will take advantage of this
affordanceinanextralegalpublic-privatepartnership forcensorship. Finally, itoffersarichly detailedevent
study of the complexity of the emerging networked fourth estate, and the interaction, both constructive and destructive,betweenthesurvivingelements of the traditional modelandtheemergingelements of thenew. It
teaches us that the traditional,managerialprofessional sources of responsibility inafree press function imper
fectly under present market conditions,while the distributed models of mutual criticism and universal skeptical
reading, so typical ofthe Net, are far from powerless to deliver effective criticism and self-correction where necessary.The future likely is, as the Guardian put it,^^a new model of co-operation^^ between surviving elements
ofthe traditional, mass-mediated fourth estate, and its emerging networked models. 1FN41^^ The transition to
this new model will likely be anything but smooth.

IFNal^. lack N. and Lillian R.Berkman Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; Faculty Co-Director, Berkman Center for Internet and Society,Harvard University.lam grateful to Bmce Ackerman, Marvin Ammori, lack Balkin, David Barron, Fernando Bermejo, David Isenberg, Susan Landau, Micah Sifry,Ionathan^ittrain, and Ethan tuckerman for comments and criticisms.
l^FNl^. TheodoreRoosevelt, Address of President Rooseveh at theLayingof the Corner Stone of the Office
Building of the House ofRepresentatives:The Man with the Muck-Rake^Apr. 14,1^06),available atVoiees of
Democracy,http:^^voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu^theodore-roosevelt-the-man-with-themuckrake-speech-text.
1FN2^.Adam Levine, Gates: Leaked Documents Don't Reveal Key Intel, But Risks Remain, Cnn^0ct.l6, 2010,
^:2^AM),http:^^articles.cnn.com^2010-10-16^us^wikileaks.assessment l^ulian-assange-wikileaks-documents.
lFN3j.See media analysis infra, text accompanying noteslO^ 124.

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1FN4^. See detailed description and sourcing infra, notes ^3^^.
IFl^^^. U.S. Dep'tofDefense,NewsTranscript,DODNewsBriefingwithSecretary Gates and Adm. Mullen
from
the
Pentagon
(Nov.
30,
2010),
available
at
ht
tp:^^www.defense.gov^Transcripts^Transcript.aspx7TranscriptID^472^. GatessaidataPentagonpressbriefing
on the day ofthe release:
Now,I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described asameltdown,asagamechanger, and so on.Ithink—I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought.The fact is,governments dealwith theUnited States because it's in their interest,not because theylike us,not because they trust
us,and not because they believe we can keep secrets.Manygovernments—some governments deal with us because they fear us,some because they respect us,most because they need us.Weare still essentially,as has been
said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work
withus. Wewill continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing7Yes.Is it awkward7Yes.Consequences forU.S.foreign policy7Ithink fairly modest.
Id
1FN6^.Biden Makes Case ForAssangeAsA^HighTechTerrorist,^The Huffington Post ^Dec. 1^,2010,3:^1
PM),
http:^^
www.huffingtonpost.com^2010^12^1^^joe-biden-wikileaks-assange-high-tech-terroristn7^^^3^.html ^^^If he
conspired,to get these classified documents,withamember of theUSmilitary,that'sfundamentallydifferent
than if somebody drops in your lap,^Here David, you'reapress person, here is classified materials ....^Iwould
argue that it's closer to beingahigh tech terrorist than thePentagonPapers.^^).
1FN7^.See infra, notesl01103^describing comments ofBobBeckel,William Kristol,and Sarah Palin).
IFN^^. Thomas L. Friedman, Op Ed., We've Only Got America A, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1^,2010, at A31, available
at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^12^1^^opinion^l^friedman.html; see infra, notes 33^-37^.
l^FN^^. Haroon Siddique ^ Matthew Weaver, US Embassy CablesCulprit Should Be Executed, Says Mike
Huckabee,
guardian.co.uk,
Dec.
1,
2010,
http:^^
www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^dec^01^us embassy cables executed mike huckabee; Nick Collins, WikiLeaks:
Guilty
Parties
^Should
Face Death
Penalty,^
The
Telegraph,
Dec.
1, 2010, http:^^
www.telegraph.CO.uk^news^worldnews^wikileaks^^l72^16^WikiLeaks-guilty-parties-shouldfacedeath-penalty.
htmL
l^FNlOj.See infra section II.A,II.D.2,II.D.3.See infra Koh,note7^;as well as organizational attack.
IFNll^. See WikiLeaks, Wikipedia,http:^^en.wikipedia.org^wiki^Wikileaks^lastvisitedFeb. 23, 2011). 1 use
this source advisedly; following the citation lists in the article suggests that it isaparticularly good entry point
into the history ofWikileaks.
1^FN12^
WikiLeaks
Timeline,
The
Globe
and
Mail,
Dec
www.theglobeandmail.com^news^technology^wikileakstimeline^articlel^37131.

14,

2010,

http:^^

^FN13^Id
lFN14^.SeeWikiLeaksTimeline,supra note 12,at 200^tab; see alsoThomasClabum, Apple's Controversial

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iPhone Developer Agreement Published, InformationWeek (Oct. 2^, 200^, 3:^0 PM), http:^^
www.informationweek.com^news^personaltech^smartphones^showArticle.jhtml7articlelD^211601121.
IFNl^^.Eric Schmitt^MichaelR. Gordon, CrossBorder Chases From Iraq O.K.,Document Says, N.Y.Times,
Feb 4,200^,atA10
1FN16^. MikeMesnick, DebunkingThe Faulty PremisesOfThePirate BayCriminalizationTreaty, Techdirt
^May 23 200^,6:21PM),http:^^wwwtechdirtcom^articles^200^0^23^1203101212 shtmL
1FN171. Amnesty Announces Media Awards 200^ Winners, Amnesty Int'l UK (lune 6, 200^), http:^^amnesty.org.uk^news details.asp7NewslD^1^227.
IFNl^^. Winners of Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards Announced, Index on Censorship
^Apr
22,
200^),
http:^^
www.indexoncensorship.org^200^^04^winners-of-index-on-censorshipfreedom-of-expression-award-announced.
IFNl^^.WikiLeaksTimeline,supra note 12,at 200^ tab.Thelist includes: in lanuary,telephone intercepts of
Peruvianpoliticians andbusinessmeninvolvedinanoil scandal; inFebruary, 6,7^0Congressional Research
Service reports; in March,aset of documents belonging to Barclay's Bank; in luly,areport relating toanuclear
accident at thelranianNatanz nuclear facility;andinSeptember,intemaldocumentsfromKaupthingBankof
Iceland,showing what appeared to be self-dealing ofbank owners.
lFN20j. See Ben Dimiero,FO^LEAKS: Fox Boss Ordered Staffto Cast Doubt on Climate Science, County Fair
^Media Matters for America) ^Dec. 1^,2010,^:0^ AM), http:^^mediamatters.org^blog^2010121^0004; Andrew
C Revkin, Climategate Fever Breaks, Dot Earth (N Y Times) (luly 7, 2010, ^:02 AM), http:^^
dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com^2010^07^07^gate-fever-breaks.
l^FN21LThe report was originally availableon Wikileaksitself. lulian Assange,U.S. IntelligencePlannedto
DestroyWikiLeaks,WikiLeaks ^Mar. 1^,2010).Since the assault onWikileaks has made access to the site difficult,that particular report can more easily be accessed elsewhere as ofFebruaryl^,2011:MichaelD.Horvath,
U.S. Army Counterintelligence Ctr., Wikileaks.org-An OnlineReferencetoForeignlntelligenceServices,Insurgents, or Terrorist Groups7 2 ^Mar. 1^, 200^) l^hereinafter Pentagon Reports, available at http:^^
www.scribd.com^doc^2^3^^7^4^UslntelWikileaks,
or
in
PDF
format
at
http:^^
www.wuala.com^WikiLeaks^new^us-intel wikileaks.pdf.
1FN22^.Stephanie Strom,Pentagon SeesaThreat from Online Muckrakers,N.Y.Times,Mar.l7,2010, a t A l ^ .
lFN23LId
1^FN24^.That report was apparently an early instance of collaboration betweenWikileaks andamajor news outlet; Assange explains that the report was published in collaboration with NewYork Times reporter Eric Schmitt.
Annotationsby lulian AssangetoFeb. ^,2011 draft ofthis Article(Mar 10, 2011)^onfile withauthor)
l^hereinafter Assange Annotations^.
1FN2^^.Pentagon Report, supra note21,at 2.
1FN26^.Id.at^.These are descriptions that largely appear to take Wikileaks'own self-description as true.

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1FN27^ ld at2
lFN2^jIdat3
lFN2^^Id
^FN30^1dat6^quotingNcwYorl^ Times C o v U n i t e d States, 403 CS713.717^1^71))
1FN31^.Id.at^^^^The foreign staff writer for Wikileaks.org,lulian Assange,wrote several news articles,coauthored other articles, and developed an interactive data base for the leaked documents. In addition, other
Wikileaks.org writers and various writers for other media publications wrote separate news articles based on the
leaked information posted to theWeb site.^^).
1FN321 I d a t l l
l^FN33^1d
lFN34^1datl^
1F1^3^^. A search in the Lexis-Nexis ^^News, All^^ database forarticles published fromlanuary 1, 2007 until
December31,200^ using the term^^Wikileaks^^ yielded 407 results.A^^focus^^search for ^^Assange^^ yielded ten
results.
1FN36L Pentagon Report, supra note21,at 2.
lFN37^1d
1F^3^^.David Sarno,Burst ofLeaks Getting Slippery,L.A.Times,Apr. 16,200^,atEl.
1FN3^^.Pentagon Report,supra note21,at 3.Assange notes that this is an overstatement of inaccuracy; his annotations suggest that l ^ o f received documents fail verification and are not posted,while no documents posted
to date onWikileaks have failed verification.Assange Annotations,supra note 24.
1^FN40^.Pentagon Report, supra note21,at3.
1^FN4I^. Wikileaks itselfhas provided no public statement about the source.Manning was charged by the Army
only with the first release.Glenn Greenwald of Salon makesapowerful case that the evidence against Manning
originates in ahighly unreliable source. Glenn Greenwald, The Strange and Consequential Case of Bradley
Manning,
Adrian
Lamo
and
Wikileaks, Salon
^lune
1^,
2010,
^:20
AM), http:^^www.salon.com^news^opinion^glenn greenwald^2010^06^1^^wikileaks Ihereinafter Greenwald, Strange and
ConsequentialL For the background story,see Chris McGreal,HackerTums in US Soldier over WikiLeaks Iraq
Video,
The
Guardian,
lune
^,
2010,
at
1^,
available
at
http:^^
www.guardian.co.uk^world^2010^jun^07^hacker wikileaks-iraq-video-manning. The underlying materials Greenwald discusses include Kevin Poulsen ^ Kim better, Suspected Wikileaks Source Described Crisis of Con
science Leading to Leaks, Threat Level ^Wired) ^lune
10, 2010, ^:41 PM), http:^^
www.wired.com^threatlevel^2010^06^conscience.
lFN42j.Elizabeth Bumiller,Video Shows U.S.Killing ofReuters Employees, N.Y.Times, Apr. ^,2010, atA13,
available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^04^06^world^middleeast^06baghdad.html7hp.

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1FN43^. Collateral Murder, WikiLeaks (Apr
^, 2010). Full version available at ht
tp:^^www.youtube.com^watch7v^lS^sxRfU-ikl^hereinafter Collateral Murder, full versions. Edited version available at http:^^www.youtube.com^watch7v^^r^PrfnU3G0 1hereinafter Collateral Murder, edited versions.
lFN44^.SeeChrisMcGreal, Wikileaks Reveals Video ShowingUS Air Crew Shooting Down Iraqi Civilians,
The
Guardian,
Apr.
6,
2010,
at
2,
available
at
http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^apr^0^^wikileaksus-army-iraq-attack;WikiLeaksPostsVideoof^US Military Killings'in Iraq, BBC^Apr. 6, 2010), http:^^news.bbc.co.uk^2^hi^americas^^603^3^.stm.
1FN4^^.Greenwald,Strange and Consequential,supra note41.
1FN46^. GlennGreenwald,The Inhumane Conditions of Bradley Manning's Detention,Salon (Dec. 1^,2010,
1:1^ AM), http:^^ www.salon.com^news^opinion^glenn greenwald^2010^12^14^manning^index.html Ihereinafter
Greenwald,InhumaneConditions^;IoshuaNorman,Bradley Manning, Alleged WikiLeaks Source,inSolitary
Confinement, CBS News ^Dec 1^,2010), http:^^www cbsnews com^^301^03^43 162 2002^724^03^43 htmL
lFN47j. SeeRadioBerkman 171: Wikileaks and tbeinformation Wars,BerkmanCtr. forlnternet^Soc'y at
Harvard
Univ
(Dec
^,
2010),
http:^^
wilkins.law.harvard.edu^podcasts^mediaberkman^radioberkman^files^2010-12-0^
004I^LESSIGTRANSCRlPTpdf(transcriptofpodcast)
l^FN4^^.Iustin Fishel, Military Raises Questions About Credibility of Leaked IraqShootingVideo, Fox News
^Apr
7,
2010),
http:^^
www.foxnews.com^politics^2010^04^07^military-raises-questions-credibility leaked iraq shooting video.
1FN4^^.The helicopter circled the struggling,injured man,as one of the pilots is heard saying,^^Come on buddy,
all you gotta do is pick upaweapon.^^ Collateral Murder, full version, supra note 43,at 6:^^7:03.
IFN^Oj.Collateral Murder,fullversion,supra note 43,at 2:30-2:42;CollateralMurder,edited version, supra
note43,at4:0^4:17
IFl^^lL The edited version excludes the moment when the pilot hears that the ground troopshave found a
wounded girl and says,Ah, damn, oh well,^^ in an aural shrug. Collateral Murder, full version,supra note43,at
17:11. Similarly,anunrelatedincident,fifteenminuteslater and caught as part of thefullcut,clearlydisplays
the same gunship's crew shootinghellfiremissiles into abuildingjust as an unarmed civilian walks by the
house,and again describesin conversation among the pilots another missilehitting the same building as three
apparently unarmedcivilians walkthrough the rubble looking forsurvivors. Collateral Murder, full version,
supra note 43, at 34:00. At least some individuals walking into the building before that point appear unarmed.
These much more damning images were not part ofthe edited version, presumably because they were not part of
the story about shooting the Reuters crew. An advocacy piece aiming to besmirch the U.S. military would
clearly have highlighted those unambiguous examples ofcallous disregard for human life by the same gun crew,
minutes after they had seen that they shot and injured two children in the course of trying to prevent the evacuation of an unarmed person they had injured in their prior volley.
lFN^2j.At minutel6:00 of the full video,the pilot reiterates seeing the RPG as the reason to ask for permission
tofire; at minute 1^:22 26 of that video,one of the ground troops is heard saying,^^I got one individual looks
likehe'sgotanRPGroundlayingundemeathhim.^^CollateralMurder,full version,supranote43,at 16:00,

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1^:22 26.
lFN^3j. SeeDavid Leigh, Afghanistan WarLogs: Howthe GuardianGotthe Story, TheGuardian,Iuly 26,
2010, at 2,available at http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^jul^2^^afghanistanwar-logs-explained-video.
1FN^4^. SeeDavidLeigh^LukeHarding, WikiLeaks: Strained Relations, Accusations-andCrucialRevelations.
The
Guardian,
Feb.
1,
2011,
at
16,
available
at
ht
tp:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2011^jan^31^wikileaks-embassy-cables-publieation; Bill Keller, Dealing with
Assange and theWikiLeaks Secrets,N.Y.Times,Ian.26,2011,at MM32,later online version of article available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2011^01^30^magazine^30Wikileakst.html7
r^l^pagewanted^all; Marcel
Rosenbach^HolgerStark, An InsideLook at Difficult Negotiations with lulian Assange,SPIEGEL,Ian.2^,
2010, available at http:^^www spiegel.de^international^world^0,l^l^,742163,00.htmL
IFN^^j. Assange explains that posting thematerialsincluded removing about onefifth of thematerials to prevent potential harm to individuals mentioned in them,processing to provide distribution and statistical analyses,
and in particular that he himself identified the documents relating to one of the most significant finds, the description ofTaskforce 373,aforce that undertook targeted assassinationsin Afghanistan. Assange Annotations,
supra note 24.Forapublication of this story,see Nick Davies,AfghanistanWarLogs:Task Force 373—Special
Forces Hunting Top Taliban, The Guardian, luly 2^, 2010, at 4, available at http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^jul^2^^taskforce 373 secretafghanistan-taliban.
1^FN^6^.C.I.Chivers etal.,View is Bleaker than Official Portrayal ofWar in Afghanistan,N.Y.Times, Iuly2^,
2010, atAl,available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^07^26^world^asia^26warlogs.html; Nick Davies^David
Leigh, AfghanistanWar Logs: Massive Leak of Secret Files ExposesTruth of Occupation,The Guardian,luly
26,2010,ati,available at http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^jul^2^^afghanistan-war-logs-military-leaks.
1FN^7^.Eric Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents,WikiLeaks Seeks^Transparency,^N.Y.Times,luly26,
2010, at A l l
IF^^^^. Terence Burlij, The Moming Line: Leaked Afghanistan Field Reports to Shape Political War Debate At
Home,
The
Rundown
^PBS
Newshour)
^luly
26,
2010,
^:30
AM),
ht
tp:^^www.pbs.org^newshour^rundown^2010^07^themoming-lineleaked-afghanistanfieldreportsto-shapepoliti
cal-war-debate-at-home.html.
IFN^^j Adam Brookes, Huge Wikileaks Release Shows US ^Ignored Iraq Torture,^BBCNews^Oct 23, 2010),
http:^^www.bbc.co.uk^news^world-middle-east-1161131^.
lFN60^.Levine, supra note 2.
1FN61^. Nancy A. Youssef,OfficialsMay be Overstating the Danger from WikiLeaks,McClatchy^Nov. 2^,
2010),http:^^www.mcclatchydc.com^2010^1L2^^104404^officials-maybe-overstating-the.htmL
lFN62j.See Adam Levine,TopMilitary Official: WikiLeaks Founder MayHave^Blood^on His Hands,CNN
(Iuly2^, 2010), http:^^www.cnn.comi^2010^US^07^2^^wikileaksmullengates^index.htmLABBC report attributedasimilar statement to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.Brookes,supra note
l^FN63^The Iraq Archive: The Strands ofaWar,NYTimes,Oct 23,2010, a t A l .

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1FN64^.Hans Hoyng etal.,TheWikiLeaks Iraq Logs:AProtocol of Barbarity,Spiegel Online, Oct. 2^,2010,
http:^^www.spiegel.de^international^world^O,l^l^,724026,00.html.
1^FN6^^. Brookes, supra note
1FN66^.For an example, see SabrinaTavemise^AndrewW.Lehren, Detainees Fared Worse in Iraqi Hands,
Logs Say,NYTimes,Oct 23, 2010, at A^
l^FN67^.^^Mr.Morrell, of the Pentagon, told the BBC that the leak wasa^travesty^ which provided enemies of
theWest with an^extraordinary database to figure out how we operated.He said the cache of documents contained ^nothing new^ with regards to fundamental policy issues. And he once again asked Wikileaks to remove
the documents from the web and return them to the Department ofDefense.^^ Brookes,supra note
l^FN6^^Id.
lFN6^^.IohnF.Burns^RaviSomaiya,WikiLeaks Founder on the Run,Trailed by Notoriety,N.Y.Times,Oct.
23,2010, available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^10i^24^world^24assange.html.
lFN70^1d
1FN7I^.See Strom, supra note 22 (^^l^A^ tiny online source ofinformation and documents that governments and
corporations around the world would prefer to keep secret.^^).
1FN72^. Friedman, supra note ^.
1FN73^ Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe,NYTimes, Dec 12, 2010, at WK1;US Embassy Cables: The
Background, BBC News (Nov.2^,2010), http:^^www.bbc.co.uk^news^world-us-canada-11^62320.
1FN741. Shane, supra note73; David Leigh, How2^0,000 US Embassy CablesWereLeaked,The Guardian,
Nov.2^,2010, at 2,available at http:^^www.guardian.co.uk^world^2010^nov^2^^ow-us-embassy-eablesleaked.
1FN7^^. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to lennifer Robinson, attomey for
lulian
Assange
(Nov
27,
2010),
available
at
ht
tp:^^media.washingtonpost.com^wpsrv^politics^documents^Dept of^State Assange letter.pdf.
1^FN76^ l^L^SC^7^3(d)^2006)
1^FN77^.Pentagon spokesman GeoffMorrell used language very similar to that which would be used by the State
Department's legal counselafew months later, claiming that the documents threaten our forces and Afghan ci
vilians, and demanding their retum.U.S.Dep't of Defense, NewsTranscript,DODNews Briefing with Geoff
Morrell
from
the
Pentagon
^Aug.
^,
2010),
available
at
ht
tp:^^www.defense.gov^transcripts^transcript.aspx7transcriptid^^3001.
1F1^7^^. See infra note 14^; Keller, supranote ^4; Marcel Rosenbach ^ Holger Stark, Lifting the Lid on
WikiLeaks: An Inside Look at Difficult Negotiations with lulian Assange, Spiegel Online, Ian. 2^, 2011, http:^^
www.spiegel.de^intemational^world^0,l^l^,742163,00.htmL
l^FN7^^.BrettI.Blackledge^IameyKeaten,RespectedMedia Outlets Collaborate with WikiLeaks, ABC News
(Dec.3,2010), http:^^abcnews.go.com^Business^wireStory7id^l2302107;Shane, supra note73.

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[FN80]. See infra text accompanying notes 108-124.
[FN81]. Lists of the relevant cables are maintained by several news organizations. One that tracks releases by a
wide range of organizations is the Guardian. See WikiLeaks Embassy Cables, The Key Points at a Glance,
guardian.co.uk,
Dec.
7,
2010,
http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-embassy-cables-key-points. A shorter list is maintained by
the BBC. See At a Glance: Wikileaks Cables, BBC News (Dec.
18, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-l 1914040.
[FN82]. Elizabeth Dickinson, The First WikiLeaks Revolution7, Foreign Policy (Jan. 13, 2011), http://
wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/wikileaks_and_the_tunisia_ protests; Scott Shane, Cables from
American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence on Tunisia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2011, at A14.
[FN83]. Leigh & Harding, supra note 54, at 16.
[FN84]. See, e.g.. At a Glance: Wikileaks Cables, supra note 81; Cable 09STATE15113, WikiLeaks, http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/02/09STATE 15113.html #par 15 (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
[FN85]. In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Julian Assange explained that the "[n]ews
value of this cable was two fold 1) to further show that US diplomats were being illegally used to conduct foreign spying (it is explicitly stated in the cable to keep such inquiries secret from the host government), and to reveal 'assets' the US might fight a war over or otherwise use its diplomatic muscle to control." Assange Annotations, supra note 24.
[FN86]. In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Julian Assange reports that this release
was done in coordination with the Times of London, rather than with one of the five main organizations that collaborated on the release. Id.
[FN87]. WikiLeaks Publishes List of Worldwide Infrastructure 'Critical' to Security of U.S., MSNBC.com
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/40526224/ns/us_news-wikileaks_in_security.
[FN88]. David Smith, Morgan Tsvangirai Faces Possible Zimbabwe Treason Charge, guardian.co.uk, Dec. 27,
2010, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/27/wikileaks-morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-sanctions.
[FN89]. The cable was posted to the Guardian on December 8, 2010 at 21:30 GMT. See US Embassy Cables:
Tsvangirai Tells US Mugabe Is Increasingly 'Old, Tired and Poorly Briefed,' guardian.co.uk, Dec. 8, 2010, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/241595. It was posted to Wikileaks that same
day, apparently about an hour later. See Cable 09HARARE1004, WikiLeaks (Dec. 8, 2010, 22:31 GMT), http://
213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09HARARE1004.html. Assange confirms that the release was coordinated and
simultaneous. Assange Annotations, supra note 24. The release appears to fall within the practice of following
thejudgment of the mainstream media organizations rather than releasing independently.
[FN90]. In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Assange explains:
This is absolutely false. I have never used "poison pill," nor ever made a threat. I have stated on many
times that we have distributed backups, to insure that history will not be destroyed. I f we are not in a position to
continue publishing ourselves, we, in understanding the significance of history, will release the passwords to
these backups of future publications to ensure that others can take up the work. The disincentive is not of a

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threatening nature,but rather tomakemassarrests,sabotage or assassinationspointlessexercisesinprior re
straint.
Assange Annotations, supra note 24.This annotation suggests no misunderstanding.The term "poison pill"
impliesameasure taken byapotential target of hostile action(originally,ashareholder plan intended to dilute
the holdings of the winner inapotential hostile corporate takeovers battle in the 1980s)to make itself toxic to
the predator consuming it.This appears to be the implication ofthis explanation as welL
lFN91^NearvMinnesota,283 CS 697,716 (1931)
1FN92L See JackShafer,TheExorcismof theNew YorkTimes, Slate (Oct 20,2010,6:52 PM), ht
tp://www.slate.com/id/2128429.
1FN93^.Judith Miller Criticizes Julian Assange For NotVerifying Sources,Video Cafe (Jan.2,2011,7:59 AM),
http://videocafe.crooksandliars.com/scarce/judith-miller-criticizesjulianassangenot.
lFN94j. Glenn Kessler, Clinton, in Kazakhstan for Summit, Will Face Leaders Unhappy over WikiLeaks Cables,
Wash.
Post,
Nov.
30,
2010,
available
at
http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/ll/30/AR2010113001095 htmL
1F1^95^.Biden Makes Case For Assange AsA'HighTechTerrorist,'supra note 6.
lFN96^.DODNews Briefing, supra note5.
lFN97j.Holger Stark^MarcelRosenbach,'WikiLeaks Is Annoying, But NotaThreat,'Spiegel Online, Dec.
20,2010,http://wwwspiegel.de/intemational/germany/0,1518,735587,00.htmL
1FN98^.Fox News'Bob Beckel Calls For'Illegally'Killing Assange:'ADead Man Can't Leak Stuff (VIDEO),
The
Huffington
Post
(Dec
7,
2010,
5:50
PM),
ht
tp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/fox news-bob-beckel calls n 793467.html.
lFN99^Seeid
I^FNIOO^ Michael O'Brien, Republican Wants WikiLeaks Labeled As Terrorist Group, The Hill (Nov 29,2010,
8:38
AM),
ht
tp://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/130863-top-republican-designate-wikileaks-as-a-terrorist-org.
IFNIOI^. William Kristol, Whack Wikileaks, The Weekly Standard (Nov 30, 2010, 8:25 AM), ht
tp://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/whack wikileaks 520462.htmL
lFN102^Id
1FN103^. Peter Grier, WikiLeaks' Julian Assange, Does Sarah Palin ThinkCIA Should 'Neutralize' Him7,
Christian
Sci
Monitor,
Nov.
30,
2010,
http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/TheVote/2010/1130/WikiLeaks-Julian-Assange-Does-Sarah-Palin-thinkCl
Ashouldneutralize-him.
^
1FN104^.Harold Koh, Legal Adviser,U.S.Dep't ofState, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society oflntemational Law (Mar. 25,2010),available at http://www.state.gOv/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.

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1FN105^. As the President put it explicitly, in response to questions about investigating the torture of Spanish
citizens at Guantanamo: "Tmastrong believer that it's important to look forward and not backwards,and to remind ourselves that we do have very real security threats out there."Sam Stein, Obama On SpanishTorture Investigation: I Prefer To Look Forward, The Huffington Post (Apr. 16, 2009, 11:51 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/16/obama-on-spanish-torture_n 187710.html (reporting onaCNN en Espanol interview with President Obama on April 15, 2009).
1FN106^.See, e.g.,ErvingGoffman, Frame Analysis(1974).
1FN107^ United Statesv Progressive, liic,467 FSupp 990 (WD Wis 1979); Howard Morland,TheHbomb
Secret,The Progressive, Nov.1979,at3,available at http://www.progressive.org/images/pdf/1179.pdf.
1FN1081.The data was collected from the LexisNexis database on January 29,2011.The date range searched
was November 28,2010 to January 14, 2011.The dataset was "Major Newspapers."The search string was pur
posefully broad: "wikileaks w/25 ((thousands or 250,000)/7 cables)."The resulting 353 reports were manually
coded to exclude non-U.S.publications,and then identified as"thousands"or"250,000"released;"correct"or
"ambiguous."
1FN109^. Paul Richter, U.S. Tries to Contain Damage; WikiLeaks Cables Reverberate in Global Hot Spots, Chi.
Trib,Nov 30, 2010, atC12;USRushes to Reassure Edgy Allies,LATimes,Nov 30, 2010, a t A l
IFNllO^.Editorial, Undiplomatic Tales; On the WikiLeaks Revelations, S.FChron.,Nov.30, 2010, atA17.
l^FNlll^.ClintonTreads Carefully in Leading Massive Damage-Control Campaign,Wash. Post, Nov.30, 2010,
atA13
1FN112^. The Associated Press in particular was careful not to say that 250,000 cables were released, but rather
said that Wikileaks "began publishing" the 250,000 documents.This was true at the time, but was coded in this
study as "ambiguous"relative to the much clearer stories explaining the limited nature of the release.See,e.g.,
David Stringer, British Court Grants Bail toWikiLeaks'Julian Assange,San Jose Mercury News,Dec. 14,2010.
lF^113^.KristenSchorsch, Leak: Afghan President's Brother Loves Lakeview,Chi.Trib.,Nov.29,2010, at C3
(correctly categorized in the data set).
1FN114^. CableLeaks: U.S. UrgedtoHit Iran; Latest WikiLeaks Release Also SaysU.S. EnvoysSpiedon
Counterparts, Chi.Trib.,Nov.29,2010, atCl (incorrectly categorized in the dataset as "thousands").
1FN115^.Return of WikiLeaks;White House Says New Round of Document Releases Puts Lives at Risk,Chi.
Trib.,Nov.29,2010, at3(categorized as ambiguous).
1FN116J. Marisa L. Porges, 'We Cannot Deal with These People': WikiLeaks Shows True Feelings on
Guantanamo,
Christian
Sci.
Monitor,
Nov.
30,
2010,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1130/We-cannot-deal-with-these-people-WikiLeaks-shows
-true-feelings-on-Guantanamo.
|^FN117^. Sara MillerLlana, Ecuador and VenezuelaCompetetoPraiseWikiLeaks'JulianAssange,Christian
Sci. Monitor,Nov. 30,2010 ("The Venezuelanpresidentseemsto seize every chancetocriticizetheUnited
States, and he didn't missabeat by praising the'bravery'of controversial websiteWikiLeaks-which is releas-

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ingacache of250,000 classified us diplomatic cables—and calling for the resignation ofUS Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton.").That is. Christian Science Monitor continued to use the "this hurts America"frame.
1FN118^ Ariel 2^irulnick,WikiLeaks: What the World is Saying, Christian Sci Monitor,Nov 30, 2010 ("The
latestWikiLeaks trove of 250,000 diplomatic cables,obtained in advance by five news outlets,has generated
enough fodder in the US alone to occupyAmerican readers.But people all over, from Germany toLebanon to
Australia, are alsotalking about the sometimestroubling, sometimes mundane cablesthatWikiLeaksfounder
lulian Assange is gradually releasing for public consumption.").
1FN1191.CBS Evening News, Saturday Edition(CBS television broadcast Jan8, 2011).
1FN120^ Sunday Morning(CBS television broadcast Dec. 5,2010).
lFN121^The Early Show(CBS television broadcast Nov 29,2010)
1FN122^ NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Dec 5, 2010).
l^FN123^Today (NBC television broadcastDec 24, 2010)
1FN124^. Good Moming America(ABC television broadcast Dec.1,2010).
1FN125^ Keller, supra note 54
lFN126^.Bums^Somaiya, supra note 69.
1FN127^. Data collected and analyzed using Media Cloud. See Media Cloud, http://www.mediacloud.org.
1FN128^. DianneFeinstein,Op-Ed., Prosecute Assangeunder the Espionage Act, Wall St. J.,Dec. 7,2010,
available at http://online wsj com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575653280626335
1FN129^. See supra, notes 76 77 andtext accompanying notes (describing how thelanguage used in boththe
Pentagon and State Department documents,concerning threat toU.S.forces,illegality of origin, and demand for
retum are consistent with laying the foundations of the elements of an offense under the Espionage Act againsta
person possessing documents).
lFN130^.GeoffreyR. Stone,PerilousTimes: FreeSpeechin Wartimes FromtheSedition Actof 1789 tothe
War onTerrorisml53 (2004)
lFN131^Masses Publ'gCovPatten,244 F 535,542 43 ( S D N Y 1917)
lFN132^SeeStone,supranote 130, atl71 (quoting ShaffervUnited States, 255 F 886 (9th Cirl919))
lFN133^1datl71-72
lFN134^StokesvUnitedStates.264F18,26(8thCirl920)
^FN135^.Stone, supra note 130, atl73.
1FN136^ ld(citing United StatesvMotion Picture Film "The Spirit of'76." 252 F 946, 947 48 (DCal 1918)
)

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11N137^ Revive "Spirit of '76," Film Barred in 1917, N Y. Times, July 14, 1921, available at ht
tp://querynytimescom/mem/archivefree/pdf7
res^F50D14FD3C5AlB7A93C6A8178CD85F458285F9;
see
also Timothy Noah, The Unluckiest Man in Movie History, Slate (June 13, 2000, 10:13 AM), http://
www.slate.com/id/1005493.
1FN138^ Harding Frees Debs and 23 Others Held for War Violations,NY Times, Dec 24, 1921,available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf7res^9B0DE2D71539E133A25757C2A9649D946095D6CF.
1^FN139^ Charlie Savage, BuildingACase For Conspiracy By Wikileaks, N.Y.Times, Dec. 16, 2010, a t A l .
|^FN140^.Charles Arthur, WikiLeaksUnderAttack:TheDefinitiveTimeline,guardian.co.uk, Jan.8,2011,http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-under-attack-definitive-timeline.
1^FN141^. The 2008 Pentagon report identified China, Israel, and Russia as having developed and deployed denial-of-service attack capabilities against terrorist or dissident websites.Pentagon Report, supra note21,at21.In
his annotations to the February 8,2010version of this article,Assange expresses the belief that the scale of the
attack, together with the fact that "It^here is almost no-one in the capable computer underground that is opposed
toWikiLeaks on political or philosophical grounds" supports the inference that the attacks were statebased. Assange Annotations,supra note 24.
1FN142^. Nathan Olivarez-Giles, 'Hacktivist' Takes Credit for WikiLeaks Attacks via Twitter, L.A. Times
(Nov
30,
201L
^^1^
PM),
http://
latimesb
logs.latimes.com/technology/2010/ll/hacktivist-takescreditfor-wikileaks-attacks-via-twitter.htmL
1FN143^. Craig Labovitz, Wikileaks Cablegate Attack, Arbor Networks (Nov. 29, 2010, 1:17 PM), ht
tp://asert.arbornetworks.com/2010/ll/wikileakscablegate-attack;
Craig Labovitz, Round 2 DDoS against
Wikileaks,
Arbor
Networks
(Nov
30,
2010,
4:51
PM),
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2010/ll/round2 ddos versus wikileaks; Ethan tuckerman. If Amazon Has Silenced
Wikileaks
. ,
My
Heart's
in
Accra
(Dec.
01, 2010,
6:38
PM), http://
www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2010/12/01/if-amazon-has-silenced-wikileaks,
l^FN144^.Zuckerman, supra notel43.
lFN145^.Arthur,supra note 140.
1FN146^. EwenMacAskill, WikiLeaks WebsitePulled by Amazon afterUSPolitical Pressure,The Guardian,
Dec.
2,
2010,
at
11,
available
at
http://
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-website-cables-servers-amazon.
Most readers will know
Amazon from its e-commerce site; Amazon is alsoamajor provider of consumergrade cloud computing platform services,and Wikileaks was using its platform to host the cables.
lFN147^.AmazonWeb Services, http://aws.amazon.com/message/65348:
It's clear that WikiLeaks doesn't own or otherwise control all the rights to this classified content. Further, it is not credible that the extraordinary volume of250,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been carefully redacted in suchaway as to ensure that they weren't putting innocent peoplein
jeopardy.... IW^hen companies or people go about securing and storing large quantities of data that isn't right
fully theirs,and publishing this data without ensuring it won't injure others,it'saviolation of our terms of ser-

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vice....
1FN148^. SeeMichaelD.Bimhack^NivaElkin-Koren,ThelnvisibleHandshake: TheReemergenceofthe
State in the Digital Environment,8Va.lL^Tech 6,48 53 (2003).
1^FN149^. Arthur, supra note 140.
lFN150^1d.
1FN151^.Josh Halliday^AngeliqueChrisafis,WikiLeaks: France Adds to US Pressure to BanWebsite, guardian.co.uk, Dec. 3,2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-france-ban-website.
1FN152^. Andy Greenberg,AppleNixesWikileaks iPhone App. Will Google Follow7,Forbes (Dec.21,2010,
6:33
AM),
http://
blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/12/21/apple-nixes-wikileaks-iphone-app-will google-follow (quoting an
Apple spokesperson as saying that the app was removed because"la^pps must comply with alllocal laws and
maynotputanindividualortargetedgroupinharmsway");AlexisTsotsis,AppleRemoves Wikileaks App
from
App
Store,
TechCrunch
(Dec.
20,
2010),
http://
tech
crunch.com/2010/12/20/apple-removes-wikileaksappfromappstore.
1FN153^.Arthur, supra notel40(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1FN154^.See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, supra note75.
1FN155^.See infra. Part IV.The demand made in the letter, coupled with the assertion of injury,mayitselfhave
been crafted to createapotential violation of the Espionage Act.See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
1FN156^. Arthur, supra note 140.
lFN157^Id
1^FN158^. Tom Murphy, Bank ofAmerica Stops Handling WikiLeaks Payments, Yahool Finance (Dec. 18,
2010), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Bank-of-America-stops-apf-3526927234.htmLAstatement from the bank
said that "It^his decision isbased upon our reasonable belief thatWikiLeaks may be engaged in activities that
are,among other things,inconsistent with our internal policies for processing payments."Id.In the case of Bank
of America, since it was rumored at the time to be the potentialtarget of leaked materials held by WikiLeaks,
the other financial institutions'decision probably gave cover to the bank's own need to seeWikiLeaks deterred
and shut down, rather than response to pressure.
l^FN159^.RyanSingel,KeyLawmakersUpPressureonWikiLeaksand Defend Visa and MasterCard,Threat
Level
(Wired)
(Dec
9,
2010,
3:27
PM),
http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/wikileaks-congress-pressure.
1FN160^.David deSola,U.S.AgenciesWamUnauthorized Employees Not to Look atWikiLeaks,CNN (Dec.
4,2010,3:05 AM),http://edition.enn.com/2010/US/12/03/wikileaks.access.warning/index.htmL
1FN161^.Id.(quoting Library ofCongress spokesman Matthew Raymond).
1^FN162^.Id.('"Wehave put outapolicy saying Department ofDefense military,civilian and contractor person-

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nel should not access theWikiLeaks website to view or download the publicized classified information,'Department ofDefense spokesman Maj.Chris Perrine told CNN.").
1FN163^. EmanuellaGrinberg, WillReading WikiLeaksCostStudents Jobs WiththeFederalGovernment7,
CNN
(Dec
8,
2010),
ht
tp://articles.cnn.com/2010 12 08/justice/wikileaks.students 1 wikileaks-security-clearance-students.
|^FN164^ See DerrickTDortch, Job Hunters Should Steer Clear ofWikiLeaks Site, WashPost,Dec9,2010,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2010/12/08/AR2010120806796 htmL
1FN165^.
Our
Leadership:
Derrick
T.
Dortch,
President,
The
tp://www.diversagroup.com/DerrickTDortchBio.html(lastvisitedFeb.l9,2011).

Diversa

Group,

ht-

1FN166^.Dortch, supra notel64.
1F^167^.Kevin Poulsen^KimZetter,ICan't Believe What I'm Confessing toYou, Threat Level (Wired)(lune
10, 2010, 9:01PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/wikileakschat.
lFN168^Seeid
l^FN169^.See,e.g.,GeoffreyR.Stone,First Amendment Ctr.,Govemment Secrecy vs. Freedom of thePress
1-10(2006), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/Govt.Secrecy.Stone.pdf.
1F^170^.See Pentagon Report, supra note21.
1FN171^.See Greenwald, Inhumane Conditions, supra note 46; see alsoThe Law Offices of David E.Coombs,
Manning Case, http:// www.armycourtmartialdefense.info/search/label/Manning^20Case (providing updates
from Manning's counsel); Jeffrey L.Meltzner^JamieFellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S.
Prisons:AChallengeforMedicalEthics,38J Am.Acad. Psychiatry^L 104, 104 (2010) ("Solitary confine
ment is recognized as difficult to withstand; indeed, psychological stressors such as isolation can be as clinically
distressing as physical torture.").On the psychological effects, seeP.S.Smith,The Effects ofSolitary Confine
ment on Prison Ininates:ABriefHistory and Review of the Literature,34Crime^lust.441(2006).
1^FN172^. Timeline: Sexual Allegations Against Assange in Sweden, BBC News (Dec. 16, 2010), ht
tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11949341.
1FN173^. Sweden Reopens Wikileaks Founder Rape Investigation, BBC News (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11151277.
1FN174^. Wikileaks Founder Julian
tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-1 1937110.

Assange

Refused

Bail,

BBC News

(Dec.

7,

2010),

ht

lFN175^ld
1^FN176^. See,e.g., Alan Nothnagle,SwedesOuestion Rape Accusations Against WikileaksFounder,Lost in
Berlin
(Aug
21,
2010,
1:13
PM),
http://
open.salon.com/blog/lost in berlin/2010/08/21/swedes question rape accusations against wikileaks founder.
1FN177^. Wikileaks Founder Assange Bailed, but Release Delayed, BBC News (Dec. 14, 2010), ht

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tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11989216.
1^FN178^ Wikileaks Founder Julian Assange Freed
tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12005930.

on Bail,

BBC News (Dec

16, 2010), ht

1FN179^.Nick Davies, lOdays in Sweden:The Full Allegations Against Julian Assange, guardian.co.uk, Dec.
17,2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/17/julian-assangesweden.
lFN180^Seeid
lFN181^1d
1FN182^. See Wikileaks: Julian AssangevSweden's Broad Sexual Laws, BBC News (Dec. 8,2010),http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11946652.
lFN183j.The only statisticslhave been able to obtain state that in 2009-2010,Sweden madeatotal of six extradition requests from the United Kingdom underaEuropean Arrest Warrant,which is not the same as an Interpol
RedNotice.NickHerbert,HouseofCommonsWrittenAnswers: European ArrestWarrants,Parliament of the
United
Kingdom,
Nov.
9,
2010,http://
ser
vices.parliament.uk/hansard/Commons/ByDate/20101109/writtenanswers/part004.htmL
1FN184^.The accusers'lawyer isaSwedishpoliticianwhosesignatureissueisgenderequality.lt was apparently he who advised the accusers that they could challenge and reverse the prosecutorial decision not to pursue
Assange.See David Leigh^Luke Harding,WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange'sWar on Secrecyl62-63 (2011).
1FN185^.Josh Halliday,WikiLeaks Site's Swiss Registry Dismisses Pressure toTake it Offiine, guardian.co.uk,
Dec.4,2010,http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/04/wikileaks-site-swiss-host-switch.
1FN186^ Jane Wakefield, Wikileaks' Struggle to Stay Online, BBC News (Dec
tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology 11928899.

7, 2010), ht

1FN187^. For a time-sensitive snapshot, see Arthur, supra note 140; see also WikiLeaks - Donate, http://wikileaks.ch/support.html (last visited Jan.11,2011).
1FN188^. Assange notes that it is tme that the back-up payment systems did function, "but by knocking out the
most popular payments systems,some 80 t o 9 0 ^ o f revenue stream was lost,at least ^5Mdollars. Wehave
since worked around this, and can now take PayPal, Visa and Mastercard through the appropriate proxies, but
the Bank of America interdiction remains."Assange Annotations,supra note24.
1FN189^.See,e.g.,Glenn Greenwald,Attempts to ProsecuteWikiLeaks Endanger Press Freedoms,Salon (Dec.
14, 2010, 6:15 AM), http:// www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/14/wikileaks/index.html
Ihereinafter Greenwald,Attempts to Prosecuted; Clint Hendler,TheWikiLeaksEquation:Secrets,Free Speech,
and
the
Law,
Colum.
Journalism
Rev.
(Dec.
28,
2010),
ht
tp://www.cjr.org/behind the news/the wikileaks equation.php; Shane,supranote73.
lFN190LP^ul Farhi, At theTimes,aScoopDeferred,Wash. Post, Dec. 17,2005, at A7,available at ht
tp://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR2005121601716.htmL

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1FN191^.Of less importance, but worth noting nonetheless,was the role of thePirate Party in Sweden,which
hosted the data, and the Swiss Pirate Party, which had registered wikileaks.ch months earlier and made it immediately available as the backup domain name that has provided access since the shutdown by EveryDNS.These
partiesareregisteredintheir national systemsaspoliticalparties; the SwedishPirateParty actually has two
members ofparliament in the European Parliament.They refiect the beginnings ofthe institutionalization ofthe
anti-authoritarianculture of peer-to-peer file sharing and its conversion into amore establishedpart of the
European political system.
1FN192^ B G , The 24 Hour Athenian Democracy, The Economist (Dec
tp://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/12/more wikileaks.

8, 2010, 11:48 AM), ht

lFN19311d
1FN194^. FBI in Hunt for Pro-WikiLeaks Hackers: Report, Agence France Presse, Dec. 31, 2010, available at
12/31/lOAgenceFrPresse 19:50:53 (Westlaw)
1FN195^.B.G., supra note 192. Assange's annotations to this article suggest that at least Assange disagrees with
my assessment of the effect, and he believes that "li^t appears that the supportive attacks won us more popular
support than we lost and possibly also asa'social discipline'mechanism, these'online protests'may be valuable
in policing future extrajudicial censorship attacks."Assange Annotations,supra note24.
1^FN196^.Kim ^etter,WikiLeaks Posts Mysterious'Insurance'File, Threat Level (Wired) (July 30, 2010, 3:09
PM),http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/wikileaks-insurance-file.
1^FN197^ Ashley Fantz, Assange's 'Poison Pill'File Impossible to Stop, Expert Says, CNN (Dec.8, 2010), ht
tp://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-08/us/wikileaks.poison.pill l_iulian-assange-wikileaks-key-encryption.
l^FN198^.0ssiCarp,"ANewWikiLeaks"Revolts Against Assange, DN.se, Dec. 9,2010(MajsanBostrom,
trans.),http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/a-new-wikileaksrevolts-against-assange-l.1224764.
1FN199^. Id.(describing OpenLeaks); BrusselsLeaks About, http://brusselsleaks.com/about (last visited Feb.
22,2011)
1FN200^. Michael Calderone, NY Times Considers Creating an 'E^ Pass Lane for Leakers,' The Cutline
(Yahoos)
(Jan
25,
2011,
8:38
AM),
http://
news.yahoo.com/s/yblogthecutline/20110125/tsyblog_thecutline/nytimesconsiderscreating-an-ez-pass-laneforleakers.
1FN201^.About theTransparency Unit, AlJazeeraTransparency Unit, http://www.ajtransparency.com (last visitedFeb 19,2011)
1FN202^. The Palestine Papers, Al Jazeera, http:// english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers (last visited Feb. 19,
2011)
11N203^. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y ofState, Remarks on Intemet Freedom at theNewseum (Jan. 21,
2010), available at http://wwwstate.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
1^FN204^ 403 L^S713(1971)

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1FN205^.See generally NeilSheehan etal.,The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the NewYorkTimes(1971).
1FN206^.Stone, supra note 169,at 11; see also Hedrick Smith, Mitchell Seeks toHalt Series onVietnam, but
Times
Refuses,
N.Y.
Times,
June
15,
1971,
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/04/13/reviews/papers-mitchell.htmL
lFN207^^cwYork Times. 403 U S a t 730 (emphasis added)
lFN208^.Id.at 728.
1FN209^.Id. at 727-28 ("In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our
national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas ofnational defense and intemationalaffairsmaylieinanenlightenedcitizenry in aninformed and criticalpublicopinionwhich alone
can here protect the values of democratic government.For this reason,it is perhaps here thatapress that is alert,
aware,and free most vitally serves the basic purpose ofthe First Amendment.For without an informed and free
press there cannot be an enlightened people.").
1FN210^ See Stone, supranote 130
lFN211JNearvMinnesota,283 US 697,716 (1931)
lFN212^NewYork Times, 403 U S a t 729
lFN213^MassesPubl'gCovPatten,244 F 535 ( S D N Y 1917)
1FN214^249 US47(1919)
1FN215^ 395 CS 444(1969)
1^FN216^ 274 CS 357 (1927)
lFN217^.Bartnickiv Voppei,532 US 514, 528 (2001)(quotingSmithvDaily Mail Publ'gCo,443 U S 9 7 ,
103 (1979)).
1FN218^ See,eg,Landinark Commc'ns, Inc v Va,435 US 829 (T978); Worrell Newspapers o f l n d v West
hafer,739 F2dl219,1223 (7thCir 1984), affd 469 US 1200 (1985j;GeoffreyR Stone, Perilious Times:
Free Speech inWartime From the Sedition Act of 1798 to theWar onTerrorism (2004); Stone,supra notel69,
at 14 (citing David A. Strauss,Freedomof Speech andthe Common-Law Constitution, in Eternally Vigilant:
Free Speech in the Modem Era 32, 57-59 (Lee C.Bollinger^GeoffreyR. Stone ed.,2002)(arguing that "it is
difficult to believe that the Court would have allowed newspaper editors to be punished, criminally, after they
published the IPentagon^Papers").
1FN219^. See Mary-Rose Papandrea,Lapdogs, Watchdogs and Scapegoats, 831nd.L.1.233,234-35 (2007); see
also Stone, supra notel69,at 27 n.2.
lFN220^YickWovHopkins,118CS 356, 374 (1886); seealsoBoumedienevBush,553 US 723 (2008)
1FN221^ See GeraldLNeuman, Whose Constitution7 100YaleLJ 909 (1991); see also JoseACabranes, Our
Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application ofU.S.Constitutional Law, 118 Yale

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LJ 1660 (2009)
lFN222^Id
lFN223^Boumediene,553 US723
l^FN224^1dat 765 (quotingMurphyvRainsey,114CS 15,44 (1885))
lFN225^DownesvBidwelL182US 244,282 83 (1901)
1FN226^ 376 US 254(1964)
1FN227^.See SecuringThe Protection Of Our Enduring And Established Constitutional Heritage ("SPEECH")
Act of2010,28 CSCA^^41014105 (West 2010)
1FN228^. JamesMadison, Letter to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), i n 9 The Writingsof James Madison 103,
103-09 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,1910)(1822)("ApopularGovemment,without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it,is butaProloguetoaFarceoraTragedy; or, perhaps both.Knowledge will forever govem ignorance: Andapeople who meantobe their ownGovernors,must armthemselves withthe power which knowledge gives.").
1FN229^.Special Report w/Brit Hume: How the BlogosphereTook on CBS'Docs (Fox News television broadcast Sept. 14,2004), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,132494,00html(transcript).
1FN230^ Brian Stelter, Jonathan Klein to Leave CNN, Media Decoder (N Y Times) (Sept 24,2010,10:12
AM),http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/jonathankleintoleave-cnn;CatherineTaylor, With
Jonathan Klein Dismissal, CNN Finally Pushes the Panic Button, bNet (Sept 27, 2010), ht
tp://www.bnet.com/blog/new-media/with-jonathan-klein-dismissal-cnn-finally-pushes-the-panic-button/6204.
l^FN231^.Burns^Somaiya, supra note 69.
lFN232^ Keller, supranote 54
1FN233^.Paul Starr,Goodbye to the Age ofNewspapers (Hello toaNewEra of Corruption),The New Republic,
March
4,
2009,
at
28,
available
at
http://
www.tnr.com/article/goodbye-the-age-newspapers-hello-neweracorruption.
lFN234^BranzburgvHayes,408 US 665,704 (1972)
1F^235^.Stone, supra note 169,atl.
1FN236^. Meet the Press (NBC television
tp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40720643 (transcript).

broadcast

Dec.

19,

2010),

l^FN237^.Burns^Somaiva, supra note 69,atAl.
l^FN238^ Keller, supranote 54
^FN239^.Greenwald,Strange and Consequential,supra note41.

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at

ht

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1FN240^.See, e.g.,Yochai Benkler,TheWealthofNetworks: How Social ProductionTransforms Markets and
Freedom ch.7 (2006); see generally Clay Shirky,Cognitive Surplus (2010); Dan Gilmore,Wethe Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People,for the People (2006).
1FN241^. Paul McLeary, How TalkingPointsMemo Beat the Big Boys on the U.S. Attorney Story, Colum.
Joumalism
Rev
(Mar
15,
2007,
1:53
PM),
http://
www.cjr.org/behind the news/how talkingpointsmemo beat the.php.
1FN242^. Pulitzer Prize in Investigative Reporting: Deadly Choices at Memorial, ProPublica, ht
tp://www.propublica.org/awards/item/pulitzer-prize-in investigative-reporting-deadly-choices-at-memorial (last
visited Feb 19,2011)
1FN243^ vonBulowv vonBulow,811F2dl36,144(2dCir 1987)
lFN244^Id(alterationinoriginal)(emphasisadded)(quotingLovellvGriffin,303 US 444,452 (1938))The
Third Circuit, in In re Madden,interpreted this as "the Supreme Court's recognition that the'press'includes all
publications that contribute to the free fiowofinformation."151F.3d 125,129 (3dCii,1998).
1FN245^.von Bulow.811F.2d at 144 45(alteration in original)(quotingBranzburgv.Hayes,408 U.S 665,705
(1972), and later quoting Branzburg language on the lonely pamphleteer).
lFN246^SeeShoenvShoen,5F3d 1289. 1293 (9th Cir 1993)
l^FN247^Madden,151F3datl30
1FN248^ ld atl28
1FN249^. Free Republic, http://www.freerepublic.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
1^FN250^. Power Line, http://www.powerlineblog.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
1^FN251^. Julian Assange, State and Terrorist Conspiracies, iq.org, Nov. 10, 2006, available at http://eryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf.
lFN252^Id
1FN253^.The closest he comes toit is the implication,in the second version of the essay,that the Republican
and Democratic parties would fit his definition of'conspiracy."See Julian Assange,Conspiracy as Governance,
iq.org, Jul. 31, 2010, available at http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf.
1FN254^.See supra notes21-40 and accompanying text.
1F1^255^. If that was the purpose, it is hard to tell whether it was successful in the long term. Initial public statements suggest that the responseisless oriented towardlimiting information sharing,andmoretoward tighter
controls on how easy it is to copy information,on identifying patterns ofleakage,and on identifying individuals
at risk for disaffection.See,e.g.,DOD News Briefing,supra note5.The primary available formal action known
publicly isamemorandum from the Office ofManagement and Budget detailing appropriate agency efforts that
seemtobefocusedonpreventing leakage,bothtechnicalandhuman,ratherthaneffortstolimit information
sharing. How these will be implemented remains, of course, to be seen. See Memorandum for the Heads of Ex

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ecutive Departments and Agencies,from JacobJ.Lew,Director,Office of Management and Budget,re:lnitial
Assessments of Safeguarding and Counterintelligence Postures for Classified National Securitylnformation in
Systems
(Jan.
3,
2011),
available
at
http://
msnbcmeAutomated
dia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/OMB Wiki memo.pdf.
1FN256^. lnstapundit.com, http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
1FN257^.Sunlight Foundation, http://sunlightfoundation.com (last visitedFeb.23,2011).
1FN258^. Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
1^FN259^.Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com (last visited Feb.23,2011);Townhall.com,http://townhallcom
(last visited Feb. 23, 2011). Note, however, that it appears that these kinds ofengaged, larger scale participatory
platforms are more typical of the lefi wing of the blogosphere than the right wing.SeeYochaiBenkler^Aaron
Shaw,ATaleofTwoBlogospheres: Discursive Practices on the Left and Right 23 (Berkman Ctr. for Internets
Soc'y
at
Harvard
Univ.,
Apr
27,
2010),
available
at
http://
cy
ber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Benkler Shaw Tale of^
Two Blogospheres Mar2010.pdf.
lFN260^.SeeYochai Benkler, Giving the Networked Public SphereTime to Develop, inWill the Last Reporter
PleaseTurn Out the Lights:The Collapse of Journalism and What Can Be Done to Fix It (Robert McChesney^
Victor Packard, eds.,forthcoming 2011); Benkler, supra note240.
lFN261^BranzburgvHayes,408 US 665, 704 (1972).
l^FN262^.Feinstein, supra notel28.
1FN263^.Charlie Savage, Building Case for Conspiracy by WikiLeaks,N.Y.Times,Dec.16, 2010, atAl,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/16wiki.htmL
1^FN264^.United StatesvO'Brien,391US 367 (1968)(draft card burning case)
1FN265L See,eg,SneppvUnited States, 444 US 507 (1980); P i c k e r i n g v B d o f E d u c , 3 9 1 U S 563,568
(1968); Stone, supranote 169,at 1418
1FN266^.For an overview of sources ofliability,see StephenLVladeck,The Statutory Framework, in Geoffrey
R.Stone, First Amendment Ctr.,Govemment Secrecy vs.Freedom of the Press 35 (2006), available at http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/Govt.Secrecy.Stone.pdf.
1^FN267^ 1 8 U S C ^ 793(e)(2006)
1^FN268^ 1 8 t ^ S C ^ 952 (2006)
1F1^269^ 18USC^1030(a)(l)(SuppIlI2010)
1FN270^ 1 8 U S C ^ 1030(a)(5)(SuppIII2010)
lFN271^SeeUnitedStatesvMorison,844 F2d 1057 (4th Cirl988)

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1FN272^.See generally Sheehan, supra note 205;see also Stone, supra notel30, at 500-16.
1FN273^ 532 US 514(2001)
1^FN274^ Stone, supranotel69,at2123.
lFN275^Idat23
1FN276^. GlennGreenwald, Gettingto AssangeThrough Manning, Salon(Dec 16, 2010, 8:17 AM), ht
tp://www.salon,com/news/opinion/glenn_ greenwald/2010/12/16/wikileaks Ihereinafter Greenwald, Getting to
Assange^.
1FN277^.See supra. Parts II.D.lIl.D.3(describing the multi-system attack onWikileaks).
1^FN278^ See Birnhack^ElkinKoren, supra note 148, at 25.
lFN279^439 F S u p p 2 d 974 ( N D C a L 2006), superseded by statute, FISA Amendments Act of2008. Pub L
No 110 261, 122 Stat 2436, as recognized in H e p t i n g v A T ^ T C o r p , 5 3 9 F3d 1197(9th Cir 2008)
(remanding in light of the FISA Amendments Act).Foracolleetion of documents from the case, see Heptingv.
AT^T,Electronic Frontier Found.,http://www.eff.org/cases/hepting^242 (last visited Apr.l,2011).
lFN280^FISAAmendmentsActof2008,PubL No 110 2 6 1 ^ 802,122 Stat 2436, 2468 70 (codified as
amendedat50CSC^ 1885a(Supplll2010))
lFN281^1nieNat'l Sec AgencyTelecommRecordsLitig,633 FSupp2d 949 ( N D C a L 2009)
lFN282^Benkler, supra note240, at c h 7
l^FN283^SeeWilkievRobbins.551US 537 (2007^
1FN284^.See id.at 568 (Thomas!.,concurring in part).
1FN285^ See,eg,Writers Guild of A i n , W , l n e v Am Broad Co,609 F2d 355. 365(9th Cir 1979)
(describing and citingawide range of cases on regulation by raised eyebrow,or jawboning).
lFN286^Restatement (Second) ofTorts^ 766 (1979)
lFN287^.ProsserandKeetononTorts^ 129(W.PageKeetonetaLeds.,5thed.
law).

1984)(citing extensive case

lFN288^.AWSCustomer Agreement, Amazon WebServices, http:// aws.amazon.com/agreement (last visited
Feb. 6, 2011). These terms were superseded by terms updated on February 8, 2011, but purported to apply to actions at the time of the events described here.
l^FN289^AttemptsonJan.29,201L
1FN290^ Restatement (Second) ofContracts^ 206(1981)
lFN291^Idat^205

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lFN292^1dat^208
1FN293^.See United Statesv.Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (refusing to createaspecial antitrust law for
the press).
lFN294^Restatement(Second)ofTorts^ 766B(1979)
lFN295^ Seesupranotes 290 292
1FN296^ Restatement(Second)ofTorts^ 766 cmts rs(1979)
1^FN297^.Kristol, supra note 101.It is worth noting that organizations,likeWikileaks, that depend on bobbing
and weaving hetweenjurisdictions may not choose to employ this technique,so as not to risk jurisdictional exposure.On the other hand, corefacilities the organization needs like DNS service and hosting-are subject to
the jurisdiction, so bringing action may not be seen as fundamentally increasing the organization's exposure.
1FN298^.Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins ofModern Communication 88 90 (2004); 1th
ieldeSolaPool,TechnologiesofFreedom 75 80 (1984)
1FN299^ Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Red 17905, ^ IV (F C C. 2010), available at ht
tp://wwwfccgov/Daily Releases/Daily Business/2010/dbl223/FCC 10 201Al pdf
1^FN300^.See generally Benkler, supra note240,at chs.67.
1FN301^ See generally id.at chs.24,7
1FN302^. See generally Starr, supra note 298.
lFN303^Id
l^FN304^1amesRBeniger, The Control Revolution(1986)
lFN305^.Benkler,supranote240,atchs.6.
1^FN306J.Eli M.Noam,Media Ownership and Concentration in America 377 Tablel5.4(2009).
1^FN307^.Warren Buffet explained this most clearly inaletter to shareholders ofBerkshire Hathaway inl984:
The economics ofadominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the business world.Owners,
naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn
outawonderfulproduct.Thatcomfortabletheory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While firstelassnewspa
pers make excellent profits, the profits of third rate papers are as good or better as long as either class of paper
is dominant within its community. Of course, product quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving
dominance.Webelieve this was the case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who preceded us.
Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how good or how bad the paper
will be.Good or bad,it will prosper.That is not true of most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics.But evenapoor newspaper isabargain to most citizens simply because of its "bulletin board"
value.Other things being equal,apoor product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved byafirstclassproduct.Apoor product, however,will still remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their at

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tention will commandtheattentionofadvertisers. Sincehighstandardsarenot imposedby themarketplace,
management must impose its own.
Letter fromWarrenBuffett,Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway,Inc.,to Shareholders ofBerkshire Hathaway,
Inc.(1984),available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.htmL
1^FN308^.Letter fromWarrenBuffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway,lnc.,to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway,Inc.(1990),available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1990.htmL
lFN309^Id
1FN310^.Letter fromWarrenBuffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway,lnc.,to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway,Inc.(1991),available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1991.html
lFN311^Buffetputit:
An economic franchise arises fromaproduct or service that: ( l ) i s needed or desired; (2) is thought by
its customers tohave no close substitute and;(3)is not subject toprice regulation.The existence of allthree
conditions will be demonstrated byacompany's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and
thereby to earn high rates of retum on capitaL Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminishafranchise's profitability,but they cannot infiict mortal damage.
Id
lFN312^ld
lFN313^Id
1FN314^.Summary ofFindings, Public Knowledge ofCurrent Affairs Little Changed by News and Information
Revolutions: What Americans Know: 1989-2007,PewResearchCenter for thePeople^thePress (Apr. 15,
2007),
ht
tp://people-press.org/report/319/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed-by-news-and-information-re
volutions.
lFN315^.Foramore detailed analysis of this phenomenon andareview of the literature,see generally Benkler,
supra note 240, at chs. 5-6.
1FN316^.Inquiry into Section73.1910of the Comm'n'sRules^Regulations Concerning the Gen.Faimess Doc
trine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102F.C.C 2d 142,246 (1985)(declaring that the Fairness Doctrine was
no longer in the public interest).
1FN317^. See generally Cass R.Sunstein, Republic.com (2001).
1FN318^.See generally Benkler,supranote240,at chs.2-4.
1FN319^.Carl Shapiro^HalR.Varian, Information Rules:AStrategic Guide to the Network Economy 19-27
(1999)
1^FN320^.See, e.g.,Benkler,supra note 240, at ch.3;see generally Clay Shirky,Here Comes Everybody (2008);
Siva Vaidhyanathan, Anarchist in theLibrary: HowtheClashBetweenFreedomandControlisHackingthe
RealWorld and Crashing the System (2005).

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1FN321^. See, e.g., Don Tapscott ^ Anthony Williams, Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes
Everything (2006); RobertDHof, The Power ofUs, Business Week, June20, 2005,at 74 82, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05 25/b3938601.htm.
1FN322^. For example, the peer-to-patent initiative, developed by Beth Noveck as an academic, seeks to hamess
distributed knowledge to improve the quality of patents granted.SeePeerto-Patent,Open Government Initiative,The WhiteHouse,http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/innovations/PeertoPatent. Onthelocal level,efforts
range from very practical strategies to improve services through harnessing distributed citizen reporting systems,
like Boston's New Urban Mechanics initiative, see The Mayor's Office of New Urban Mechanics, http://www.newurbanmechanics.org, toa widerangeofeffortstoengagecitizensinparticipatory budgetingor
planning,see Jennifer Shkabatur,Cities^Crossroads:DigitalTechnology and Local Democracy in America,
76BrookLRev(forthcoming2011).
lFN323^.Flickr,http://www.fiickr.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011)
1FN324^. allrecipes.com, http://allrecipes.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
lFN325^.TripAdvisor, http://www.tripadvisor.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
1FN326^. Yelp, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
1FN327^. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); Revver, http://www.revver.com (last
visited Apr. 19,2011); metacafe,http://www.metacafe.com (last visited Feb.22,2011).
lFN328^.RobertF.Worth^DavidD.Kirkpatrick,SeizingaMoment,Aljazeera Galvanizes Arab Frustration,
N.Y.
Times,
Jan.
27,
2011,
at
Al,
available
at
ht
tp://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28jazeera.html.
1FN329^, Top Sites, Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/News (last visited Jan. 28, 2011)
lhereinafterAlexaRankingsj(ranking the most popular news websites).
1FN330^.David Reid^TaniaTeixeira, Are People Ready to Pay for Online News7,BBC Click (Feb 26, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/programmes/click online/8537519.stm.It is difficult totranslate exactly from daily
subscriptionnumbers which may include multiple readers per household and need to be multiplied to reacha
monthlyfigure—andto know what 36 million online readers really means. The numbers should therefore be read
for illustration purposes only.
1^FN331^. Alexa Rankings,supra note 329.lexcludehereTheWeather Channel andYahool News from whati
consider to be "news outlets."Both are ranked ahead ofthe Huffington Post, however.
1FN332^.SeeTalkingpointsmemo.com, Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/talkingpointsmemo.com (last visited Apr. 1,2011).TocompareTalking Points Memo with theBaltimore and Atlanta newspapers,click onthe
"TrafficStats"tab,type http://www.baltimoresun.com and http://www.ajc.com into the"Compare" boxes,and
click"Compare."The"TrafficRank" tab describes the sites'Alexa traffic rank, and the"Reach" tab describes
the percent ofglobal Intemet users who visit the sites.
1FN333^.Noam Cohen, Now Hiring atTalking Points Memo, N.Y.Times,July 12,2009,at B5,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/business/media/13marshall.htmL

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1FN334^. See About Us, ProPublica, http://www.propublica.org/about (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
1FN335^.See About, The American Independent, http://tainews.org/about (last visited Apr.3,2011).
1FN336^.See About Us,FactCheck.org, http://factcheck.org/about (last visitedApr. 3,2011).
1FN337^. See About Us, Sunlight Foundation, http://sunlightfoundation.com/about (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
lFN338^.Benkler^Shaw,supranote 259,at4.
lFN339^Idat23
lFN340^.Newsvine, http://www.newsvine.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
lFN341^.Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
1FN342^.Crooked Timber, http://crookedtimber.org (last visited Apr.3,2011).
1FN343^.See supra noteland accompanying text and Part III.A and accompanying text.
1FN344^. Chris Lefkow,CORRECTED: Future of Joumalism Debated inUS Senate, Agence France Presse,
May 7,2009,available at 5/7/09 AgenceFrPressel8:16:00 (Westlaw)
1FN345^. See How Will Journalism Survive the Intemet Age7, Fed. Trade Comm'n, ht
tp://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml(last visited Apr. 1, 2011); Fed.TradeComm'n,Staff Dis
cussion Draft: Potential Policy Recommendations to Support the Reinvention ofjournalism (2010), available at
www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/junl5/docs/new-staffdiscussion.pdf.
1^FN346^. Starr, supra note 233.
1FN347^. Govemment Intervention to Save Journalism (WNYC radio broadcast July 16, 2010), available at http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/07/16/02.
1FN348^.See generally,e.g.,RobertW.McChesney^JohnNichols,The Death and Life of American Journalism(2010); LeonardDownie,Jr.^MichaelSchudson,TheReconstructionof American Journalism,Colum.
Journalism Rev.,Oct.l9,2009,http://www.cjr.org/reconstruction/the reconstruction of^american.php.
1FN349^ Thomas Friedman, OpEd,Too Good to Check,NY Times, Nov 17,2010, at A33,available at ht
tp://www.nytimes.com/2010/ll/17/opinion/17friedman.htmL
1FN350^.Amajor Indian news outlet that Forbes Magazine described ina2006 article as "India's top-rated Eng
lish-languagenews channel."NaazneenKarmali,NewsDelhiTV,Forbes.com(Sept. 18,2006),http:// membersforbescom/global/2006/0918/034htmL
1FN351^ Press Trust oflndia, US to Spend ^200 mnaDay on Obama's Mumbai Visit, NDTV (Nov 2,2010,
8:54 PM IST), http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/us to spend-200-mn-a-day-on-obama s-mumbai-visit-64106.
1FN352^
The
Drudge
Report
www.drudgereportarchives.com/data/2010/ll/02/20101102

(Nov
2,
2010),
http://
155942.htm (precise timestamp unavailable).

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1FN353^.Doug Powers, Obama to See India on ^200 MillionaDay,MichelleMalkin(Nov.2, 2010, 1:53 PM),
http://michellemalkin.com/2010/ll/02/india.
lFN354^2ndUPDATE Obama IndiaTrip: 34 Warships^lkmLong AC BombProofTunnell, Daily Paul
(Nov. 2, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www dailypaul.com/node/148219; Joe Biden Making His Move on Obama,
Lame
Cherry
(Nov
2,
2010,
11:22
AM),
ht
tp://lamecherry.blogspot.com/2010/ll/joe-biden-makinghismoveon-obama.html;Obamas'IndiaTrip Costing
USA ^200 Million PER DAY, KatABlog (Nov 2, 2010, 12:28 PM), http://wwwkatablogcom/display
blogcfm7bid^0E0FDD3CB83EF4FC82ElFA3F39F534A8
1FN355^ Stack of Stuff Qi^i^k Hits Page, The Rush Limbaugh Show (Nov 2, 2010), ht
tp://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site ll0210/content/01125104.guest.htmll^hereinafter Rush Limbaugh
Show^.
1FN356^ James White,'^200maDay'Cost ofBarack Obama's Trip to India Will Be Picked Up b y U S Tax
payers.
Mail
Online
(Nov.
2,
2010),
http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1325990/Obamas-200m-day-India-visit-pickedUS-taxpayers.htmL
1FN357J.The Media Desk, Election Night:LiveBlogging the Media Coverage, Media Decoder (N.Y.Times)
(Nov
2,
2010,
11:26
PM),
http://
mediadecoder,blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/electionnightwatching-the-media-coverage/^carter-on-fox-huckabeeputs
-a-price-tag-on-a-state-visit ("On FoxNews,one of the potential futureRepublicanpresidentialcandidateson
the network's payroll,Mike Huckabee,said that the president was about to takeahuge entourage tolndia this
week that would cost the American people ^200 millionaday-but that was less than the government spent each
day in the United States, so the people were probably gettingabreak.").
1FN358^.Rush Limbaugh Show,supra note 355.
1FN359^.Doug Powers, Details of Obama's Big'Carbon Footprint Felt 'Round theWorld'Tour,ThePowers
That
Be
(Oct
29,
2010),
http://
dougpowers.com/2010/10/29/details-of-obamas-bigcarbonfootprintfeltround-the-world-tour.
1FN360^.Robert Knight, Pulling Back the Curtain on Obama's Audacity,WashingtonTimes, Nov. 1,2010, at
Bl,
available
at
http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/29/pullingbackthe-curtainonobamas-audacity.
1FN361^. EricBolling,Follow theMoney(FO^ Business televisionbroadcast Nov. 3,2010),available at http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/201011030048.
1FN362^
Hannity, (FO^ NEWS television
tp://mediamatters.org/mmtv/201011030052.

broadcast

Nov

3,

2010),

available

at

ht

1FN363^.Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Nov.4,2010) Ihereinafter Anderson Cooper 360^.
1FN3641.
Trip
to
Mumbai,
FactCheck.org
factcheck.org/2010/ll/ask-factcheck-trip-to-mumbai.

(Nov.

3,

2010),

http://

1FN365J.Sarah Pavlus,White House Debunks "Wildly Infiated"S200MperDayPriceTag for Obama's India

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Trip,
County
Fair
(Media Matters
tp://mediamattersorg/blog/201011030032

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for

America)

(Nov

3,

2010,

4:31

PM),

ht

IFN.366^.Foreign Currency,Snopes.com,http://www.snopes.eom/politics/obama/india.asp (last updated Nov.5,
2010). The precise time of the original Snopes.com post has been obscured by the November 5th update of that
site's analysis.
lFN3671.JonathanWeisman, Fuzzy Math Dogs Obama's AsiaTrip,WashingtonWire (The Wall Street Joumal)
(Nov.4,2010,3:16PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/ll/04/fuzzy-math-dogs-obamas-asia-trip.
1FN368^. Details on Obama Trip Remain Unclear, Glenn Beck (Nov
tp://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/47729.

5, 2010, 12:53 PM), ht

1FN369^. See Media Cloud, http://www.mediacloud.org (last visited Apr. l,2011)(results of analysis on file
with author). Media Cloud isaresearch platform developed at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at
Harvard University.The lead developer ofthe project is Hal Roberts.The development team includes David La
rouchelle,CatherineBracy,and associated researchersincludeEthanZuckerman,BruceEtling, John Palfrey,
Urs Gasser,Rob Faris,andYochai Benkler.
1FN370^ No, Obama's Not Taking 34 Navy Ships to India with Him, Hot Air (Nov 4, 2010,7:02 PM),http://hotair.com/archives/2010/ll/04/no-obamasnottaking34-navy-ships-to-indiawithhim.
1FN371^.Glenn Reynolds, Debunking:No,Obama'sNotTaking34Navy Ships tolndia with Him, Instapundit.com (Nov. 4, 2010, 8:21PM), http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit/109224.
^FN372^.Doug Mataconis, Obama's India Trip CostingS 200MillionADay7 Don't Believe It, Outside the Belt
way
(Nov
4,
2010),
http://
www.outsidethebeltway.com/obamasindia-trip-costing-200-million-adaydontbelieve-it.
1FN373^. Anderson Cooper 360, supra note 363.
1FN374^. Friedman, supra note 8.
lFN375^Id
1FN376^. See, e.g., Greenwald, Attempts to Prosecute, supra note 189.
1F^377^.See Greenwald,Strange and Consequential,supra note41;see also Greenwald,Inhumane Conditions,
supra note 46; Greenwald, Getting to Assange, supra note 276.
1FN378^. Friedman, supra note 8.
1^FN379^ Keller, supra note 54
lFN380^Id
lFN381^Id
1FN382^. Strom, supra note 22.

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1FN383^.See Pentagon Report, supra note21,at 2,6.
lFN384^Keller,supranote54
1FN385^. See Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War and American Diplomacy, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2011/video/opensecrets/edited.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (containing the
edited version ofthe footage).
1FN386^. Ironically, given the general concern about distributed editorial platform, among the better sources colleeting and providing an objective overview of the competing interpretations of the edited volume is theWikipe
dia article on the subject. See luly
12, 2007 Baghdad Airstrike, Wikipedia, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July 12, 2007 Baghdad airstrike (last visited Apr.2,2011).
1^FN387^.Keller, supra note 54 ("Atapoint when relations between the news organizations and WikiLeaks were
rocky,at least three people associated with this project had inexplicable activity in their e-mail that suggested
someone was hacking into their accounts."). In his annotations to this article, Assange stated: "This allegation is
simply grotesque."Assange Annotations,supra note 24.
lFN388^Keller,supranote54
lFN389^Id
lFN390^Id
1FN391^. AlanRusbridger, WikiLeaks:The Guardian's RoleintheBiggest Leak in theHistoryof the World,
guardian.co.uk,
Jan.
28,
2011,
http://
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jan/28/wikileaks-julian-assange-alan-rusbridger.
1FN392^.Rosenbach^Stark,supra note78. Assange,in his annotations tothis article,explained that the disagreement with Keller was over Keller's decision tokillapieceonTask Force 373,the targeted assassination
squad, authored by national security reporter Eric Schmitt, and widely considered by other papers to be one of
themost important revelations in the Afghan War logs. Assange Annotations, supranote 24. A Lexis-Nexis
search of the NewYorkTimes suggests that,indeed,Task Force 373is mentioned only once,inabrief, highly
sanitizedversion:"SecretcommandounitslikeTaskForce 373—a classified group of Army and Navy special
operatives—workfroma'capture/kill list' ofabout 70 topinsurgent commanders.Thesemissions, whichhave
been stepped up under theObama administration, claim notable successes, but have sometimes gone wrong,
killing civilians and stoking Afghan resentment."C.J.Chivers etal.,The Afghan Struggle: ASecret Archive,
NYTimes, July 26, 2010, a t A l
lFN393^Keller,supranote54
lFN394^Id
lFN395^Id
lFN396^.Leigh^Harding, supra note 54.
lFN397^Keller,supranote54

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l^FN398^1d
lFN399^Id
lFN400^Id
lFN401^ Id (emphasis added)
lFN402^1d
lFN403^.Rosenbach^Stark, supra note 78
1^FN404^ Keller, supranote 54.
lFN405^Id
1FN406^. Javier Moreno, Lo Q^^ de Verdad Ocultan los Gobiernos, El Pais, Dec. 19, 2010, http://
www.elpais.com/articulo/intemacional/verdad/ocultan/Gobiernos/elpepuint/20101218elpepuint
23/Tes ("Pero
sibastanteparadartestimoniodequelounicoquesediscutioentodoslosencuentrosfuelaconvenienciade
acordaruncalendariocomundepublicacionylaexigenciadeprotegernombres,fuentesodatosquepudiesen
ponerenriesgolavidadepersonasenpaisesenlosquelapenademuertesiguevigente,oenlosquenorigeel
Estadodederechocomosedisfruta en Occidente."). My thanks to Fernando Bermejo for the pointer and translation.
l^FN407^.Burns^Somaiya,supra note 69.
1FN408^.Special Reportw/Brit Hume, supra note 229.
lFN409^ Keller, supra note 54
l^FN410^1d
1^FN411^ Paul Farhi, supranote 190
l^FN412^.EricRaymond,The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental
Revolutionary
19,
30
(Tim
O'Reilly
ed,
rev
ed
2001),
available
at
ht
tp://www.catb.org/-esr/writings/cathedralbazaar/cathedralbazaar/ar01s04.htmL
1FN413^.See Internet Gains onTelevision as Public's Main News Source,PewResearch Center for the People
^
the
Press
(Jan
4,
2011),
ht
tp://people-press.org/2011/01/04/intemet gains on-television-as-publics-main-news-source. Although the Internet is gaining asadelivery vehicle,much of what is used ontheNet is the online version of major traditional
media outlets.See Matthew Hindman,The Myth ofDigital Democracy 58-67 (2009).
1FN414^.See generally Benkler, supra note 240,at212-73;DanielW.Drezner^HenryFarrel,The Power and
Politics ofBlogs,134 Pub.Choicel5 (2007);KevinWallsten,Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of theRelationshipbetweenMainstream Media and Political Blogs, 24Rev. Pol'y Res. 567 (2007); Kevin
Wallsten,Political Blogs:Transmission Belts,Soapboxes,Mobilizers,or Conversation Starters7,4J.Info.Tech.
^PoL19(2008)

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|^FN415^.See, e.g.,Ethan Zuckerman,Tunisia, Egypt, Gabon70ur Responsibility toWitness, My Heart's In Accra
(Feb
9,
2011,
1:40
PM),
http://
www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2011/02/09/tunisia-egyptgabon-our-responsibility-to-witness(discussingdifficultyof getting Gabon's revolution covered by GlobalVoices,throughthe media focus on Egypt andTunisia);
Ethan tuckerman. The AttentionDeficit: Plenty of Content, Yet an Absence ofinterest, NiemanRep. (Fall
2010),
ht
tp://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102448/The-AttentionDeficitPlentyofContent-Yet-an-Absenceoflnterest.aspx(describingmoregenerally the difficultiesfaced by Global Voicesintranslating the excellent
on the ground reporting its journalists were performing throughout Africa into attention in U.S. media outlets).
1FN416^.See generally SiobahnO'Mahony^Beth A.Beehky,Boundary Organizations: Enabling Collaboration
Among Cnexpected Allies, 53 Admin Sci 0 422 (2008).
1FN417^. Assange notes thatWikileaks had been working with individual Times reporters since 2007. Assange
Annotations,supra note 24.This is,perhaps,not surprising,atatime whenWikileaks was less well known and
playeda role that fit muchmoreclosely the traditional perceptionof "source." Bythe timeofthe embassy
cables, Wikileaks was no longer playing that role, and the relationship was no longer up to the individual report
er writing the story.
|^FN418^.Leigh^Harding, supra note 54.
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Wikileaks Claims Facebook Deleted
Their Fan Page Because They
"Promote Illegal
Acts" (http://gawker.com/5520933/wikil
—-claims-facebook-deleted-their-fanADRIAN CHEN (H
TTP://ADRIANCH
EN.KINJA.COM)

4/20/10 11:53pm
(htlp://ga wker.com/5520933/wikileaks
-claims-facebook-deletedtheir-fan-page-because-they

WIKILEAKS (/T..

(http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks

-ciam
, s-facebook-d=iee,d-ther,-fan page-because-they-promote-illegalacts)
L 20
page-because-they-promote-illegal- J

(http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks
-claims-facebook-deleted-their-fan- Secret-sharing website Wikileaks
page-because-they-promole-illegalactsHreplies)
(http://Wikileaks,org) is at it again,
tweeting allegations against people who
have pissed them off. Previously, it was
Robert Gates,
(http://gawker.com/5514665/wikileakssays-robert-gates-is-lying-in-his-defenseof-iraq-slaying-video) whom they called a
"liar". Tonight, it's Facebook, which
Wikileaks claims deleted its 30,000
member-strong fan club.
Wikileaks—which was, of course, the
outfit which leaked that infamous
helicopter video
(http://collateralmurder.org/)—tweeted
(http://twitter.com/wikileaks) this a few
moments ago.
WikiLfiiks lai-i'lxKik piij'f deified
toKi'tbur will) xo.ooo fans... boili'i plate
ri'spiiiise iiK-ludcs "..prcmiolcs illegal
arts..."

RELATED
Wikileaks
Says Robert
Gates Is
(http://gawker.qcijij^|5i\^^|/wikileaks
-says-robert- Defense of
gates-is-lying Iraq Slaying
Video
-in-his(http://gawker.com/55146l
defense-of-says-robert
iraq-slaying-gates-islying-in-hisvideo)
defense-ofiraq-slayingvideo)
Earlier today, on ABC's This Week,
Defense Secretary Robert Gates
defended the troops shown killing
Iraqis in a video aired by leaks site,,.
Read,,,
(http://gawker,com/55i4665/wikileaks
-says-robert-gates-is-lying-in-hisdefense-of-iraq-slaying-video)

f ' wikileaks

DEFENSE E X H I B T T ^ f o r identification
PAGE OFFERED; ___PAOE / . D M l T T E D x — ^
PAGE
of
PAGES
http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks-claims-facebook-deleted-their-fan-page-because-the.,.
7/18/201

.3\5)

Wikileaks Claims Facebook Deleted TheirFan Page EecauseThey "Promote Illegal Acts"

Page2of4
19412

However, a visit to Facebook.com/wikileaks (http://Facebook.com/wikileak^ shows that the
"Official Facebook Page" of Wikileaks is up. So what's the big deal? It appears the page that v?as"
deleted was a user-run fan page, which Wikileaks tweeted atiout earlier this month:
871 reading; Search Engine Creator's...
.loin otl I l'':u'i'l)(>ok I'':\iU'kil> at
liMp: Im.K V.I l,i!iclui.i! (owner of
taiu-lub please contact
wl-sniip()rt>'rs(o siinshinepri'ss.orK)

f.,^
Visiting the link there leads nowhere now.
Wikileaks and Facebook have clashed in the past. When they released their helicopter video
earlier this month, Wikileaks accused Facebook of "censoring" links to it. (Facebook denied this
(http://blog.dogsounds,com/20io/04/o6/facebook-censoring-wikileaks-not-so/),)
But the most interesting Facebook-Wikileaks episode occurred in 2008, when Wikileaks was
sued by Swiss bank Julius Baer (http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/bank-asks-judgeto-dismiss-its-suit-against-wikileaks-site/) over posting stolen documents relating to one of its
clients. In the course of the trial, Julius Baer subpoenaed an officer of a Wikileaks Facebook
page, mistaking him for an officer ofWikileaks itself. According to Network World
(http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/25540), Julius Baer's lawyer sent the
following to the guy—a Stanford student named Daniel Matthews:

Wikileaks lists you as an officer ofthe company on its Facebookpage. As an officer
ofa defendant in this action, my client is entitled to serve you a copy ofthe
summons and complaint pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Since Julius Baer wasn't able to get hold of a real Wikileaks employee—scattered worldwide as
they are—some random Stanford student had to go to trial on their behalf in a high profile
lawsuit. (He was listed as the "Stanford representative" of Wikileaks
(http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/03/wikileaks-restraining-order-a-failurejudge-says.ars) on the page.) He was not pleased. And the possibility of Facebook users being
sued simply for belonging to groups probably gave Facebook headaches, too. (The suit resulted
in Wikileaks being shut down for a bit by a judge, before the bank ultimately withdrew their
case.)
It's possible that, having been burned by this previous episode, Facebook is looking to head off
any other possible legal complications for its users. That, or Facebook is WORKING FOR THE
CIA.
Update: Facebook spokesman Andrew Noyes responds:

The disabled Wikileaks page was flagged as an inauthentic Facebook page and its
fans will be migrated to the authentic page soon. The administrator ofthe
inauthentic page violated our Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, particularly
Section 12.2. which states: "You may only administer a Facebook page ifyou are an
authorized representative of the subject of the page."

t Discuss
7 discussions displayed because an author
is participating or following a participant.

I participant
GoalieLax (http://goali...

11 participants
W SeAor Flandangles (htt...

http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks-claims-facebook-deleted-their-fan-page-because-the...

7/18/2013

19413

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19418

SccA'my 15-6, dated 14 Febtt-000550 swan?
For use at this term. use AR 190-45; Ina agenw in PNG.
PRNAGY ACT
AIJTHONW: Title 10. USC Section 301; Title 5. USC Section 2951; E0. 9397 Social Seeurlw Number ISSNI.
IIRINCIPAL IDURPOSE: To document colential criminal adiviu lnvolvina the us Anny. and to allow Army cllidals to minlaln diadplinQ,_
law ant order lnvasmatim of corrplalnta and mcianta I .
notmue uses: pronoun may be tulher disdosed to tedarra. state. local. and mm Govemmant raw unrurngriuu

agenelea. courts, child protective services. vidirns. witnesses. the Department ct Veteran?
the Otliae at Paraomel Management. lnturnatlon provlded any be used tor datermlnallons reoaningl
non-yudielal ptatlatenant. other dleuptlnary ecttona. aecurlv cleermeoa.
placement and emeroevsonnel actions.

orsctosunez Disclosure or you ssu and am intormacon is voluntary.

1. LOCATION DATE 3. runs
2/no MTN DIV. rm Drum. New York 20: atoms 1300 .

5. NAME. rams. MIDDLE NAME 5. ssu ri?e/srarus
Showman, lihrleah Wittuey

8. ORGANIIATICN OR ADDRESS
52. 2nd BCT. MIN DIV. Fort Drum NY

9- .
Jihrlaah Witmey Showman .wmr ro MAKE rue rouowruc statement unoen onmz



What is your name. rank. SSN. and duty position?
A: Jihrleah Wittney Shawrnarg SPC. 208-6841036, BCT Security Specialist
Q: When did you first come I) know PFC Manning?
A: MAR ot09 when he got to the unit. I was arriving to the unit and waatold by that I would he the team leader of the
3 SFs. A
0: Tell me about the incident in the spring when Manning missed formation. .,

A: He missed PT Formation in APR or MAY, there was still snowon the pound. [went to Manning's room to make sure he wn
alive. knocked (II the door. and he answered. looking like he just up. I told hin to get his P?l?s on and meet me at die entrance
to the barracks. I was not yelling at him, I was telling him what to dofthe wsyout to formation. I explained to him in a very calm
voice that he would have to reptrt early to the company for PT to ensure that he was on time. I also told him lwould have to give
him a counseling for missing fonnation. We were approaching MSG Adkins in the company parking lot. when Manning froze in his
tracks. started jumping up and down and waving his arms, yallin to the point that saliva was coming out ofhis mouth. MSG Adkins
approached Manning and asked him in a calm voice what his prob ermwas. Alter Manning calmed down. he explained that his
outburst was because he can't handle it when he makes rdiatak? or messes up. He was counseled later that day and his corrective
training was I) report to me at the company 20 minutes for day for about month. He started showing up on time after
that.

Q: was any thought given to not deploying n?ng?

A: Yes, was asked by MSG Adkins a lot abcuth;L1nlng"s mental state. if it dealt with Manning. I was asked because I was his first
line supervisor. Initially, Manning went to Behavicril at Drum, but since it was sell?-referral we never got any data back
from his appointment: and no follow-ups were scheduled. Actually, several incident: occurred that should have led to Manning not
deploying: emotional break downs-?ha would ?eece emotionally; he stated that he felt no loyalty to this nation, that the flag on his
shoulder meant nothing to him; he statedsevcral timeathat he felt paranoid, that he felt people were listening in on him; at one
point he described to me diet In the procoIs,ot' joining the Anny that he had to scrub the internet of anything with his name on it or
he wouldn't have gotten a security clearance. He told me that these things were blogs and expressed that it? the military had seen his
blogs that he never would have gotten ?a security clearance. I ?lled MSG Adkins in on that conversation and I thought that
was extreme lbra person with a cleaiance?and talked to MSG Adkins about it. He went to our OIC MAI Clauaen, ?om my
understanding, there was?nodiing'm that could have proved Manning should have stayed behind. That was due to our shop
keeping everything not the company commander. We did get Manning to go back to Behavioral Health. We
don't know what wa discussed because it wasn't command referred. That by itself, along with Manning not being able to hurdle in
day at work without an em should have caused him to stay here. I even used the phrase "possible spy? to MSG I

Adkins dunn this time


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19419
s??Ai9??E?t?i3s?lI??iE?e?rl= race is NOT uesoeo. I-Lease moceeo TO rmaL race or runs roan.
0, Showman. Iihrleah Wi_ltney Tm? 1300 amp not mm 97:
Icen?nuadl
you don?t know who decided to deploy with Manningcould have stayed at the 82 level or he may have brought it to the All MSG Adkins told me win heqbrought
it to the S1.
Q: About how often did he have these outbursts?
A: At least once a week. He would have incidents where he couldn?t work if he was corrected. I-le wouldbw rigid if he
was corrected on anything. Almost on a daily basis. Even to the point that we had to lay down the foundatli?l ho - ldiers were























to interact with Ol?cers because the work environment was getting a little too friendly and the Soldiqp were military
bearing. Even after that, where] briefed the whole shop on it, Manning got rigid and unresponsivdagainf 'lt7got to the point where LT
iclds had to go over and check if Manning was breathing, .

What was that like as his supervisor? .

A: It was liusrrating. whatever way we could give him a task and he was allowed to do it, he was tinefbitqgy detour ?om that track
for him mentally would cause him to freen and he would become emotionally unstable for a "of time.

Q: What was the effect ofManning?s behavior on the rest of the section? . I .

Hard to say. It pt them in trouble often. when one Soldier would mess up. we would bring theni ?all into the conference room to
ddress it with SGT Mitchell. They wereconstantly beirg corrected and having to learn the'ru_ha a?in. It made them less
productive. - .

During deployment. what was yourjob?

A: I was initially the NCOIC of the Fusion Cell and Manning worked nights with me. This waeduring the RIPITOA. About a month
later. alter we got Padgett to the shop, I was moved to targeting duringthe day and lladg?tt tool: over on nights. In mid
December, Manning was late to work twice and Padgett counseled hitii.? This was whe?n Maiming ?ipped the table. I witnessed what
appenedj ust alter the table was turned over because it was near sliill change and Invent to see what happened until Manning was
subdued. I wasn't surprised. I was just counting down the days unti lost it. we all pretty much thought that way. Manning had

0

Q: Alter Manning returned from EML. around FEB. he went back to days.? what was that like?

A: Manning had no physical incidents because he was watched. He would still freeze up if people tried to get him back on track
uring a brief, but overall, he wasn't as bad as before. We tried to lighten things up with a newsletter in the SCIF thattold funny
stories because it was getting pretty .

O: Was this about the time of the ?0 complaint? ..

A: I truly don't remember, but he was on days at the time-?-?this allowled him to hear everybody?s mnvenuims.
accused me of being hateful towards homosexuals because"! ?word with ref" . - - bein able to do so many

hu 1- nmosexua s. At somgt and Chief Ehresman and myself were talking -- they
can't prove thal l?FEt3e?ni Ubama was am in theilnitedvd?tes and



we mentionul that if that wm true, then Arnold Slrwarzenegger
should run. What was reported to the E0 office we hit said the President Obama had an inabilityto lead this country
because he was a foreigner. which was not the direction? ol?-the conversation. We all told the E0 of?cer what the truth was and
nothing was really done about it that I know til?. We asked to sup talking about anything that could offend people so we just
opped talking Shortly before the indent with me, gh, Manning started using words like ?faggoty" and ?gay? in a derogatory

fashion. so sent out a shop email remiridiggeveryone of the E0 complaint.

:Deseribethe incident when Manning attacked on.

A: was called in to the omce ?o_m.myQ arigsomeone couldn't find a tile on someone we were targeting. I walked into the
and no one was reallywo . CPTW. SPC-, and LT Fields were in there.Manning was playing Zunra, the gameon
his computer. I asked if would b?ef on, situation since no one was working on the task I was called in to research and

told me what they I went to workstation and asked where everyone had looked for the information and started to

pull it up on my computer. Manning got up item his computer and walked over to me with his Coke can and told me he
had already looked for the information and couldn't find it, that CPT In didn't know what she was talking about. While he paced
back and forth, I fiddledgtiith my computer and asked Manning if he had looked in a particular location on the Division Portal,
Manning said yes theyhad Ulf?id they obviously hadn't because here it is and pulled it up on my screen. Manning asserted that they
had done so and that .th_er'e_Twu no reason to berate the Soldiers in the SCIP. He was probably a mod 4 feet away from me. I told
him, ?Manning how aboutyou (btyour shit before you tell me how to fix mine?. He threw his hands up in die air, yelled ?no? and
rushed punched mela? the lice and kind of body slammed me. Then I pushed my chair back, he rushed me again andl pinned
him ground arid screamed at him if this is what he wanted. He said a couple of times he was tired of this. Then SGT Taua h?

\7

In

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

.

twp! PERSON Mgtleue statement

an iron: 32;, APO PE not

2



19420

PAQE I8 DDT NEEDED. PLEASE PROCEED FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORI.

3151551531 0; _?_bowman. J?l?clh Wittney A1 I300 20! 1/0

(Continued)

all knew this was going to happen. Nothing happened until the next day when LT -changed the code on th the
SCIF door and demanded that his weapon be taken away. The company commander was not infonned and she MPs?c??1tte
over and talte statement. No one had taken my statement until then. I believe this was in an attempt to lrergtit inteihal lathe S2
shop. but LT is very bold and l?m thankful for that because she wanted the company commander We then
immediately wrote up a derogatory report to have Manning's clearance pulled. -



10: What happened after the MP3 tool: your statement? y,
A: The MPs detained Manning and he was moved out of the S2 shop. Then the Wikilealts we were
interviewed that night. I

Q: Who did Manning 5) to chow withthe time. SPC- would talre him to chow in the rear. He would go ks Pin: Hut wallting to his room. On
hleployment, he would typically go with -nd then when they were separated and he waion days [would only see him wallting

from the Chowl-laIlhaclttohisCl-{U.
Q: Did he have any friends? 3.. 5 .
A: Not that was made known. He typically was referred to as a loner. If he had friends thd?gwould bdihis opinion of friends. kind of
one-sided friends that he tallted to in the stnolte pit ltind of randomlyever go on pass? .4:
A: In garrison, yes, he would always go back to DC. he would take a bus if he could afford it?l four day weekends. He has an aunt in
the area and his server is in the DC area and he would remote into it from here uilhlraq.
Q: What about weekends? -

A: He apentthem in his room. Once he went to Mexico. NY to "out with buddjes 6r talte a taxi to Watertown to go shopping. At
least that's what he said. He didn'tawn a car, spent most of his morncy on computers-and imrestments?he was always bragging
about how much money he made with his investments. -
0: Anything you care to add? ..
A: in the Intel community there is a large disconnect between Soldier duties anq"l??ch duties. This has caused large difficulties
when leading these soldiers. All Soldiers must know how to ful?ll the bas'ic'i'es'ponsibilities of a Soldier and this has not been a

tandard in the tech MOS's. leaders must lead regardless of the MOS. a Soldier first a Tech second. Manning could not grasp how a
true Soldier should be.
Manning had way too many windows open on his computct".No else in the shop had as many windows open atonee: in return no
one else had their computers crash many times either. The Tech had indicated many times that Manning overloaded

omputer by opating to many windows and he was downl?'p'dl'n?g to rjuty things at once. He had to have his computer wiped multiple
times during the deployment.
Command referral to Behavioral Health for ?ippl ?the table--lSG told me to talk to Manning about his command refeml to
Behavioral Health. This was an interesting intervi ?~,knaw would be chaptered out. This would have ?negative on the
world". He had said that if he is honest with the ca?selor th :they would have to chapter him out and if he gets kicked out that It

affect the whole world. I informed that he has noehoice but be honest with them.

That night before shi? change Prior to rig me in the face he sat on the lloor in the conference room in a fetus

position melting back and forth. P) pffow














m?f? son nM'i7tG srarawaar

PAGE 3 or 4 PAGES
as sonar nu, Novices Milt





19421

SecArmy15-6.dated14 Feb11-000553
3757359" op Showman. Jihricah Wiuney A1 1300 ogfea 20' 9

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19422

Offered but not admitted into evidence.

Defense Exhibit TT
have been entered into
the record as a CD/DVD
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with the original
Record of Trial

19423

Offered but not admitted into evidence.

Defense Exhibit UU
have been entered into
the record as a CD/DVD
and will be maintained
with the original
Record of Trial



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
IENITFI) STATES IRAQ
BAGHDAD. IIMQ
APO At: om:

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USFL 15 July 20l0

FOR RECORD

SUSJE CT. List for MSG Psui Adkins reference USP-I AR l5-61m/estigaticn

3 July 20!0 I interviewed MSG Paui_Adkins in support of the AR I5-6 Investigation that Iwes
-zornpietc:

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pro ?idea. 322.11 a iisi. of questions to answer using the DA Form 2823. Sworn Statement.

3. ing. is the list of questions he used to generate his statement responses and are numbered
on a'ii5 statement:

Wn.-3 account request process for the Brigade?

creates the accounts and what documentation is required (IA training. phishing, etc.)?
\vj..ar 55 required to suspend an azcounr (process. :lccumen:s. time)?

During dail duties as 2 anaiyst what level and type of information was PFC Manning required
work with?

3. what level 0 analysis was required - search and fusion or merely static analysis of provided

:eport.=.?

n? ?J-/lea: acditioncl was available in work areas for PFC Manning?: access?

Die 3-: have access via another Sl PR workstation or only via the

8. Die I does Manning possess an on

H: users'in your facility have .s'w'lC$ access?

it?: How-' are acsraurzi requests handled? (decision a.rt?.ority /job position)

. Wise! physics! separation of work area I terminals do you have from Secret to

. i'l'C Manning have used other accounts or other?: access to pull TS material?

chat logs tile: had TS (JWICS) data- do you think that is
i not??

4 is ?Last $22530 Sy-area: (HESS) iic:ded (6 systems in your brigade?

9-icnv ot"i:r= are ,?JcfiOQiC conducted of machines in your organization?

16



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. dam-e yea: had a Divisicr in-c; assistance visit (or higher) for IA/?security during your tour?
-. Mas: are kept i? it End?-viduat /and for how long?

38 Wi':at rights time. 3.4.. EA) ievei -1&5 PFC Manning possess c-n

10. rze her.? .32: perrnissions as crawler" to his machine
.'*icw mm)? and w21t- are the IMO: 5.3: BDF.

ii type? is provided for l?:iO?s in your organization?

22. 5: Manning hsve them to install such a program for him?

2.). 3.-ac aware of a Division ic cr poiicy for any oftiie things we've discussed so far:

- . Akoridcnti?ca?m


PAGE or Mots



19436

9574

USF
EC T: Question List for MSG Paul Adkins reference AR I5-6 Investigation

f.



Account creation
Rights management
Permissions
Logging

Periodic Scanning
User Training

2-1. What training have you rewived related to information assurance I security?

33'. Do you haw: your Sccurity+ certification? CISSP7

36. Do you know of any that may have caused, contrimtcd to, or
facilitated this compromise? -

On you know If any that may have caused. contributed to. or facilitated this
compromise"

28 may athcr you deem material to this Command?s situational awareness.

-1. The pain: ?or this memorandum is MAJ Randy Away at



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19441
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3 '3
0 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
I-IEADQUARTERS. smeaoe couaar TEAM

vacuums: owrsrou (uom
roar onuu. NY 13602



AFZS-BBA-IN 29 April 201 1

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10"? Mountain Division
(Light Infantry), Fort Drum, NY 13602-5000 .

Commander, 10?? Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, NY 13602-500

FOR Commander, Headquarters, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson,
Georgia 30330-1062 .

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand of Master Sergeant Paul D.
Adkins, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d set, 10?? MTN DIV, Fort Drum, NY
13602-5000 .

1. I respectfully request that this statement be reviewed and considered before a ?nal .
determination is made regarding ?ling of this Administrative Reprimand in accordance with
Anny Regulation (AR) 600-37, paragraph

2. I acknowledge receiving this Administrative Reprimand.

3. I have read and understand the tmfavorable information presented against me and submit the
following on my behalf.

a. Understanding of time line of events while in garrison.

(1)1 have read the AR 15-6 Report, and it fails to provide and establish a timeline of
events that would give the reader a better perspective of why certain courses of actions were
taken.

(2) As a leader, one learns to employ a variety of tactics to train, mentor and address
de?ciencies. Therefore, to my recollection, the ?rst outburst (he did not harm himself or others)
that PF Manning had occurred around August of 2009. We were set to deploy in September of
2009. I determined as a leader it was urgent to address whatever issues PFC Manning was
having, to ensure our section?s ability to support the needs of the Command. I had to take
control because the S-2 section was not fully functional. The S-2 was below sta?ing
requirements in accordance with the UMR. Additionally, ?ve key leaders within the section
(one CPT, one ILT, one CW2, one SSG and one SGT) deployed at least one month later than the
main body due to medical, familial or administrative requirements. Contrary to the misleading
statements in paragraph (5) of the AR 15-6 Report, I expressed my concerns about PFC Manning
at the time with MAJ Clausen, the brigade S-2. We discussed leaving PFC Manning with the
rear detachment, but we were faced with another soldier who had recently had a heart attack and
was pending medical retirement in the near future. One incident in August of 2009 by PFC

Manning was of him yelling and would not justify leaving him with rear detachment.

- "jj .
i i
PAGE of ES





AFZS-BBA-IN
SUBJECT: Rebuttal of General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand of Master Sergeant Paul D.

29 April 201 1

Adkins, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d BCT, 10"? MTN DIV, Fort Drum, NY

13602-5000

Additionally, I informed MAJ Clausen that [was referring PFC Manning to Behavioral Health.

(3) The Army has been placing an enormous emphasis on its leaders to not stigmatize and

instead assist their Soldiers in receiving mental health treatment, avoiding situations that

may lead to suicide or other behaviors harmful to Soldiers. Therefore, after his outburst, I not
only addressed concerns with leadership in the 3-2 section, but guided PFC Manning to seek the
services of a behavioral health specialist. PFC Manning went through a pre-screening exam.
However, there was not enough time to? initiate therapy because of the impending deployment in
only about a month.

(4) I was able to conclude from the lack of concern from the pre-screening, that PFC
Manning?s issues were not grave enough to concern a behavioral health expert, or disqualify him
from deploying on time with the unit. It was my understanding at the time that there simply was
not enough time to initiate long term therapy. The recommendation from Behavioral Health was
to initiate therapy ir1 theater.

(5) Essentially, what the AR 15-6 Report characterizes as leadership that appeared to be
hands on, personal and close allowed me to lose objectivity is erroneous. PFC Mamring?s
immediate supervisors during a month prior to deployment had enough to deal with, and I took

"control of the situation. ensured they supported the needs of the command while I ensured PFC

Manning received attention through the appropriate services the Army has available, allowing
the section to support the Command?s intelligence requirements.

b. Events while deployed.

(1) While deployed, I ensured PFC Manning initiated therapy, as was recommended in
garrison. He attended therapy sessions at the combat stress center shortly after arriving in
tlnater, approximately November of 2009. MAJ Clausen and myself ?wanted to reduce the risk
of problems with PFC Manning; thereby, he was placed on the night shift to mitigate his stress
level. During the course of the deployment, I also suggested to the company commander MAJ
Potter that a Command referral be made for a mental health evaluation. The commander

?concurred. The evaluation, however, determined the Soldier was ?t to retum to duty. However,

he continued therapy until he was arrested around May of 20 10.

(2) I wrote three memorandurns for record, December of 2009, March of 201 0 and April
of 201 0. The three rnernorandums were addressed to PFC Manning?s therapist, which described
his behaviors and outburst. My intention of writing those memorandums was to ensure the
therapist had a clear understanding of PFC Manning?s behavior since I was not privy to their
discussion and did not want PFC Manning to sugarcoat or fail to mention the incidents.
Additionally, I met face-to face at least twice with his therapist to discuss PFC Manning?s
conditions

ManningB_00O13086

19442



l' I

. :2 1..
AFZS-BBA-IN 29 April 2011
SUBJECT: Rebuttal of General O?icer Memorandum of Reprimand of Master Sergeant Paul D.
Adkins, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d BCT, 10?? MIN nrv, Fort Drum, NY
13602-5000

(3) The AR 15-6 Report statw I failed to take appropriate actions a?er PFC Manning
assaulted SPC Showman and allowed him to retain his weapon. This statement is misleading.
PFC Manning kept his weapon, but I secured PFC Manning's bolt from his weapon the evening
of the incident. I placed the bolt in a locked ammo can which was chained to the ?oor, thus
rendering his weapon unusable.

(4) Paragraph (4) of the AR IS-6 Report is again misleading in that it states that I failed
to notify the chain of command of the incident concerning SPC Showman, when in fact CPT
Fulton, the S-2 Planning O?icer, was present during the incident PFC Manning was removed
immediately from the T-SCIF and later charged with assault. I noti?ed the S2, CPT Lim, as well
asthe company ISG, immediately after the situation stabilized Due to this incident, he was
reduced from SPC to PFC. Additionally, he lost access to the T-SCIF and no longer had access
tohis MI computer.

(5) Lastly, I do not recall PFC Manning making any statements to me that indicated a
lack of loyalty to the United States or that the United States flag meant nothing to him.

4. In conclusion, I should not be reprimanded for the actions of PFC Manning I made
ladership decisions based on limited information. I deemed these decisions at the time to be in
the best interests of the Soldier and our unit. I attempted to mitigate risk by a?crding PFC
Manning proper? medical attention while continuing to employ him e?ectively in a combat
situation Within my service time I have deployed four times for a total of 42 months, to both
Iraq and Af?ianistan. I consider myself a patriot of a country I love, and have always been
lam
just as appalled and disgusted by the actions ofPF(; Manning as all are in our nation.

5. For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully request that you withdraw the Administrative
Reprimand and not place it in my OMPF.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN _r
DSN

PAUL D. ADKINS
MASTER SERGEANT

MannIngB_00013087

19444

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PATRICK KENNEDY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Before the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Govemmental Affairs
"Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks:
Balancing Security and Collaboration"
March 10,2011

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, Members of the
Committee, good aftemoon and thank you for this opportunity to appear before
you today to address the status of information sharing in light of the WikiLeaks
disclosures, and in particular to discuss efforts within the executive branch both to
improve the security of its systems, and to ensure that information is shared
effectively and in a manner that continues to advance national security objectives.
The Department of State and our interagency partners here today have long been
closely engaged in achieving the dual objectives of appropriate informationsharing and protection, and in light of the WikiLeaks compromises, we are
working together with renewed attention on achieving these dual objectives.

As you may be aware, I bring a rather unique perspective to the challenges
of sharing and protecting information. I have served most of my career at the State
Department — overseas, at the United States Mission to the United Nations and
here in Washington, and I was also honored to serve as the first Deputy Director of

DEFENSE EXHIBITDDDfor identification
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19445

National Intelligence for Management at the creation ofthe Ofltce ofthe Director
ofNational Intelligence(ODNl). Given this experience,Iespecially appreciate the
commitment ofthis Cotnmittee to work with us in addressing the challenges of
information security and sharing. Despite events ofthe past eight months,Iwant
to assure Members ofthis Committee at the outset that we at the State Department
maintain our commitment to fully share our diplomatic reporting on which our
interagency partners rely. Ourcollectivechallenge is to do so inamannerthat
provides safeguards and protections that are reasonable, pragmatic, and
responsible, not to stop sharing.
The focus ofmy testimony this aftemoon is threefold: first, to explain
briefiy the Department'sunique role within the executive branch asasouTce of
diplomatic reporting that is essential toavariety of diflerent agencies-second, to
provide an overview ofthe State Department'smitigation efforts-and finally,to
highlight the challenges as we move forward to share and protect our classified
information.
^ol^o^^^^Io^^t^c^^^o^ti^^
The State Department has historically accomplished basic communication
bet^eenWashington and overseas posts through the use of diplomatic telegrams or
cables. These communications serve as the vehicle for our intemal deliberations

19446

relating to all aspects ofour foreign relations and include candid assessments of
conditions overseas and ofdiplomatic instructions that are vital to national-level
decision-making. This formal channel bet^eenWashington and our overseas posts
provides the Department and OtherU.S.Ciovemment agencies crucial inlormation
about the context in which we collectively advance our national interests ona
variety ofissues. For example, these communications may contain information
about promoting American export opportunities, protecting American citizens
overseas, and supporting military operations. Weconsider this reporting from
posts around the world to be one ofour most valuable contributions to every facet
of national security,and we share this diplomatic reporting through automatic
dissemination to over

agencies based on profiled requirements these agencies

provide to the DepartmenL Recent events have not changed our commitment to
sharing this vital information.
^^^^^^^I^^^c^ost^^^s^^^St^t^^^^^^^^^tl^^ti^^t^o^ Actions
July 2010
When DoD material was leaked in .luly2010,we worked with DoD to
identify any alleged State Department material that was inWikiLeaks'possession.
Weimmediately asked Chiefs ofMission at aflected posts to review any purported
State material in the release and provide an assessment, as well asasummary of

19447

the overall effect the WikiLeaks release could have on relations with the host
country.
Following the completion ofthe review in August, when it was believed that
purported State cables might be released, the State Department instmcted all
Chiefs ofMissions to familiarise themselves with the content in the Net Centric
Diplomacy (NCD)database shouldarelease actually occur.

November 2010
When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release
purported State cables starting on November 2^, 2010, the State Department took
the following immediate actions:!) Establisheda24^7 WikiLeaks Working Group
composed of senior officials ftom throughout the Department, notably our regional
bureaus-2) Createdagroup to review potential risks to individuals-and^)
Suspended SIPRNetaccesstoNCD(SIPRNetisaDODnet^ork)
The Department also createdaMitigationTeam to address the policy,legal,
security,counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the
release ofthese documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress
apprised ofboth the intemational fallout caused by the WikiLeaks^ disclosure and
the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate
briefings for members ofboth the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate within

19448

days (December 2, 2010)ofthe first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared t^ice
before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December7and^,
2010)
Ongoing Mitigation Efforts
State continues its thorough review ofpolicies and procedures related to
information security to ensure that they fttlly meet the current challenges. Efforts
are being coordinated throughout the DepartmenL as well as with the interagency,
to ensure that we share classified information in an effective and secure manner
with those who need it in theirwork to advance our national security.

^ While the Department already had strong safeguards in place,we have
further enhanced and updated our computer security policies that prohibit
the downloading of classified inlormation to removable media(e.g.,thumb
drives, CDs^^Ds)on the Department'sclassified network.
^ The Department continues to deploy an automated tool that audits and
monitors the Department'sclassified network to detect anomalies that would
not otherwise be apparenL This capability is backed up by professional staff
who promptly analyse detected anomalies to ensure that they do not
represent threats to the system.

19449

^ The NCD database ofdiplomatic reporting and the State Department's
classified web sites, although now inaccessible through SIPRNeL remains
available via the more limited distribution Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS). ThroughouL the State Department has
continued to share its diplomatic reporting among federal agencies through
its traditional system of cable dissemination.
^ Toheighten awareness ofwhat is and is not permitted when working on the
Department'sclassified network and on classified systems, user awareness
reminders are now available for Department employees on its classified
network, in addition to the standard in person briefings about handling
classified material andasoon-to-be-released computer-based course on
identifying and marking classified and sensitive information.
In addition, the Department is exploring solutions to improve how we share
and protect information with those who are not direct recipients ofour telegrams.
One such solution would involve the creation ofawebsitewithasearchable
database that would allow appropriately cleared personnel to use key word
searches to discover relevant State cables-the search would reveal cable metadata,
such as the subject line, but would not provide the fttll text ofthe cables ina
potentially vulnerable database. This would ensure that cleared personnel are
awate ofcables they have an operational or strategic need to see. Cleared

19450

personnel ftom other agencies would then be able to seek cables necessary for
their work functions through their own organi^ation'sintemal distribution system.
The responsibility will be on the receiving, not the originating, agency to
disseminate information to its intemal personneL
The Department has continued to work with the interagency on information
management issues by participating in meetings ofthe new Interagency Policy
Committee (IPC) chaired by the Special Advisor for Information Access and
Security policy as well as existing IPCs such as the Information Sharing and
Access IPC.

CIi^l^^^^^^

The interagency is grappling with the complexities ofthree main challenges
in the aftermath ofWikiLeaks.
The first main challenge is ensuring information sharing policies are
consistently directing the use oftechnology to solve problems, not the otherway
around. The post-^^llmindset was focused on providing technical solutions to
information sharing problems. Asaresult, technical experts were asked to develop
solutions to the barriers inhibiting information sharing. Thepost WikiLeaks
environment reminds us that technology isatool to execute solutions but is not in

19451

itself the answer. Simply puLwe must more consistently sort out what we share
before determining how we share iL Connecting systems and networks may
provide the means to share information, but we must still manage and share the
content in the most appropriate way.
Mr. Chairman, the national security community must doabetter job of
articulating what information is appropriate to share with the widest appropriate
distribution, and what is more appropriately confined toanarrower audience, in
orderto ensure adequate safeguards. The State Department believes that the way
in which we share cables through our traditional means of dissemination and the
steps we have taken already since November are leading us firmly in this direction.
The second main challenge involves each agency'srigorous adherence to
existing, or improved, information security policies. This includes improved
training ofcable drafters in the use oflabels to indicate appropriate breadth of
dissemination based on the sensitivity ofacable'scontenL The executive order on
classified information (E.O. 1^^26) establishes the basic levels of classification
within the Executive Branch. From that foundation, individual agencies may still
have their own captions that denote how information should be disseminated
because not all cleared personnel need to see every diverse piece ofclassified
information. Agencies that receive information need to understand how to handle

19452

that captioned information, so that it is not inappropriately made available toa
wide audience, which would undermine the intent ofthe captions.
The Office ofManagement and Budget(OMB)directed agencies to create
teams to address security,counterintelligence, and information assurance issues.
Webelieve that the State Department'sMitigationTeam serves asamodel for
broad, cross-discipline coordination, or govemance, because it brings together
various subject matter experts ftom differentfieldsto address information sharing
andsecurity issues inacoordinated manner. Many information sharing and
security issues can be resolved at the agency level as long as there are standards in
place for agencies to execute. Forthe most part, standards have been created by
existing interagency bodies, but there are some areas where ftirther coordination is
needed.
The third main challenge involves the coordination, or govemance, of
information management in the interagency community. Numerous interagency
groups are wrestling with issues related to the technological aspects ofinformation
sharing, such as those dealing with data standards, systems, and networks. Others
are wrestling with the policy decisions ofwho should have access to what
classified information. New interagency govemance structures to coordinate
information sharing have been developed, including those focused on sharing with
state, local, and tribal govemments, as well as with foreign partners. In keeping

19453

with the first main challenge, these new structures should maintain or increase their
focus on defining the content to be shared and protected as well as onthe
technology by which it is shared and ptotected. Each agency must be confident
that security processes and procedures are applied inauniform and consistent
manner in other organisations. In addition, it must be understood that material
originating in one agency will be treated by other agencies in accordance with
mutually understood handling instmctions.
The State Department shares information with the intent ofproviding the
right information to the right people at the right time. Wewill continue to share
this reporting appropriately so that we can continue our diplomatic mission as well
as our role in the national security community. Werecogni^e the imperative to
make diplomatic reporting and analysis available appropriately with the
interagency community. Wecontinue to review how our information is
disseminated at other agencies.
Co^cl^s^o^
Torecap, the State Department has long been, and remains, committed to
both appropriately sharing and protecting information critical to ournational
security. This commitment requires ongoing efforts to conftont multiple, complex
challenges associated with information sharing. FirsL national security agencies
must consistently put policies about content ahead oftechnological solutions.
to

19454

Second, each agency must manage the sharing and protecting ofinformation it
originates and receives. Third, the interagency asawhole must continue to
coordinate betterto improve all facets ofinformation sharing.
Thank^ you for this opportunity to appear here today. Ilook forward to
working with the Committee on the challenges ofsharing and protecting
diplomatic and other sensitive information, and would be pleased to respond to any
questions you may have.

tt

19455

Offered but not admitted into evidence.

Defense Exhibit EEE
have been entered into
the record as a CD/DVD
and v^ill be maintained
with the original
Record of Trial

19456

Offered but not admitted into evidence.

Defense Exhibit FEE
have been entered into
the record as a CD/DVD
and will be maintained
with the original
Record of Trial

?Ia

v?



A

19458

A T T A f

X

Front Cover Image:
U.S. Soldier uses a metal detector
to search for possible improvised
explosive devices during a security
patrol in Afghanistan.
Photo: Cpl. Artur Stivartsberg

C/\T

T R A I N

Message from the Director Image:
A U.S. Marine Corps mine-resistant,
ambusti-protected vetiicle, equipped
Witt) a mine-roller, is parlced at ttie
Combined Anti-Armor Team 2's patrol
base in Afghanistan.
Photo: Lance Cpl. James Purschwitz

19459

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR.

l

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,

3

THREATS A N D TRENDS

5

jlEDDO MISSION AND MISSION AREAS

9

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

9

RESOURCES
FUNDING
PERSONNEL AND STAFFING
COUNTER-IED SENIOR INTEGRATION G R O U R
FISCAL YEAR 2010 JlEDDO FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS

10
10
12
12
13

FISCAL YEAR 2010 MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
ATTACK THE NETWORK.
DEFEAT THE DEVICE
TRAIN THE FORCE

15
15
17
19

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT,

21

FISCAL YEAR 2010 TRANSFERS, TRANSITIONS, TERMINATIONS

22

APPENDIX: ACRONYMS

27

19460

19461

' .'4!/*-*,

For five years, the critical purpose of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat
Organization (JlEDDO) has been to rapidly provide counter-IED (C-IED) capabilities to
warfighters. JlEDDO has provided significant support along three lines of effort — Attack the
Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force.

^

-^'^^"

This annual report provides an accounting of JIEDDO's efforts and investments in fiscal year
(FY) 2010. Highlights include:
::.
\

'

'

'

-'',^-.. -

.

-

"

• Supporting increased Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) C-IED requirements via rapid
acquisition, reprogramming of funds, and repurposing of previous investments on the
magnitude of $1,2 billion from an overall $2,7 billion effort

\

• Providing fused information tools for warfighters in the field to enable and enhance



V

their capabilities to attack enemy IED networks
• Streamlining organizational processes to speed acquisition efforts
&

.

" ^: ^

-:

,".., ;

^

^

.

...

.

As 2010 closes, we have witnessed the return on our significant: C-IED investments that
reduced the volume, as well as lethality, of lEDs in Iraq, IED use has leveled off to the
lowest in six years.

^MkAggk-

In Afghanistan, as we have witnessed escalated use of lEDs in response to the surge, we
have accordingly shifted our resources to enable and enhance mission accomplishment for
the warfighter,
»
(
We are in an extended era of persistent conflict that spans the globe. On average, more
than 260 lEDs are employed every month outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, Terrorist and
criminal networks have continued to demonstrate remarkable skills in development and
delivery of lEDs,
As we move forward into 2011 and previous years' investments and acquisitions come
to useful fruition, JlEDDO will continue to seek the most responsible use of funding and
programs to fulfill the needs of combatant commanders with improved capabilities wherever
they serve.

Michael L Gates
Lieutenant General, U,S, Army
Director

\

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g

19462

^ ^ ^ B ^ ^ ^ ^

^ ^ ^ li^ I ^ B ^ ^

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I ^

FY 2010 ANNUAL
^

\\j$'^f
RE pp RT E ^ G U T I
SUMMARY X

klWk^^f:::^

'

^

19463

lEDs continued to be the main

the right theater at the right

initiatives to enable

threat to coalition forces (CF)

time, JlEDDO committed to

warfighters to organize,

in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

rapidly field prioritized C-IED

plan, and conduct C-IED

In Afghanistan, IED casualties

technologies in accordance

operations; properly employ

continued at elevated

with C-SIG instruction.

C-IED equipment; and improve

May 2009. In Iraq, IED activity

JIEDDO's Attack the Network

threats.

continued to decline.

(AtN) Line of Operation (LOO)

understanding of new IED

seasonal cycles that began in

enables offensive operations

JIEDDO's rapid technology

lEDs increased as the

against complex networks

development program focuses

weapon of choice for global

of financiers, IED makers,

activities in a number of areas

insurgents and terrorists with

trainers, and their supporting

spanning the three lines of

an average of more than

infrastructure by providing

operation.

260 IED incidents per month

intelligence, surveillance,

outside of Afghanistan and

reconnaissance, information

JlEDDO seeks to transition

Iraq, Device effectiveness and

operations, counter-bomber

or transfer proven C-IED

lethality continued to improve

targeting, biometrics,

initiatives to the military

in diverse regions around the

and weapons technical

services, combatant

world.

intelligence capabilities.

commands (COCOMs), or

Supporting the warfighter

government agencies for

Supported by Government

in this fiscal year, JlEDDO

lifecycle management and

Accountability Office (GAO)

developed several AtN

sustainment within two years.

enablers.

Similarly, JlEDDO seeks to

recommendations,

terminate initiatives that

JlEDDO critically
reviewed its mission
statement, existing
structure, and
processes with
the objective
of enhancing
clarity and
streamlining
^

JIEDDO's Defeat the Device

met an urgent requirement

(DtD) LOO enhanced freedom

and are no longer needed

of maneuver and safe

or have failed to deliver

operations for CF, focusing

anticipated results. Timely

on providing defensive

initiative transition, transfer,

technologies to detect lEDs,

ortermination (T3) prevents

neutralizing them before

long-term resource

they can be detonated, or

commitments residing within

mitigating the effects of

JlEDDO and enables the

detonations. Supporting the

organization to apply limited

Early in

warfighter in FY 2010, JlEDDO

resources to the most urgent

FY 2010,

developed multiple DtD

C-IED requirements.

processes.

the Secretary of

enablers and initiatives.

Defense (SECDEF) established
An improvised
explosive device
blast hole slows
traffic near Nawa,
Afghanistan.
Photo:
Sgt Justin Howe

the C-IED Senior Integration

JIEDDO's Train the Force

Group (C-SIG), charged with

(TtF) LOO assessed joint

the mission to integrate and

and service C-IED training

prioritize C-IED efforts with

requirements and supported

the goal of ensuring the right

the development and

capabilities are deployed to

improvement of training

19464

A T rA#^ K

K^C* L A i

IT F t / A

I N

THREATS AND TRENDS
IED OVERVIEW FOR AFGHANISTAN AND IRACL
< 2500
1 2000

1

~ 1500
1000
u
a
tu

— —

\AA ^

^\JV\
_ / \^ l / ^ ^ r

500

I

kV / - v y ^

0
Oct

AFG

. lm,.

ISF an i Iraqi Civ Cas
ANSF and Afg Civ Cas
>n Force Cas in Afg —
on Fofce Cas in Iraq

Oct

FY2008
4,124
18,962

- .1

Oct

FY2009
7.691
14,445

FY2010
9,137
10.256

lEDs continue to pose the main threat to CF in both Afghanistan
and Iraq as seen above. The number of lED-related casualties
for CF, host nation security forces, and civilians in Afghanistan
increased 19 percent during the previous year. In Iraq, the
number of CF, host nation security force, and civilian IED
casualties declined 29 percent.

ri
"^'f'M

A Mine Roller is damaged by a
roadside IED in Afghanistan.
Photo: USMC

19465

AFGHANISTAN IED EFFICACY TRENDS FY 2009-2010
1600
IEfffec(iv« lEO Attaclis

ln«ffecliv« IED Attack*

1200

« « * ll»1 ,SJ4

nta

Trar

iia

e

I
o
Q

«

UJ

123

71*

800

n%
MP

«M

Ti%

»J

Trw

w m n*




«*

m . 11%
TM

400
U%

m.

«w m> m

mBQEalmmMmmm
Oct Nov Oec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep

Not*: EMetlWe lEO attack* ar* IhoM Sut cautad colaition fbrc* and/or Iwtl nation catualHas. Iiwfiactiva IED attack* caused no
c**«alil>« and in-cludo detonatioii* wilh no (aaualMte*, early delectton, pre^l«tcm»|joiw, and Iufn4n*.

A F G H A J M ISTAN
Afghan insurgents used lEDs effectively to cause casualties, restrict CF freedom of maneuver,
challenge legitimate government authority, and isolate CF from civilians. Widespread insecurity,
intimidation of local populations, and readily available sources of homemade explosives (HME)
enabled insurgents to elevate IED use rates. Insurgents leveraged external support and safe havens
to sustain IED campaigns.
The volume of IED use increased significantly from FY 2009, alongside an increased CF operational
tempo. Despite this increased volume of attacks, efficacy rates remained steady in the last half of
FY 2010 as seen above. Decreased severity of IED events, combined with other operational factors
led to a decreasing rate of U.S, personnel killed in action (KIA) per effective IED attack, Non-U.S.
CF KIA per effective attack remained constant.

A U.S. Soldier with a counter
Improvised explosive device team
moves through an Afghan Village to
ensure the roads are safe for travel.
Photo:
U.S. Army Spc. Theodore
Schmidt

6

19466

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

T R A I N

Afghan insurgents continue to rely predominantly on victim-operated lEDs (VOIEDs) and command
wire lEDs employing simple, yet effective technologies and designs often used with large net
explosive weight charges. The incorporation of HME and other block explosives into lEDs continued
to be the most significant IED threat to CF in Afghanistan. Insurgents also continued elevated
targeting rates of dismounted forces due to the increase of dismounted operations by CF forces in
support of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
Afghanistan Outlook. Afghan insurgents will continue to use low-tech solutions and increased
volume of IED emplacements to conduct their IED campaign. Most devices will be constructed with
simple technologies and readily available materials.

iRACL
In Iraq, the overall number of IED attacks occurred at consistently reduced levels not seen since
August 2003. The overall effect of attacks remained generally stable through the year, as noted in
the IED trend chart below.

1RAQ_1ED EFFICACY TRENDS, FY 2009 -2010
leoo

|Etff«c«r« IED Attacks

Ineffecliv* IED Attacks

wa
"t

*"

"

ts% tn.

W

4S6

***

" "

m «» w% ***

mmMMmMMMM

Out Nov Ooe .tan F*& Mir Apy May Jun Jul Aug Sm^ Oet Nov Oee Jan Fab Mw Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep

Note: Eftective ED Mtack* ar* thoea that cauaed colaMon fbrc* andHsr boat ration cawaHka. tneHecWy* KO attack* cniaad no
t#*wlW«$ and Inctud* detonttiont with no casualWM, early dsttctlon, pm-delonttloits. and tum-Ni*,

19467

^LOEAL
Globally,IEDs increased as the insurgent and terrorist weapon of choice. The average number
of IED incidents per month outside of Afghanistan and Iraq was 2^0, up from the previous year
as noted below. JIEDDO'sreview of worldwide IED reporting showed device effectiveness and
lethality. Complex suicide attacks in Pakistan and areas of Ll.S. Africa Command are notable IED
events of FY 2010. Communications and coordination among threat groups has continued the
proliferation of IED technology and techniques worldwide.

GL08AL1ED INCIDENTS

^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

actors tram, practice^
and emphy lEDS i
woridwide
>if-

Jk

I- ^

IED Events*

O N D J

F M A M J J A S O N D J

F M A M J J A S

Monthly Global Terrorist Events I minus Iraq & Afghanistan)

* actual IED allacks oi
devices found and cleaied
Sep 2008
Sep 2010

The average numb«r of monthly IED incidents outside Iraq and Afghanistan was 260 fo the last 6 moths.

8

19468

A T T A C K

DE#=EAT

T R A I N

JlEDDO MISSION AND MISSION AREAS
During 2010, JlEDDO

for JlEDDO in managing C-IED

to counter known, newly

critically reviewed its mission

requirements, synchronizing

deployed, and emerging

statement, existing structure,

JlEDDO operational

IED threats. The DDRA&T

and procedures with the

activities, coordinating

ensures the initiatives

objective of enhancing clarity

C-IED operational support to

program includes required

COCOMs, identifying C-IED

training, sustainment, an

gaps, and facilitating C-IED

effective feedback loop,

J I E D D O ' S REVISED

concepts of operations and

and product improvement

M I S S I O N STATEMENT:

doctrine.

spirals and provides lifecycle

and streamlining processes,

management oversight

JlEDDO leads Department
of Defense (DoD) actions

Deputy Director of

to rapidly provide C-IED

T r a i n i n g (DDT)

capabilities in support ofthe

The DDT serves as the

combatant commanders and

training lead for JlEDDO,

to enable the defeat ofthe

maintaining and managing

IED as a weapon of strategic

the distributed Joint

influence.

Center of Excellence
(JCOE) that facilitates

ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURE

individual, collective,
and unit C-IED training;
enabling the development

The director determined

and propagation of new

that JlEDDO should be

operational techniques

organized as a headquarters

and tactical procedures;

of JIEDDO-funded C-IED
solutions. With the science
advisor, the DDRA&T
oversees science and
technology (S&T) efforts
on behalf of JlEDDO and
works with the services to
coordinate C-IED science
and technology investments
for the future. The DDRA&T
also serves as the director of
the Capabilities Acquisition
Center (CAC).

element with three operating

and providing a venue for

Deputy Director of

arms to execute JlEDDO

training and support for the

Operations Intelligence

efforts across three lines of

experimentation and testing

I n t e g r a t i o n (DDOi)

operation. A deputy director

of emerging C-IED equipment

The DDOI serves as the lead

structure to provide the

and concepts. The DDT also

for JlEDDO in supporting

command group a single

serves as the director ofthe

the C-IED mission through

point of accountability for

JlEDDO JCOE.

the supervision of relevant
information collection,

each mission area was
implemented. A revised

Deputy Director of

intelligence analysis, fusion,

organizational chart is

Rapid Acquisition and

and dissemination to deliver

provided on page 10. Deputy

Teclinology (DDRA&T)

rapid C-IED and network-

director responsibilities are;

The DDRA&T serves as the

attack capabilities in support

lead for JlEDDO in rapidly

of COCOMs. The DDOI also

Deputy Director

developing, acquiring,

serves as the director o f t h e

of Operations and

integrating, assessing, and

Counter-IED Operations/

R e q u i r e m e n t s (DDOR)

fielding proven materiel and

Intelligence Integration

The DDOR serves as the lead

non-materiel C-IED initiatives

Center (COIC).

9

19469

Notable changes from the previous organizational design are;
^The Competitive Strategies Group was disbanded and its functions were realigned within the
COIC and CAC
^ T h e Joint J^rainingCIED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) transferred to LI.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Center. DDTcoordinates training support requirements provided by
JJ^COIC

JlEDDO ORGANIZATION CHART
Stwctnl

vice 04rector
c
Command Sergeant Major c

• A M M a i M n l d Diraclor ICMel, J H |

«#»

,J

lilAfhl

,1m r,1

a,i*^

"'ParaonatitaW' '"""i
• EMcudve OIHear
• %M• EiHKudv* AstlManI.!

Director
i^rHtri^

• OMMral CwmKH t o o
• SeMfW* AdvltM
• EngavtmHit Dirsctw tOuuaacW "
• Oncicr'i Sun Orvup
't
aA#

CMaf of Staff

CSIOXO
J1/*^

•sV
Deputy Director
Operation* & Training

Deputy Director
Training

Deputy Director
RwM AoquWllon & Tech

Deputy Director Operationsi'lntetHgenoe
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Established by Congress in
FY 2007 as a new appropriation,
the Joint IED Defeat Fund
(JIEDDF) provides flexible,
three-year duration funds
enabling JlEDDO to rapidly
develop capabilities that
counter constantly morphing
lEDs and the highly adaptive
networks employing them.

Protocol;

ID

Support
Oat* analysis
•^-Heaoifch &
iColaboration

TFTiay

FUNDING

Peniegi
Coordlnai

Evaluation

X CJTF Paladin

RESOURCES

Strategic
• Communlea*35»

Nat-Centric
binovation

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This annual report provides a

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Affairs
- Contracting
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Surgeon
(Medical Advisor)

lotemel Aeview

countering the Iraq IED threat.

snapshot of the $2.7 billion

In FY 2009, JIEDDO's focus

drawn from the FYs 2008,

shifted as national priorities

2009, and 2010 appropriations

changed and forces surged to

JlEDDO expended in FY

Afghanistan.

2010 (see JlEDDO Funding
Highlights on pages 13-14).

Anticipating this shift, JlEDDO

During FY 2007 through

requested and received $1.1

FY 2010, Congress provided

billion in funding planned

more than $13 billion for the

for FY 2010 to provide

JIEDDF, primarily through

C-IED resources essential

supplemental appropriations

to support the expected

(see chart on page 11). For

surge. Due to this early

FY 2007 through FY 2008,

appropriation of multi-

JIEDDO's main effort was

year funds in anticipation
10

19470

,^^^,^^..,K

IDt

F E

of the build-up of forces in

A T

T R A I N

requirements. JlEDDO is

As an example, the FAR

Afghanistan, JIEDDO's FY

not a contracting activity

requires contracting officers

2010 execution included

and consequently relies

to negotiate in good faith,

significant funding drawn from

exclusively upon other

meaning they must know with

FY 2009 appropriations.

organizations to obligate

certainty funds are available

JIEDDF funds that deliver

when soliciting proposals for

C-IED solutions.

goods and services. Another

The FY 2010 DoD

example deals with letter

Appropriations Act

contracts, where contracting

provided both overseas

Other factors contribute to

contingency operations

JIEDDO's unique financial

officers are limited in the

(OCO) supplemental and

execution profile. First,

amount of committed funds

base budget funding to

a significant portion of

they can obligate. Up to 49

JlEDDO through the JIEDDF.

JIEDDO's budget is dedicated

percent ofthe funds can

Approximately 95 percent of

to responding to joint urgent

be obligated when a letter

the total budget authority was

operational needs (JUONs),

contract is awarded; the

OCO supplemental funds,

Each year when the budget

amount can increase to 75

with the remaining 5 percent

is approved, neither specific

percent if a qualified proposal

in the base budget.

nor aggregate JUON costs

is received within 120 days.

are known, making financial

JlEDDO closely tracks initial

JIEDDO's financial

targets difficult to set and

commitment to obligation

execution profile differs

more difficult to achieve as

rates, typically within 60

significantly from traditional

JlEDDO shifts resources to

days. These are examples

DoD programs — and

meet IED threats that can

of many procurement

consequently leaves

surface or change in weeks.

requirements delaying

observers believing that

obligations. Consequently,

JlEDDO is under-executing

Complex measures written

JlEDDO has little control over

its resources. Commitments,

into the Federal Acquisition

rather than obligations,

Regulation (FAR) protect

are a better reflection of

the government's interests

JlEDDO meeting COCOMs'

the typical six-month lag
between fund commitment
and obligation and its unique
financial execution profile.

but delay full obligation.

JlEDDO BUDGET I N HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
3.000

2.500
2,000

EQ
tn

1,500

1,000

500

FV06

11

II

•o to
© o

FY07

FY08

FY09

FY 10

is

19471

PERSONNELAND
STAFFING

government personnel from
14 to 24 percent.

An institutional review,
reassessment, and
revalidation ofthe
organization'smission
and functions, supported
by repeated GAO
recommendations,highlighted
the urgent need to increase
government oversight and
direction. To address the
noted concerns,141 new
government civilian billets
were approved to provide
an experienced, mid level
leadership team raising
the percentage of JlEDDO
military/government
personnelfroml0tol4
percent In FY 2010,JIEDDO
filled 69 percent of its joint
manning document personnel
authorizations. While making
great strides to fill the
additional government civilian
billets, .^lEDDO continued
to have challenges filling its
military personnel billets.

Recognizing the military
services'difficulty in providing
active duty military personnel,
JlEDDO initiated an
aggressive effort to develop
and gain approval for reserve
component augmentation,
JlEDDO received approval
for 119 Army Reserve,13 Air
Force Reserve, and 23 Marine
Corps Reserve augmentation
positions, with 30 requested
Navy Reserve billets pending
the Navy FY 2011 Rrogram
Objective Memorandum
review,

To further reinforce
government oversight
and direction of its largely
contractor-based workforce,
JlEDDO also received
approval to convert 192
contracted manpower
equivalent authorizations
to government civilian
positions in FY 2012, Once
the conversion is complete,
JlEDDO will improve the
percentage of military/

order to more effectively
counter the IED threat in
Afghanistan,"TheCSIG's
mission is to integrate and
prioritizeCIED efforts with
the goal of ensuring the right
capabilities are deployed to
the right theater at the right
time, JlEDDO committed to
rapidly field prioritizedCIED
technologies in accordance
withCSIG instruction,
beginning in July 2010,
JlEDDO began to perform
secretariat roles for theCSIG,
providing relief for the Joint
Chiefs ofStaff,J34This
handover was completed in
August 2010

JlEDDO continued to rely
heavily on service contracts
to quickly acquire the
variety of skill sets not
easily found in the services
or through government
civilian recruiting,To this
end, JlEDDO implemented
acomprehensive services
support contract providing
aflexible and enduring
contracting vehicle, enabling
JlEDDO to respond quickly to
warfighters'needs,
GOUNTER lED SENIOR
INTEGRATION GROUP
At the beginning of FY 2010,
the SECDEF established
theC-SIGto^^harmonize
resources organizationally
across the Department and
allocate them efficiently in

1^

19472

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

T R A I N

FISCAL YEAR 2010 JIEDD(

$2.78

Attack
the
Network
$1.0B

Defeat
the
Device

$1.38

S&l
FY10

13

• COIC: $249.0M*
•WTI:
- Exploitation Laboratory Enhancements: $14.5M*
- National IED Exploitation Facility: $6.0M

- Torchlight: $7.6M*
- TED AC: $59.5M*
• Special Programs:
- Wolfhound: $49.8M*
-Zionbobcat: $22.9M
- Forgersnoop: $8M*

- Radial
- Blue [
-Speck
- Sand I
• Addition
- VADEI
- BIstati
• Predict!
-Keyho
- Route

• Detect Air:
- Desert Owl: $27.4M*
- Copperhead MinlSAR: $31.8M*

- Quiet
-BCT <

• C-IEO Electronic Warfare:
- CREW Fixed Site CVRJ: $47.7M*
- CREW Universal Test Sets: $49.3M*
- E W O Kits: $12.5M
• Detect Ground:
- Persistent Threat Detection System: $376.0M
- Persistent Group Surveillance System: $119.0M
- Handheld Ground Penetrating Radar (Minehound): $23.6M*
- Goldie: $19.5M'
- Counter Bomber: $7.2M
- Beachcomber: $21.7M*
- PBIED/VBIED Defeat - Entry Control Point: $134.3M
• Neutralize:
-Jackal: $17.7M

- Robot
(RMD!
- Devil I
-Sheric
-MaxP
- Gray F
• Mitigate
-USMC
- IED R<
- Joint I
- Hard I,
- Ghost
-ARDEi
-Sentlfl

• Joint Center of Excellence:
- C-IED Training Support Mission: $26.9M*
- Exportable Training Support JATAC; $29.5M*
- C-IED Support Element & C-IED Team Training: $18.9M*
- C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams; $8.4M*
- CJTF Paladin Training Support: $10M*
- C-IED Force on Force Environment: $6,6M
- C-IED Live Fire Environment: $13.8M
- Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer: $15.4M*
- Home Made Explosives Training Program $1.0M*
- Tactical Site Exploitation: $3.5M

»Systems
(JTCOIC
•JTCOIC
Simulatii
• Syntheti
Environr
• Biometri
• Infantry
• Immersi'
• C-IEO lm

• Headquarters: $121.5M*

Anal^i

19473

D FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS

I t Falcon: $24.1 M
)evil: $61.9M
les: $9.9M*
Dragon: $5.8M
al Detect Air:
R: $41.3M*
cs: $13.0M

-Integrated Signatures Program: $12.1M
-Saturn Arch: $43.7M*
- Person-Borne IED Counter Architecture: $15M
- London Brook: $4.9 M
- Tripwire Analytic Capability: $22.4 M
• Other 77 R&D Investments and Remaining
Programs: $123.1 M*

ind Prevent:
le: $74.6M
Clearance Optics Suites: $47.tM
Storm: $6.1 M
Operational Research and Systems
iis (ORSA): $19.1M»
ic Mounted Detection System
J) with LADAR: $5.0MJ
>up EGD Mini Robot: $32.8M
ick: $4.7M*
ower: $7.1 M*
ox: $6.3M*

• Joint Test Board: $46.5M*
• Other 62 R&D Investments and Remaining
Programs: $106.7M*

Mine Roller System: $13.8M
>llers (Sparks II): $236.0M
ED Neutralize Roller (JOLLER): $11.9M
mpact: $12.6M
Ship: $1.3M
Z Objective Armor Protection: $7.9M
el Scout: $2.4M
Integration and Modeling and Simulation
Database): $22.5M
Systems Integration, Modeling and
jns: $4.7M
c Environment Core Common Virtual
nent: $12.2M*
cs & Forensics Virtual Training: $4.2M
Immersion Trainer: $5.6M
/e Training Environment: $1.2M
tegration Cell (CLZC): $14.5M*

• Technical Collection: $23.0M
• Joint Expeditionary Team (MTAT): $13.3M*
• 1st Army Combat Training Center Leveling: $9.4M
• Joint Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange: $5.8M*
• Virtual Medical Training: $22.6M*
• Tissue Stabilization Program: $10.3M
• Lost Limb Mitigation: $6.5M*
• Remaining 13 Programs: $18.3M*

'Multi-year Funds: FY2008 - S9.4M, FY2009 - $1,064.0M. FY2010 - $1.66«.SM

14

19474

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

T R A X N

FY 2010 MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
This section describes new initiatives in FY 2010 on which
JlEDDO expended budgetary resources from the JIEDDF.
Descriptions of initiatives started in other years can be found
in the JlEDDO annual report for that fiscal year. Descriptions
of initiatives started and terminated within FY 2010 are listed
in the table of T3 initiatives on pages 23-26.

ATTACK THE NETWORK
JIEDDO's AtN LOO enables offensive operations against a
complex networks of financiers, IED makers, trainers, and
their supporting infrastructure by providing intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations,
counter-bomber targeting, biometrics, and weapons technical
intelligence capabilities.
COIC Technology I n t e g r a t i o n . The International Security
Assistance Force (iSAF) commander established the Afghan
Mission Network (AMN) as the principal command and control
system to enable real-time collaboration and information
sharing across the coalition. COIC provided hardware,
software, and technical engineering support enabling JlEDDO
COIC Analytic Support Team analysts to transition quickly to
the AMN. The Joint Staff designated the COIC as the lead for
establishing the AMN in the National Capital Region.
COIC Training I n t e g r a t i o n . COIC made 41 tool and
process training modules available to classified computer
users supporting pre-deployment and deployed unit needs.
These modules included familiarization, tool integration,
network analysis, and advanced integration and collaboration.
COIC developed 13 interactive e-learning modules for tool
familiarization and training.
Weapons T e c h n i c a l Intelligence (WTI). WTI is a
process and a category of intelligence derived from the
forensic and technical exploitation of lEDs, associated
components, and improvised weapons. WTI uniquely
combines service, intelligence community, federal law
enforcement, and national laboratory capabilities to produce
actionable intelligence not only enabling the identification
and disruption of low-signature networks employing lEDs,
15

19475

but also contributing to
the development oftime
sensitive countermeasures,
targeting of enemy
combatants,material
sourcing efforts, and
supporting the prosecution
ofthose attributed to attacks
onLI.S. andCF.
zionbobcat. 2ionbobcat
isaproofofconcept
passive integrated airborne
tactical deployment sensors
system for interrogation of
communications devices.

Specifies. Speckles isa
developmental 35 pound
unmanned aerial vehicle with
EO and short wave or long
wave infrared (IR) sensors
for route clearance patrol
(RCR) operations. Runway
independent, rail launched,
and belly landed. Speckles is
capable of eight hour mission
endurance and direct video
downlink,This enables the
RCR to rapidly investigate
areas of interest and maintain
immediate area situational
awareness.

moving target indicator
(GMTI) radar providing highdetection probability, low
false-alarm rate, and precise
geo-location against moving
targets. The system uses
inexpensive radars to cue
EO/IR sensors.
Predict and Prevent.

Predict and Prevent efforts
facilitate the rapid fielding of
sensitive C-IED materiel and
non-materiel technologies to
give the warfighter collection,
exploitation, and analytic

Detect ^ i r . Detect
Air systems enable the
warfighter to detect
insurgent IED emplacement
activity and all observables
associated with lEDs and
their emplacement,
BlueDe^ii. ^lue Devil is
aunique,developmentaL
integrated,multi
intelligence,autotipping,
and cueingC IED airborne
intelligence,surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR)
capability, ^lue Devil
integrates the highest
resolution wide field of view
electro-optical (EO)sensor
with high definition cameras
and signals intelligence
geo location sensors l^he
imagery is simultaneously
sent toatactical operations
center and remote video
terminals in real time.

A developmental Speckles system takes off for a test route clearance patrol
operation.
Photo: JlEDDO

Sand Dragon. Sand Dragon
is a small, long-endurance,
runway independent,
unmanned aerial system
asset suited for the detection
of IED observables during RCP
operations in OEF.
Bistatics Surveillance
System (BSS). BSS is
a tower-mounted ground

advantage in multiple
intelligence disciplines.
Quiet Storm. Quiet Storm
funds intelligence analysts
focused on the IED supply
chain. Leveraging federal
law enforcement data
made available to DoD, IED
facilitators are identified
and intelligence and law
16

19476

A T T A C K

a ^ ^ a

enforcement operations are
synchronized against IED
facilitation networks.
Brigade Combat Team/
Regimental Combat
Team Operations
Research Systems
Analysis (ORSA). This
AtN C-IED capability provides
operations research capability
in immediate proximity to
tactical problems, enabling
real-time analysis of issues
addressing Brigade/
Regimental Combat Team
Command's needs.
Person borne IED
(PBIED) Counter
Architecture. The
PBIED counter architecture
effort is a JlEDDO and
Department of Homeland
Security cooperative
project. This detection
system incorporates a

^

^T^7^^N

family of sensors, a software
information backbone,
and software that assists
in prioritizing threats and
allocating detection assets
against those threats.
London Broolt. This target
audience analysis study
examined how to best affect
insurgent behaviors, including
those involved in commission
and execution of IED attacks.
The complete report was
delivered to ISAF.
Tripwire Analytic
Capability (TAC). TAC
is a Web-based analytic
and decision support
system enabling real-time
and collaborative analysis
through persistent querying
of streaming and stored
data. TAC supports the
JlEDDO mission by enhancing
C-IED-related decision

PBIED sensors must be able to conduct multimodal scans with a
predetermined percentage of the crowd, accurately scan people approaching
at differing angles, address crowd-blocking and proximity effects, and target
people of interest within a wide field of view.
Photo: SPIE paper April 2010; Paper Number 7666-60

17

making through quantitative
analytics.
DEFEAT THE DEVICE
JlEDDO enhances freedom
of maneuver and safe
operations for CF through
the DtD line of operation.
DtD focuses on providing
defensive technologies
to detect lEDs, neutralize
them before they can be
detonated, or mitigate the
effects of detonations.
Counter IED Electronic
Warfare (CIEW).
CIEW seeks to integrate
counter radio-controlled
IED electronic warfare
(CREW) systems with other
capabilities operating
within the electromagnetic spectrum to
ensure compatibility and
interoperability within U.S.
DoD and coalition nations,
CIEW broadens the aperture
expanded from jamming
to include C-IED sensor
capabilities. JlEDDO funded
the research, development,
and procurement of manportable, vehicle-mounted,
and fixed-site jamming
technologies.
CREW Universal Test
Set (UTS). CREW-UTS
is a follow-on capability
configured to give operators
a go/no-go test capability
to confirm CREW equipment

19477

performance at the warfighter
level.
Electronic Warfare
Officer (EWO)Tool
l^its. EWO tool kits
provide the next level of
maintenance and diagnosis
support for CREW systems
complementing the CREW
UTS
Detect Ground. Detect
Ground systems seek
to detect person borne,
vehicle-borne, and buried
lEDs, as well as suspicious
activity associated with IED
emplacement.
Persistent Threat
Detection System
(PTDS).ThePTDSisa
tethered aerostat (balloon)
equipped withasuite ofhigh
resolution EOBIR equipment.

The PTDS providesa
persistent surveillance
and situational awareness
capability.
Persistent Ground
Surveillance System
(PGSS).ThePGSS system
isasuite of single-and
dual configurable sensors,
mounted onatethered
aerostat (balloon). PGSScan
operate atahigher altitude,
hasalarger balloon,anda
greater payload option than
the PTDS
li^andheld Ground
Penetrating Radar
(GPR)Minehound.The
Minehound GPR system isa
lightweight, hand-held, ground
penetrating radar enabling
dismounted patrols to find
lEDswithlow orno metallic
signature.
Goldie.The Goldie system
isalightweight,man
portable, handheld device for
detecting IED components
while conducting dismounted
patrols. This initiative isa
one-time commercial off-the
shelf(COTS) procurement.

^naer^t^^fafH^affoen
i^r^^ea^edft^
^ee^^af^fiever^

andar^t^iBnda
mt^ffir^af^^naff^a^efrt
Ar^ftanfsfan.
F^ftofo.C^f.
Cftr^i^fo^ftef^Oit^ftaen

Subtle Madness. Subtle
Madness isamagnetometerbased system for detecting
suicide bombers in
unstructured crowds, at
installation entry checkpoints,
and traffic control points.

Robotic Mounted
Detection System
(RMDS) w i t h Laser
Detection and Ranging.

RMDSisadevelopmental
effort designed to remotely
operate the Husky Mounted
Detection System. RMDS
allows remote detection of
lEDsfromatrailing vehicle.
NEUTRALIZE
Neutralize systems seek to
deny IED actuation atatime
and place of the enemy's
choosing.
Devil Pup Mini Robot.

Devil Pup isamanpackable,
highly agile, miniature
robot specifically designed
for dismounted explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD)
operators.
Sherloci^. Sherlock isa
COTS trace detector for
identifying suspicious solids
and liquids. Sherlock provides
portable trace detection of
explosives.
BiuePo^. Blue Fox is an
effort to characterizeaCOTS,
manportable,radiography
system exceeding current
EOD radiography penetration
capabilities.
GrayPo^. Gray Fox isa
backscatter)(-ray imaging
system. Gray Fox enables the
EOD operator to remotely
IB

19478

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

T R A I N

^-ray thick cased containers

culverts and determining

is installed on a vehicle to

and munitions to determine

which options within the Hard

permit remote operation

the presence of an IED fusing

Impactdesigns willbe most

from a control panel in a

system or haz^ardouslic^uids.

effective.

trailing vehicle. The semi
autonomous vehicle control

e h o ^ ^ h l p . Ghost Ship is

system is designed to

a k i t installed in High mobility

enable remote detection and

l i t i g a t e systems seek to

multipurpose wheeled

neutralization of lEDs using

minimize the effects of

Vehicles allowing complete

C IED enablers such as rollers

IED blasts on personnel,

remote operation o f t h e

and ground penetrating radar

ec^uipment, and facilities.

vehicle by an operator in a

on an unmanned vehicle.

MITIGATE

trailing vehicle.
I^.B

^ o l n t IED D e f e a t T e s t

llHar^neCorp^

6^^a^^^lT^^Th6J^

^Il9^^^l^l^les^

The

B ^ t e n ^ l ^ a ^ a ^ a City

Re^earch^ O e v e ^ o p m e ^

validates that JlEDDO funded

^ 1 ^ ^ R o l l e r . PC rollers

anB Englneeirlng C e n t e r

C-IED initiatives are proven

mitigate the effects of VOIEDs

^AROEC^Oh^ect^ve

capabilities, and allows DoD

by standoff pre-detonation,

A m ^ r l^rotect^on.

reducing causalities and

AI^DEC objective armor

new technologies. In FY 2010,

vehicle damage.

protection seeks to provide

Ji^ODOfunded^^J^test

developmental armor

events, evaluating 317 C IED

H a r B Im^pact^ Hard Impact

technologies for protection

efforts across the JlEDDO

is a device to deny the

against large explosively

LOOs^

enemy the use of culverts

formed penetrators and

for empIacinglEDs while

rocket propelled grenades at

Army

The

leadership to confidently field

Tl^^T^^^OI^C^

still allowing water flow.

a reduced weight compared

Thesystem is adaptable to

to currently available armor

JlEDDO s TtF LOO assesses

different culvert sizes. This

solutions.

Joint and service C-IED
training requirements and

program is also creating
tools and criteria to assist

8 e n t ^ n e l BcoMt. This

operators in assessing road

developmental applique kit

supports the development
and improvement of
training initiatives to enable
warfighters to ofganize,
plan, and conduct C IED
operations; properly employ
C-IED equipment; and improve
understanding of new IED
threats.

f^.S. St^die^^sfaffaf^antff^^a^t
t ^ f ^ e , a^tif^e^tfenfafa^s^a^,
B e s t e d ft^^i^r^aver^a^si^r^^ie^fs
f^r^^fanf^^f^Ost^rtdery^eafft
nt^adt^^.
^ ^ ^ ^ S ^ . ^ t ^ ^ . Ot^i^fte^

^9

19479

In response to the SECDEFs
memo ofMarch 18, 2010,
JlEDDO has dramatically
increasedC-IED training
support to ISAF troop
contributing nation partners
through support to U.S.
European Command and
in cooperation with North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)Allied Command
Transformation.
JIEDDO'smajor training

fB.S.^ofdier^e^arriineevident^eafanf^Ofr^ainin^^ifeaffffe^afiena^
Ti^afnin^Cenfer^af^errfr^in,C^.
^ftoft^,.^^^000

investments were in filling
Afghanistan surge operations

^COEComhined^oint

asignificant increase of

and increased emphasis

Tasl^Porce(C^TP)

visual graphic and computer

on live, virtual, constructive

PaiadinTraining Support

generated entity quality within

gaming (LVCG), formerly

T e a m . T h i s initiative

virtual training systems.

modeling and simulation.

provides forward-stationed
instructors to conduct

JCOE launched several

Biometrics and

receipt, staging, onward

Porensics Virtual

movement, and integration

T r a i n i n g . This initiative

training to incoming forces

provides virtual gaming

^COEC-IEDTraining

in Afghanistan such as, EOD,

interactive multimedia

Support Mission.

special forcesBCOIN,and

instruction on comprehensive

search and site exploitation,

and persistent biometrics and

initiatives during this year;

This initiative funded

forensics training.

the development and
propagation of newC IED

LVCGTraining.To

training capabilities based on

overcome the joint

T i s s u e Stahili2^ation.

emerging threats. Major types

operational problem, JlEDDO

This initiative will accelerate

of support include; training,

partnered with the services to

research in tissue repair and

tactics, and procedures

developLVCG initiatives.

skin grafting. It accelerates
(by three-to eight years)

development; publication and
distribution; and support to

Synthetic Environments

additional surgical procedures

the Afghan training fusion cell.

Core Common Virtual

to reduce infection, rapidly

E n v i r o n m e n t (SE-

grow skin, and reduceB

C IED S u p p o r t E l e m e n t s

C o r e ) . JlEDDO funded the

remove scar tissue caused by

andC-IEDTeam

acceleration ofaproven

IED injuries.

T r a i n i n g . T h i s Battle Staff

training program to meet

Training Team provided

C IED requirements JlEDDO

training that supported units'

funded the procurement of

C IED training for surge

hardware and software for the

deployment to Afghanistan.

SE Core program enabling

^0

19480

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
JlEDDO invests in S&T to
mature technology and
accelerate a capability
to theater. Some
projects explore unknown
phenomenology to gain
better understanding to
develop a component
technology required for
a larger system, JlEDDO
programs are often worked in
partnership and collaboration
with experts from across the
DoD S&T community. Efforts
in these areas span all three
lines of operation.
Sensor and Data
Exploitation. JlEDDO
continues to explore new
sensors and exploitation
methods to demonstrate the
ability to detect command
wires, disturbed earth, signs
of emplacement activity,
and other observables
associated with emplaced
lEDs, to include integration
and demonstration ofthese
capabilities on both aerial
and ground platforms.
PBIED Detection
Technology. JlEDDO is
exploring new techniques
for detecting explosives
to include neutron-based
detection, millimeter wave
imaging, ultrasonic, and
multi-modal detection.
21

T R A I N

_

Neutralization. JIEDDO's
technology development
program is exploring
technologies to neutralize the
IED. The use of high-power
microwave as a technique to
pre-detonate an IED remains
a challenge.
Information Technology.

JlEDDO is working with
information technology
experts across industry,
academia, and the services
to advance the state of
the art in a number of
information technology areas
to include fusion, knowledge
management, natural
language processing, and
human computer.
Social Dynamic
Analysis. The JlEDDO
social dynamic analysis
program includes several
programs that look at
network analysis, cultural
understanding, and metrics
to gauge success in security
operations and other COIN
activities. These efforts
promise to provide a set
of integrated solutions for
JlEDDO, DoD, and other
agencies to consider as part
of their philosophy of using
social and cultural aspects of
a network.
Cognitive Analysis.

JlEDDO successfully
completed a cognitive
analysis study providing

scientific evidence to
understand why 60 percent
of detected lEDs are
discovered by the human
eye. Understanding of critical
skills is enabling the services
to incorporate the cognitive,
physical, and individual
differences into live, virtual,
and gaming systems to better
train warfighters to detect
lEDs.
Medical. In cooperation with
the Army Surgeon General's
office, JlEDDO focused a
number of medical research
initiatives and treatment
capabilities intended to
defeat IED wounding effects.

19481

FISCAL YEAR2010TRANSITIONS, TRANSFERS,AND TERMINATIONS
Chartered by DoD to rapidly acquireCIED capabilities, JlEDDO seeks to transition or transfer prov
enCIED initiatives to the services, COCOMS, or government agencies for lifecycle management
and sustainment within two years, Similarly,JIEDDO seeks to terminate initiatives that have met an
urgent requirement and are no longer needed or have failed to deliver anticipated results.Timely
initiative transition,transfer,or termination avoids JlEDDO being saddled with longterm resource
commitments and enables JlEDDO to apply limited resources to the most urgent emergingC-lED
requirements.
JlEDDO transitioned or transferred ^6CIED capabilities and terminated four initiatives in FY 2010
(see charts on pages 23 26). JlEDDO transitionsCIED initiatives when those initiatives are judged
to be integral to an existing and enduring capability for the joint force and are expected to become part of an existing program of record funded in the president'sbudget. JlEDDO transfers
C-IED initiatives when the solution is not judged to be part of an existing approved capability,but
will continue to be used in the current conflict and sustained through OCO supplemental funding
requests.
Annually in the third quarter,JIEDDO formally briefsT3 recommendations to the Protection Func
tional Capabilities Board Working Group, Joint Capabilities Board, and Joint Requirements Over
sight Council (JROC). Based upon JROC'sendorsement,aJROC memorandum (JROCM) signed
by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informs the services and agencies of the JROC
action.TheT3 list and JROCM are forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for T3 decision

MRAP pushes a mine roller through the route ensuring the path is clear of lEDs during a 5-day convoy to FOB
Edinburgh, Afgtianistan.
Photo: Lance Cpl. Bruno J. Bego

22

19482

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

CIED Initiative Name

T R A I N

Description

Source Document

After Action Review (AAR) Video
FaodtMck System

Two video capture systems and supporting AAR for
existing sites (supports existing COTS strategy)

Deputy Secretary of
Defense memo (DSDM)
2010

Additional Combined Vehicle Radio
Jammer (CVRJ) Jammers

Follow-on procurement of CVRJ systems to bridge
current fielding requirements and next generation
system

DSCM Aug. 18,2009

Additional Mobile Multi-band
Jammer

Funding provides procurement of additional
systems in support of active jammer JUONS

DSDM Aug. 18. a m

Battlefield Foransica Mobiie
Training Team (MTT)

MTT for weapons technical intelligence

FY 2010 Congress

Biometrics MTT

MMT for b k m e t r k s

FY 2010 Congress

Biometrics Training Integration

Addition of biometrics exploitation into other
C-IED training

FY 2010 Congress

Comlilned Information Data Network
Exchange (CIDNE) Web-enabled
Temporal Analysis System Oata
Management Sustainment

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) mandated
process-oriented data collection and correlation toot

DSDM June 13, 2008

C-IED Live Fire Environment

A complex and durat>te facility capable of Integrating
all critical C-IEO enablers in a live-fire exercise (LFX)
scenario

FY 2010 Congress

Comt^at Tracking Dogs

D^ection and traclcins of terrorists (program of record)

D S E ^ June 13.2006

Combined Information Oata
IMetworIt Exchange

Improves dissemination of theater-derived
CIED information

DSDM June 13.2008

Comi^any Intelligence Suppori
Teams

Provides instructors, computers, pattem, and link-node
analysis software to develop and train company
intelligence support teams at the comt»at W i n i n g
centers (CTC)

FY 2010 Congress

CREW - Global System for Mobile
(GSM) Risk Mitigator

Classified CREW project: Navy non-concurred and
intended to end funding in FY 2010. GSM risk
mitigator (Jukebox)

DSD acMon memo
Jan. 14, 2010

CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training
Devices

Surrogate device for training

DSDM 2010

DARWARS Ambush

Provide virtual representation and replication of
CREW actions and effects in support of training
for convoy defense operations as well as
IED defeat mounted and dismounted
maneuver training

DSDM 2010

Mfst Army CTC Leveling

Enhanced home-station C-IED training

FY 2010 Congress

Gallant Dart

Classilied C-IEO effort

DSDM Aug. 18, 2009

Groendart

Classified C-IED effort

OSDMAu9.18,2C»9

Home Station C-IED Lane Training

infrastructure improvements, personnel, surrogate
training vehicles, and IED training aids to enhance
C4ED lane training

D S m June 13, 2008

Home Station C IED
Training Capabilities

Assist services to enable IED defeat training at home
Stations and improve readiness prior to CTC rotations

OSDM June 13, 2008

Home Station Training Lanes II

Congressional add

FY 2010 Congress

Husky Mounted Detection System

GPR for detection and marking of i»uried lEDt

DSDM Aug. 18. 2009

1 Army FY 2010 Transfers

23

.

^
\

19483

1

1 v" f \

_ at — ......

CIED Initiative Name

1

Description

BHHBMHHi^^^^l

Km
1 Army FY 2010 Transfers (continued)
i n s u ^ e n t s on tfie Battlefield

|
Provides AtN training t»y using role players to perform
as key charactere In social, political, and religious

OSDM Aug. 18,2009

9««ui»
Integrated Capability Development
Team

Assists with rapid C-IED capabilities development,
material solutions integration, training, and fielding
using subject-matter experts (SMEs)

DSDM June 13.2008

Joint CREW 3.1 Dismounted
System

Develops higher performing man-portable systems

OSDM Jan. 14, 2010

Joint Electronic Warf are Course

Prepares EWOs from all services for electronic warfare
duties at the electronic warfare control center

OSDM 2010

Joint Total Entity Tracking for the
Instrumented Battlefield

Provides a means to track redA»lue activities, down to
the individual level - congressional add

FY 2010 Congress

Joint Readiness Training Center
Simulated Radio Infrastructure
Expansion

Congressional add

FY 2010 Congress

Joint Theater EW Operations
Course

EW planning and coordination skills for employment
at COCOM, Joint task force, or corps-level

OSCWI2010

Multifunction, Agile, f^mote-control
Robot-Experimental Robot

A small, man-transportable, remotely controlled
robotic platform for stand-off visual inspection of
suspected lEDs

OSDM June 13,2008

Night E a g l e l & H

High-resolution ISR system at survivable

OSDM June 13.2008

Opposing Forces Command and
Control Network

Creation of cell phone and wireless local loop
networks at four CTCs

OSDM June 13, 2008

Quick Reaction Dismount (QRO)
(Guardian)

CREW Manportable version 1

OSDM Jan. 14, 2010

ORD Surrogate Devices

Training devices for QRO (Guardian)

DSDM 2010

Wire Neutralization System

Roller attachment to defeat command and tripwire
IED initiators in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF

OSDM June 13, 2008

1 Navy FY 2010 Transfers

1

CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training
Devices

Surrogate device for training

O S t m 2010

CREW Legacy Support

Funding to sustain legacy CREW systems in FY 2009
until replaced

OSDM June 13,2008

Future Immersive Training
Environment

Congressional add

FY 2010 Congress

Home Station C-IED Lane Training

Infrastructure improvements, personnel, surrogate
training vehicles, and IED training aids to enhance
C-IEO lane training

OSDM June 13. »)08

Home Station C-IED Training
Capabilities

Assist services to enable IED defeat training at
home stations and improve readiness prior to CTC
rotations

t » O M June 13,2008

HME Detection

HME detection capability

OSDM June 13,2008

JCREW 3.1 Dismounted System

Third-generation C-IED Jammers

OSDM Jim. 14.2010

JCREW 3.2 Mounted System

Tfiird-^eneration C-IED Jammers

OaOM Jan. 14, 2010

Joint Training COIC

Congressional add split with JlEDDO

FY 2010 Congress

QRD Surrogate Devices

Training devices for QRO (GuanMan)

OSDM 2010

24

19484

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

CIED Initiative Name

:

R A I N

Description

Source Document

1 Navy FY 2010 Transfers (continued)
TrIpleplay (Easy FarmerfEasy
Actor/WOMP)

"
1

Classified C-iED effort

OSDM Aug. 18, 200*

1 Marine Corps FY 2010 Transfers

|

AAR Video Feedback System

Two video capture systems and supporting AAR for
existing sites (supports existing COTS strategy)

DSDM 2010

C-IED Live-fire Environment
(Marine Corps)

A complex and durable facility capable of integrating
all critical C-IED enablers In an LFX scenario

FY 2010 Congress

Company-Level intelligence Cell
(CUC)

Provides instructors, computers, pattem, and link-node
analysis software In the all-source intelligence targeting
toolkit to support the requested CLIC and equipment
integration

FY 2010 Congress

CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training
Devices

Surrogate device for training

OSDM 2010

Home Station C-IEO Lane Training

Infrastructure improvements, personnel, surrogate
training vehicles, and IED training aids to enhance
C-IED lane training

OSDMAug,18,2009

Home Station C4ED Training
Capabilities

Assist services to enable IED defeat training at home
stations and improve readiness prior to CTC rotations

DSDM Aug. 18.2009

Infantry Immersion "Trainer

Small unit level Immersive IED defeat training capability
replicates sights, sounds, smells, chaos of battle with
home station availability

FY 2010 Congress

Insurgents on the BatlleMeld
(Marines): Deputy Secretary of
Defense Action Memo, dated
Dec. 2,2008

Provides AtN training by using role players to perform
as key characters in social, political and religious
groups

OSDM Aug-18.2009

Integrated Capability Development
Team

Assists wiBi rapid C-IED capabilities development,
material solutions integration, training and fielding
using subject matter experts

OSDM Aug. 18, 2009

JCREW 3.1 Dismounted ^ s l e m

Third-generation C-IEO Jwnmers

OSDM Jan. 14.2010

Joint Total Entity Tracking for the
Instivmented Battlefield

Electronic training aids for field exercises

FY 2010 Congress

Opposing Force ( O P F ( ^ 0
C2 Network

Creation of cell i ^ o n e and wiretess local loop
networks at four CTCs

OSDMAug.18.2009

Quicd Reaction Dismount (QRD)
Surrogate Devices

Training devices for W D (Guardian)

OSDM 2010

QRO (Guaniian}

CREW Man-portal>le version 1 being replaced by
CREW 3.1

OSDM Jan. 14.2010

Route Clearance Research,
Development. Testing, and
Evaluation

C-IED scrapper blade for Afghanistan

DSDM 2010

USMC OEF VOIEO Roller

C-IED mine roller for Afghanistan

DSDM 2010

C-IED ISR Integration

Integration of command and control of airbome
C-IED assets

FY 2010 Congress

Combat Tracking Dogs

Detection and traekittg of t e r r o r t e (program of record)

DSDM June 13,2009

CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training
Devices

Surrogate device for training

DSDM 2010

i
;

j|

1 Air Force FY 2010 Transfers

25

;

4
?
'i

{

19485

CIED Initiative Name

Description

1 Source Document

Air Force FY 2010 Transfers (continued)
Home Station C-IEO Training
Capabilities

Assist services to enable IED defeat training at home
stations and Improve readiness prior to CTC rotations

DSDM June 13,2009

QRD Surrogate Devices

Training devices for QRD (Guardian)

DSDM 2010

U S, Air Force War#ire Center
Joint IND Team

Mobile C IED team

OSrat 2010

USSOCOM FY M I O Transfers
EGON

Classified C4ED effort

THOR/AM-terrain Vehicle

THOR is a man portable and vehicular-mountalile
CREW system

DSDM Aug, 18, 2009

National Securi^ Agency (NSA):
C-IEO Embeds

Classified C-IEO effort

DSDM 2010

NSA: CSS Cryptologic Services
Group (COIC)

Classified C-IED effort

DSDM 2010

NSA: Fusion Analysis
Development Effect

Classified C-IED effort

Memorandum of
understanding signed
by Lt. Gen, Metz
Sept 13, 2009

NSA: Liquid Fire {Meta Data Denver)

Classilied C-IED effort - memo for record (MFR)

Technology

"#MiLug.18,2009

Agency FY 2010 Transfer*

Requirements and
Integration Division MFR
W#AS#p.17,M0»

26

19486

A T T ^ C K ^ -

lO^I^FEAT

"""^"^^A^^
^^^(^NIY^^

AAR
AMN
ARDEC
AtN
C2
CAC
CF
CIDNE
C IED
CIEW
CI2C
CLIC
CJTF
COCOM
COIC
COIN
COTS
CREW
C-SIG
CTC
CVRJ
DDOI
DDOR
DDRA&T
DDT
DoD
DSDM
DtD

2^

after action review
Afghanistan Mission Network
Army Research, DevelopmentaL
and Engineering Center
Attack the Network
command and control
Capabilities Acquisition Center
coalition forces
combined information data
network exchange
counter improvised explosive
device
counter-IED electronic wartare
counter-IED integration cell
company level intelligence cell
combined joint task force
combatant command
Counter-IED OperationsB
Intelligence Integration Center
counterintelligence
commercial off the shelf
counter radio controlled IED
electronic wartare
Counter lED Senior Integration

EW
EO
EOD
EWO
FAR
FY
GAO
GMTI
GPR
GSM
FIME
IED
IR
ISAF
ISR
JATAC
JCOE
JIEDD
JIEDDF
JlEDDO

Group

JOLLER

combat training center
combined vehicle radio jammer
Deputy Director of Operations
Integration
Deputy Director of Operations
and Requirements
Deputy Director ofRapid
Acquisition andTechnoIogy
Deputy Director ofTraining
Department of Defense
DeputySecretaryofDefense

JROC

JUON
I^IA
LF)^
LOO
LVCG

memo

MFR

Defeat the Device

MTAT

JROCM
JTB
JTCOIC

electronic wartare
electrooptical
explosive ordnance disposal
electronic wartare officer
Federal Acquisition Regulation
fiscal year
Government Accountability Office
ground moving target indicator
ground penetrating radar
global system for mobile
homemade explosive(s)
improvised explosive device
infrared
International Security Assistance
Force
intelligence,surveillance,and
reconnaissance
Joint AsymmetricTreat Awareness
C IED training
Joint Center of Excellence
Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Fund
Joint IED Defeat Fund
Joint IED Defeat Organization
Joint IED Neutralize Roller
Joint Requirements Oversight
Council
JROC memorandum
JlEDDO Test Board
JointTraining Center IED
Operations Integration Center
joint urgent operational need
killed in action
live-fire exercise
line of operation
live, virtual, constructive gaming
memo for record
MarineTrainingAdvisoryTeam

19487

^^^(^NIY^^
NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

S&T

science and technology

NSA

National Security Agency

SE

synthetic environment

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

OCO

overseas contingency operations

T3

transitions, transfers, and

OPFOR

opposing forces

ORSA

operations research systems

TAC

tripwire analytic capability

analysis

TEDAC

Terrorist Explosive Device

terminations

Analytical Center

PBIED

Person borne IED

PC

Panama City

TtF

PGSS

persistent ground surveillance

USCENTCOM U.S, Central Command

system

USMC

U.S. MarineCorps

PTDS

persistent threat detection system

UTS

universal test set

ORD

quick reaction dismount

VBIED

VehiclebornelED

RCP

route clearance patrols

VOIED

victimoperatedlED

RMDS

robotic mounted detection system WTI

Train the Force

weapons technical intelligence

2B


(377) 251 -3337




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19489
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This Publication can be found online at:

wvvw.jieddo.dod.miI

19491

Table of Contents
Message from the Director

3

Threats and Trends
IED Overview for Afghanistan and Iraq
Global
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
U.S. African Command (AFRICOM)
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

4
4
6
6
7
7
8
8
8

JlEDDO Mission and Mission Areas

9

Resources
Funding
Personnel and Staffing
JlEDDO Enterprise Management System

10
10
10
11

FY 2009 Major Accomplishments
Attack the Network
Defeat the Device
Train the Force

12
12
14
15

Competitive Strategies Group

18

FY 2009 Transfers, Transitions, and Terminations

19

JlEDDO Field Teams

22

Science and Technology

22

Acronyms

23

. 19493

Message from the Director
The Depart:ment of Defense (DoD) established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JlEDDO)
in February 2006 to meet an urgent and compelling need to counter improvised explosive
devices (lEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since then, JlEDDO has provided significant
capabilities to warfighters - enabling IED network attack, enabling IED detection and defeat,
and providing leading-edge counter-IED training to our men and women in uniform.
This Annual Report provides an accounting of JIEDDO's significant efforts in Fiscal Year
2009. Highlights include:
e Orchestrating a $3.1 billion effort to develop and deliver counter-IED
capabilities on abbreviated timelines.
• Improving effectiveness in developing and fusing information to understand
and enable attacks against IED networks - and pushing that information forward
to troops in theater.
e Posturing JlEDDO to meet long-term DoD needs to counter lEDs as weapons
of strategic influence.
At the end of 2009, JlEDDO continued to deliver urgently needed counter-IED capabilities
to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, where IED use dramatically escalated in 2009. On a positive
note, IED use continued to decline in Iraq. Elsewhere in the world, violent extremists
employed, on average, more than 250 lEDs per month. Notably, IED networks continued
to (Jemonstrate remarkably rapid IED innovation cycles.
We are in an extended era of persistent conflict that spans the globe. lEDs figure prominently
as the weak adversary's weapon of choice - continuing a several-century trend. To counter
the persistent IED threat, our nation needs new and improved counter-IED capabilities with
an eye toward leaping beyond the terrorists' next innovation.
As we move forward in 2010 and beyond, the men and women of JlEDDO remain committed
to putting improved counter-IED capabilities in the hands of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and
Airmen wherever they serve.

c::Pl^.Gjcr
Michael L, Oates
LTG, U.S. Army
Director

HP

19494

Threats and Trends
IED Overview for Afghanistan and Iraq
lEDs continued to be a significant threat in both Afghanistan
and Iraq in FY 2009, with overall incidents against U.5. and
Coalition Forces (CF) decreasing in Iraq, and increasing in
Afghanistan. As reflected in Figure-1, while the number
of casualties caused by lEDs in Iraq has followed FY 2008
trends, IED casualties in Afghanistan began to increase in
May 2009, lEDs in Iraq accounted for more than 14,400
casualties in FY 2009, a 31 percent decline from nearly
19,000 such casualties in FY 2008. In contrast, the number
of casualties caused in Afghanistan increased 39 percent
to almost 6,200 casualties in FY 2009 from approximately
3,800 casualties in FY 2008.

6,800 IED incidents in FY 2009, 52 percent were found and
safely cleared; 26 percent detonated but failed to produce a
casualty; and 22 percent detonated and caused a CF, NonCF, or Host Nation casualty. As measured by CF casualties
per incident, lEDs were 14 percent more effective in FY 2009
over FY 2008. Coupled with the significant corresponding
increase in IED incidents, this resulted in over twice the
number of CF casualties that were suffered in FY 2008.
lEDs in Afghanistan continued to present a significant threat
to CF, Most lEDs encountered in Afghanistan continued to
employ simple, yet effective, technologies and designs such
as Victim Operated lEDs (VOIEDs) (e,g,, pressure plates)
and Command Wire lEDs (CWIEDs) that often used large
net explosive weight (NEW) charges. These basic devices
circumvented many CF countermeasures due to their
simplicity and difficulty of detection.

6000
Iraqs.
0)

U> 5000
<

4000

&

-

in

«
ra 3000

3
tf)

ra
U

2

,o

1000

1000

y ' V v AfgTianTsfiBin^
FY04

FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09

Figure-1: IED Casualties (Coalition Force, Non-Coalition Force, and Host Nation) in Iraq and Afghanistan

Afghanistan
lEDs were the most serious threat to Coalition Forces (CF)
in Afghanistan in FY 2009. The use of lEDs in Afghanistan
dramatically increased in FY 2009, continuing its steady
climb since 2005. Taliban, other insurgent groups, and al
Qaeda-aligned foreign fighters use lEDs to cause casualties,
restrict CF Freedom of Maneuver, create insecurity in the
populace, and separate CF from the civilian population.
The increase in CF troop levels in Regional Commands
(RC) South (S) and East (E) during FY 2009 resulted in a
significant increase in IED incidents as these units pushed
into areas formerly controlled by the Taliban ancj other
insurgent groups. The influx of CF Into areas has led to the
highest rates of IED attacks on CF since the conflict began
in 2001,
In FY 2009, the number of IED incidents in Afghanistan
nearly doubled from FY 2008 (Figure-2). Of the more than

The incorporation of homemade explosives (HME) and
other bulk explosives into large lEDs continued to be the
most significant IED threat to CF in Afghanistan. HME, and
other bulk explosives were used in the majority of IED main
charges in Afghanistan,
In addition to targeting CF vehicles, insurgents also
increased targeting of dismounted forces in FY 2009 due
to the increase of dismounted operations by CF forces in
support of Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The lEDs
used in these attacks often employed the same types of
simple victim operated and command wire initiation used in
attacks against mounted forces.
Afghanistan Outlook: Driven largely by the increased CF
presence and expanded COIN operations in Afghanistan,
IED activity and lED-related casualties will persist at
elevated levels in the near term. IED activity will increase
as CF push into areas previously controlled by the Taliban,
especially in traditional insurgent strongholds in RC-South
as well as traditional insurgent areas of RC-East.

19495

1200
1000
800
600
mo A n t e t t m M nan Cf CMutltDn.

4O0
SO Attmdtt with CmMtkm Foic» C#MwAiw

200
tiit^tfvctfve

FY06

FY05

fY07

fill

FY08

Attitck^

FY09

Flgure-2: Afghanistan - IED Incident Trends

Most lEDs encountered by CF in Afghanistan will continue
to employ simple, yet effective, technologies and designs.
Insurgents will continue to target armored vehicles with large
net explosive weight lEDs in an attempt to cause significant
casualties. With increased COIN operations requiring
dismounted tactics, insurgents will also increasingly focus
on targeting dismounted troops. In addition, insurgents
will focus on conducting high-profile suicide attacks
similar to the multiple Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED)
attacks against CF and Government of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan (GIRoA) targets in Kabul during FY 2009.

Iraq
The decline in IED activity in Iraq continued in FY 2009,
with attacks at their lowest levels since May 2004; and
IED incidents falling nearly 50 percent as compared to the
previous fiscal year (Figure-3). The withdrawal of the
majority of U,S. Forces Iraq (USF-I) from Combat Outposts

in the cities to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in June
2009 was a major contributing factor to the decline in the
IED threat. As a result, insurgents shifted some of their IED
targeting efforts to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), government
and sectarian targets in attempts to reverse recent gains in
security and stability.
Due to the reduced operational posture of U.S, Forces
Iraq (USF-I), many threat groups in Iraq have shifted a
significant portion of their IED targeting efforts to Iraqi
Security Forces and symbolic government and sectarian
targets. However, despite a significant reduction in IED
incidents, lEDs continue to present a significant threat to
USF-I and will continue to threaten USF-I forces remaining
in Iraq after the completion of the drawdown.
Iraq Outlook: The overall decline in IED attacks against
USF-I will likely continue, although there is potential that
insurgents may attempt to increase attacks against USF-I
depending on the outcome of Iraqi elections in FY 2010

4000

FY03

FY04

FY 07
Figurs-3: Iraq - IED Incidents Trends

FY08

FV09

19496

and during USF withdrawal operations. AlQaeda in Iraq
(A0I)9ndShiaextremistswill continuetopropagate
sectarian violence while A^Iwill attack Iraqi government
and security targets using large SVBIEDs and Person
borne lEDs(PBIEDs), Periodic spikes in IED violence can
be anticipated during post election government formation,
religiousholidays,andassociated pilgrimages,

thatgrowin sophistication, others will continueto rely
on relatively simple, but effective TTPs until they are
effectively countered, IED events will increase in frequency
in many unstable areas of the globe as threat groups share
information,capitalizeon rapidly evolving global wireless
communicationstechnologies,homemadeexplosives(HME),
and realize the potential psychological, social, and political
impact ofthis weapon, Thesetrends arealready being
seen in places such as Pakistan, North and East Africa, and
South America(Colombia), No other widely available terror
weapon garners suchpotential for mass mediaattention
and strategic influence as does the IED.

Global
lEDs continued to be the weapon of choice for global
insurgents and terrorists, FY 2009 saw an average of
over 250 IED incidents per month outside ofAfghanistan
and Iraq as shown in ^ f B ^ ^ - ^ , Device effectiveness and
lethality continued to improvein many areas outside of
Afghanistanand Iraq, Improvedglobal communications
and coordination among threat groups has enabled
proliferation of IED technology world wide ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ - ^ .
Many global terrorist and insurgent groups outside oflraq
andAfghanistan increasinglyreliedonlEDsandincorporated
successful indigenous tactics,techniques, and procedures
(TTPs)as well as those demonstrated by insurgents in Iraq
andAfghanistan,

^.^.GentraiGomn^and(G5i^TGGi^)
Threat groups in CENTCOM(outside Iraq andAfghanistan)
employednearly every type of lEDin FY 2009, Suicide
attacks in the form of SVBIEDs and PBIEDs were common
and caused significant casualties in countries such as
Pakistan, The proliferation of suicide IED tactics by alO^eda and their proxies inCENTCOM continued to bea
growing global threat,
Pakistan continued to be thefocus o f a significant IED
campaign in FY 2009 by al ^aedaandTalibanaffiliated
groupsthatsoughttodestabilizethe Pakistani government
and counter ongoing Pakistani military operations targeting

lEDs will continue to threaten security forces throughout
theglobe, Whilesomethreatgroups will employ lEDs

aIS reitder sale
2007 ^'ISep 2009
" Signtfl&nt
IED IncklenI
O N D J

F

M

A

M

J

J

A

S

O

N

D

J

F

M

A

M

Monthly Global Terrorist Events (minus Iraq & Afghanistan)

Flgure-4: Global IED Incidents

J

J

A

S

19497

JIEDDO'S Reach
Afghanistan FIcW Team (Bagram. Kabul, Kandahar, Salerno,
Jalalatiad. Ghazni, Gardez, Orgun-E, Sharona. Tann K o w t * Abad)
- FmtwN* Mith at}f>to*^ei iinHii
• Advlnmg UnW*
• TTP*«vii»• .
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< CHEW«r*lnlBg

J o i n t lEO Defeat Organiza l i o n . Crystal C• R«»Mirclfis ilM CD
flgtn

• DlracHon. C• fvchnolcigy IntoQrxtion
• M t u f f O t l Mom R w a Equipping r m * @tM|

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Joint CenWr o t Excelionco Ft Irwin, CA
* NmowMi* Ttmnif^j tci tho lEO D«fMt ri0iit
• CHracUsn, OuHtanc*, * Cooreinabon

CounlcT-IEDOperationi
Inlcyratio"! Center. VA

JFCOM. Norfolk, VA
• PM-4*pioym#n( Trmmno AM4tianc»
• Support JcMtn TratmDiff
• .MrH Ci*pNWW|:4#p* Inttg^^lon
WgW Know#«ga U4))Aoem«nt
Training COfC, F o r i M o n r o * . VA

f

Iraq FwW Team (Baghadad, Tikiit. & Ramadi)
• E m M with a#p*oy*d u«tK«

* AavmsnQ Mwuik
* TTP drr»eofiin«f^
dtMwWnwWkw
' CftCW inlnlRB
• TMMM&km ToMi 5
^

Flgure-5: Global IED Network and TTP Linkages

extremist groups in the tribal regions and border areas
with Afghanistan, Numerous PBIED and VBIED attacks on
civilian, government and security force targets in FY 2009
illustrated the ability of Pakistani Islamist groups to conduct
high casualty IED strikes that had strategic political and
social impact.
In the beginning of 2009, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni
al-Qaeda organizations merged to form al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); a group capable of carrying
out coordinated attacks against fortified compounds as
illustrated in the 17 September 2008 assault on the U.S.
Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen as well as attacking U.S. interests
both inside and outside the region.
The continued proliferation of IED technology and TTPs
from Iraq and Afghanistan to the rest of the CENTCOM area
of responsibility will be a continuing concern,

US. African Command (AFRICOIVI)
In AFRICOM, IED attacks were prominent in North and East
Africa due to a permissive security environment, integration
offoreign fighters into local insurgent groups, and increased
focus on the AOR by groups such as al Qaeda, These
attacks employed multiple types of lEDs, With al Qaeda
influence, funding, and training, IED attacks became more
lethal and sophisticated, especially in the Horn of Africa
(HOA) where the al Qaeda linked al Shabaab group in
Somalia demonstrated success with multiple, coordinated

SVBIED attacks against African Union security forces and
other political and military targets. We assess these trends
will continue into FY 2010.
In North Africa and the Sahel, al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb's (AQIM) maintained an ongoing IED campaign
against Algerian security forces and government targets, as
well as posing an increasing IED threat to western targets in
the region. On the west coast of Africa, Nigeria witnessed
multiple IED attacks on multinational oil company pipelines
and facilities by a loose coalition of criminal extortion groups
known collectively as the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND).

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOIVI)
In FY 2009, threat groups in PACOM conducted significant
IED attacks in Thailand, the Philippines, India, and Indonesia,
In addition to insurgent and terrorist groups, rogue states
such as North Korea are assessed to have the capability to
implement state-sponsored IED campaigns in the event of
hostilities in the region.
In Thailand, southern Malay Muslim insurgents continued
to employ significant numbers of lEDs; these attacks were
usually confined to the three southernmost Thai provinces.
Threat groups in the Philippines, such as the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), continued to use lEDs against the
Filipino government. Of note, on 29 September 2009, an
IED emplaced by members of an Islamist group on the
island of Jolo destroyed an up-armored High Mobility Multi-

19498

purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and killed two U,S,
soldiers as well asaPhilippine Marine.
The IED threat in India consists ofacombination of threats
from indigenous leftist groups(e,g,,the Maoist ^^Naxalites"),
Pakistan based Islamist groups, and domestic Indian
Islamist groups. FY 2009 saw continued IED use by violent
ethnic separatist groups and Indian Maoist groups (e.g,,
Naxalites)that will continue to poseasignificant IED threat
to India in FY 2010.

U.^.^oi^^l^ernCommand(^OOTI^COi^)
In FY 2009, the mostsignificant IED threats in SOUTHCOM
emanated from the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia
(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia,
These groups conducted sophisticated and effective IED
attacks on civilian, government, military,and infrastructure
targets, Elsewhereinthe SOUTHCOM AOR, leftist and
criminal groups conducted IED attacks against security
forces, government targets, and large corporations. These
attacks tended to use smaller,lesssophisticated devices.
In Chile, small leftistandanarchistgroupscontinuedtocarry
outsmall scalelEDattackson multinational corporations,
banksand embassies in Santiago, In Peru, the Maoist
influenced Shining Path, aka SenderoLuminoso(SL),has
continued IED attacks against Peruvian security forces.
Several Islamicextremistgroups maintain a presence
in multipleareasof Latin America, This presence may
provideincreased potential forfuturelEDeffortsacross
the SOUTHCOM area of operational responsibility (AOR)
as demonstrated bythe 19^2and 1994 Hezbollah IED
attacks againstJewish targets in Argentina, Sunni Islamists

^

groups could also exploit the presence of Sunni supporters
in Latin America to facilitate future IED attacks against U.S,
interests,

O.^.Ei^ro^eanCommand(EUCOi^)
In the EUCOM area of responsibility, domestic leftist and
anarchistgroupsin^reece,dissidentIrishrepublicangroups
inNorthernlreland, Spain's separatist Basque Fatherland
and Liberty(ETA),andTurkey'sKongra^el(K^K), continued
significant use of lEDs in FY 2009.
Islamic terrorists associated with, or inspired by al Qaeda,
may also attempt direct targeting of Western interests in
the EUCOM area of responsibility with IED attacksthat
may involve suicide operatives, ThelmiratKavkaz(IK),
an Islamic extremist group in the Russian North Caucuses,
will continue using sophisticated suicide IED attacks against
Russian security forces,

US.^or^l^ernCommand(i^ORT^COi^)
Historically,IEDs in NORTHCOM are limited to small devices
related to criminal activity. Most lEDs in the U,S. and
Canada during FY 2009 consisted of simple devices such
as pipe bombs. However,thereremainsagrowing threat
that U.S, based Islamic extremists will carry out IED attacks
againsttheU,S,homelandusingtrainingandTTPsobtained
overseas.
In Mexico, drugcartelsbegan t o u s e l E D s o n a limited
scale, Mexican cartels may increase the use of IED TT^Ps to
respond to increased law enforcement pressure.

19499

JlEDDO Mission and Mission
Areas

Organizational Structure

JIEDDO's mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all
DoD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders and
their respective joint task forces' efforts to defeat lEDs as
weapons of strategic influence.
To accomplish this mission, JlEDDO has four specified
mission areas:
strategic planning, rapid acquisition,
information fusion, and operations and training support.

BK""

Petsonal Staff





JlEDDO continued to implement the organizational structure
adopted in FY 2008. JIEDDO's organization (Figure-6)
reflects two significant changes in FY 2009, First, JlEDDO
realigned the Technology Requirements and Integration
Division (TRID) and Acquisition Oversight Division (AOD)
under the Capabilities Acquisition Center (CAC), Second,
the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Center (JTCOIC)
achieved initial operational capability in Newport News,
Virginia,

Exacutiva OMicar
Special A**l«Mnt«
AMa
Execulivt AsaisMnt

-""-nn

"Director

Special Staff

#;%"T!n:r

V i c e Director

• Qanaral Counsoi
• Congntiional Affair*
• Science Adviser
• MeiKcal Advisor
• ktenW Baview
» Straiegie ConmHinloations

JlEDDO C S M

I

Deputy D i r e ^ ^ ^ g
IntelligeigHHH

Deputy
ct M i ^
m y Dg tg( t M
ratioi

E

Chief of Staff
Deputy CoS

Joint C«nt»r
of Excellence

Capatiilities
'
Acquisition Center

Counter-IED
Operations
Integratim Center

us:
Field Team
Af^anistan

I
J-1,4

T

I
J-2

Joint Training C-IED
Operations Integration
Center

Competitive
Strategies Group

J-3,7

JB

I

J 6

(CIO)

J-8
IRM)

Flgure-6: JlEDDO Organization

J-9
(ORSA)

• Staff Action Control Office
• Weapons T e c h n M InteSigence TF

19500

^^so^^^^s

Defeat the Device line of operation received 45 percent of
total obligations.

Funding

Personnel and Staffing

TheJointIEDDefeatFund(JIEDDF),establishedbyCongress
in FY 2007 asanew appropriation, provides JlEDDO with
the flexibility and agility necessary to counterlEDs and the
highly adaptive networks which employ them against U,S,
and Coalition forces.
Providing funds with a three-year lifespan, the JIEDDF
allows JlEDDO to respond rapidly to changing IED threats
andinvestinpromisingemergingtechnologies.
During FY 2006^FY2008,JIEDDOfundedmorethan^l2B
for theCIED effort ^^^r^^-,B^, During this threeyear
period, JIEDDO's main effort was to counter the IED threat
in Iraq, In FY 2009, JIEDDO's funding levels decreased
^ reflecting the transfer of very expensive established
programs to the Services (e,g,Counter Radiocontrolled
Electronic Wartare(CREW) systems). In FY 2009, the focus
of theCIED effort transitioned from Iraq to Afghanistan
due t o a s h i f t in national priorities and the troop surge
in Afghanistan; the grey and red lines show the historic
allocation of funds to Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. In
FY 2009, JlEDDO requested and received ^I.IB in funding
originally planned for FY 2010 in anticipation of significant
expenditures tosupport theforcesurgeto Afghanistan,
The final bar depicts JIEDDO's requested FY 2010 funding.
The Overseas Contingency Operations(OCO)supplemental
provided 100 percent of JIEDDO's FY 2009 budgetauthority
through the JIEDDF and was used to fund its four Lines
of Operation (LOOs) by supporting warfighter needs in
Iraq and Afghanistan, ^ ^ r ^ - ^ o n the next page shows
the funding breakout of ^3,1B by LOO and the initiatives
funded within these LOOs, These initiatives are described
in more detail later in this report, Notably,as the focus of
theCIED effort transitioned from Iraq to Afghanistan, the

In FY 2009, JlEDDO filled 90 percent of its Joint Manning
Document (JMD) personnel authorizations. While making
great strides filling its permanent government civilian billets
approved in FY 2007, JIEDDOhad challenges fillingits
military personnel billets,
RecognizingthemilitaryServices'difficultyinprovidingactive
duty military personnel, JlEDDO initiated an aggressive
effort to develop and gain approval for reserve component
augmentation from each of the Services, When approved,
these personnel resources will enhance JIEDDO's ability to
meet warfighters'C IED needs,
Aninstitutionalreview,reassessment,andrevalidationofthe
organization's mission andfunctions, supported by repeated
government Accountability Office(^AO) recommendations,
highlighted the urgent need to increase government
oversight and direction. To this end, JlEDDO sought
authorizations for additional government civilian billets to
provide an experienced, mid-level leadership team. To
reinforcegovernmentoversightand direction ofits heavily
contractor based workforce, JlEDDO sought to convert
the 192 contracted manpower equivalent authorizations to
governmentcivilianpositionsapprovedattheorganization's
inception in 2006,
JlEDDO continued to rely heavily on service contracts to
quickly acquirethevariety of engineering, scientific, and
subjectmatterexpertisenot easily foundin the Services
or through government civilian recruiting. To thisend,
JlEDDO implemented a comprehensive services support
contract which providesaflexible and enduring contracting
vehicle, enabling JlEDDO to respond quickly to the needs
of warfighters.

8,0

3,000
2,500
2,000

It

1,500
1,000

tQ CQ
(9S fO

03

V*

(A 3

500
0.0
FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09

Figure-?: JlEDDO Funding - Historical Perspective

10

FY 10

m
o

19501

JlEDDO Enterprise i^anagement
System
Tl^e JlEDDO Enterprise Management System (JEMS)
increases execution efficiency of JlEDDO activities by
providingastreamlined, webbased, and enterprisewide
set of business tools to automate organizational processes.

enabling rapid acquisition by serving as the repository
for information about JIEDDO's initiatives. Residing on
the SIPR network, JEMS provides internal and external
transparency to JIEDDO's decision making process, JEMS
access is available to external users witha^^need to know"
^instructions for obtaining access are on JIEDDO's SIPR
website. Full JEMS operational capability is expected in FY
2010, with possible capabilities expansion in future years,

In FY 2009, JEMS achieved initial operating capability as
an integrated tracking, staffing, and decision making tool.

^^.^8
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Attack
the
Network
$1.1B

the
Device
$1.4B

Training
$0.58

Attack the Network:
C-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC):
• COIC Analytical Support Team (JCAST): $128.2M
• Social Dynamics: $39.5M
• Network Dynamic Analysis Comprehensive
Look Team: $1.5M
• Etjge User: $5.4M
• Other COIC Programs: $139.3M
Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI): $12SM
Special Programs:
•Wolfhound: $14.7M

Defeat the Device:
Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare
(CREW):
• Dismounted Man-Portable CREW 3.1: $181M
• Vehicle Mounted CREW 3,2: $37.IM
• CREW Vehicle Radio Jammer for Legacy
Vehicles: $19M
• CREW Vehicle Radio Jammer for Fixed
Locations: $27 2M
Detect Ground:
• Counter Bomber: $17.4M
• Beach Comber: S16M
• Vehicle Opttcs Sensor System (VOSS): $51.3M
• PBIED/VBIED Defeat: $89.3M

Train the Force:
Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE):
• JointTraining COIC: $19.3M
• IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams: $17.7M
• Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer: $10.4M
• Home Made Explosives: $3.9M
• Tactical Site Exploitation: $3.8M
• Other JCOE Programs: $71.3M

r*waai#Mi#*

Detect Air:
• Other DA Initives: $138.04
• Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar
(VAOER): $2m
Predict and Prevent:
•Keyhole: $21 .IM
• Route Clearance Optics Suite (RCOS): $17.8M
Other R&D Investments: $158.1M
Remaining 69 Programs: $280.2M*

Neutralize:
• Technology Upgrades for EOD Robots: $23.7IVI
• Devil Pup; $4,8M
Mitigate:
• Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit (SPARK): $236M
Joint IED Defeat Test Board: $111,IM
Other R&D Investments: $184.2M
Remaining 24 Programs: $260.8M*

Systems Integration and Modeling and Simulation:
• Home Station Training Lanes: $128.4M
•JointTraining COIC Database: $5.2M
lEOD Integration Cell (I2C): $16.5M
Technical Collection: $11,5M
1" Army CTC Leveling: $9.4M
Remaining 23 Programs: $78.3M'

Staff and Infrastructure:
Headquarters: $100.9M

FY09
Flgure-8: FY09 JlEDDO Funding Highlights

11

19502

FY 2009 Major
Accompiisliments
Attack the Network (AtN)
JIEDDO's AtN Line of Operation enables offensive operations
against complex networks of financiers, IED makers, trainers,
and their supporting infrastructure by providing intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations,
counter-bomber targeting, biometrics, and weapons
technical intelligence capabilities. JIEDDO's significant FY
2009 AtN accomplishments include the following new and
improved C-IED capabilities.

C-/ED Operations Integration Center (COIC)
In FY 2009, the COIC continued to provide fused analysis
products to warfighters that enabled effective attacks
against enemy IED networks. Continuously seeking new,
innovative information fusion tools and methods, the COIC
provided value to warfighters by connecting stove-piped
information sources, accessing national-level intelligence
data, and conducting timely analysis to meet requesting
unit operational timelines.
COIC analysts, working
alongside interagency partners, responded to 2,154
requests for support (RFS) during FY 2009, compared to
1,780 requests in FY 2008 - a 21 percent increase. Since
its FY 2007 inception, JlEDDO COIC has answered 4,716
warfighter requests for information - and in the process
has simultaneously built and improved the body of IED
network analytical knowledge.
JlEDDO COIC Analytical Support Team (JCAST).
The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the JCAST
initiative which enables JlEDDO to provide embedded
COIC AtN operations and analytical and technical support
to warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq. The COIC planned
and coordinated JCAST as a single initiative to streamline
forward support initiated earlier under three separate
initiatives. In FY 2009, the three initiatives provided up to
117 personnel to support deployed warfighters. Forward
support under JCAST is also more flexible to evolving
requirements than had previously been possible.
Social Dynamics, JIEDDO'sSocial DynamicAnalysis(SDA)
program employed experts from multiple social science
disciplines to build tools, techniques, and procedures to
understand current and future C-IED environments. The
resulting knowledge enabled wartighters to understand
cultural context of their operating environment, to
understand insurgent behaviors, and to target enemy
networks.
Edge User, Edge User is a communications capability
specifically intended to enable COIC collaboration with
brigade combat team C-IED planning/operations cells in Iraq
12

and Afghanistan. In FY 2009, JlEDDO procured and fielded
the Edge User system to Afghanistan to support brigade
combat teams whose tactical communications capabilities
were unable to effectively communicate with the COIC.

Additional COIC Programs
Modeling and Simulation. From its FY 2007 inception
through the end of FY 2009, the COIC produced 130 3-D
virtual terrain models that enabled warfighters to move
virtually through, over, and around their operational areas.
In FY 2009, tactical units conducted more than 70 rehearsals
or war games using these computer models to refine their
tactical planning.

Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)
w n is an intelligence category focused on the collection
and forensic and technical exploitation of lEDs, associated
components, and improvised weapons, WTI uniquely
combines Service, intelligence community, Federal law
enforcement, and national laboratory capabilities to produce
actionable intelligence that enables the identification and
disruption of low-signature networks that employ lEDs.

Cache of lED-maklng materials. Photo 1st Lt.Kurt Stahl

In FY 2009, JlEDDO invested almost $125M in WTI
initiatives to improve and refine the exploitation capabilities
and processes for overseas contingencies. While the main
effort continued to be rapid response to immediate theater
WTI requirements, JlEDDO played a critical role supporting
WTI institutionalization in the DoD,
The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC)
serves as the primary national facility for the processing,
exploiting, and storing of wn-related material for the DoD.
In FY 2009, JlEDDO and the FBI concluded that the TEDAC
was substantially under-resourced to meet expected nearterm exploitation requirements and timelines on the high
volume of material being recovered from the battlefield. In

19503

response, JlEDDO provided an additional ^64M to expand
analytical capabilities and triple material exploitation
capacity in future years.
In Afghanistan in FY 2009, U.S, Forces Afghanistan
(USFOR A) recovered thousands latent fingerprints of value
from lEDs, This enabled biometric matches to people
associated with lEDs, Ahigh priority USFORAeffort is
collecting fingerprint data from the population to compare
against latent fingerprints recovered from lED related
materiaL
In Iraq in FY 2009, Multi National Force lraq (MNF I)
recovered over 5,000 latent prints of value from lEDs,
Todate,WTI efforts have enabled the identifications and
detention of hundreds of suspects and of IED suspects.
In 2009, JlEDDO, in coordination with the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), published and distributed more
than 10,000 w n handbooks, Thesehandbooks provide
detailed information on a wide range of WTI functions
to assist commanders, staffs, and other warfighters in
understanding and applying WTI concepts and capabilities.
In September 2009,andincollaboration with theArmy,DIA,
Department of Justice, and other government agencies,
JlEDDO coordinated comprehensive, full-spectrum C-IED
w n tactical training foradeploying Stryker BrigadeCombat
Team's Soldiers ^ a significant shift from the historical
practice of training individual augmentees to pertormwn
tasks. The ^^nDALSUN^'initiative wasaproofofconcept
for standing up and providing holistic w n pre deployment
unit training.

devices in Afghanistan. Wolfhound is the first system of its
kind designed for use in dismounted operations, JlEDDO
funded the Research Development Testing and Evaluation
(RDT^E), procurement, and sustainment of 69 systems,

detect Air
DetectAirsystemsenablethewarfightertodetectinsurgent
IED emplacement activityandall observables associated
with lEDs and their emplacement from airborne platforms,
CommandWireandDisturi^anceDetection Command
Wire (CW) detection isa priority capability becausethe
command wireinitiatedlEDs often have larger,more lethal
charges. During IED emplacement, insurgents frequently
cause detectable ground disturbances that can enable
IED detection. In FY 2009 JlEDDO funded four command
wire andchange detection technology solutions. These
initiatives were eitheroperationally tested or funded for
development as proofs of concept and all strive to achieve
as effective combination of sensortechnology to detect IED
observables,
The Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation leadar
^VADEI^^,Vaderisacollaborative JlEDDO andDefense
Advanceti Research Project Agency (DARPA) project
to develop an airborne ground moving target indicator
system that identifies both vehicular movement and
insurgents on foot. Specifically designed forCIED AtN
operations, VADER^s real time processing, exploitation, and
dissemination capabilities alert warfighters to insurgent
locations. TwoVADER prototype systems have flown more
than 127 flighttests.

In 2009, JlEDDO facilitated C IED information sharing
enhancements from the strategic to the tactical levels.
Working in concert with theCIED community of interest,
JlEDDO focused on facilitating the creation o f a CIED
database federation,in which individual database owners
make their data searchable and accessible usingacommon
lexicon and an information exchange model. In November
2009,JIEDDOsuccessfullydemonstratedthatdata could be
discovered and extracted from threedistinctlEDdatabases.
The demonstration leveraged the Net Centric Enterprise
Services information sharing infrastructure as prescribed by
the DoD Net Centric Data Strategy, DoD Directive 8320.2,
and other policy and guidance.

^peciaiPro^ran^s
Special Programs initiatives enable the warfighter to better
predict where and how the enemy is employing lEDs,
understand the nature and location of enemy IED networks,
and preventtheenemyfrom achieving successandstrategic
influence with lEDs.
Wolfhound. Wolfhound is a direction-finding system
used by ground forces to locate personal communications

Vehecll and Dismount Exploltlon leader, B^^OOO^^o^o

Predict an(^Pret^ent
Predict-and-Prevent systems enable the warfighter to
gain collection, exploitation, and analytic advantages
Signals Intelligence (SIOINT), Electronic Intelligence
(ELINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Communications
Intelligence(COMIl^)^in support of AtN efforts.
13

19504

I^oyhoie, This enhanced optics system consists of man
portable equipment items that provide increased capability
tosnipersaniJunitdesignatedmarksmen, Keyholedelivers
an allweather,dayornight targeting capability to defeat
and deter IED emplacers. In FY 2009, JlEDDO provided
158 systems to units in theater,

BeachComher. Reacting to an immediatewarfighter
need to find buried lEDs, JlEDDO tested multiple
commercial off the shelf handheld metal detectors
to select one for rapid acquisition and deployment,
JlEDDO funded 3,000 dectors for dismounted
operations in Afghanistan,

l^outeCiearanceOpticsSystem^l^COS) RCOSprovides
the same enhanced Keyhole optics reconfigured specifically
tosupportRouteClearanceTeams, RouteClearanceTeams
use RCOS to identify lEDs and emplacement activity along
routes. JlEDDO procured 48 systems for route clearance
operations in Afghanistan,

Vehicle Optics Sensor System ^VOSS) Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and route clearance
teams usethisdaynight, thermal imagingcamera
mounted onatelescoping mast to detect lEDs and
IED emplacement activities. In FY 2009, JlEDDO
continued the funding of 538 VOSSs and transferred
this initiative to the Army,

Defeat the Device (DtD)
JIEDDO's DtD Line of Operation enhances freedom of
maneuver and safe operations for Coalition Forces, Defeat
the Device focuses on providing defensive technologies to
detect lEDs, neutralize them before they can be detonated,
or mitigate the effects of detonations, JIEDDO's FY 2009
investment included the following new and improvedCIED
capabilities,

Oot^nterPa^io^^ontroiie^iEOEiectronio
^ar^areC^PE^
The CREW family of systems prevents radio controlled IED
(RCIED)switches from functioning. As cell phone and radio
technologies advance, the RCIED threat rapidly evolves,
which in turn drives rapid countermeasure investments to
keep peace. In partnership with DoD CREW Single Manager
(PMS 408), JIEDDOfunded the research, development,
and procurementof thefollowing man-portable, vehiclemounted, and fixed-site jamming technologies in FY 2009:
TI^OI^
Dismounted Man l^ortahie CI^EW
^CI^EW^.l),THORIIIbuiltuponpreviousdismounted
CREWcapabilitiestoincreaseperformanceagainstRC
IED threats, THOR III also reduced the dismounted
warfighteBs load from three to two boxes, JlEDDO
guided and funded the research,development, and
procurement ofTHOR III systems.

Entry Control l^oint^ECI^) Solutions i n a B o ^
JlEDDO funded 234 ECP inaBoxkits,tailored to
meet specific ECP operationalneedsinOEF. Each
ECP inaBox consisted of up to 15C-IED components
that detect lEDs, protect personnel, and mitigate IED
blasts at ECPs, Kit composition was based upon site
surveys of vehicle and pedestrian traffic,

i^et^traii^e
Neutralize systems seek to denylED actuation a t a
time and place of the enemy's choosing,
l^oi^t Technology t^pgrades
JlEDDO funded
3,140 upgrade kits forTALON and PACBOTrobots
to improve system capabilities, the man machine
intertace, and logistics supportability.
Upgrades
includedlightweightcameras, improved batteries,
and handheld video screens to provide the EOD and
engineer forcesamore versatile robot.
Devil l^up EOD l^oi^ot
Devil Pup is a man
packable robot specifically designed fordismounted
EOD operators. Devil Pup provides the capability to
remotely disarm lEDs during long range foot patrols,
JlEDDO funded the procurement and delivery of 55
Devil Pup robots.

detect ^rot^n^
Detect Cround systems seek to both detect person
borne, vehicle borne, and buried lEDs and suspicious
activity associated with IED emplacement,
Coun^erBomher.
Stand-off detection is critical
to preventing person borne suicide IED attacks,
CounterBomberisaradar and video system employed
at entry control points to detect suicide bombers,
JlEDDO funded 20 CounterBomber systems for OEF.
Devil Pup EOD Robot. JlEDDO Photo

14

19505

Mitigate
Mitigate systems seek to minimize the effects of IED
blasts on personnel, equipment, and facilities.
Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit I I (SPARK I I ) ,
JlEDDO funded the development and procurement
of the SPARK II in response to CENTCOM's urgent
requirement for a more maneuverable roller for
Afghanistan's rugged terrain. JlEDDO will field 1,679
SPARK II rollers to OEF in 2010.

academia in support of the JIEDDOC-IEDefforts, These
working groups created tools for data management,
standardized test protocols, coordinated electronic
warfare techniques, and prioritized threat lists.

Train the Force (TtF)
JIEDDO's TtF Line of Operation assesses Joint and Service
C-IED training requirements and supports the development
and improvement of training initiatives to enable warfighters
to organize, plan, and conduct C-IED operations; properly
employ C-IED equipment; and improve understanding of
emerging IED threats.
In FY 2009, JlEDDO funded $509M in a broad array of C-IED
training initiatives to support urgent Service and COCOM
requirements. JlEDDO refined its unit pre-deployment
training with emphasis on training synchronization, Battle
Staff C-IED training, and information sharing.

Route Clearance Team with RHINO and SPARKS, JlEDDO
Photo

JIEDD Test Board (JTB)
JTB validates that JIEDDO-funded C-IED initiatives
are proven capabilities and allows DoD leadership
to confidently field new technologies. In FY 2009,
JlEDDO funded over 500 JTB test events.
The JTB conducted tests to evaluate JlEDDO C-IED
efforts across the JlEDDO capabilities portfolio,
including handheld metal detectors, robots, counterPIR systems, airborne IED detection systems, and
support equipment.

Home Station Training Lanes.
FY 2009 was
JIEDDO's last year funding the Home Station Training
Lanes (HSTLs) initiative due to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense's June 2008 decision to transfer the lanes to the
Services. Over the course of 16 months, JlEDDO provided
nearly $500 million dollars to the Services for constructing,
equipping, and manning HSTLs. The HSTL initiative
created or upgraded 57 home station training lanes at 55
locations and encompassed more than 150 C-IED training
initiatives.
Joint Center of Excellence. The JlEDDO Joint Center
of Excellence (JCOE) focused on facilitating individual,
collective, and unit C-IED training - enabling joint forces to
proactively defend against and defeat IED threats they will
face in combat. The JCOE also addressed IED training gaps
arising from the rapid fielding of C-IED capabilities directly
to combat theaters.

JTB conducted over 200 COCOM-requested test
events to validate CREW systems' performance and
document their compatibility with other U.S. and
Coalition electronic systems.
The Joint led Defeat Test Board invested in Joint
Experimental Range Complexex and the istallation of
advanced communications systems.
The Joint IED Defeat Test Board funded upgrades to
electronic warfare text benches and ranges.
The Joint IED Defeat Test Board coordinated working
groups drawn from the Services, industry, and

JlEDDO JCOE instructor at Ft. Inwin. JlEDDO Photo

15

19506

Located at Fort Irwin, California, and operational since
2006, the JCOE leadsfour subordinate, Serviceoriented
centers of excellence(COE): the Army COE at Fort Irwin;
the Navy COE at Indian Head, Maryland; the Air Force COE
at Lackland Air Force Base,Texas; and the Marine Corps
COE atTwentynine Palms, California,

I i i l III liniiiiiT.,
......

- ' " ^

Intenmedlate Search (Tactical Site Exploitation). JlEDDO
Photo

^^^^lia^^^^i^a^^^

^

B^D^tlH^^^^

kfa>. . . . T T T !

JCOE construction of an Iraqi village, JlEDDO Photo

In FY 2009, the JCOE funded $290M in materiel training
initiatives and $123M on technical, non-materiel C-IED
training solutions. Through FY 2009, the JCOE has
supported C-IED training for more than 65 Army brigade
combat teams and 60 Marine Corps battalions constituting
more than 200,000 individual service members,
FY 2009 C-IED training innovations developed and funded
through JCOE included:
Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE). In a span of
90 days, the JCOE produced an initial TSE capability
at the Army's National Training Center (NTC), TSE
trains warfighters on search techniques, collection
methods, and tactical questioning to ensure that
documents, material, and personnel are identified,
collected, protected, and evaluated. This enables
rapid exploitation of information gained, facilitating
further investigation and action against IED networks.
The TSE initiative included constructing a small village
complex modeled on Iraqi villages, where certified
TSE instructors conducted search training.
Capitalizing on the initial success, the JCOE expanded
the TSE training to the Joint Multinational Readiness
Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and seven
other sites, including Camp Shelby, Camp Atterbury,
Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, and Marine Corps Base in
Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, In the aggregate, the JCOE
invested more than $7M in TSE and other search
training initiatives during FY 2009.
Home Made Explosives (HME). In early FY
2009, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Paladin,
Afghanistan, identified an urgent need for warfighters
to detect HME and unknown bulk explosives (UBE)
being used in lEDs. Within five days of receiving

16

the requirement, the JCOE began training a joint,
interagency, and coalition team to assist in HME/UBE
training. In collaboration with Los Alamos National
Laboratory explosives chemists, the JCOE developed
a course to provide warfighters specialized knowledge
of the chemistry involved in producing HME - enabling
them to recognize HME production signatures,
C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams
(C-MATT). In FY 2009, the JCOE created C-MATT
to provide focused C-IED training for units not having
a pre-deployment training opportunity at a combat
training center (CTC), The C-MATTs coached,
mentored, and trained unit leaders and battle staffs
to implement USCENTCOM's Counter-IED Training
and Capabilities Guidance. C-MATT leveraged C-IED
home station training lanes for units requiring this
training, as identified by the Army's force generation
process. During FY 2009, C-MATTs trained more
than 6,000 Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen.

Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer. JlEDDO Photo

Joint Asymmetric Threat Awareness and
C-IED Training Program (JATAC). In FY 2009,
the JATAC training program, started in FY 2007,
continued to address critical C-IED pre-deployment
training gaps, such as: embedding C-IED trainers and

19507

enablers in deploying units, training opposing force
role players to provide relevant and realistic training
to deploying units, training tactical site exploitation
skills, and preparing EOD forces for theater-specific
threats. Through FY 2009, the JATAC program has
trained 8,500 service members at 27 locations for
deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan,
MohileCIED Interactive Trainer (MCIT), The
MCITinitiative provided Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
and Marineswithself paced, interactive, adaptable,
field configurable IED threat training specific to
each unit's anticipated area of operation. The
MClTconsists of four 40foot trailers equipped with
interactive multi media equipment that can rapidly
be adapted to evolving threats. The MCIT increases
warfighterC-IED awareness with information about
IED components, IED employment strategies, and
IED network organization and functioning.
In FY 2009,warfighters at Fort Bragg and Camp
Pendelton provided enthusiastic support for the
MCITsystem, JlEDDO anticipates delivering future
systemsto CONUS and combat zone locations to meet
warfighter training requirements.

MCIT training at Ft 8ragg. .^^^000 ^^0^0

JointTraining Counter lED Operations Integrations
Center(JTCOIC). In FY2009,theJTCOICachieved initial
operating capability in Newport News, Virginia, as the single
sourcefortraining COIC tools and processes to the Services

and Joint Forces forlED network attack, JlEDDO plans
to fund the JTCOIC asaproofofconcept initiative for two
yearsbeforetransferringthecapability.
During FY 2009, the JTCOIC supported active and reserve
Army,Navy,Air Force, and Marine Corps components. The
JTCOIC established training support cells at the Army's
CTCs in the U,S, and Germany,
TheJTCOICinauguratedsupporttoJointForcesCommand
(JFCOM)forthe United Endeavor exerciseseries, which
trains Division, Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, and
Joint Task Force headquarters deploying to Iraq and
Afghanistan, JTCOIC's support included developing IED
network scenarios and storylines to create appropriate,
robust IED problem sets drawn from Iran and Afghanistan
for these headquarters. The JTCOIC alsomentored the
JFCOM exerciseC IEDobservertrainerstofacilitate realistic,
productive staff training,
C IED training innovations developed and funded through
theJTCOIC during FY 2009 included:
Systems Integration and Modeling and
Simulation (SIMS). In FY 2009, theJTCOIC
continued the development of training, modeling,
and simulations capabilities through their SIMS team.
The SIMS team employed innovative technologies
andmethods to recreate IED events as interactive,
three-dimensional visualizations, JTCOICisableto
producearealisticvisualizationasquickly as four days
- a uniqueDoD capability. During the year, more
than 150 organizations downloaded these unclassified
training products for deployment preparation,
JTCOIC Central Training Datai^ase TheJTCOIC
collected information from more than 50 data sources
andarchivedthem in its central training databaseamassingmorethanonemillioncombatzonemessages
and reports,TheJTCOIC, JCOE, and other units draw
upon this database to develop richCIED exercises
for units at the operational and tactical levels. The
information drawn from the central training database
profoundlyimpactedtrainingenvironmentsbyenabling
realistic detail that was previously unattainable.

1^

19508

^o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^o^^
^^^^^

The Competitive Strategies Group (CSG) extends the
JlEDDO Director's strategic and critical thinking process
by challenging JIEDDO's strategy and decisions with
independent, critical, and alternative perspectives that are
technologically, culturally, and politically aware. These
efforts enable JlEDDO to gain and maintainacompetitive
advantage across the global operational environment,
CSG is functionally aligned withaStrategic Influence Cell
(SIC),aCultural and Political Perspectives Ceil(CPC), anda
Technology Exploitation Cell,
Strategic Influence and Cultural Political Cell (SIC^
CPC), The SIC^CPC provides an independent capability to
fully explorealternatives in plans, operations, concepts,
organizations, and capabilities in the context of the
operational environment and from the perspectives of
partners, adversaries, and others. Over the past 12
months, theSIC^CPC has published more than 70^^red
teaming" information papers designed to provoke thought
and generate discussion to help shape an understanding of
how the adversary may view actions taken by Blue Forces,
Topics included: ^^Coalition Force buildup in Afghanistan:
What will be the response7"^^Whatwillhappen when CF
draws down in Iraq7" and ^^How does North Korea plan to
useIEDs7"
In response to the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization
Act,theSIC^CPC collaborated with various organizations
and agencies to identify potential IED threats facing the
COCOMs in 2012 2018, JIEDDO's response highlighted the
portability of knowledge and skills needed to construct and
uselEDs, The report concluded that each COCOM faces
divergent and decentralized hostile actors with increasing
capability and lethality.
Technology Exploitation Cell (TEC)
The TEC
provided an independent capability to create and
exploit technical C IED defeat alternatives. The cell

IS

considered ^^what'snext7" in thelED fight, reached out
tothe commercial sector to identify newand emerging
technologies, and leveraged relationships with other
government agencies, industry, and academia to discover
and mitigate vulnerabilities andpotential uses of current
and emerging technologies as lEDs, TheTEC is organized
into three groups:
Technical l^e^^^lue Team Assessment Croup
During FY 2009, competing Technical Red^Blue
Teams completed more than 65 ^^QuickLook" and
detailed assessments. These teams from Johns
Hopkins University^Applied Physics Lab,GeorgiaTech
Research Institute, and Massachusetts Institute of
Technology^Lincoln Labs theorized Red Force counter
countermeasures (CCMs)to defeat Blue ForceCIED
systems. In response, BlueTeams documented the
expected effectiveness of likely Red Force CCMs,
identified system limitations and vulnerabilities, and
offered recommendations to improve the system's
capabilities. These efforts shaped the development of
Service and JlEDDO initiatives, such as MANPOWER,
C0UNTERB0MBER2, Shield, Laser Vibrometry IED
Detection, and theJointLightTactical Vehicle,
Device Coordination Croup (DCC) The DCG
reverse engineered and reproduced lEDs found in Iraq
andAfghanistan, These IED surrogate devices were
used for Joint Counter lED system testing and training.
In 2009, DCG supported 15 test events and provided
more than 1,100 individual devices for DoD test ranges
and laboratories.
Device Innovation Croup (DIC) The DIG provided
research in and production of emerging threats not
yet seen, but likely to be used. During 2009, the DIG
traveled to international technology tradeshows and
conferences andselectedconsumerelectronics to be
evaluated as possible future lEDs,

19509

FY 2009 Transitions,
Transfers,
and Terminations
C-IED Initiative Transitions, Transfers, and
Terminations (T3), Chartered by the DoD to rapidly
acquire C-IED capabilities, JlEDDO seeks to transition or
transfer proven C-IED initiatives to the Services, COCOMS,
or government agencies for lifecycle management and
sustainment within two years. Similarly, JlEDDO seeks to
terminate initiatives that have met an urgent requirement
and are no longer needed or have failed to deliver anticipated
results. Timely initiative transition, transfer, or termination
avoids JlEDDO being saddled with long-term resource
commitments and enables JlEDDO to apply limited resources
to the most urgent emerging C-IED requirements.
JlEDDO transitioned or transferred 48 C-IED capabilities
and terminated 14 initiatives in FY 2009 (see Appendix
below). JlEDDO transitions C-IED initiatives when those
initiatives are expected to provide an enduring capability for
the joint force and are expected to become a program of

'gggggg

record funded in the President's budget, JlEDDO transfers
CIED initiativeswhenthesolution isnot expectedtoprovide
an enduring capability, but will continue to be sustained
and used in the current conflict; transferred initiatives are
expected tobe sustained through Overseas Contingency
Operations supplemental funding requests,
JlEDDO hosts monthly Transition andTransfer Working
Group meetings with Service, COCOM, and agency
representativesfor processtransparency and to provide
Services, COCOMs, and agencies time to program and
otherwise plan for transitions and transfers. Annually in the
3rd Quarter,JIEDDOformally briefs its T3 recommendations
to the Protection Functional Capabilities Board (P FCB)
WorkingGroup, Joint CapabilitiesBoard(JCB),and Joint
RequirementsOversightCouncil(JR0C),BaseduponJR0C's
endorsement,aJROC Memorandum (JROCM) is prepared
for the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,informing
the Services and agencies of the JROC action, TheT3list
along with the JROCM is forwarded to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense (DSD) for T3 decision.

WtKKKKB
DSD 8/17/07

(U) AMSTEL

(U)

H^daWiedCIEDsmoit

(U) Backscatter X-rays
of Personnel

(U)

Safe, non-inlrusive screening system that rapidly and
accurately images metallic and non-metallic objects concealed
on a person s body

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Bloodhound

(U)

COTS EMI sensors and magnetometers to detect and locate
deeply buried weapons caches

DSD 8/17/07

1

(U) CREW - Coalition Joint
Spectrum Management
Planning Tool

(U)

Sofiware designed to assist EWOs in the employment of
Counter Radto-Controlted IED Electronic Warfare (CREW)
systems (jammers) in support of tactical operations.

DSD 8/17/07

1

(U) Eagle Eye

(U)

Mobile integrated sun/eiltance for force protection providing Full
Motion Video from EO/IR sensor, with radar cueing & PSDS2.

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Explosive Detection
Equipment

(U)

Family of commercial systems to non-intrusively inspect
vehicles and cargo for explosives and other contraband
associated with lEDs.

DSD 8/17/07 1

(U) IED Detection and
Interrogation Arm

(U)

A stand-off capability to RG-31 and Husky thai is similar to the
arm on a Buffalo vehicle.

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Joint Trauma Analysis and
Prevention of Injury in
Combat


Joint database for collection, analysis, and sharing of information
related lo effectiveness of personal protective equipment and
vehicle equipment designed to protect against blast injury.

(U) Law Enforcement
Program (LEP)

(U)

Expert criminal enterprise analysts who can enhance
commander's ability to identify, monitor, penetrate, interdict,
and suppress criminal networks.

(U) Next Generation Mobile
Non-Intrusive Inspection
System

(U)

Fleld-deployable, trailer-mounted mobile inspection systems
using gamma and X-ray technologies to inspect vehicle mtenors
and engine compartments.

(U) RDISS (Rapid Deployable
Integrated Surveillance
System

(U)

Rapidly deployable surveillance system for quick set-up of
Combat Outposts.

1
i

:
DSD 8/17/07

DSD 8/17/07

*
DSD 8/17/07

1
)

i

1

j

DSD 8/17/07

i

19

19510

Army FYP9 Transfers.,

Description

..

Source

,4xAdUHBi

(Ul Route Clearance DebilS
Blower

(U)

Powerful air blower used to remove debris to identify
camouflaged lEOs on madsides.

UUU i:.', / C

(U) Ruggedized Detection
Imaging Module

(U)

Imaging system that detects contraband and other threats found
on people and vehicles.

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Toggle Trust

(U)

Highly classified C-IED effort

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Vehicle Optics Sensor
System (VOSS)

(U)

Combines high-resolution color, low-light night vision and
advanced thermal imaging tn a single lightweight gimbal that is
mast-mounted

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Z101 Walk-Through Portal

(U)

Stand-off personnel scannirtg capability at Entry Control Points.
Portable conveyor belt-based, backscatter x-ray system.

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Triced Block

(U)

Highly classified C-IED effort

DSD 8/17/07

Navy PY09 Transfers
.

,

, ,

:

. ,,'

V,'. .

Description
; •

\



:..

.

:>,„ < -•

.

v -.7"

,,.„.

.

i ,

me^a

(U) CREW - SM - JCREW
Technique Development

(Ul

Joint JlEDDO and Navy Technique Development etfon

DSD 8/17/07

(U) CREW - SM - Mounted 2 1
Sustainment / Support

(U)

Sustainment and support effort for CREW Mounted 2.1

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Bomb Suit NVGs

(U)

Night Vision Goggles

DSD 8/17/07

(U) EOD - Disposable Firing
Systems

(U)

Remote Firing Systems

DSD 8/17/07

(U) EOD Robotic Systems
Data link

(U)

Communications upgrade for EOD robots

DSD 8/17/07

(U) EOD SATCOM

(U)

Communications upgrade for EOD teams

DSD 8/17/07

(U) EA-6B LITENING Pods

(U)

Modification of USMC ES-6B LITENING ISR Pods to provide
EO/IR Capability.

Marmo FY09 Transform

DSDM 8/18/09

Description

(U) CREW - USMC •
Sustainment


Sustainment of USMC CREW Systems

DSD 8/17/07

(U) Ground-Based Observation
and Surveillance System
(G-BOSS)

(U)

Integrated and networked ground ISR system

OSD 8/17/07

(U) Z - Backscatter Vans: MOA
dtd 28 Jan 2008

(U)

Mobile imaging system for remote vehicle inspections for hidden
explosives at entry control points

20

DSDM 8/18/09

19511

Description
(U) Native Echo

(U:

^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^E.
(U) NSA Tangletamer

' (U)

A nor, attriOwiaoie niu-ti mgoia influence ettort

Source
DSD 8/17'07

_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HH^IIil
Highly classified SIGINT effort

DSD 8/18/09

Terminations
(U) C R E W - P D C R E W Legacy

(U)

Repair services and spares at the lowest replaceable unit The rapid introduction
of improved CREW systems soon limited the sustainability of this initiative, as
newer CREW variants could not be serviced by the old spares components.

(U) EOD Hotstick

(U)

Telescopic, man-portable, lightweight robotic manipulator

(U) Hotshot


Vehicle-mounted RCIED neutralization system

(U) 10 Reachback

(U)

Reachback provided to Information Operations support to JlEDDO

(U) Jaguar 1 (FOPEN)

(U)

UHF radar system on a C-12 aircraft to provide airborne tactical surveillance

(U) JUNCTORENEMY

(U)

Highly classified C-IED project

(U) Semi-Autonomous HMMWV


Remote Control HMMWV to lead convoys in urban terrain

(U) Snarf

(U)

X-Ray apparatus used to identify hazards internal to suspect devices
LOO IPT recommended Termination.

7/14/09

21

19512

^^^^^O^^^^d^^^^^
JlEDDO FieldTeams are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan
to ensurethat all CIED efforts translate effectively into
each theater. They serve as JIEDDO's primary operational
link,supportingthesuccessfulintegrationofCIEDtraining,
materiel programs, and networkattacksolutionsintocurrent
operations,
JlEDDO FieldTeams supported thedelivery and distribution,
ongoing development, and operational training ofawide
array ofCIED capabilities throughout FY 2009,including
mine rollers,CREWsystems,pre detonation systems, and
route clearance equipment,
Non materielsupportincludedintegrationofCorps, Division,
and Marine Expeditionary Force support team elements
intocoordinatedCIEDcells; observation of individual unit
CIED TTPs;and facilitation of intheater and reachback
COIC support for operations planning and execution.
Inlraq,the JlEDDO FieldTeam Commander also serves
asthe intheaterCOIC Director, leveraging COIC tools to
enable commanders on the ground to effectively attack the
IED networks within their respective areas of responsibility,
Inaddition,theJIEDDOFieldTeamAfghanistanCommander
also serves as the CJTF Paladin Commander and the
International Security Assistance Force C IED Branch
Chief,

^^^^^^^^^d^^^^^^^^^^
JlEDDO continued to evolve its C IED Science and
Technology (S^T) program withaportfolio of more than
200 projects. The preponderance of JIEDDO's ^500M
S^T investment focused on immediate warfighter needs;
however, JlEDDO also madekey investments to provide
longer termC-IED solutions. In coordination with Director,
Defense Research^Engineering, JlEDDO published its first
S^T Investment Strategy for Countering lEDs^identifying
counterlED capability gaps; outlining S^Tprograms to
address these gaps; and describing efforts to coordinate
counter lED S^Tinvestments across the DoD,
In2009,JIEDDOdeployedmultiplecommandwiredetection
systems to combat theaters for operational assessments,
including Desert Owl, Copperhead, and Sand Dog, Through
focusedS^T investments, JlEDDO continuedto advance
stateoftheartcommand wire and buried IED detection
systems.

22

Through sensor fusion research investment, JlEDDO
developed the fusion exploitation framework (FEF), an
open standard, software interface layer which serves as
a foundation for implementing advanced fusion within
multi sensor and multi intelligence systems. The FEF was
transitioned from S^T to the Distributed Common Ground
Station^Army (DCGS-A) V3,l. This capability willbe
delivered to theater in 4th quarter FY2010 and will enable
bothinteractiveandautomated fusion withintbe Army's
battlefield intelligence system.
In FY 2009, JlEDDO establishedaSocial Dynamic Analysis
(SDA)S^Tportfolio inthe Attack the Network Line of
Operation to examinetheuse of social science, cultural
understanding, and analytic methodologies to counter
networks employing lEDs, Under the hypothesis that an
insurgency has access to unlimited human capital and
thus cannot be defeated by attrition, SDA examines stx^ial
dynamics, counterinsurgency dt^rine, and non kinetic
methodstodeter,mitigate,and^orreduceinsurgency.
Within the COIC, JlEDDO developed innovative new
technologies and methodologies to assist all source
intelligence analysts in scoping, assessing, and fusing
information about insurgent networks.
The JlEDDO S^T portfolio extends beyond technology
developmentand lookstodevelopunderstandingofphysical
phenomena associated with lEDs and the environments in
which they are placed. This understanding guides both new
detection technology investment and warfighter training,
JlEDDO S^T supported medical research to understand IED
blast effects on warfighters^informing personal protection
technology investments.
In 2009, JlEDDO continued to expandand leverage the
resources of its solutions network to develop an increased
understanding of the threat and to continuously search for
new capabilities for the warfighter. JlEDDO participated as
amember of the Defense Science andTechnoIogy Advisory
Group tocoordinateitsS^TinvestmentsacrosstheServices.
JlEDDO leveraged National Research Council and Defense
Science Board expertise to advise JIEDDOIeadership on
S^T program execution, JlEDDO hosted semi annual
Technology Outreach Conferences to publicizeCIED gaps
and seek solution proposals from industry partners.

19513

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
3G
ACGU
AFRICOM
ABIED
ANSF
AOR
AOD
AQI
ATEC
AtN
CAC
CCMS
CDMA
CENTCOM
CF
CIED
CTFP
CTTF
CMATT
COCOMs
COE
COIC
COIN
COMINT
CONUS
CREW
CSG
CTC
CVRJ
CW
CWIED
DARPA
DCG
DFFC
DHS
DIA
DoD
DoJ
DSTAG
DtD
DTMF
ECP
EFP
ELINT
ELN
EO
EOD
EUCOM
FARC
FEF
FOB
FVEY

third generation
Australia, Canada, Great Britain, United States
U.S, Africa Command
Air borne IED
Afghan National Security Forces
area of responsibility
Acquisition Oversight Division
alQaeda in Iraq
Army Test and Evaluation Command
JlEDDO LOO: Attack the Network
Capabilities Acquisition Center
countercountermeasures
Code Division Multiple Access
U.S, Central Command
Coalition Forces
Counter Improvised Explosive Device
Counter-IEDTargeting Program
Combined JointTask Force
CIED Mobile Assistance TrainingTeams
Combatant Commands
Center of Excellence
Counter^IEDOperations Integration Center
Counterinsurgency
Communications Intelligence
Continental United States
Counter Radio Controlled IED Electronic
Warfare
Competitive Strategies Group
CombatTraining Center
Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer
command wire
Command Wire IED
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
Device Coordination Group
DirectionallyFocused Fragmentation Charge
Department of Homeland Security
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Department of Justice
Defense Science andTechnoIogy Advisory
Group
JlEDDO LOO: Defeat the Device
DualToneMultiFrequency
Entry Control Point
Explosively Formed Projectile
Electronic Intelligence
National Liberation Army
electrooptical
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
U,S, European Command
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
Fusion Exploitation Framework
fon/^ard operating base
Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New
Zealand

GAO
GCTF
GIRoA

Government Accountability Office
Global CounterTerrorism Force
Government of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan
GWOT
Global War onTerrorism
HME
homemade explosive
HMDS
Husky Mounted Detection System
HMMWV
Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HOA
Horn of Africa
HSTLs
Home StationTraining Lanes
HUMINT
Human Intelligence
12C
lEDD Integration Cell
IED
Improvised Explosive Device
lEDD
IED Defeat
ImiratKaukaz
IK
Infra Red
IR
IRAM
Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar
ISAF
International Security Assistance Force
ISF
Iraqi Security Forces
JAM
Jayshal Mahdi
JATAC
Joint AsymmetricThreat Awareness and
CIED
JCAAMP
Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and
Acquisition Management Process
JCAST
JlEDDO COIC Analytical SupportTeam
JCB
Joint Capabilities Board
JCOE
JlEDDO: Joint Center of Excellence
JlEDDO Enterprise Management System
JEMS
JFCOM
U,S, Joint Forces Command
JIEDDF
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Fund
JlEDDO
Joint IED Defeat Organization
JMRC
Joint Multinational Readiness Center
JOLLER
Joint IED Neutralize Roller
JROC
Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROCM
JROC Memorandum
JTB
JIEDDOTest Board
JTCOIC
JointTraining Center IED Operations Center
TTF
JointTask Force
LVBIED
Large Vehicle Borne IED
LOO
Line of Operation
MCFI
Multinational Coalition Forces lraq
MCTF
MobileC-IEDInteractiveTrainer
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNFI
Multi National Forces Iraq
MRAP
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle)
NDACLT
Network Dynamic Analysis Comprehensive
Look Team
NORTHCOM U,S, Northern Command
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTC
NationalTraining Center
OEF
Operation Enduring Freedom
OCO
Overseas Contingency Operations
OPFOR
Opposing Forces
PACOM
U.S. Pacific Command

2^

19514

PBIED
PFCB
PIR
RC
RC
RCEast
RC South
RCIED
RCOS
RF
RFI
RFS
RDT8tE
S^T
SDA
Services
SIC/^CPC
SIED
SIGINT
SIMS
SIPR
SOCOM
SPARK
SVBIED
SVIED
T3
TEDAC
TRIO
TSE
TtF
T^Ps
UBE
UBIED
UHF
ULFA
USFI
USFORA
UVIED
VBIED
VOIED
VOSS
WBIED
WIT

wn

YPG

24

PersonBornelED
Protection Functional Capabilities Board
passive infrared (type of switch)
regional command
remote control
Regional Command East, Afghanistan
Regional Command South Afghanistan
Radio controlled IED
Route Clearance Optics Suite
radio frequency
request for information
request for support
Research DevelopmentTesting and
Evaluation
Science andTechnoIogy
Social Dynamic Analysis
U.S, Military Services
Strategic Influence and Cultural Political Cell
Suicide IED
Signals Intelligence
Systems Integration and Modeling and
Simulation
Secret Internet Protocol Router
U.S, Special Operations Command
Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit
Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
Suicide Vest IED
Transitions, transfers, and terminations
Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center
Technology Requirements and Integration
Division
Tactical Site Exploitation
JlEDDO LOO:Train the Force
tactics, techniques, and procedures
unknown bulk explosive
Underbelly IED
ultra high frequency
United Liberation Front of Assam
U,S. Forces Iraq
U,S, Forces Afghanistan
UnderVehiclelED
Vehicle Borne IED
VictimOperatedlED(switch)
Vehicle Optics Sensor System
WaterBornelED
Weapons Intelligence Teams
Weapons Technical Intelligence
Yuma Proving Ground



19516

Att.ick the Network - Defeat the Device - Train th«

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(JlEDDO)
(877) 251-3337
jieddowebmaster@hqda.army.mll
www.jleddo.dod.mil
HELMAND
KANDAHAR
NIMROZ

A t t a c k t h e Net wo rk — D e f e a t t h e D e v i c e - Train t h e

Force

^

19517

SWORN STATEMENT
For use ol this form see AR 190-45 Ihe proponent agency iS PMG

AUTHORITY:
PfllNCIPAL PURPOSE:

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
Title 10 USC Section 301 Title 5. USC Section 2951: E O 9397 Social Secunty Number ISSN)
To document potential cnminsi activity involving the U S Army, and la allow Army officials to maintain discipline
law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents

ROUTINE USES:

Information provided maybe further disclosed to lederal slate, local, and foreign government law enforcement
agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Oepartment of Veterans Affairs, and
ihe Office ol Personnel Management Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or
non-judicial punishment other administrative disciplmaiy acliorts. secunty clearances, recruitment, retention,
placement, and other personnel actions

DISCLOSURE:

Disclosure of your SSN and other inlormation is voluntary

I

LOCATION

2

HQ. 2d BCT. 10th MTN DIV (Ll). Ft. Dram, W

DATE

(YYYYNMDD)

I

5 LAST NAME. FIRSTNAME, MIDDLE NAME

6

TIMF

= I'.E NUMBFR

1000

201 I ' d 20

7

SSN

GRADE/STATUS

Miller, David M.

06/RA

8 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HQ. 2d BCT. 10th MTN DIV (LI). 10200 North Riva Ridge Loop. Ft. Drum. W 13602
9

I David M. Miller

. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

I have been the Commander of 2d BCT. 10th MTN for approximately 40 month.s. I do not know my next assignment yet: SLD i.<
telling me to stand by as they consider some nominative possibilities. I expect to find something out soon, I was not originally
informed about the issues with PFC Manning s outbursts or his behavior. Once I was made aware of what wa.< occunnng, my .itaff
and I conducted an After Action Review to look at ourselves and our processes. I wanted to look ac Information Assurance,
training, and all aspects of OPSEC and security. We also looked at BH and mental health. We implemented some changes based
upon that internal look. It would have been helpful if I or other leaders had data from basic training and AIT upon which to make
decisions, but that infomiation docs not come forward with Soldiers. There is a wall that keeps us from that infoimation.
Approximately 60 days prior to deployment I had the unit look hard at the SRC Scrub, Another unit, 3BCT. 10th MTN barely made
deployment strength. After IhaL FORSCOM guidance wa.s that BCTs would take a hard look at their numbers. We didn't want to
take the wrong personnel forward, nor did wc want to leave a large rear D behind fora small staff to manage and lead. During this
scrub. 1 was tracking 500 or f>00 Soldiers that may have had deployment issues but I was not tracking PFC Manning personally: I
wa,s tracking the BCT as a whole. Wc reduced our numbers down to around 300 mostly medical or chapters.
In Iraq, we assumed responsibility for 17 Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in eastern Baghdad. We had a BCT TAC at
JSS LOYALTY in East Baghdad and the BCT TOC outside the city at FOB HAMMER. We generally were responsible for eastern
Baghdad and partnered with an Iraqi Corps equivalent HQ and two separate Iraqi Divisions (Ist Federal Police and the 9th Iraqi
Army). We were helping the units to build their sta IT capacity and providing security for upcoming elections. After the elections
our focus shifted to responsible drawdown and transition of security as well as JSS's and COP's to IA control.
It was during this time that a problem wilh my S2, M.AJ Clausen, was coming to the forefront. MAJ Clausen's performance was not
up to the standard that I expected. He could not provide a valuable intelligence picture or analysis in a manner that was useable to
the unit as a whole or me as the Commander and our ability to assist the IA • IP. I discussed the issue with the BSTB Commander,
then LTC Paul Walter. LTC Walter was also branched M i and understood what was necessary from an intelligence standpoint.
Based upon discussions with LTC Walter and LTC Kerns (XO), I decided it was best to remove MAJ Clausen from his position as
the S2 and place CPT Lim into that job. CPT Lim was the MICO Commander and he had served as a battalion S2 for 2/14 on a
prior deployment. He wa.s capable and understood the unit. He is the type of officer who should be a Battalion Commander.
I placed him in the job and looked to LTC Walter to help provide some oversight, I did not get involved in the inner workings of the
S2 department under CPT Lim's leadership. Based on our pannership requirements and our split TAC and TOC locations, all of my
.staff was relatively thin but rather than place inexperienced Intel personnel at the battalions,! chose to accept risk at the Brigade
level instead of at more remote locations - particularly in a bottom up Intel driven fighL
10 EXHIBIT

I 11 INITIAL S ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ j & ^ ^ l N G STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF

ADDITIONAL PAGEShitUSTCONTAIN

THE HEADING 'STATEh/IENT OF

TAKEN AT

PAGES

DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE f^UST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAK/WG THE STATEtvlENT. ANO PAGE NUtvlBER
ttitUST BE INDICATED

DA FORM 2823. NOV 2006

ManningB_00013622

PREVKSUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

APOPf
DEFENSE EXHmrrKKKfbr identifjc3t'*<5n
PACH OFF[iR}:n:
CI? ADMrTTUD;
PAGEJ of_S" ^'i:'';

19518
u s e THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

David M Wilier

TAKENAT

Fl D f u m . N Y

DATED 201 I 01-20

!
3 good
'hcther the

As the BCT Commander. I had a noimal battle rhythm that had me circulating the battlefield all day and retuming to Forward
Operating Base (FOB) Hammer at night. During the elections and a few other critical times I C2'd the BCT From our TAC at JSS
LOYALTY in order to be in the city 24 ' 7,
I don't recall the .spec! lie OPSEC training pieces conducted during the AAR after the Manning arrest, but from what I understand,
almost noihirig would ha\e stopped PFC Manning from doing what be did I WHK made a'j.are, alter the fact ofthe unauthorized
electronic ntedia in the SCIF. He may .\till have gotten the information out ofthe SCIF even if every proper control measure was
ill place and executed properly because most checks are designed to control people who do not ncuwaliy have access and not
people who belong in the ,section. As an Army we may need to look ai modifying control measures to look as much inicmally as wc
do at external threats.
With respect to ihe information side ofthe house, ourcurrent SIGO and our AS6 tell me that there is not enough training. The S(>
111 theater was average, bu! was noi computer savvy. He worked hard but struggled. Until I goi the AS2, CPT Cherepkn, there was
no: enough knowledge aboul computer systems within my Sfi shop. CPT Chcrcpko was competent and conducied other functions.
He is the sort of officer who will put lough issues on the lable. My observation is that there ha, to be more trammg inil experience
in this area to give more depth and expertise in ihe fonnaiutn. '["here is even less knowledge at the BN level and below. Given that
we were dispersed o'.cr 17 area.'*, it seem,s lhi,s could hate occurred at any one ofthem.
A problem area that came to tight was tha! one of my chaplains had to be separated from the Army for conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman. CPT Cberepko was the only person in the unit who was able to look at the computer assigned lo the
Chaplain and perform die analysis that provided the information.
I also was having connectivity problems with ilie weekly updates to MG Wolff and had the statT come up wiih a solution for this
problem. It was during this timeframe on the io-ss of connectivity l i s t ! was made aware there was unauthorized data on ihe system.
1 understood this was an issue hampering connectivity but not a security threat The system was not working properly but afier the
removal of users and excess data, the system began lo function better There was only one person in the BCT who had the skills
necessary to fix the computer systems-CPT Cherepko I do not have special knowledge ofthe coniputers or the syslems and the
way Ihey work The Army provides units with a skilled person who understands this area but in (his case, the S6 1 was provided with
simply did nol have all the required experience. There was not training or training oversighi provided to my S6 section from ihe
division because the G6 of ihc division already deployed wivh tlic Division HQ's. The only training provided was insiifutianal.
Wlicn 1 served as the Deputy COG for /RTC, I iearucd that one of the choke points ue as an Aimy liy to caich up on "importam" or
"required" spcciaity training is al CTCs during the first few days of MREs. The problem with ihis is thai there is so much of il that
it is impossible to fit il all in during the available lime. I did not know all of what was happening with PFC Manning. There was a fit
for duty determination during the deployment and I found out about ii after the fact, 1 am not sure what the interplay was between
the company chain of command and mental health. I undcpitand bcticr the facts of the case today, but I caniioi .say what the issue
was that forced MSG Adkins lo raise ibe red flag on PFC Manning.
When looking al who lo take forward on deployment or who we sent back from iraq. I looked at two set of criteria to delennme
wheiher to send some back. First, could the Soldier receive the type of cait: they needed in a deployed environment ' Second, was
the Soldier a threat to themselves or others? If the answers '*ere no lo the former and yes to the latter (ifwe could not safe guard
him or her), we sent them home. I'll have lo check the exact numbers, but we sent quite a few Soldiers home for BH issues and
treatmem, I was the approving authority for all release from theater including BH issues - the BCT surgeon and BCT CSM brought
each recommendation lo me. Manning was never brought to me.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAK!NG STATEMENT
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STATEMENT OF

9. STATEMENT



TAKEN AT

F l Pnim. NY

DATEO



I 20

•Continued)

From my perspective, the issues surrounding PFC Manning would have been something tbat the Sl' personnel would have been more
involved in than the company. One issue that could have impacted what occurixzd during that time period is that the former
company commander, MAJ Drcher was relieved over property accountability and ethics issues and wtis not making good decisions.
The new company commander was working through the property book issues, but either would have provided support if necessary.
As far as PFC Manning is concemed, we were the GRF prior to deployment and he was sharp as a briefer. He was not experienced
at analysis but he wasfinein making presentations. He might have been a little animated in his posture and military bearing but it
never crossed my mind that there were any underlying issues. As time passed the presentations stopped and the unit focus changed
to other things. My next visibility of PFC .Manning occurred when we received guidance to detain him,
! broke out responsibility among ihe relevant staff in the following way; The XO had staff os-crsight, the S6 controlled all of Ihe
networks, and the S2 controlled anything dealing with the SCIF. I used the DCO to oversee the non-lethal arena and specific
special projects. I controlled the lethal effects of the BCT and gave overall guidance forboth lethal, non-lethal and all aspects of
our partnerships with Iraqi forces, I had contact and interaction wilh the staff at my nightly updates and every other Friday wax a
more in depth staff update. I held twice a week breeze sessions with my battalion commanders and met with them all face to face at
one ofthe BN HQ's cxcry two weeks.
Upon returning to Ft, Oram from my trip to Lcasenworth and my interview with LTG Casiea, ( had my XO and staff pmvide me
additional information based on questions he asked tiiat I felt my response; were inadequate or not specific enough. The
information provided below is from that cfTort:
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
1. Number of behavioral health cases during Brigade's deployment: 300 (sleep, tobacco cessation, anger management, post
-incident trauma)
" Total number command refeired; 24
2. Number of BH ctises that resulted in either early redep'o^^nent or delayed return from EML: Approximately 16
1. Most command referred BH issues were briefed to tne by BN CDRs as a matter of routine reporting. All release from theater
were approved by me,
4. We also conducted a "State of the BCT' 100 Day review during the January time frame in theater. The purpose was to pulse the
entire BCT for command climate, BH issues / trends. Soldier sense of purpose and understanding of the mission and its
mportance. This was done by teams of EO reps. Chaplains, PA's and a few others across the entire BCT at the platoon level. LTC
Johnson has a hard copy of the results briefed lo me.
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
1 Manning Command Referred?
• Manning was command referred by both MAJ Dreher (Dec) and by CPT Freeburg (late May, prior to CID arrest). Both doctom'
assessments did not recommend redeploy. They recommend removing the bolt from his weapon and continue treatment.
2. MSG Adkins' performance as an NCO
• Marginal, but not bad enough lo either relieve or replace. Technically competent, lacked leader skills expected ofa MSG (this
info from the current BCT CSM with knowledge ofthe NCO).
3. What was the S2 section's supervisory structure in the SCIF? Was there anyone between PFC Manning and MSG Atkins?
• Manning was a Shia analyst in the SCIF, and was supen ised by SSG Balonek and CW2 Ehresman, However, within the 24 hour
staffing of the SCIF, Manning worked the night shift, which consisted of four total analysis and 5 SIGINT personnel On the night
shift, SPC Padgett was the NCOIC ofthe nigbi shift for the Intel fusion section. Manning was placed on night shil\ because he was
a good analyst and could be relied on to produce staff products on his own with little or no supervision—not to keep him out of the
"main effort" on the day shift.

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STATEMENTOF

t)avid M. Miller

TAKEN AT

Ft. D r u m , N Y

DATED 2011/01 20

9 STATEMENT fConOnu**
i . At what point (by regulation) should a DF.ROG he initialed'.'
• Commanders (in conjunction with their unit security manager) are allotted 30 days to submit an mitial D.A 524H-R. following the
discoveiy of credible derogatory inj'orinanon on a Soldier.
• Alter the initial DEROC is submitted and processed by SID CCF. the unit has 90 days to submit a follow-up 524S-R. if there is a
pending investigation or adverse action taken (e.g.. summary court martial).
• Once the investigation/proceedings are completed and the Soldier has been cleared/charged of olTcnse, the unit must .submit a
FINAL derog.
5. When was one initiated on Manning?
• The 2BCT security manager sent 2 x initial DEROGs to SID/Dl V while in Iraq. The first was following his assault on SPC
Showman OH May: the second initial DERCX) was after CID arrested and charged him with the unauthorized use and disclosure of
U.S. classilied information. The follow up (final) DEROG v,as never submiited for eitheroffense by 2BCT within the 90 day
period (July-August).
The final DEROGs were never submitted in the required timeframe because we believed that oversight of Manning's DEROGs
were taken "out ofour hands" due to the severity of his offense.
(INFORMATION ASSURANCE'SA SECTION
Bandwidth network pmblems wilh BCT HQ - when did they star? Method to fi.t?
• 3,fi2set the network to meet their needs, as a tcmporaiy outgoing unit. Upon RIP TOA. we inherited their network and began
reconfiguring it to meet our needs; part ofthis reconfiguration is establishing network priorities and optimizing data flow
' Minus random hardware failures, the internal 2BCT LAN-WAN was wortting acceptably. Connectivity outside of the Iraq
theater was slow,
• To ensure connectivity during CUBs, BUAs. and the Friday CG bnef, wc instituted measures including re-routing traffic and
minimizing streaming video usage dunng sessions
' Were we in compliance wiih published difwlive.-! and DIV CDR guidance?
• Yes,
' Who certified the certifiers? Was our lA Staff trained/accredited appropriately .'
• The IAM was fully certified and accredited, as was the lASO. The S.A/T\IA was in compliance, but not certified.
What, if any BCT directives did we cmplaee'/
• Disabled all computers that were nol in compliance
• Disabled all cumpuieix that had not been connecied to the neiworii for over .30 days;
• Disabled all user acco'jnts that had nol been active for over 30 days
• Scanned for unauthonzed media (music, movies and games), removed all media, and notified supervisors about unauthorized
media found
• Enforced limited domain admin rights on the network
" After the incident wai identified;
• Disabled ali SIPR CD'DVD write capabilities in the BCT (months ahead of CYBERCOM directive)
• Coiiducted a review of need for SIFR Accounts
• Eliminated role based accounts' (e.g,, 2bci.chops) ability to login to a computer
LTG Caslen asked about TRO training for our 53, I asked CPT Cherepko aboutthis. According lo him. there are 153 existing
documents that describe S3 series related requirements - no one coherent document. He said he had no training in school with
respect to knowing specific TRO requirements.

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OA FOAM 2823, NOV 2006

ManningB_00013625

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OF

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GTATEWENT OF

S STA-rgMENT

LUud M M i i i g ;

TAKi-NAt

OAreo zmi 01 20

F l . Drum*. N Y

/Ca!
Nothing f u f U i c .

AFFIDAVfr
1

David M, Miilf

HAVg READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME TH-S STATEMElft

WHICH iJEGINS ON P,tSE I ANO ENDS ON PACE

4

| FULLY UNDilfiST.^MD THE CONTENTS OFTHE ElfTIRe STATEMENT MADE

a ' ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. iHAVt: w r i A L E D A L l CORRECTIONS AMD HAVE INI I IAI 1-0 I HE 60?TOM OF EACH PAGrU
CONTAINING we STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FM5mjJViI.:*aigj!«OPE

OF BFNyiTOR

THREAT OF PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION. L''^'t.&iftmjC^^iil.milyli^UhlL^WF-JL

HtWf

Wlj

l^pt^CVM-H^

(Signature of Ptrson Kfaking Statement)
S«csc!ifc«it .ir.i) swoffi (0 fiskus mm. a pRfsrxi auihoiixaii s;y inw ie

•vVITNaSSiiS.

^(Sms.'vir.isr o»ihr.. ihis
al

ORGANIZATION OR AOORESS

20sh

day of

January

201!

Fl. Drum. N V

{SigfMiirs uf Pi^rsoi; AdininJackie L. Thottipsor.
(Tflisd Harris of Pvaaii Admrntsterifig Oafft.i
Art_136(b}|4) UCNiJ_
(Aaiiitaiily to Adritii^fer

ORGAWZATtON OR ADOftESS

Oiiihs)

_c:;

•NiTiALS o r PERSOi^ MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE
DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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19522

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
uumzo ARIIY 11-?cw. usreuse SERVICE
Jonrr BASE VA 2350:

IEPLYTO
ATTEHHON OF:



AFRDJA-TDS 8 April 2011

FOR Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Ir., Commander, US. Army
Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2300

SUBJECT: Submission Regarding Filing of Memorandum of Reprimand. LTC Brian D. Kerns

I . IAW paragraph 3-63, AR {have read and understand the unfavorable information
presented against me and submit the following matters in my behalf.

2. First, I truly regret that this incident occurred under my watch. am aware that my actions
have caused you to question my judgment. Despite that. I am confident I still have the ability to
provide valuable service to the Army and Soldiers. This memorandum and the accompanying
documents are provided to support my request that you ?le this reprimand locally.

3. Second, as the former Brigade Executive Officer, I take full responsibly for everything that
the Headquarters. 2d Brigade. l0"' Mountain Division accomplished or failed to accomplish. All

of the brigade staff sections and their actions fell under my purview and any of their
shortcomings are ultimately my own.

4. Finally, without trying to he argumentative or defensive, fully understanding the seriousness
of this reprimand and my culpability, I submit the following extenuation and rebuttal. Given the?
potential negative repercussions on my life and career that this ?ling decision will have, I
respectfully request that you please consider the following:

a. I am accused of not taking the neccs sary steps to provide additional supervision of the S-2
section personnel, despite recognizing that the S4 and 84 COIC were weak leaders. Ideally,
the S2 and NCOIC should not have deployed in their respective positions and I recognized this
during our JRTC rotation. With no one to replace them on such short notice, however, this was
simply unfeasible. loan attempt to overcome this shortfall, I put a great deal of effort into
counseling and providing the S2 with oversight and mentorship. We also applied additional Ml
leadership from across the Brigade to provide oversight and strengthen our S2 section.

in. 1 am further accused of failing to put adequate measures in place when I learned that

some Soldiers were placing unauthorized electronic media on the SIPR network. We fell in on
networks and systems with signi?cant operational and security shortfalls. Our nesworlt stability,
reliability, and security improved dramatically based on the work of our S-6 and control
measures 1 established. My focus was on enabling the Brigade Commanrlerto battle command
the brigade while protecting ourselves from external threats. lnow realize that these measures

Pagelof2

..
LL -- -.


?it-la It


..

1

.

?aft 5
PAGE *5



AFRD-IA-TDS
SUBJECT: Submission Regarding Filing of Memorandum of Rcprimand, LTC Brian D.

were inadequate and for that! am truly Lontrite. Quite simply. I was so focused on protecting
and enhancing our systems? cqnbilitics that I overlooked the very real peril of internal threats.

5. In my more than eighteen years of service and six operational deployments I have consistently
put the needs of the Army and my Soldiers abowc my own I want to continue to serve the Army

and respectful ly request that you file this Memorandum of Reprimand in my local file. Thank
you for your cons idcration Sir.

6. Point of contact is the undersigned at

77% he

1 Eric]. BRIAN D. KERNS
1. OER.02 JUN 2009 -01 JUN 2010
G3 Training
Page 2of2

250



i

- swonu snreueur 19524
.4
eruvacvacrsrareuur






acmrlas. preaaetnrs.
heotluoihrsonrratuanaumant
non-jusldatpuniahrnant, disciplinary actions. aaosritydaaranas. raerulbnant. rahntion.



DIOCLOICK:
2. w) 3. 4. UMSER
Yortr 20l_l_IOIIla

5. LAST M5. IODLENAME EB. s'si( 7. GRADE-ISTATUS
Fielrh. Elizabeth Ann o-2/uxr

e.
2d loth MTN Division. Fort Drum. New York

9.
3. Elinbeth A. Fields . want To mice we rouoweoc uuoen mm:

Q: What is your full name?

A: izabeth Ann Fields

0: What was your job?

A: Srmni analyst

Q: What was your training?

A: BOLC 2 and Fort I-luachuca BOLC

Q: What were your responsibilities while deployed?

A: I wasthessllusdthe Sunnianalyst

Q: What training did you receive for your responsibilities as

A: I received about one hour of training from Mr Gerrish at 10th MNT Division.

Q: What did the training cover?

A: Basic rules and regulations for a SCIF here at Fort Drum. Essentially not to bring in cameras and phones in to the SCIF.
Q: You weretheSSllonIyforFort Dr-urn

A: Yes

Q: Who assumed the role forward?

A: MSG Arlrins was the one that worked the security of the and I dealt with security clearances.

Q: When yougotto Iraq whatwasthe process ofturningoverthe

A: It was copyingrnernos with from 3/82 and forwarding to Division to lreepthe SCIF open.

Q: Was the unit certi?ed in Iraq?

A: Yes, MSG Arkins sent up some memos and a 88G from Division came down and inspected the SCIF.

Q: Were there any periodic inspections of the SCIF from higher headquarters?

A: No, not that ibelieve. The inspector did come down to read people on.

0: From your perspective as a Sunni Analyst how did MSG Arlrins provide supervisory responsibility?

A: I thought it was terrible because the problems were ignored. Such as mental problems. he tried to keep it to himself. A key
problem was Manning and when the problems came up I was told that it was a NCO problem and to stay out of it.
- Q: What was the first issue you knew about Maming?

A: It Arlrinswas hestarted Adlrinstoolrhirnoutofthe SCIF.
Q: Md partofthu type ofmanagernent did MAJ Clausen have?

A: Nonethat I saw.

Q: What about the [867

A: They didn'ttalne are the unit alter we deployed because they were not located with us.

10. EXHIIT 11. mine or get: on unrucsrararem
3? PAGE 1 or 3 PAGES
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~:CP'l'Lim

V- lnitially they weren't allowed into the SCIF but then they slaclted off and they were brought into the SCIF so they could play

A: CW2 Bhresrnan's role was to get tasks from CPT Lim and then he would give thorn tothe team.
Why?

MSG Adkins pull the responsibility to his
. No he disseminated the responsibility.

. Whatltind of leadership did COL Walters have over the section?

19525

s1'A'rEuEm-or at Fort NY 20l 8


-I . Explain it?
lSG's main role was to talk to the senior NCOs and then it was their job to relay it to the soldiers.

-.s When was the next issue you knew about Manning?

A: End of January SPC Padgett was counseling Manning again and we heard some screaming and the NCO went into the room.
had thrown a table and cracked a computer screen.

i Q: What happened to Manning?

We all wrote sworn statements and Manning stayed in the SCIF because MSG Adkins said that we need personnel.

?Who did you give the Sworn Statement to?



































. Do you know about the decision to put Manning on day shift?
Vi:That was the time lhadchangedjobs and [just heard about it.
i Did MAJ Clausen give any guidance on bringing CDs and DVDS into the

is usic on the computers.

p: Was it simply accepted?

1 A: Yes

i How did you ensure accountability of media?

.: There was no accountability of media.

I Did any unit training while at U10 focus on SCIF operations?

5

At some point in the deployment the S6 lbund games and music on the shared drive what happened.
A: There was an email sent out to delete all media and if you didn't they would delete it themselves. So what soldieis would do is
idle it on the desk tops.

So do you feel what the chain of command did was successful?

A: No because they didn't follow up later

.: Above the 82 section was MAJ Claosen ne ICPT Lim and then CW2 Ehresmtut?

A: Because the leadership was taken on by MSG Adkins for NCOs and CPT Lim was in charge of the oflicers

Did SSG Balonel: have supervisory responsibility of Soldiers?
No

Did the environment improve a?er Um tool: over?

in. No

-: None

Did COL Miller see the Soldiers issues?

:No notthatlarnawareof.

I Did the ISO see the issues with the Soldiers



Q: So what went wrong?

There was a lack of leadership across the board. We should have all seen the issues. As leaders we should have pushed harder
. tthe NCOs to the O?icers. The perception was that we needed Soldiers. MAJ Clausen allowed the information to flow too

. reely.
is there anything else you would like to add?
us: No

immsor Psasou?mroNcstA1'?u?ur' .
W. PAGE 2 or 3 PAGES

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CONTAINING 11-Ie STATEMENT. I Have MADE 111:3 STATEMENT FREELY WITPDUT none or-? aeneerr on.? ARE-.



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PAGE 3 or 3 PAGES
WPEWW3





19527

. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
nuooumrms mo eoururv.

3 TEAI.
io"?uourrAu (LI)
,0 Four oauu. new YORK iuoz-snno
A??i?la
ADFR-BBA-IN I 6 April 20: 1

MEMORANDUM THRU 91 4

Commander, 2D Brigade Co eam, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Dmm,
New York l3602
Commander, loth Mo Division (ugh Infantry). Fort Drum. New York l3602

FOR Commander, U.S. Anny Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas 66027

SUBJECT: Rdiuttal of General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand - WOI Kyle J. Balonek

BLUF 2 The information contained in the General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand is
incorrect and does not accuruely reflect the sworn statements and facts presented in the 15-6
investigation. Therefore respectfully request that this General Of?ccr Memorandum of
Reprimand not be ?led in my Official Military Personnel File.

1. respect?illy request that this statement be reviewed and considered belbre a final
determination is made regxding ?ling of this administative reprimand in accordance with Amy
Regulation (AR) 600-37, paragraph

2. I acknowledge rweiving this reprimand.

I have read and understand the unfavorable infomiation presented against me and submit the
following on my behalf:

a. 1 served as PFC Bradley Manning's mid-level supervisor for only a short period of time.
While under my supa-vision any misconduct that was brought to my attention was dealt with
according! y.

(I) Between April 2009 and July 2009 I served as PFC Manning's mid-level supervisor
with SPC Showman as his direct supervisor and MSG Paul Adkins as his senior supervisor. SPC
Showman never brought to my attention PFC Manning's April 2009 outburst nor did she report
to me PFC Manning's March 2009 ?no loyalty to country? statancnt. SPC Showman
circumvented me and reported the incidents directly to MSG Adkins (See Exhibit (E78-S) SPC
Statement On July 20, 2009 I began my ASAS Master Analyst Course at Ft.
Huachuca, AZ (See Enclosure I). This course lasted until September I8, 2009 at which time I
took approximately ten days of leave. I returned to Fort Drum on September 28, Since I
was attending the Master Analyst Course, I did not go to JRTC with my brigade. Therefore I was

DEFENSE idcnt.i?cs.tion
PAGE PAGE


19528

ADFR-BBA-IN
Rebuttal of General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand - WOI Kyle .1. Balonek

unaware of PFC Manning?s August 2009 outburst at JRTC. deployed on October 1 1, 2009,
thirteen days after I returned to Fort Drum.

(2) During the process of deployment to lraq, 1 again served as PFC Manning?s mid?level
supervisor. However between October 1 1, 2009 and November 12, 2009 he had no outbursts or
any other documented issues. To the contrary speci?cally remember PFC Manning performing
well. While we were in Kuwait he showed up on time, always had all the proper gear and even
attended a First Sergeant's meeting for me, where he took excellent notes.

(3) Between November 12, 2009 and February 10, 2010 was not PFC Manning?s
supervisor since he was detailed to the night shift. During deployment an E4 was the NCOIC of
the night shift and was directly overseen by MSG Adkins (See Exhibit (A) IS-6 Report 3-1-11
FINAL (2d Correction), Section 1B: Chain of Command, pg. 26, Figure 3 and pg. 27). 1 had no
supervisory duties over the night shift personnel and all disciplinary actions were the
responsibility of the night shift NCOIC and MSG Adkins. During this period of time PFC
Manning had an outburst where he ?ipped a table. This incident was addressed by MSG Adkins
by sending PFC Manning to mental health.

(4) PFC Manning was put on the day shift when he returned from leave on approximately
February 10, 2010 and remained there until early April 2010. During this period of time 1 was,
on paper, considered the NCOIC of the day shift. However, MSG Adkins had assumed
responsibility for all personnel matters (See Exhibit (A) 15-6 Report 3-1-1 1 FINAL (2d
Correction), pg. 28). As the Senior lntelligence Sergeant, was responsible for supervising all
intelligence production and ensuring quality control of all intelligence products (See Enclosure 2,
Part 111, box According to MSG Adkins 1 was not responsible for personnel matters.
However, 1 still handled the day to day personnel matters if necessary. While PFC Manning was
on the day shift, under my supervision, his work products were excellent and he had no major
disciplinary problems. The only problem I encountered with PFC Manning while he was on the
day shift was his punctuality which 1 addressed with both verbal and written counseling
statements.

(5) PFC Manning returned to the night shift in early April 2010. While on the night shift

PFC Manning was supervised by SPC Showman and MSG Adkins. I remained the day shift
NCOIC and thus had no supervisory responsibility over PFC Manning. On May 7, 2010 PFC
Manning assaulted SPC Showman. MSG Adkins took the appropriate disciplinary action by
giving PFC Manning an Article 15. 1 left theater on May 27, 2010 to attend Warrant Officer
Candidate School.

b. 1 had no knowledge of most of PFC Manning?s personal and behavioral issues and
addressed all the misconduct that was brought to my attention. The only behavioral issue 1 had
knowledge of while PFC Manning was under my supervision was his propensity to show up late
for duty. To correct this I gave him both verbal and written counseling statements. I had
knowledge of PFC Manning's December 2009 outburst where he flipped a table, as well as PFC





19529

ADFR-BBA-1N
SUBJECT: Rebuttal of General Oflicer Memorandum of Reprimand -- W01 Kyle J. Balonek

Manning's assault on SPC Showman. However, both of these incidences occurred while PFC
Manning was on the night shift and the appropriate corrective action was taken by MSG Adkins.

(1) PFC Manning?s April 2009 outburst as well as his March 2009 ?no loyalty to country"
statement to SPC Showman was reported directly to MSG Adkins (See Exhibit (E78-3) SPC
Statement and Exhibit (E78-5) SPC Statement 19.1 AN1 These incidences were
never reported to me and 1 had no knowledge they had occurred.

(2) 1 also had no knowledge of PFC Manning?s August 2009 outburst at JRTC. As stated
previously, 1 did not attend JRTC with my brigade since 1 was at the ASAS Master Analyst
Course at Ft. Huachuca, AZ. Additionally, this outburst was never reported to me when I
returned to the unit on September 29, 2009.

(3) PFC Manning's April 24, 2010 ?my problem" email was addressed directly to MSG
Adkins (See Exhibit (El-4) Email from SPC to MSG PFC Manning?s statements in
that email were never reported or shared with me, thus I had no knowledge of his personal
issues.

c. MSG Adkins created a situation where l, as a supervisor, was circumvented in regards to
personnel matters. Not only was I intentionally circumvented by MSG Adkins, but the extent to
which 1 was being circumvented was also hidden from me. 1 agree MSG Adkins did not relieve
me of my supervisory duties and I indeed continued to act as a supervisor for personnel matters
on the day shi?. This is evidenced by my counselingof PFC Manning for being late to duty.
However, MSG Adkins had created a situation that made sure most issues with PFC Manning
were reported directly to him. MSG Adkins intentionally cut me out of all decision making and
disciplinary actions. My ability to supervise and take appropriate corrective action was
hampered by MSG Adkins supervisory scheme which made sure all direct supervisors reported
to him. rather than to me.

(1) The 15-6 investigation states that MSG Adkins ?purpose?illy removed or impeded
other and Warrant Officers from participating in the decision making process, usurping
their supervisory responsibilities over enlisted soldiers within the section." (See Exhibit (A) 15-6
Report 3- I -l 1 FINAL (2d Correction), Section 18: Chain of Command, pg. 24).

(2) The 15-6 investigation also states that MSG Adkins changed the supervisory schemes
pre and post deployment which created a dysfunctional supervisory relationship among S-2 mid-
level leaders and enlisted soldiers (See Exhibit (A) 15-6 Report 3-1-1 1 Correction),
Section IB: Chain ofCommand, pg. 24).

(3) Finally, MSG Adkins himself stated that he wanted to ?ride out Manning's]
issues with therapy and hopefully Manning could] ETS with an honorable [discharge]?
(See Exhibit (E1-5) 380-5) MSG Statement (IOJUN This statement shows that
MSG Adkins wanted to protect PFC Manning from any discipline by creating a supervisory

19530

ADFR-BBA-IN
Rebuttal of General Of?cer Memorandum of Reprimand W01 Kyle J. Balonck

scheme which would circumvent mid-level supervisors and hid and diminish any misconduct
committed by PFC Manning.

d. I never knew of any instances where MSG Adkins failed to take appropriate corrective
action. As stated before, I was only aware of PFC Manning?s problems with punctuality, his
December 2009 outburst where he ?ipped a table and his assault on SPC Showman. I took
appropriate action in the form of verbal and written counseling to correct PFC Manning?s
problem with punctuality. MSG Adkins properly referred PFC Manning to mental health after
he ?ipped a table. MSG Adkins also took appropriate action in the form of an Article IS and
removal from the SCIF when PFC Manning assaulted SPC Showman. I became aware of PFC
Manning?s other incidences of misconduct only after receiving this memorandum of reprimand
and having the chance to review the I5-6 investigation and the accompanying swom statements.

4. For the forgoing reasons. I respectfully request that you do not file this Memorandum of
Reprimand or, in the alternative, file this Memorandum of Reprimand in my local file rather than
in my Official Military Personnel File.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned

4
2 Encls
I. September I8, 2009 DA 1059 WOI. US Army
2. March l0, 20|0 NCOER Respondent

19531

.)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

,. • ;

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMYFORCES COMMAND
1777 HARDEE AVENUE, SW
FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-1062
REPIVTO
ATTENTION or

115APRU
AFCG

MEMORANDUM FOR Master Sergeant Paul D. Adkins. Headquarters and
Headquarters Company, 2d BCT, 10th Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY
SUBJECT: Reprimand

1. During the period from August 2008 to May 2010. you failed to report to your chain
of command various acts of misconduct and inappropriate behavior of PFC Manning.
This information was crucial to the commander's determination whether to deptoy this
soldier and whether to maintain his security clearance. Your failure to keep the chain of
command Informed impeded decision-making and created opportunities for further
misconduct. Your failure to keep the chain ofcommand informed constitutes dereliction
of duty in violation of Article 92, Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice.
2. You are reprimanded. Your actions are contrary to your duty to inform your
commanders in order for them to make essential decisions. With regard to PFC
Manning, your failure to report significant information about the soldier was an essential
factor in PFC Manning's continued access to classified information, notwithstanding
numerous acts on his part that raised questions as to his suitability for continued
service and ability to maintain security of classified information. For a noncommissioned officer of your rank, experience and responsibility, these failures are
unacceptable. You failed to display the sound judgment that your rank and position
demanded.
3. This reprimand is imposed under the provisions of Army Regulation 600-37 and not
as punishment under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, You are advised that
in accordance with AR 600-37, paragraph 3-4b, I may file this reprimand in your Official
Military Personnel File (OMPF). Prior to making a filing decision, however, I shall
consider any matters you present to me.
4. Within ten (10) days of receipt of this memorandum, you may submit any matters for
my consideration in making a filing determination. Submit any materials in rebuttal to
me through the Staff Judge Advocate. US Amy Forces Command, 1777 Hardee
Avenue SW, Fort McPherson. GA 30330-1062.

Enclosures

I yJAMESC
General, USA
Commanding

DEFENSE EXHIBIT ' " " ^ i r identification
PAGE OFFERED:
PAGE ADMXTTCD:
ManningB_00013083

PAGE

of

PAGES

19532

.}
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FORT ORtM
FORT DRUM. NEW YORK 13602-5000

AFDR-ASC
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson,
Georgia 30330-1062
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Reprimand - Master Sergeant Paxil D. Adkins, Headquarters and
Headquartas Company, 2d Brigade Combat Team, Fort Drum, New York 13602
1. I have reviewed the case file, the memorandum of reprimand, and the rdjuttal documents,
submitted by MSG Adkins.
2. I recommend the following action:
[ ] The reprimand be withdrawn and destroyed.
pfMSO Adkins' reprimand befiledin Ws([0M^^EOCALnLE].
3. I make this recommendation for the following reasons:
'

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A^SyLyfy

HARRY E. MILLER, JR
Brigadier G«ieral, USA
Commanding

ManningB_00013088

(^r

19533

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
10TH MOUNTAM DIVISION (LIGHT INFANTRY)
FORT DRUM, NEW YORK 13602-5000

AFDR-BBA
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Fort Drum, Fort Dmm, New York 13602
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Reprimand - Master Sergeant Paul D. Adkins, Headquarters and
Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry),
Fort Drum, New York 13602
1. I have reviewed the casefile,the memorandum of reprimand, and the rebuttal documents,
submitted by MSG Adkins.
2. I recommend the following action:
[ ] The reprimand be withdrawn and destroyed. nc^C^
^^MSG

Adkins'reprimandbefiledinhi^^OM^^[LOCALFILE].

3. Imakethis recommendationforthefollowingreasons:
^^^^^^^^^g^

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1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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DEtms SrSVLLIVAN
COL, IN
Commanding

ManningB_00013089

19534

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
1777 HARDEE AVENUE, SW
FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-1062
REPLY TO
ATTENTION or

AFCG

"^^mi

MEMORANDUM FOR MSG Paul D. Adkins, Headquarters, 2d Brigade Combat Team,
10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY 13602
SUBJECT: Disposition of Reprimand
1, I have reviewed and considered all information provided by you relating to the
reprimand dated 15 April 11.
2. After considering the underlying events, surrounding circumstances, and information
ytxi provided, I determine to file the reprimand in your
a,

Official Military Personnel File.

b.

Unit local file for a period of

(up to 36) months.

3. POC is the Staff Judge Advocate at (404) 464-6200 (DSN = 367).

^y^L^^JXr^
/ydAMES D. THURMAN
* ^ General, USA
Commanding

ManningB_00013090

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APPELLATE EXHIBITS

19540

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Prosecution Proposed
Case Calendar

21 February 2012

1 . The proposed calendar is based upon several assumptions. To the extent these assumptions
prove to be incorrect or too ambitious, the schedule will be correspondingly longer. These
assumptions are:
a. The United States and defense file their motions according to the judicial calendar.
b. All parties to this court-martial protect classified information and err on the side of
caution when creating documentation that could contain classified information.
c. The military judge establishes adequate procedures under M ilitary Rule of Evidence
( M RE 505) to adjudicate defense requests and to review potentially discoverable documents.
d. Defense requests for classified information do not require inter-agency coordination
between multiple Executive Branch Departments, Agencies, and organizations. I
e. No additional clearances or "read-ons" to any programs will be required based on the
United States or defense's use of classified information.
All fact witnesses are available for trial and a trial date is set sixty days in advance of the
last round of pretrial motions hearings, so that the United States can properly coordinate with not
just senior members of the United States government, but all witnesses for both the defense and
government.
£

g. The consolidation of issues relating to classified information during pretrial hearings and
trial will increase judicial efficiency and minimize delay.
2. Prosecution Proposed Calendar. The prosecution broke the projected issues into seven
phases.
a. Phase 1. Immediate Action (21 February 2012 - 16 March 2012)
( 1 ) Proposed Case Calendar
( A) Filing: 21 February 2012
( B) Response: N/ A
1

The United States recognizes that the defense is unaware of the approval processes for certain classified

information and will make requests based on classified information it deems necessary under MRE 505.

1

19541

( C) Article 3 9( a): 23 February 2012
(2) Protective Order and any Challenges
( A) Filing: 21 February 2012
( B) Response: N/ A
( C) Article 3 9( a): 23 February 2012
( 3 ) Bill of Particulars
( A) Filing: 17 February 2012
( B) Response: 9 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 1 5-16 M arch 2012
( 4) Pretrial Publicity Order
( A) Filing: 20 February 2012
( B) Response: 9 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 1 5-16 M arch 2012
( 5) Proposed Procedures under MRE 505
( A) Filing: 20 February 2012
( B) Response: 9 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 1 5-16 M arch 2012
b. Phase 2. Legal Motions, excluding Evidentiary Issues (9 March 2012 - 19 April
2012)

( 1 ) Speedy Trial, including Article 10
( A) Filing: 9 M arch 2012
( B) Response: 23 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 17-1 9 April 2012
(2) Proposed Members Instructions, including elements, for Article 104, Article
134, Specifications 1 through 16.

( A) Filing: 9 M arch 2012
( B) Response: 23 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 17-1 9 April 2012
( 3 ) Unlawful Command Influence
( A) Filing: 9 M arch 2012
( B) Response: 23 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 17-1 9 April 2012
(4) Improper Referral
( A) Filing: 9 M arch 2012
( B) Response: 23 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 17-1 9 April 2012

2

19542

( 5) Dismissal of Charges
( A) Filing: 9 M arch 2012
( B) Response: 23 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 17-19 April 2012
(6) Jurisdictional Defects
( A) Filing: 9 M arch 2012
( B) Response: 23 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 17-19 April 2012
(7) Constitutional Challenges to UCMJ, MREs and RCMs
( A) Filing: 9 M arch 2012
( B) Response: 23 M arch 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 17-19 April 2012
( 8) MRE 4 04(b) Disclosures
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( 9) MRE 304 Disclosures
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
(10) Witness Lists Exchanged
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
c. Phase 3. Evidentiary Issues

not Involving Classified Information under MRE 505 (6

April 2012 - 4 May 2012)

(1) Compel Discovery
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3-4 M ay 2012
(2) Compel Depositions
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3-4 M ay 2012
( 3 ) Motions in Limine
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3-4 M ay 2012
( 4) Motions to Suppress
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3-4 M ay 2012
3

19543

( 5) Compel Experts
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3 -4 M ay 2012
( 6) Compel Witnesses
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3 -4 M ay 2012
(7) Pre-Admit Evidence
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3-4 M ay 2012
( 8) Pre-Authenticate Evidence
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3 -4 M ay 2012
( 9) Pre-Qualify Experts
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3 -4 M ay 2012
(1 0) Requests for Judicial Notice
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3-4 M ay 2012
(11) Privileges
( A) Filing: 6 April 2012
( B) Response: 27 April 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 3-4 M ay 2012
d. Phase 4. Judicial Review of Classified Material under MRE 505 (3 May 2012 - 20
June 2012)

( A) Filing: 3 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 17 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20 June 2012

e. Phase 5. Evidentiary Issues Involving Classified Information under MRE 505 (1
. 1
May 2012 - 22 June 2012)

(1) Motions in Limine
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
4

19544

( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
(2) Litigation Concerning MRE 505 Substitutions
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
( 3 ) Compel Discovery
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
(4) Motions to Suppress
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
( 5) Compel Experts
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
(6) Compel Witnesses
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
(7) Pre-Admit Evidence
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
( 8) Pre-Authenticate Evidence
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
( 9) Pre-Qualify Experts
( A) Filing: 11 M ay 2012
( B) Response: 24 M ay 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 20-22 June 2012
£

Phase 6. Miscellaneous Motions (15 June 2012 - 27 June 2012)

(1) Grunden Hearing for all Classified Information
5

19545

( A) Filing: 15 June 2012
( B) Response: 22 June 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 27 June 2012
(2) Article 13
( A) Filing: 15 June 2012
( B) Response: 22 June 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 27 June 2012
( 3 ) Any additional motion that does not have an identified deadline
( A) Filing: 15 June 2012
( B) Response: 22 June 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 27 June 2012
'

g. Phase 7. Member Selection (6 July 2012 - 19 July 2012)
(1) Venire Issues
( A) Filing: 6 July 2012
( B) Response: 13 July 2012
( C) Article 3 9( a): 19 July 2 012
(2) Voir Dire
( A) Filing: 6 July 2 012
( B) Response: N/A
( C) Article 3 9( a): 19 July 2012
( 3 ) Member Instructions
( A) Filing: 6 July 2012
( B) Response: N/A
( C) Article 3 9( a): 19 July 2012
(4) Flyer
( A) Filing: 6 July 2012
h. Phase

8. Trial by Members (3 August 2012 - 21 August 2012)

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

6

19546

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES
v.
MANNING, Bradley E., PFC
U.S. Army, (b) (6)
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 22211

)
)
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)

DEFENSE PROPOSED CASE
MANAGEMENT ORDER

DATED: 21 February 2012

1. The Defense submits the following proposed Case Management Order for the Court’s
consideration:
a. Per a docket request, the Government requested a trial date of 3 April 2012. The Defense
requested that the trial begin on 30 April 2012. Given the timeline detailed below, the Defense
requests the Court to set trial for 4 June – 22 June 2012. The Defense does not believe the trial
will require the entire scheduled time.
b. Notification pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 304 and 404(b) shall be provided by 29
February 2012.
c. The Government shall provide all discovery by 23 March 2012 either to the Defense or to
the Court pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 505(i). If the Government fails to provide the
requested discovery by 23 March 2012, the Court will consider appropriate sanctions under
Military Rule of Evidence 505(i)(4)(E).
d. The Government shall notify the Defense of its intent to use expert testimony by 28
March 2012.
e. The Government, with the Defense’s input, shall arrange for all depositions to take place
within the Military District of Washington. All depositions will occur between 2 April 2012
through 6 April 2012.
f. Requests for expert assistance shall be provided by 10 April 2012.
g. Member questionnaires will be due by 17 April 2012.
h. Witness lists will be exchanged by 24 April 2012.
i. Notice of Accused’s intent to disclose classified information under Military Rule of
Evidence 505(h) shall be provided by 11 May 2012.
1

19547

j. Notice of the Accused’s forum selection and notice of pleas shall be provided, in writing by
24 May 2012.
k. Proposed voir dire and other member instructions will be due 30 May 2012.
l. Motion deadlines, motion response deadlines, and Article 39(a) sessions set as follows:

Issues Addressed
Bill of Particulars; Compel Discovery;
Compel Depositions.
Protective Order; Pretrial Publicity Order;
Proposed Case Management Order.
Proposed Members Instructions for 641;
793(e); and 1030(a)(1).
Proposed Elements for 641; 793(e); and
1030(a)(1).
Unlawful Command Influence; Improper
Referral; Dismissal of Charges;
Jurisdictional Defects; Constitutional
Challenges to UCMJ, MREs and RCMs;
Challenges to Protective Order.
Outstanding Discovery Issues; Suppress
statements and/or items seized; Speedy
Trial; Article 10.
Compel Experts; Compel Witnesses;
Evidentiary Motions in Limine; Requests
for Judicial Notice; Any additional
motion that does not have an identified
deadline.
Grunden Hearing.
Article 13.
Voir Dire; Member Instructions;
Outstanding Issues.

Motion
Filing

Motion
Response

Article 39(a)

21 February 2012

23 February 2012

21 February 2012

N/A

23 February 2012

12 March 2012

19 March 2012

29 – 30 March 2012

19 March 2012

26 March 2012

29 – 30 March 2012

13 April 2012

20 April 2012

26 – 27 April 2012

7 May 2012

14 May 2012

17 – 18 May 2012

N/A
7 May 2012

N/A
14 May 2012

As detailed above.

N/A

1 June 2012
If necessary, during
panel’s deliberations
on Sentencing
1 June 2012

14 February 2012

2. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b) (6)
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

2

19548

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES
v.
MANNING, Bradley E., PFC
U.S. Army, (b) (6)
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENSE MOTION FOR
APPROPRIATE RELIEF FOR
PUBLICITY ORDER TO
PROSPECTIVE COURTMARTIAL MEMBER
DATED: 20 February 2012

RELIEF SOUGHT
1. The Defense moves this Court, pursuant to R.C.M. 906, for an order to prospective courtmartial members prohibiting them from reading or viewing media accounts pertaining to this
case.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF
2. As the moving party, the Defense has the burden of persuasion. R.C.M. 905(c)(2). The
burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C.M. 905(c)(1).
FACTS
3. PFC Manning is charged with five specifications of violating a lawful general regulation, one
specification of aiding the enemy, one specification of disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline and service discrediting, eight specifications of communicating
classified information, five specifications of stealing or knowingly converting Government
property, and two specifications of knowingly exceeding authorized access to a Government
computer, in violation of Articles 92, 104, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 904, 934 (2010).
4. The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the
convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011.
On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32
Investigating Officer. The charges were referred without special instructions to a general courtmartial on 3 February 2012.
5. The media interest in this case has been extensive. It is likely that the media’s interest will
only increase as we get closer to trial.
1

19549

WITNESSES/EVIDENCE
6. The Defense does not request any witnesses be produced in support of this motion. The
Defense requests the Court consider that attached Public Affair’s Office summary of media
interest during the Article 32 hearing. See Attachment A.
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
7. The Defense moves pursuant to Rule for Court-Martial 906 for an order to prospective courtmartial members requiring them to refrain from reading or viewing media accounts pertaining to
this case. Though the Defense has not been able to find any military case law on this issue, the
Defense believes such an order is within the military judge’s inherent authority to ensure a fair
trial in this case.
8. The Defense has drafted a proposed Protective Order. The proposed Protective Order is
attached to this motion.
9. If the Defense motion is opposed by the Government, then the Defense requests oral
argument.
CONCLUSION
10. Based on the above, the Defense requests that the Court issue the attached Pretrial Publicity
Order to potential court-martial members.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

2

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Subject: PAO EXSUM - U.S. vs. PFC Manning Article 32 Hearing, 21 DEC 11

PAO Executive Summary - U.S. Govt. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning Article 32
Hearing

(U) Day six of the Article 32 Hearing U.S. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning was called
into session at B963hrs.

The defense called two witnesses, one in person and one telephonic to provide
their statements. Proceedings closed today at 0939hrs with the defense resting
it's case. There were no incidents or disturbances today. The hearing will resume
at 096Bhrs on Thursday, December 22 with the closing statements by prosecution
and defense.

26 media outlets, 28 media representatives were in attendance: see attached
list. As of 0944hrs, December 21, there were 209 media stories, 146 broadcast
clips, and 1,030 conversations on social networks about the Article 32 hearing.
while the VOCUS media site continues to list most of the coverage of Manning as
negative, the majority of the coverage about the hearing remains balanced and
factual. Media Operations Center will remain open until noon today and is
expecting a visit from the Chief of Public Affairs, Maj. Gen. Lanza at
approximately 1130hrs.

First set of sketches are set to be released to the press pit at approximately
1100hrs by media pool sketch artist, Bill Hennessy.

The MDN and FGGM Public Affairs staff reported for duty at 06e0hrs. The media
operations center was operational at B630hrs. The photographers and the pool
camera captured b~roll and photos of PFC Manning, the defense team, the
prosecution team, wikileaks' lawyers and Daniel Ellsberg entering the courtroom.



Subject: PAO EXSUM - U.S. vs. PFC Manning Article 32 Hearing, 20 DEC 11

PAO Executive Summary - U.S. Govt. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning Article 32
Hearing

(U) Day five of the Article 32 Hearing U.S. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning was
called into session at a931hrs.

The government called six witnesses to provide their statements. Adrian Lamo's
testimony provided evidence of the first reports of the classified leaks.
Additionally, the prosecution provided witnesses regarding PFC Manning's erratic
behavior prior to and during deployment. Legal proceedings were closed to the
media and general public at 0946hrs for a closed session on unclassified

Enclosure 6
Page] of5

19550





information at the defense's request. The only parties allowed in the courtroom
during the closed session were the accused, the I0, the prosecution and defense
teams, witnesses and approved agencies. The hearing was called back into open
session at 1011hrs. Proceedings closed today at 1S37hrs with the prosecution
resting it's case. There were no incidents or disturbances today. The hearing
will resume at 990ehrs on Wednesday, December 21 with the defense team's first
witness.

19 media outlets, 31 media representatives were in attendance: see attached
list. As of 1S44hrs, December 26, there were 624 media stories, 164 broadcast
clips, and 1,295 conversations on social networks about the hearing. while the
VOCUS media site listed most of the coverage of Manning as negative, the majority
of the coverage about the hearing remains balanced and factual.

First set of sketches were released to the press pit at approximately 1324hrs and
the second set at approximately 1546hrs by media pool sketch artist, Bill
Hennessy.

Since former Lt. Dan Choi?s disturbance outside of the courtroom yesterday, there
have been 185 print and online stories; and 145 social network conversations in
reference to the incident. To see his interview with Keith Olbermann conducted
last night, click on link below. Unless there is significant media coverage of
the incident in the next 24 hours we will not include additional tracking of the
Choi incident in tomorrow's 1099hrs EXSUM.

tube.c /wat h>v-M



Subject: PAO EXSUM U.S. vs. PFC Manning Article 32 Hearing, 19 DEC 11

PAO Executive Summary - U.S. Govt. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning Article 32
Hearing

(U) Day four of the Article 32 Hearing U.S. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning was
called into session at 0931hrs.

The government called three witnesses to provide their statements primarily
dealing with the forensic review of PFC Manning's various computers. Court
proceedings were closed to the media and general public twice for approximately
one hour total. The only parties allowed in the courtroom during the closed
session were the accused, the I0, the prosecution and defense teams, witnesses
and approved agencies. The hearing closed at 1613hrs and will resume at 0900hrs
on Tuesday, December 20 with two telephonic witnesses called by the prosecution.

17 media outlets, 27 media representatives were in attendance: see attached
list. As of 1647hrs, December 19, there were 740 media stories, 882 broadcast
clips, and 1,492 conversations on social networks about the hearing. while the

Enclosure 6
Page 2 of 5

19552

VOCUS media site listed most of the coverage of Manning as negative, the majority
of the coverage about the hearing remains balanced and factual.

First set of sketches were released to the press pit at approximately 09S4hrs,
the second set at approximately 133ehrs, and the third set at approximately 1540
by media pool sketch artist, Bill Hennessy.

Since former Lt. Dan Choi?s disturbance outside of the courtroom there have been
118 print and online stories; and 67 social network conversations in reference to
the incident.



Subject: PAO EXSUM - U.S. vs. PFC Manning Article 32 Hearing, 18 DEC 11

PAD Executive Summary - U.S. Govt. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning Article 32
Hearing

(U) Day three of the Article 32 Hearing U.S. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning was
called into session at O940hrs.

The government called seven witnesses to provide their statements to the
Investigating Officer (IO) and were subsequently questioned by the Defense
Counsels. Out of the seven witnesses, two invoked their rights under Article 31
to remain silent. Additionally, the prosecution requested that the I0 close the
proceedings. The 10 granted the prosecution's request. Court proceedings were
closed to the media and general public for approximately an hour and 50 minutes.
The only parties allowed in the courtroom during the closed session were the
accused, the 10, the prosecution and defense teams, witnesses and approved
agencies. The hearing recessed at 155Zhrs and was called back into open session
as 1742hrs. The hearing closed at 1831hrs and will resume at 0900hrs on Monday,
December 19 with the defense team's cross examination of the last witness. After
the cross examination court will recess for the 10 to closed the session, the
court will be closed for approximately one hour. The pool media will remain at
the courtroom compound in the media holding trailer during the closed session.
Media attending tomorrow's proceedings will report to the Reece Road gate 0636-
073ehrs.

19 media outlets, 31 media representatives were in attendance: see attached
list. As of 18S6hrs, December 18, there were 1,614 media stories, 290 broadcast
clips and 1,045 conversations on social networks about the hearing. while the
VOCUS media site listed most of the coverage of Manning as negative, the majority
of the coverage about the hearing remains balanced and factual.

First set of sketches were released to the press pit approximately at 1330hrs,
the second set approximately 1739hrs, and the final sketches at approximately
1845hrs by military sketch artist, Marine Sgt. Shawn Sales, and the media pool
sketch artist, Bill Hennessy.

Enclosure 6
Page 3 of 5







Subject: PAO EXSUM - U.S. vs. PFC Manning Article 32 Hearing, 17 DEC 11

PAD Executive Summary - U.S. Govt. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning - Article 32
Hearing

(U) Day two of the Article 32 Hearing U.S. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning was called
into session at 1e34hrs.

Prior today's proceedings at the daily media brief, the legal SME informed the
media of the ruling by the ACCA on the writ filed with them by the Defense
Counsel yesterday. The writ for recusal of the 10 was denied. The ACCA also
denied a second writ filed by a third party, and the media were directed to
contact the ACCA Public Information 8 Inquiry Office for information pertaining
to that writ. The government called six witnesses to provide their statements to
the Investigating Officer (IO) and were subsequently questioned by the Defense
Counsels. Court closed at 18e8hrs and will resume at 09e0hrs on Sunday, December
18. Media attending tomorrow's proceedings will report to the Reece Road gate
0630- 0730hrs.

26 media outlets, 41 media representatives were in attendance: see attached
list. As of 1845hrs, December 17, there were 1,218 media stories and 300
broadcast clips about the hearing. while the VOCUS media site listed most of the
coverage of Manning as negative, the majority of the coverage about the hearing
has been balanced and factual.

First set of sketches were released to the press pit approximately at 1430hrs and
the second set approximately 1636hrs by military sketch artist, Marine Sgt. Shawn
Sales, and the media pool sketch artist, Bill Hennessy.



Subject: PAO EXSUM - U.S. vs. PFC Manning Article 32 Hearing, 16 DEC 11

PAO Executive Summary - U.S. Govt. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning - Article 32
Hearing

(U) An Article 32 Hearing U.S. vs. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning began on Friday, Dec.
16, 2011. Court was called into session at 9 am.

Manning?s Defense Counsel challenged the I0?s impartiality and requested that he
recuse himself from the proceedings. After deliberating the 10 refused. Defense
Counsel then asked for a stay of proceedings for the day. The I0 also refused
that request but granted a recess so that Defense Counsel could file a writ to
have the ID removed from the case with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA).

Enclosure 6
Page 4 of 5

19554

ACCA is also considering an Extraordinary writ from Julian Assange?s attorney for
him to observe the proceedings.

Court will resume at 10 a.m. on Saturday, December 17. Media attending tomorrow's
proceedings will report to the Reece Road gate 7:30 a.m. - 8:30 a.m.

46 media outlets, 76 media representatives were in attendance: see attached
list. Between December 15 and noon December 16, there were 1299 media stories
about the Manning hearing. There were 1232 media stories and 1657 broadcast
clips about the hearing on December 16 alone as of 1906hrs. while the VOCUS
media site listed most of the coverage of Manning as negative, the majority of
the coverage about the hearing has been balanced and factual.

one non-credentialed Turkish media representative snuck in with the media group
as they arrived and was subsequently removed for trying to film inside the MOC.
Upon request, he willingly erased the footage he had filmed and was taken to view
the proceedings with the general public.

The military sketch Artist, Marine Sgt. Shawn Sales, DINFOS Multi-media Graphic
Artist, Ft. Meade, provided today's sketches to media. The media pool also hired
its own sketch artist, Bill Hennessy.

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
(3aveanm

Enclosure 6
Page 5 of



IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES

PRETRIAL PUBLICITY ORDER
v. TO: COURT-MARTIAL

MEMBERS
MANNING, Bradley E., PFC
U.S. Army,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, DATED:
Fort Myer, VA 2221]

1. This Court finds that there has been pretrial publicity in the above-captioned matter such that
the following ORDER is necessary and proper in aid of its jurisdiction and in the interests of the
fair administration of ustice and due process of law for all parties.

2. It is hereby ORDERED to all prospective court-martial members:

a. The above-captioned case has been referred to trial by general court-martial. This case is
presently docketed for trial beginning on 2012 with an expected duration of three
weeks.

b. This ORDER is directed to all persons who have been selected as a prospective court
member, including as an alternate member. References in this ORDER to ?prospective court
member(s)? refer to you. If you are detailed as a member for this case, you will be contacted by
the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate and provided additional instructions, including any
change in the trial date.

3. All prospective court members are hereby ORDERED as follows:

a. Due to prior publicity, and the probability for more publicity in the news media
(newspapers, magazines, radio coverage, television coverage, internet news and editorial
sources, including the ?Early Bird,? email etc.) about this case, you are instructed and
ORDERED not to listen to, look at, or read any accounts of any incident involving the above-
named accused or concerning allegations of compromise of classified information, or the
ongoing issues involving the publication of alleged classi?ed information by WikiLeaks. You
may not consult any source, written or otherwise, involving the alleged incident. Should anyone
attempt to discuss the case with you, or talk to you about your potential or actual participation as
a court?martial member in this case, other than in open court, you must immediately forbid them
from doing so, and then you must report the occurrence to me in court at your first opportunity.

b. A trial by court-martial includes the right of the accused to be tried by a court composed of
members. As a prospective court member of the court-martial that will try the case named

19556

above, it will be your duty to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused as to the charges
upon which he is arraigned. Under the law, the accused is presumed to be innocent of the
charges against him. Neither the fact that charges have been preferred against the accused nor
the fact that charges have been referred to a court-martial for trial warrants any inference of guilt.
Your determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused must be based solely upon the
evidence and my instructions in the case as presented in open court. So, you must not read or
otherwise expose yourself to information about the facts or issues in this case from sources
outside of the court room. You must keep an open mind and not form or express any opinion on
the case until all the evidence and the instructions on the applicable law are presented to you.
You must not entertain or reach a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused until
after all the evidence and instructions have been received in open court and you are in your
closed session deliberations with other members.

c. The accused and the government are each entitled to a panel of court members who
approach the case with an open mind and who are able to keep that open mind until they
deliberate on the verdict. You should be as free as humanly possible from any preconceived
ideas about the outcome of this case. Therefore, you are instructed and ORDERED that, from
the date of receipt of this ORDER until the trial is concluded (or until you are speci?cally
advised by this court that this order no longer applies to you), you will not discuss the facts of
this case, or any publicity concerning this case, with anyone, military or civiliancourt member on the case, you are also ORDERED not to discuss the case with other court
members during the course of the trial until you enter you closed session deliberations. You may
not discuss your prospective detailing to this court-martial with anyone, other than as required to
inform your military superiors of your duty status.

d. In the event you have already read, seen, or listened to any media accounts, publicity or
other accounts concerning the alleged incident in this case, or you inadvertently do so before the
conclusion of this court-martial, you are advised that you have a legal duty to disclose that matter
to me when asked to do so in open court. Also, in the event that you have already discussed (or
listened to anyone else discuss) any matter related to this case, or inadvertently do so before the
conclusion of the court-martial, you have the duty to disclose that to me in open court. You are
advised that it is not an adverse re?ection on you to be excused from duty as a court member;
however, as a member of the military, you are required to follow the instructions in this ORDER
and not intentionally do anything contrary to the requirements of this ORDER.

e. The trial counsel shall cause a copy of this ORDER to be served through the Of?ce of the
Staff Judge Advocate on each prospective primary and alternate member of the court. The trial
counsel shall obtain and maintain a written receipt for such service, using the form provided
along with this ORDER, showing the date and time this ORDER was served on each prospective
member. A copy of the service shall be given to the defense and also to the Court to be included
in the record.

f. If the convening authority selects any additional primary or alternate member after the date
of this ORDER, the trial counsel shall immediately cause a copy of this ORDER to be served on
the new primary or alternate member. The trial counsel shall also obtain and maintain a written





receipt for such service and provide a copy of such service to the defense and to the Court to be
included in the record.

It is so ORDERED, this the day of February 2012.

DENISE R. LIND
COL, JA
Chief Judge, 1st Judicial Circuit

0 19558

2012

MEMORANDUM THRU Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Military District of Washington,
210 A. Street, Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5013

FOR Chief Judge, Judicial Circuit, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency (Trial Judiciary), 9275
Road, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SUBJECT: Acknowledgement of Receipt of Court Order United States V. PFC Bradley
Manning

1. At hours, on 2012, I received a copy of
the Court Order entitled ?Pretrial Publicity Order to Court-Martial Members dated 23 February
2012.

2. I, acknowledge that I have read and understood the
Pretrial Publicity Court Order.

Signed:

Printed Name:

Rank:

19559

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES
DEFENSE MOTION FOR
V. APPROPRIATE RELIEF UNDER
MILITARY RULE OF

U.s. Army, ?t
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 22211





1



MANNING, Bradley E., PFC EVIDENCE 505





DATED: 17 February 2012



RELIEF SOUGHT

1. PFC Bradley E. Manning, by and through counsel, moves this court, pursuant to R.C.M. 906
and Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 505 for a preliminary Article 39(a) session to consider
matters relating to classi?ed information that may arise in connection with the court-martial.
Speci?cally, the Defense requests that the Court issue a Protective Order under M.R.E.
505(g)(1), establish timing for discovery and notice under M.R.E. 505(h), and obtain
clari?cation from the Original Classi?cation Authority (OCA) for Speci?cation 3 and 15 of
Charge II regarding the scope of its classi?cation determination on referencing the OCA within
court ?lings or open court.

BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

2. As the moving party, the Defense has the burden of persuasion. R.C.M. 905(c)(2). The
burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C.M. 905(c)(1).

FACTS

3. PFC Manning is charged with ?ve speci?cations of violating a lawful general regulation, one
speci?cation of aiding the enemy, one speci?cation of disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline and service discrediting, eight speci?cations of communicating
classi?ed information, ?ve speci?cations of stealing or knowingly converting Government
property, and two speci?cations of knowingly exceeding authorized access to a Government
computer, in violation of Articles 92, 104, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
10 U.S.C. 892, 904, 934 (2010).

4. The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the
convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011.
On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32

19560

Investigating Of?cer. The charges were referred without special instructions to a general court-
martial on 3 February 2012.

5. On 14 February 2012, the Defense ?led three separate motions along with an ex parte
supplement to one it its motions. Shortly after ?ling the Defense motions, Captain (CPT)
Ashden Fein sent an email to the Defense requesting an immediate telephone conversation.
During that conversation, CPT Fein asserted that the Defense was in apparent violation of a
footnote in an classi?cation determination regarding Speci?cation 3 and 15 of Charge II.
The prohibition restricts mentioning the organization by name in conjunction with
charged speci?cations in this case.

6. As previously stated, the Defense did not, in any of its submissions, reference the
organization?s name in conjunction with any of the charged offenses. However, the Government
believed that because the Defense referred to the organization?s review of ?charged
information,? this runs afoul of the classi?cation determination and therefore constitutes spillage.
The telephone conversation ended with the Defense telling CPT Fein that it believed his
interpretation was an arbitrary one and inconsistent with the Defense security experts? opinion.

7. The following day, CPT ein sent an email to the Court and all parties requesting that the
Defense?s email not be forwarded and the attached documents not saved. At the time, the
Government believed one of the documents contained classi?ed information. Later that day, the
Government pointed to another Defense motion as also potentially containing classi?ed
information. Based upon the Govemment?s unilateral interpretation that spillage had occurred,

the Military District of Washington, J6, Information Assurance Manager,
directed all parties to take curative steps.

8. It is important to note that even the Government concedes that the Defense did not mention
the organization?s name in reference to a particular speci?cation, as prohibited by the footnote.
The Government simply believes that the Defense?s submission could lead a reasonable person
to the classi?ed information. Under the Government?s position, if a reasonable person could
infer an association between the organization and certain speci?cations, there is a spillage of
classi?ed information. To use an analogy to better elucidate this point, assume that the mention
of ?Shakespeare? in conjunction with ?Romeo and Juliet? was classi?ed, though neither the
mention of Shakespeare nor Romeo and Juliet alone is classi?ed. Further assume that
Shakespeare has already publicly announced that he wrote Romeo and Juliet. In the Defense?s
motions, it did not mention Shakespeare in association with Romeo and Juliet. At most, it
mentioned Shakespeare in conjunction with ?star-crossed lovers.? Because a reasonable person
could infer that ?star-crossed lovers? refers to Romeo and Juliet, and because Romeo and Juliet
is not permitted to be mentioned in association with Shakespeare, this (according to the
Government) constitutes disclosure of classi?ed information. What if the Defense had referred
not to star-crossed lovers, but simply ?lovers?? What if it had referred to a ?story featuring the
Montague?s and Capulet?s?? What if it had referred to a ?tragic love story?? What if it had
referred to ?poisoning?? The point is that the Defense cannot, by any stretch of the imagination,
anticipate what the Government, in its unilateral discretion, will deem to be prohibited under the
footnote. The Defense interprets the prohibition in the relevant footnote as prohibiting the use of
?Shakespeare? and ?Romeo and Juliet? nothing more. That the Government attempts to strain

51'

19561

this interpretation to the point of absurdity demonstrates the need for clari?cation in this matter.
Moreover, the Defense reiterates its position that: a) the classi?cation determination in
this respect the footnote prohibiting the use of ?Shakespeare? and ?Romeo and Juliet?) is not
a valid one because it fails to comply with the requirements of Executive Order 13526; b) the
unnamed organization?s own public statements linking ?Shakespeare? and ?Romeo and Juliet?
are inconsistent with its own apparent prohibition.

9. The Government?s expansive (and in the view of the Defense, untenable) reading of the
referenced footnote demonstrates the need for a Protective Order providing for a neutral
review of all party submissions. It also demonstrates the need for the relevant OCA to testify as
to what is, and is not, permitted with respect to the naming of this particular organization. The
Defense could never have anticipated that the Government would deem anything in its motions
to constitute spillage of classi?ed information, necessitating onerous sanitation measures. The
Government?s interpretation of the OCAs footnote places the Defense and the Court at too great
of risk for future incidents of this nature.


10. The Defense requests the following witnesses be produced in support of this motion:

a. OCA for Speci?cation 3 and 15 of Charge
b. Mr. Jay Prather, Court Security Of?cer

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

11. After referral of charges, ?any party may move for a session under Article 39(a) to consider
matters relating to classi?ed information.? M.R.E. 505(e). After such a motion, ?the military
judge shall hold a session under Article 39(a) to establish the timing of requests for
discovery, the provisions of notice under subdivision and the initiation of the procedure
under subdivision Id.

12. The Defense requests this hearing to establish Defense notice requirements under M.R.E.
505(h), the timeline for any proceedings that may be necessary under M.R.E. 505(i), and the
issuance of a Protective Order to govern the handling of classi?ed information in this case under
M.R.E. 505(g)(1).

13. Under M.R.E. 505(h), the Defense is required to provide the Government notice if the
Defense reasonably expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of classi?ed material in any
manner during the court-martial process. The Defense will provide the required notice so that
the Government can ensure that the proper documentation is obtained and requested in order that
the courtroom can be properly closed for any Defense-requested disclosure of classi?ed
information.

19562

14. Based on the inherent dif?culty in dealing with classi?ed information during the court-
martial process, something that we have already seen with the Defense submissions on 14
February 2012, the Defense requests that a hearing be held to establish the requirements of
M.R.E. 505(h) and 505(i). The Defense also moves pursuant to M.R.E. 505(g)(1) for the
issuance of a Protective Order to govern the handling of classi?ed information in this case.

15. Under M.R.E. 505(g)(l), a military judge is required to enter a Protective Order to guard
against the compromise of information disclosed to the Defense. The rule provides an example
of various provisions that a Protective Order may include. Id. These provisions, however, are
only meant as guidelines for a military judge, and are not absolute requirements. Although the
rule envisions that the Government will make a request for a Protective Order, nothing prohibits
the Defense from proactively taking steps to assist the Court in this regard.

16. In the instant case, the Defense seeks the issuance of a Protective Order that will avoid a
reoccurrence of the 14 February 2012 ?spillage? of classi?ed information. Here, the Defense
seeks the issuance of a Protective Order seeking the terms set forth in M.R.E. 505(g)(1), as well
as other measures which it believes are necessary to protect classi?ed information and ensure an
ef?cient and effective court-martial process.

17. The Defense has drafted a proposed Protective Order. The proposed Protective Order is
attached to this motion.

18. If the Defense motion is opposed by the Government, then the Defense requests oral
argument.

CONCLUSION

19. Based on the above, the Defense requests that the Court issue the attached Protective Order.

Respectfully submitted,



DAVID EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

19563

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES

PROTECTIVE ORDER
V.


MANNING, Bradley E., PFC
U.S. Army,
Headquarters an ea quarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, DATED:
Fort Myer, VA 22211

1. This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of the defense for a Protective Order to
prevent the unauthorized disclosure or dissemination of classified infonnation and documents in
the captioned case. The defense seeks a Protective Order covering documents and information
previously made available to the accused in the course of his employment with the United States
government, as well as documents and information which have been, or will be, reviewed or
made available to the accused or defense counsel in this case.

2. This Court finds that this case will involve classi?ed infonnation, the storage, handling, and
control of which requires special security precautions mandated by statute, Executive Order, and
regulation, and access to which requires the appropriate security clearances and a ?need?to-
know.?

3. Pursuant to the authority granted by Military Rule of Evidence 505; relevant Executive
Orders of the President of the United States; regulations of the Departments of Defense and
Army; and in order to protect classified information, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

a. The procedures set forth in this Protective Order apply to the accused, all counsel of
record, all other counsel involved in this case, all court personnel, and all other individuals who
receive access to classi?ed information or documents in connection with this case.

b. The provisions of this Protective Order and Military Rule of Evidence 505 will apply to all
pretrial, trial, post-trial and appellate matters concerning the above captioned case. If necessary,
the procedures may be modified from time-to-time by further order of the Military Judge acting
under her supervisory authority to ensure a fair and expeditious trial, while protecting the
national security interests of the United States.

c. The following definitions apply to the ORDER:

(1) ?Classified information,? shall mean:

0 0 19564

(A) any document or information which has been classi?ed by any executive branch
agency in the interests of national security or pursuant to Executive Order 13562, or its
predecessor Orders, as or or additionally
controlled as ?Sensitive Compartmented Information?

(B) any document or information, regardless of its physical form or characteristics,
which has been derived from information from the United States government that was classi?ed
by the United States pursuant to Executive Order 13562 as or
or additionally controlled as

(C) verbal classi?ed information known to or retained by the accused or defense
counsel;

(D) any information, regardless of place of origin that could reasonably be believed to
contain classified information, or that refers to national security or intelligence matters; or

(E) any document or information as to which the accused or defense counsel have been
noti?ed orally or in writing that such documents or information contained classi?ed information.

(2) The words ?documents? ?information? or ?associated material? as used in this
ORDER include, but are not limited to, all written or printed matter of any kind, formal or
informal, including originals, identical copies, and all non-identical copies, whether different
from the original by reason of any notation made on such copies or otherwise, including without
limitation, papers, correspondence, memoranda, notes, letters, reports, summaries, inter-of?ce
and intra-of?ce communications, notations of any sort concerning conversations, meetings, or
other communications, and all manner of electronic data processing and storage.

3 ?Access to classi?ed information? means havin access to, reviewin readin
E,
leamin or otherwise comm to know, in an manner, classi?ed information.


(4) ?Secure area? means a storage facility designated by the Court Security Officer for the
storage, handling, and control of classi?ed information.

(5) The word ?or? should be interpreted as including ?and,? and vice versa; ?he? should
be interpreted as including ?she,? and vice versa.

(6) The ?defense? refers to and includes the accused, his military and civilian counsel.

d. All classi?ed documents and information contained therein shall remain classi?ed unless
they bear clear indication that they have been declassi?ed by the agency or department of
government (hereinafter referred to as ?originating agency?) that originated the document or the
information contained therein.

e. Information in the public domain is ordinarily not classi?ed. However, if the defense
anticipates seeking the con?rmation or denial of whether information in the public domain is
classi?ed, by questioning any person who has, or has had, access to classi?ed information, or if a





truthful response to a request or question put forth by the defense counsel about information in
the public domain requires an individual to reveal classi?ed information, in any proceeding
(including pretrial, trial, and post-trial and appellate proceedings) relating to the above captioned
case, then the defense must comply with the notice requirements under M.R.E. 505 and the terms
of this ORDER.

f. Any unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed information may constitute a violation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice as well as the criminal laws of the United States. Attorneys
who intentionally or knowingly violate this ORDER may be reported to their State Bar
Association. In addition, any violation of the terms of this ORDER shall be brought immediately
to the attention of this Court and may result in a charge of contempt of court and possible referral
for criminal prosecution. Any breach of this ORDER may also result in termination of an
individual?s access to classi?ed information. This Protective Order is to ensure that those
authorized to receive classi?ed information in connection with this case will never divulge that
information to anyone not authorized to receive it, without prior written authorization from the
originating agency and in conformity with this ORDER.

g. Mr. Jay Prather is appointed as Court Security Of?cer. Mr. Prather shall ?mction as an
of?cer of the Court.

h. Personnel Security Investigations and Clearances

(1) The Court has been advised that all military trial and defense counsel assigned to this
case hold at least a SECRET security clearance and require access to the classi?ed information
and documents at issue in this case.

(2) The Court Security Of?cer will verify that the security clearances of all counsel are in
proper order. Once an individual counsel?s security clearance is veri?ed, that counsel shall have
unfettered access to classi?ed information that is relevant and necessary to prepare for this case,
subject to the requirements of this ORDER. Any changes or substitutions of military trial or
defense counsel shall be immediately made known to the Court Security Of?cer and Military
Judge. Any new military trial or defense counsel shall be served with a copy of this ORDER and
shall be subject to the provisions of this ORDER.

(3) Neither the accused, his civilian defense counsel, Mr. David E. Coombs, any
associated counsel or employee of civilian defense counsel, may have access to classi?ed
information in connection with this case, unless that person ?rst shall:

(A) execute all forms needed by the government to complete a personnel security
investigation and make a determination whether to grant a limited access authorization; and have
been granted, a security clearance or Limited Access Authorization by the Department of the
Army, through the Court Security Of?cer. Upon the execution and ?ling of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) at Appendix A, the government, under the supervision of the Court
Security Of?cer, shall expeditiously undertake the required action to ascertain the applicant?s
eligibility for access to classi?ed information.



(B) sign the sworn statement in the MOU at Appendix A to this ORDER. Any
retained civilian defense counsel?s MOU shall include a statement expressing his understanding
that the failure to abide by the terms of this Protection Order will result in a report to his State
Bar Association.

(C) sign a standard form nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to classi?ed
information. Each person executing the MOU at Appendix A must provide an original to the
Court Security Of?cer.

i. Upon compliance with the procedures set forth above, the Court Security Of?cer shall
authorize the following attorney for the defense to be given access to classi?ed documents and
all other information as required by the Government?s discovery obligations and otherwise as
needed to prepare for this case: Mr. David E. Coombs. Any additional person whose assistance
the defense reasonably requires, including defense witnesses, may only have access to classi?ed
information in this case after ?rst obtaining from the Court Security Of?cer, without the need for
prior notice to trial counsel, an approval for access to the required level of classi?cation on a
need-to-know basis and after satisfying the other requirements described in this ORDER for
access to classi?ed information.

j. In addition to the MOU contained in Appendix A, any person who as a result of this case
gains access to information contained in any Department of the Army Special Access Program,
as the term is de?ned in Executive Order 13526, or to SCI, or to any information subject to
special handling procedures, shall sign any nondisclosure agreement that is speci?c to that
information.

k. All requests for clearances and access to classi?ed information in this case by persons
subject to this ORDER or for clearances to a higher level of classi?cation, shall be made to the
Court Security Of?cer, who shall process the requested security clearances.

l. The security procedures contained in this ORDER shall apply to any civilian defense
counsel retained by the accused, and to any other persons who may later receive classi?ed
information from the government in connection with this case. The substitution, departure, or
removal from this case of defense counsel or any other cleared person associated with the
defense as an employee or witness or otherwise, shall not release that person from the provisions
of this ORDER or the MOU executed in connection with this ORDER.

m. In the event classi?ed information must be presented at trial, the following procedures
shall apply:

(1) The defense shall provide notice of intent to elicit classi?ed information at trial to the
government and the Court consistent with Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 505(h) and any
Case Management Order entered by the Court. All associated material and other documents of
any kind or description containing any of the information in the defense disclosure notice shall
be stored under conditions prescribed by the Court Security Of?cer.





(2) The notice under M.R.E. 505(h) shall contain a brief but speci?c written description of
any information known or believed to be classi?ed, which the defense reasonably expects to
disclose or cause to be disclosed in any pretrial motion, proceeding or at trial.

(3) The defense disclosure notice shall be ?led under seal with the Court Security Of?cer,
as more particularly set forth below in paragraph

n. Handling and Protection of Classi?ed Information.

(1) The Court Security Of?cer shall arrange for and maintain an appropriately approved
secure area for the use of classi?ed information and documents related to this case. He shall
make prompt arrangements for the storage of such material. The Court is informed that both
government and defense counsel have approved receptacles for storing classi?ed information.
The Court Security Of?cer shall verify this fact. If the Court Security Of?cer determines the
receptacles for the government or defense to be insuf?cient, the Court Security Of?cer shall
establish procedures to assure that proper storage is provided to the government or defense. The
Court Security Of?cer, in consultation with defense counsel, shall establish procedures to ensure
that the defense secure area may be maintained and operated in the most ef?cient manner
consistent with the protection of classi?ed information. The Court Security Of?cer shall not
reveal to the government the content of any conversations he may hear among the defense, nor
reveal the nature of the documents being reviewed or the work being generated. The presence of
the Court Security Of?cer shall not operate to render inapplicable the attorney-client privilege or
the attorney work product doctrine.

(2) All pleadings and other documents ?led by the government or defense shall be
handled under one of the following procedures:

(A) Classi?ed Infonnation: Any pleading or other document that contains any
classi?ed information or that a party believes may contain classi?ed information shall be ?led
under seal with the Court Security Of?cer. The parties shall ?le under seal both the original
pleading or document and two copies. Pleadings ?led under seal with the Court Security Of?cer
shall be marked, ?Filed Under Seal with the Court Security Of?cer.? The time of physical
submission to the Court Security Of?cer shall be considered the date and time of ?ling. The
Court Security Of?cer shall examine the pleading or document and, if necessary, in
consultation with representatives of the original classi?cation authorities, detennine whether the
pleading or document contains classi?ed information. If the Court Security Of?cer determines
that the pleading or document does not contain classi?ed information, he shall unseal the
submission, and alert the ?ling party to this fact. The ?ling party shall then submit the pleading
or document pursuant to local rules. If the Court Security Of?cer determines that the pleading or
document contains classi?ed information, he shall ensure that the portion of the document
containing classi?ed information is marked with the appropriate classi?cation marking and
remains under seal. All portions of all papers ?led that do not contain classi?ed information
shall be immediately unsealed by the Court Security Of?cer and ?led pursuant to local rules.
The original portion of the document containing classi?ed information will be held by the Court
Security Of?cer for insertion in the classi?ed portion of the record of trial. The Court Security



Of?cer shall immediately deliver copies of the entire ?led pleading or document to the Court and
opposing counsel in accordance with appropriate handling procedures.

(B) Procedural or Administrative Matters: Any pleading or document that is strictly
procedural or administrative in nature motions for extensions of time, continuances,
scheduling matters, etc.) can immediately be ?led by the parties pursuant to local rules without
the need for the Court Security Of?cer?s review.

(C) Unclassi?ed Matters: Any pleading or document that a party believes to be
unclassi?ed shall be electronically sent to the Court Security Of?cer for his review. The time of
electronic submission to the Court Security Of?cer shall be considered the date and time of
?ling. The Court Security Of?cer shall examine the pleading or document and, if
necessary, in consultation with representatives of the original classi?cation authorities, determine
whether the pleading or document contains classi?ed information. If the Court Security Of?cer
determines that the pleading or document does not contain classi?ed information, he shall alert
the ?ling party to this fact. The ?ling party shall then submit the pleading or document pursuant
to local rules. If the Court Security Of?cer determines that the pleading or document contains
classi?ed information, he shall follow appropriate procedures to correct the inadvertent spillage.
The Court Security Of?cer shall then ensure that the portion of the document containing
classi?ed information is marked with the appropriate classi?cation marking and is placed under
seal. All portions of all papers ?led that do not contain classi?ed information shall be
immediately returned to the ?ling party by the Court Security Of?cer, so that the party may ?le
the document pursuant to local rules. The original portion of the document containing classi?ed
information will be held by the Court Security Of?cer for insertion in the classi?ed portion of
the record of trial. The Court Security Of?cer shall immediately deliver copies of the entire ?led
pleading or document to the Court and opposing counsel in accordance with appropriate
handling procedures.

(3) The Court Security Of?cer shall maintain a separate sealed record for classi?ed
material and shall maintain an unclassi?ed index of such material. The Court Security Of?cer
shall be responsible for maintaining the secured records for purposes of later proceedings or
appeaL

(4) Classi?ed documents and information, or information believed to be classi?ed, shall
only be discussed in an area approved by the Court Security Of?cer, and in which persons not
authorized to possess such information cannot overhear such discussions.

(5) No one may discuss any of the classi?ed information over any standard commercial
telephone instrument or any inter-of?ce communication system, or in the presence of any person
who is not authorized to possess such information. Requests for secure telephones, fax
machines, or other secure communication devices must be submitted to the Court Security
Of?cer for coordination.

(6) All mechanical devices of any kind used in the preparation or transmission of
classi?ed information in this case may be used only with the approval of the Court Security
Of?cer and in accordance with instructions he shall issue.





(7) Upon reasonable advance notice to the Court Security Of?cer, defense counsel shall
be given access during normal business hours and at other times on reasonable request, to
classi?ed documents which the government is required to make available to defense counsel but
elects to keep in its possession. Persons permitted to inspect classi?ed documents by this
ORDER may make written notes of the documents and their contents. Notes of any classi?ed
portions of these documents, however, shall not be disseminated or disclosed in any manner or in
any form to any person not authorized to receive it subject to this ORDER. Such notes will be
secured in accordance with the terms of this ORDER. Persons permitted to have access to the
documents will be allowed to view their notes within an area designated by the Court Security
Of?cer. No person permitted to inspect classi?ed documents by this ORDER, including defense
counsel, shall copy or reproduce any part of said documents or their contents in any manner or
form, except as provided by the Court Security Of?cer, after he has consulted with the Court.

(8) The defense shall not disclose the contents of any classi?ed documents or information
to any person not previously approved by Court or the Court Security Of?cer without ?rst
obtaining the permission of Court Security Of?cer. Prior to obtaining approval, the Court
Security Of?cer shall verify (1) the intended recipient holds the required security clearance; (2)
that the intended recipient has signed the MOU in Appendix and (3) the intended recipient has
a need-to-know.

(9) Documents that do or might contain classi?ed information shall be transcribed,
recorded, typed, copied or otherwise prepared only by persons who have received an appropriate
approval for access to classi?ed information.

(10) If counsel for the government advises the defense that certain classi?ed information
or documents may not be disclosed to the accused, then defense counsel shall not disclose such
information or documents to the accused without prior concurrence of counsel for the
government or, absent such concurrence, approval of the Court. Counsel for the government
shall be given an opportunity to be heard in response to any defense request for disclosure to the
accused of classi?ed information.

(11) All classi?ed documents and infonnation to which any person is given access in this
case are now and will remain the property of the United States Government. At the conclusion
of this case, all classi?ed information provided by the government to the defense shall be
returned by the defense upon demand of the Court Security Of?cer. At the conclusion of trial,
any notes, summaries, or other documents prepared by the defense that do or might contain
classi?ed information shall be destroyed by the Court Security Of?cer in the presence of civilian
defense counsel or his designated military defense counsel, unless otherwise ordered by the
Court.

(12) As the identity of government intelligence employees or the nature of that employee?s
af?liation with this case may be classi?ed, and as certain security arrangements may be
necessary to protect classi?ed information that may be discussed, the defense may not contact
any employee of any government intelligence agency without making prior arrangements for
such contact with the Court Security Of?cer. The Court Security Of?cer shall ensure that all

0 0

necessary precautions are taken to protect classi?ed information during any such contact
between defense and a government intelligence employee. ?Govemment intelligence
employees? are employees from the following organizations: Army Counterintelligence; Central
Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National
Security Agency, Of?ce of the Director of National Intelligence, and Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive.

0. A copy of this ORDER shall issue forthwith to all counsel assigned this case and to
civilian defense counsel, with a further order that defense counsel advise the accused of the
contents of this ORDER and furnish him a copy.

p. Nothing contained in these procedures shall be construed as a waiver of any right of the

accused.

It is so ORDERED, this the day of February 2012.

DENISE R. LIND

COL, JA
Chief Judge, Judicial Circuit

19571

APPENDI^A
MEMORANDUM OFUNDERSTANDf^G

1. I ,
, understand thatlmay be the recipient ofinformation and
intelligence that concerns the United States and that belongs to the United States. This
information and intelligence is classified according to security standards set by the United States
Government. Ihave read, and understand the provisions of espionage laws(sections 793,794,
and 798 ofTitlel8,United States Code)conceming the disclosure ofinformation relating to the
national defense, andlam familiar with the penalties for the violation thereof Ihave also read
and understand the provisions ofArmy Regulation 380-5, concerning safeguarding,
disseminating, transmitting and transporting, storage and destruction, and loss or compromise of
classified information.
2. lagreethatlwill never divulge, publish or reveal,either by word, conduct or any other
means, such information or intelligence unless specifically authorized in writing to do so by an
authorized representative ofthe United States Government or as ordered by the Court or
Convening Authority.
3. lunderstand that this agreement will remain binding on me after the conclusion of
proceedings in United Statesv.PFC Bradley Manning.
4. Ihave received, read and understand the Protective Order entered by the Military Judge on
, in the case ofUnited Statesv.PFC Bradley Manning, andlagree to
comply with the provisions of said Protective Order.
5. lunderstand that noncompliance with this Order will be reported to my command, and, if
applicable, to my State Bar Association.

Signature

Date

19572

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES

PROTECTIVE ORDER
v. TO: COURT SECURITY

OFFICER
MANNING, Bradley E., PFC
U.S. Army, -
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, DATED:
Fort Myer, VA 2221

1. This Court has determined it necessary for the Court Security Of?cer to verify that
substantive matters submitted by the government and defense do not contain classi?ed
information, or if they do, to follow appropriate security measures in order to protect classi?ed
information.

2. The provisions of this ORDER are not intended to apply to strictly procedural motions of the
parties motions for extensions of time, continuances, scheduling matters, etc.).

3. Based upon the Protective Order of this Court, it is hereby ORDERED

a. The Court Security Of?cer shall review the contents of government and defense
submissions for the sole purpose of determining whether the submission and any attachments
contain classi?ed information.

b. The Court Security Officer is directed to limit his review to the extent necessary to
determine whether any submission and any attachment contains classi?ed information.

c. The Court Security Officer is directed not to divulge the contents of any ex parte
submission in this case to any individual, unless so ordered by the Court.

d. Upon completing his review, the Court Security Of?cer shall provide a written declaration
to the Court indicating whether a submission by counsel is classi?ed or unclassi?ed. If the Court
Security Officer determines that the pleading or document does not contain classi?ed
information, he shall unseal the submission, and alert the filing party to this fact. The filing party
shall then submit the pleading or document pursuant to local rules. If the Court Security Of?cer
determines that the pleading or document contains classi?ed information, he shall ensure that the
portion of the document containing classi?ed information is marked with the appropriate
classi?cation marking and remains under seal. All portions of all papers ?led that do not contain
classi?ed information shall be immediately unsealed by the Court Security Of?cer and filed
pursuant to local rules. The original portion of the document containing classi?ed information
will be held by the Court Security Of?cer for insertion in the classi?ed portion of the record of



trial. The Court Security Of?cer shall immediately deliver copies of the entire ?led pleading or
document to the Court and opposing counsel in accordance with appropriate handling
procedures.

e. The Court Security Of?cer shall comply with all requirements stated in the Court?s
Protective Order.

It is so ORDERED, this the day of February 2012.

DENISE R. LIND
COL, JA
Chief Judge, 1st Judicial Circuit

19574

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

)
)

V.

)

Manning, Bradley £.
PFC, US. Army,
HHC, U S. Army Gairison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)

Prosecution Motkm
for Protective Order
21 Febniaiy 2012

RELIEFSOUGHT
The United States in the above case requests the Court enter an appropriate protective
order to guard against the compromise of classified information by the accused, defense counsel,
and any individual detailed to the defense team.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proof on any factual issue the resolution of which is necessary to decide a
motion shall be by preponderance of the evidence. RCM 905(c)(1). The burden of persuasion
on any factual issue the resolution of which is necessary to decide a motion shall be on the
moving party. RCM 905(c)(2). Although the defense is the original moving party, the United
States is the appropriate moving party for a protective order for classified information. Military
Rule ofEvidence (MRE) 505(g)(1).
FACTS
The accused is charged with twenty-two specifications, which involve documentary and
physical evidence that contains classified information. Since 9 November 2011, the defense has
been in possession of more than 300,000 pages of classified documents and more than twenty
forensic images of digital media containing classified material. See Enclosure 1. Additionally,
on 8 November 2011 the prosecution gave a classified briefing to defense counsel and their
expert consultants, and another classified briefing on 18 November 2011, which included the
accused.
On 28 July 2010, Major General Terry A. Wolff, Commander, 1st Armored Division and
United States Division-Center, issued a protective order to protect classified information. S^
Enclosure 2. On 17 September 2010, Colonel Carl R. Cof&nan, Jr., Commander, Joint Base
Myer-Henderson Hall, issued a protective order to protect classified information. S^ Enclosure
3. The accused and all defense counsel acknowledged the second protective order by 25 March
2011. See Enclosure 4.
On 17 September 2010, Colonel Coflfinan appointed Mr. Charles Ganiel, U.S Army Test
and Evaluation Command, to the defense team, as an expert consultant in security matters. On
12 October 2010, Colonel Coffinan appointed Mr. Cassius N. Hall, U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command, to the defense team, as an additional expert consultant in security matta^.

19575

SeeEnc1osure5. Since their appointment, both security expert consultants have worl^edforthe
defense.
Between25 August 2010and3September 2010, thede^nsesubnnttedfourrequests to
have the RuleforCourt Martial (RCM) 706 board members authorized and cleared to discuss
classified information, up to the ^TopSecret^^ level with access to ^^SensitiveCompartmented
Information.^^ After his initial order dated17September2010and with the concurrenceofthe
defense, on 22 September 2010, Colonel Cof^an ordered both defense security expert
consultants to detemnnewhethertheaccused^s mental impressions werepotentially classified,
which would require defonse counsel, the RCM 706 board, and possibly defense experts to
possess security clearances at the higher level. See Enclosure 6. OnlONoyember2010,
Colonel Coflrnan issued supplemental guidance to the defense security expert consultants, which
authorized them limited useofthe Secret IntemetProtocolReouterNetworkand Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. Seeid. On13December 2010, both deforce
security expert consultants conclt^edtheirreview and detemuned the accused does retain
classified information above the secret level. Seeid.
On 12 October 2010, Colonel Coffinan issued an order directing the exact locations for
discussions and storageof classified information. SeeEnclosure7. Afterthe original order, he
issued two updates, dated 22 June 2011and10August2011respective1y. Id.
On 19September 2011,the prosecution delivered three standalone con^uters to the
Senior Military Defonse Counsel dedicated to the processing of classified information. These
con^uters were and have been in defense^s control and ^eely available fortheir use.
On 20 September 2011, the Senior Military Defonse Counsel requested courier cards for
members ofthe defonse team to authorise them to transport classified evidence betweenTrial
Defonse Servicesoffices within the Urnted States and previously approved by Colonel Cof8^:^
for storageof classified information. See Enclosure 8. On28 September 2011,Colonel
Coffinan approved this request, and each memberofthe military defonse team^s respective
security manager issued them courier cards. Id.
WITNESSES^VIDENCE
None.
LEOALAUTHORTTYANDAROUMENT
The United States respecthillyrequests the Court issueaprotectiveorderpursuant to
MRE 505(g)(1). At the request ofthe United States, the military judge ^shall enter an
appropriate protective orderto guard against the compromise ofthe information disclosed to the
accused.^^ MRE 505(g)(1). MRE 505(g)(1)forther outlines thefollowingprovisions that m^y be
included:
(A) Prohibiting the disclosure of the information except as
authorized by the military judged

19576

(B) Requiring storage of material inamanner appropriate for the
level ofclassification assigned to the documents to be disclosed^
(C) Requiringcontrolledaccessto thematerial during norn^
business hours and atothertimesuponreasonable noticed
(D) All persons requiring security clearances shall cooperate with
investigatory personnel in any investigatior^ which are necessary
to obtainasecurity clearances
(E) Requiring the maintenance of logs regardingaccessbyall
personsauthorizedby themilitary judge to have access to the
classifiedinformationinconnection with the preparation of the
defonse^
(F) Regulating the making and har^ling ofnotes taken l ^ m
material containing classified inforrr^tion^ or
(G)
Requesting the convening authority to authori:^e the
assignment ofgovemment security personnel and the provision of
government storage focilities.
The United States includes with its motionaproposed protective order, which balances
therequirement to protect classified information with the accused and defonse counsels^ need to
access classified information. SeeEnclosures9and10. In the enclosed proposed protective
order, the United States incorporated all the provisions above, except ^^(E)^^,because this
requirement seems to onerous at this time and not required. United States also combined the
previously issued protective order, the nomination ofMr. Jay Prather as your court security
of^cer, the appointment ofthedefense security expert consultants, the fact thedefonse is in
possession ofthree computers authorized to process classified information, and the convening
authority's multiple orders directing the exact locationsforstorageof classified information,
handling, and courieringofclassified information.
CONCLUSION
The United States requests the Court enter an appropriate protective orderto guard
against the compromiseof classified information bythe accused, defonse counsel, and any
individual detailed to the defonse team.

ASHDENFEIN
CPT,JA
Trial Counsel

19577

Icertifythatlserved or caused to be servedatruecopyofthe above on Mr. David
Coombs, Civilian Defonse Counsel and Ma^or Matthew I^emkes, Senior Military Deterge
Cour^e1,via electronic mail, on21 February 2012.

ASHDENFEIN
CPT,JA
Trial Counsel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



19578

Prosecution Motion
for Protective Order
Enclosure 1

21 February 2012

19579

From: in rm iIfn.m

T01 mu

Cc:
Agngr Q, L155 Matthew 1 MIL US LISA


Subject: [Suspected RE: US v. PFC BM (Discovery Meeting Location)

Date: Friday, November 04, 2011 6:04:54 PM

Importance: Low

Ashden,

Thank you for the update. I look forward to our meeting next week. Have a good weekend.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs

11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free: 1-800-588-4156

Local: (508) 689-4616

Fax: (508) 689-9282



Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain con?dential attomey-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: US v. PFC BM (Discovery Meeting Location)
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA

Date: Fri, November 04, 2011 6:01 pm










"Kemkes, Matthew MAJ MIL
ooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
"Boudiard, Paul CPT USA MIL

Cc: "Morrow JoDean, CPT USA

"0vergaard, Angel M. CPT USA
JFHQ-NC MDW "Ford, Arthur
D. W01 USA

David,

DISCOVERY

Today, we received final approval to tum?over the relevant classified
information contained in the forensic reports. CW2 Santiago signed for two

sets of disks, containing the forensic reports and specific native ?les
(BATES 00046074-00375129).

The production consists of the portions of the forensic reports the government
intends to use in its case. The associated native files are non?word





processed files, such as audio/visual files and spreadsheets, and each has an
associated placeholder document with a single BATES stamp.

If you have any questions, please let us know.
MEITING LOCATION

On Monday, I will send out the exact location of our meeting. We are trying

to reserve a different conference room at Fort McNair and will know by Monday.

Please plan on starting by 0900.
Thank you and have a good weekend.

v/
Ashden

19580



REPLY TO
ATTE NTION OF



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
u.s. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
21 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR. Dc 20319-5013

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. David Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel

SUBJECT: Contents of Forensic Cube - United States v. PFC Bradley Manning

19581

9 December 201 1

1. On 9 December 2011, the prosecution returned to you the electronic storage device (?cube?) which
contains forensic images of the following pieces of evidence:

Voucher 072-10, Item #1
Voucher 152-10, Item #1
Voucher 153-10, Item #1
Voucher 154-10, Item #1
Voucher 162-10, Item #02
Voucher 165-10, Item #1
Voucher 172-10, Item #1
Voucher 184-10
Voucher__009-11, Item #1
Voucher_020-1 1, Item #1
Voucher_051?1 1, Item #1
Voucher_053-l 1, Item #1
Voucher_060-11, Item #1
Voucher_067-10
Voucher_073-10, Item #1
Voucher?073- 10, Item #2

Voucher_078?10, Item #1
Voucher_099-1 1

Voucher_119-10, Item #1
Voucher_l22-10, Item #1
Voucher_123-10, Item #1
Voucher_124-10, Item #1
Voucher_l32-10, Item #1
1

Voucher_147?10, Item #2
Voucher_147-10, Item #3
Voucher__149-1 1

Voucher_153-10, Item #1
Voucher__161-10, Item #1
Voucher_164-10, Item #1
Voucher_179-1 1

2. Pursuant to the order, dated 6 December 2011, the forensic duplicates of the portions of Mr.
Lamo?s HDDs that are permissible to search and were used as part of the law enforcement investigation
(Vouchers 076-10 and 077-10) are also included on the cube.

3. If after the forensic review, you determine additional forensic evidence is needed, you are invited to

request the information.

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, IA
Trial Counsel



19582

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Motion
V.

for Protective Order
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 2
21 February 2012

19583

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION AND
UNITED STATES DIVISION-CENTER
CAMP LIBERTY, IRAQ
APO AE 03344
REPLY TO

^« JUL

arreNTiON Of;

AETV-THZ
MHMORAXNDUM

FOR SKM)IS rRlBanON

SCBJHCT Protective Order
I. in order U) protect the national security and pursuani to the authcriiy granted under Military
Ruic of Fvidcnce (MRE) 505. relevant exet uiive orders of ih^ President of the United States, and
regulations of the Department ofthe Army; I ORDER:
a. The following security procedures, MRE 505. and the authorities referred to above will
apj>iy to all matters concerning the investigation into alleged offenses, pre-trial negotiations, and
Article 32. Uniibrm Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), pre-trial investigation in this ca.se.
h. M used herein, the lenn "elassificd infonnation or document'' refers to:
(I) any classified document (or information containec tlierein);
(21 snfomiatjon known by the accused or defense counsel to be classirlabic:
(3) classified document (or information contained therein) disclosed to the accused or
defense counsel as pan ofthe proceedings in this ease;
(4) classified documents and information which have otherwise been made known to the
accused or defense counsel and which ha\ e been marked or described as: 'CONFIDENTIAL."
-SECRFT.' or"!OP SECRET."
c. All such classified documents and information contained therein shall remain classified
unless they bear a clear indication tliat they have been officially declassified by the Government
agency or department that originated the document or the information contained therein
{hereinafter referred to as the "originating agency").
d. The words "documents'' or "associated materials" as used in this Order include, hut arc
not limited to. all written or printed matter of any kind, formai or informal, including the
originals and all non-identical copies, whether dilVereni from the original by reason of any
notation made on such copies or otherwise, including, without limitation, papers,
currespondcnce. memoranda, notes, letters, telegrams. repotiA. summaries. Inter-ctTice and intraoOlce commimicaiions. notations of any sort huiknins. teletypes, telex, invoices, worksheets, and
all drafts, alterations, modiliearion.s, changes and amendment ol any kiitd to the foregoing,
graphic or aural record* or representations of any kind, including. witJtout limitation,
photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, video tapes, sound recordings of any kind.

19584

A£l V-TH/
SUBJECT: Protective Order
motion pictures, any electronic; mechanical or electric records or reprcbentatioas of any kind,
including without limitation, tapes, casseues, discs, recording, films, typewriter ribbons and
word processor discs or tapes.
e. The word "or" should be interpreted as including "and"" and vice versa.
f Those named herem are advised that direct or indirect ucauihohzcd disclosure, retention,
or negligent handling of classified information could cause serious and, in some cases,
cxccptionall) grave damage to the national security ofthe Urited States, or may be used to the
advantage of a foreign nation against the inicresis of the United States, fhese Security
Procedures are to ensure that persons subject to these Procedures will never divulge the classified
information disclosed to them to anyone who is not authorized by the oiiginating agency and in
eonfonnity with these proi edurc^.
g Persons subject to these Procedures are admonished that they are obligated by law and
regulation not to disclose any classified national security infomiation in ao unauthorized t'ashion.
h. Persons subject to these Procedures are admonished that any breach of these
Procedures may result in the termination of their access to classified infonnation. In addition,
they are admonished that any unauthonzed disclosure, possession or handling of classilied
infonnation may constitute siolations of L'nitcd Stales criminal laws, including but not limited
to. the provisions of Sections 641. 793. 794, 798 and 952. Title 18. L'nitcd States Code, and
Sections 421 and 7S3(b), Title 50, United States Code. In addition, for those persons who are
att orneys, a report will be filed with their State Bar Association.
2, Infonnation in the public domain is ordinarily not classified. However, if cla^siliec
information is reported in the press or otherwise enters the public domain, the information does
not lose Its classified status merely because it is in the public domain. Any attempt by the
defense to have classified information that has been reported in the public domain but which it
knows or has reason to belie\e is classilied. confirmed, or denied at trial or in any public
proceeding m this case sitali be go\emed by Section 3 ofthe Classilied Infonnation Procedures
Act. IX U.S. Code Appendix 111.
3. Personnel Security Investigations and Clearances. This case will involve classified national
securiiy information or documents, ihe storage, handling, and control of which requires special
security precautions nnandated by statute, e.\.ecutive orders, and regulations, and access to which
requires a special sceuruy clearance.
a. I he Cnnvcnmg .Authority has been advised that the Investigating Officer has the requisite
security clearance to have access to the classified inibmiation and documents which will be at
issue in th.s case Tfie Investigating Otllccr is to have unfettered access to that classified
infonnation necessarx' to prepare for this investigation, subject to requirement in paragraph 3.g.
below
b. The Convening .Authority has been advised that the govenuncnt trial counsel working on
this case have the requisite securii) clearances to have access to the classified information and

19585

AFTV-ni7
SI BJRCT: Protective Order
documents which will be at issue in this case. The government trial counsel are to have
unfettered access to classified infonnation necessary to prepare for this inv estigation, subject to
the requirements in paragraph 3.g. belOw,
c. The (Convening .Authority ITJS been adv ised that Private First Class (PFC) Brad.ey
VLinning's detailed defense counsel have tlie requisite security clearance to have access to the
rele\ant and necessary classified information and documents which will be at issue in this case.
As a condition of receiving classified infomiation. the detailed defense counsel agree to the
conuitions specified herein this order.
d -As a condition of receiving classified inlortnation. any retained defense counsel will
agree to the conditions specified herein and execute all nece^ary forms so that the Government
may complete the necessary personnel security background investigation to make a
determination whether defense counsel is eligible for a limited access authorization. Any
retained defense counsel will also sign the statement in paragraph 3 e I pon the execution and
filing ofthe statements set forth in paragraphs 3.e and 3,f by any retained dei'ense counsel
requiring access to classified information, the Government shall undertake, as expeditiously a$
possible, the required inquiries to ascertain defense counsel's eligibility for acces:- to classified
infoimatinn.
e. I "here are two conditions precedent to obtaining access to the classified information at
issue in tliis case.
(1 j All individuals, other than die Investigating Officer, Government and
detailed defense counsels and personnel ofthe originatmg agency, can obtain access only after
ha', ing provided the necessary infonnation required for, and having: been granted, a security
clearance or Limited .Access ,Authorization by the Department of the .Army or Department of
State, through the Investigation Security Officer; and
(2) Each person, other than the Department of Anny employees named herein and
personnel ofthe originating agency, before being granted access to classified information must
idsu sign a sworn statement thai states:
ifEMOR.4NDL'Xf Oh UMDKRSTASDJNC,
I
/
umiersiancJ ihti I may he the recipient of mtorniaiion
umi i7j/e///jq:ence lhat concerns the ,vecwr/n ol ihe UniwU Siuivs andlhul belongs la the
Vniiei/ Slates This informattm and intelligence, loociher with ilie methods tyf
cnlteciinii and handling it. are cias.$i/led according to seciirily standards csluhhshed
h} tile U S Govermteni I lutve read and understand tlie proxisiotis nfiiie espionage
lav,'s (sections ~9x ^94 and ^98 of title !,S, I 'niied Suies Codej concerning the
disclosure of in/nrmution reletting to ihu nalinnal defense and the provimtis of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act (section -12! of title 5ft United States Codei and
I utu Uwiiliar with the penalties provided for the violatttm thereof.

19586

.A£lV-Ili/
SL'BJEC I • Protective Order

J.
/ agt ee thai I will nevtr divulge, publish or reveal, either hi' word, conduct, or
any other mean.^. such information or intelligence unless specifically authorized in
writing 10 do so by an authorised representative ofthe I'.S. Cmwrnmem or as
otherwise ordered hy the Court. I further agree to submit for prepuhlication review
any article, speech, or other publication derived from ar base upon experience or
informaiion gained in the coune of CttitedSlaies v. Private First i 'lass Bradlev E
MmwiSg / understand this review is solely to ensure that no classified national
security information is contained therein
/ tinder.sland that this agreeinitnt w ill remain hincting upon trie after the
i.
conclusion ofthe proceedings in thcca.se of L'niteJ Sluies v. Private First C/«.v.v
Bradlev E. \4anning
4. J ha\%' received, read and understand the Security Procedures enivrvd 6* th(.'
Convening .Authority on
. 2010 in the case of United States v.
Private First Class Bradlev E. Manning relating to ctussifted information, and 1
agree to comply with the provisions thereof.

StgnufureDate
Any MOU with a retained defense counsel shall include a statement expressing his
understanding ihat the failure to abide b) the terms of these Security Procedures will resuh in a
report to his State Bar Association. Each such person executing the above statement must file an
original with the Investigating Officer and provide an onginal each to the Investigation Security
Officer and the Government Counsel.
t. in addition to signing the XIOl I in paragraph 3.e. any person who, as a result ofthis
investigation, gains access to infonnation contained in any Department ofthe .Army Special
.Access Program, as that term is defined in section 4.2 of Executive Order 12356. to Sensitive
Compartmented Infomiation (SCI), or to any information subject to Special Category (SPhC.AT)
handling procedures, shall sign any non-disclosure agreement which is specific to that Special
.Access Progra-'n. Sensitive Compartmented infonnation. orSPEC.AT infonnation.
g All odner requests for clearances for access to classified information in iliis case by
persons not named in these Procedures, or requests for clearances for access to informauon at a
higher level of classification, shall be made to the Investigation Security Officer, who, upon
approval (^f the Convenmg Authority , shall promptly process the requests.
h. Before any person subject to these Security Procedures, other than govemmcni
tnal counsel, detailed defense counsel, and personnel ofthe originating agency who have
appropriate level security clearances, receives access to any classified infonnation. tliat person
shall be served with a copy of these Procedures and shall execute the written agreement set forth
in paragraph 3,c.

19587

Al^JA^TI^^
SUl^J^CU ProtectiveOrder
fhe Procedures shall apply ^o any del^nseeounselofth^ accused, and to any other
persons who may later receiveclassifiedinlormation from the Department of the.Arm^^^r
Department ofState in connection w^th this case.
^

handling and ProtectionofClassified Information,

a. All counsel shall seek guidance from the Investigation Seet^rityt^fficer with regard to
appropriate storage and use of classified information.
b. The InvestigationSecurity Officer will provide appropriate physical security pr^^tection
for any materials prepared or compiled by the defense, or by any person in relation to t^te
The materials and
preparation of the aecused^sdelense or submission under I^^RT
doct^mcnts^detinedaboveJrequiringphysicalsecurityincludevvTtliout limitation, any notes,
carbon papers, letters, photographs, drafts discarded drafts, memorat^. typewriter ribhons.
magnetic recording, or other documents or any kind or description. Classified materials prepared
by the defense shall be maintained by the Investigation SecurityOffieerinaseparate scaled
container ^ow^hich only thedefensecounselshall have access.
c Classified documents and information, orinformation believed to be classified shall be
discussed only in an ar^a approved by the Investigation Security Officer, and in which persons
not authori^ed to possess such information cannot overhear such discussions.
d. ^ootte shall discuss any classified infonnation over any standard commercial telephone
instrument or any iiner.ol^^c^ communication system,or in the preseneeofany person v^ho is n^
authorised to possess such information
e ^riiten materials prepared l^ir this case by the accused or defense counsel shalUne
transcribed, recorded, ty^ed, duplicated, copied or otherwise prepared only by persons who are
cleared for access to such it^fi:^rmatiDn.
f. All mechanical devicesofany kind used in the preparation or transmission of cla^sif^ed
int^mtation in this case may be used only with the approval ofthe h^vestigation Security Otficet
and in accordancewith instructions he or she shall issue
^, Upon reasonable advance notice ofthe Investigation ^eeuriry Officer, defence c^^unsel
shall be given access during normal business hours, and at other times on reasonabler^quest, to
classified national security documents which the goven^ment is required to make available to
defense counsel but elects to keep in its possession Persons permitted to inspect classified
documents by r.^cse Procedures may make written notesof the documents and their contents.
l^otesofa::iy classified portions ofthese documents, however shall not be disseminated or
disclosed in any manner or fi^nn to any person not subject to these Procedures. Suchnoteswtll
be secured in accordance with the terms ofthese Procedures Persons permitted to have access to
classified documents will be allowed loview their notes withi^^ an area designated by the
Investigation Security Officer, ^o person permitted to inspect classified d^^uments by these
Prccedures.nictuding defense cotinsel,shall copy or reproduce any part ofsaid documents or

19588

^^T^.TllB
SUf^.lf^C^: ProtectiveOrder
their contentsmany maimer or lorni. except as provided by the Investigation Security Otficer.
atfer he or she has consulted with tlie Convening Authority.
h without prior authorisation of the Depaitmcnt of the,Army or Department ofState. there
shall be no disclosure to anyone not named in these Piocedtires by persons who may iater receive
asecurity elearance or limited access authorisation from the Department ofthe Anny or
f^partmentofState in connection with this casefexcept to or from govemn^ent employees
acting in the course oftheir official duties^ ofany classified national security infi:^imation or
national securitydocument^orinfbrniationcontairiedtherein^untilsi^ch time, ilever.that such
documents or iitformation are declassified,
i, ^he defense ^all not disclose the contents of any classified documents or inlortnation to
any person except those persons identified to them by the Investigating O^^cer as having the
appropriate clearances, andaneed to know.
All persons given access to classified information pttrsuantto these Procedures are
advised thatallinfortttation to which they obtain access by these Procedures is now andwill
foicvcrreniain the property ofthe United States Government They shallretum all maferiais
which may have come into theirpossession.orforwhich they are responsible becttusei^f such
access, upon demand by the Investigation Security Officer
k .Acopy ofthese Procedures .shall issue forthwith to defense counsel, wi^ further order
that the defense lounsel advise theaccused named herein ofthe contentsofthes^ Procedures,
and furnish htmacopy The accused through defense counsel, shall fdrthwTtJi sign the
statements set forth in paragraph3fof these Procedures, and counsel shall forthwithfilean
original with the Investigating Officer and provide an orign:iai each to the Investigaiion Security
Officer and the GoverninentCounsel. The signing and fllingofthis statement by the accused is
acondition precedent to tft^ disclosure ofclassifled infonnation to the accused
^ nothing contained in these Procedures shall be e^nstrtiedasv^aiver of any ri^ht of the
accused.

TERRT A. WOLFF
Major General, USA
Commanding
Dl.SrR!BUTlO\:
Investigating Officer
Trial Counsel
Defense Counsel

19589

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Motion
V.

for Protective Order
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 3
21 February 2012

19590

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE
FORT MYER, VIRGINIA 22211-1199
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

IMND-MHH-ZA

17 September 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Protective Order for Classified Infomiation - United States v. PFC Bradley Manning

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Protective Order is to prevent the unauthorized disclosiu e
or dissemination of classified national security information in the subject named case. Tliis
Protective Order covers all infomiation and documents previously available to the accused in the
course of his employment with the United States Government or which have been, or will be,
reviewed or made available to the accused, defense counsel, and otlier recipients of classified
infomiation in tliis case.
2. APPLICABILITY. "Persons subject to tliis Protective Order" include the following:
a. the Accused;
b. Military and Civilian Defense Counsel and Detailed Militaiy Paralegals;
c. Members ofthe Defense Team lAW M.R.E. 502 and U,S, v, Toledo. 25 M.J. 270
(C.M.A. 1987);
d. Security Officers;
e. Members of the Rule for Couits-Mai-tial 706 Inquiry Board; and
f. Behavioral Mealth Providers for tlie Accused.
3. ORDER. In order to protect the national security and pursuant to the authority granted under
Militai-y Rule ofEvidence (MRE) 505, relevant executive orders of tlie President of the United
States, and regulations of the Depaitiiients of Defense and of the Aniiy, it is hereby ORDERED:
a. The procedures set forth in this Protective Order and the authorities refened to above will
apply to the Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 706 inquiry, Article 32 investigation, pretrial, fial,
post-trial, and appellate matters concerning this case.
b. The temi "classified information" refers to:
(I)

any classified document (or infomiation contained therein);

19591

IMND-MHH-ZA
SUBJECT: Protective Order for Classified Infomiation - United States v. PFC Bradlev Manning
(2)
information known or that reasonably should be known by persons subject to tliis
Protective Order to be classifiable. If persons subject to this Protective Order are uncertain as to
whetlier the infomiation is classified, they must coiifmii whether the infomiation is classified;
(3)
classified documents (or information contained therein) disclosed to persons
subject to this Protective Order as pait of the proceedings in tliis case;
(4)
classified documents and infomiation which have otlierwise been made known to
persons subject to this Protective Order and which have been maiked or described as:
"CONFIDENTIAL", "SECRET", or "TOP SECRET".
c. All such classified documents and infonnation contained therein shall remain classified
unless such classified infomiation bear clear indication they have been declassified by tlie
government agency or department tliat originated the document or information contained tlierein
(hereinafter refened to as "original classification authority"),
d. The words "documents" or "associated materials" as used in tliis Protective Order
include, but are not limited to, all written or printed matter of any kind, foniial or iiifonnal,
including the originals and all non-identical copies, whether different from the original by reason
of any notation made on such copies or otherwise, including, witliout limitation, papers,
con'espondeiice, memoranda, notes, letters, telegrams, reports, summaiies, inter-office and iiitiaoffice communications, notations of any sort, bulletins, teletypes, telefax, invoices, worksheets,
and all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes, and amendment of any kind to tlie foregoing,
graphic or aural records or representations of any kind, including, without limitation,
photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, video tapes, sound recordings of any kind,
motion pictures, any electi onic, mechanical or electric records or representations of any kind,
including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, CDs, DVDs, thunibdrives, hai'd drives, otiier
recordings, films, typewriter ribbons and word processor discs or tapes.
e. The word "or" should be interpreted as including "and", and vice versa; "he" should be
interpreted as including "she", and vice versa.
f. Persons subject to this Protective Order ai'e advised that direct or indirect unauthorized
disclosure, retention, or negligent handling of classified infonnation could cause serious and, in
some cases, exceptionally grave damage to the national security of tlie United States, or may be
used to the advantage of a foreign nation against the interests of tlie United States. Tliese
security procedures are designed to ensure that persons subject to this Protective Order will never
divulge the classified infomiation disclosed to them to anyone who is not autliorized to receive it,
witliout prior written authorization from the original classification authority and in confonnity
with these procedures,
g. Persons subject to this Protective Order aie admonished that they are obligated by law
and regulation not to disclose any classified infomiation in an unauthorized fashion.

2

19592

IMND-MHH-ZA
SUBJECT: Protective Order for Classified Infomiation - United States v. PFC Bradlev Manning
h. Persons subject to tliis Protective Order are admonished tliat any breach of die security
procedures in this Protective Order may result in the temiination of their access to classified
information. In addition, they ai'e admonished that any unauthorized disclosure, possession, or
handling of classified infonnation may constitute violations ofUnited States criminal laws,
including but not limited to, the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18,
United States Code, and Sections 421 and 783(b), Title 50, United States Code. In addition, for
tliose persons who are attonieys, a report will be filed with their State Bar Association.
4. Prior to any RCM 706 inquiry. Article 32 investigation, or court-martial proceeding, a
security officer will be appointed in writing and sei-ved with a copy of this protective order.
5. Personnel Security Investigations and Cleaiaiices
a. The storage, handling, and control of classified infonnation requires special security
precautions mandated by statute, executive orders, and regulations, and access to which require a
security cleaiance.
b. Once a person subject to this Protective Order obtains a security cleaiance and executes a
non-disclosure agreement (SF 312), tliat person is eligible for access to classified infonnation,
subject to tlie convening authority's disclosure determination.
c. As a condition of receiving classified infomiation, any retained civilian defense counsel
will agree to the conditions specified herein and execute all necessaiy forms so that tlie
Department of the Amiy may complete the necessaiy persomiel security investigation to make a
deteniiination whether to grant access. Any retained civilian defense counsel will also sign tlie
Acknowledgment of Protective Order (liereinafter "Acknowledgment"). Any retained civilian
defense counsel shall also sign a standard form nondisclosure agreement (SF 312) as a condition
of access to classified information.
d. In addition to the Acknowledgment, any person who as a result of this case gains
access to infomiation contained in any Department of tlie Anny Special Access Program,
as that teiiii is defuied in Executive Order 13526 [or for events occuning before 27 June
2010, E.O. 12958], or to Sensitive Compartmented Infonnation (SCI), shall sign any
nondisclosure agieeinent which is specific to that Special Access Program or to that
Sensitive Compartmented Infomiation.
e. All other requests for clearances for access to classified infonnation in this case for
persons not named in this Protective Order or for clearances to a higher level of classification,
shall be made tlirough the trial counsel to the convening authority.
f. The security procedures contained in this Protective Order shall apply to any civilian
defense coimsel retained by the accused, and to any other persons who may later receive
classified infomiation fiom the U.S. Department of the Anny in connection with tliis case.
6. Handling and Protection of Classified Infonnation

19593

IMl^D-MIIII-ZA
SflBJECT: ProtectiveOrderforClassifiedltifomiation^UnitedStatesvPFC Bradley Manning

a. All persons sul^ect to this Protective Order shall seek guidance from their respective
security officers with regard to the appropriate storage and use of classified iiifbmiation,
b. Tlie defense security officer will ensure appropriate physical security protection for any
materials prepared or compiled by the defense, or by any person in relation to tlie preparation of
the accused'sdefetise or submission under MRE 505, Tlie materials and documents(defined
above)requiring physical security iiiclude,witIiout limitation, any notes,carbon papers, letters,
photographs, drafts, discarded drafts, memoranda, typewriter ribbons, computer diskette,
CD^DVDs, magnetic recording, digital recordings, or otIierdocLiments or any kind or
description,
c. Classified hifbmiation, or infonnation believed to be classified, shall only be discussed hi
an area approved byasecurity officer, and in which persons not autliorized to possess such
information cannot overhear such discussions,
d. No one shall discuss any classified infomiation overastandard commercial telephone
instrument, an inter-office communication system, or in the presence of any person who is not
authorized to possess SLich infonnation,
e. written materials prepared for this case by persons subject to tliis Protective Order shall
be transcribed, recorded, typed, duplicated, copied, or otlierwise prepared only by persons who
have received access to classified infomiation pursuant to tlie secLirity procedures contained in
tliis Protective Order,
f All mechanical devices, ofany kind, used in the preparation or transmission of classified
infonnation infills case may be used only with the approval ofasecurity officer,
g. Upon reasonable advance notice to the trial counsel orasecurity officer, defense counsel
shall be given access during tiomialbLisitiess hours and at other times on reasonable request, to
classified documents which the goveniinent is required to make available to defense counsel but
elects to keep in its possession. Persons peniiitted to inspect classified documents by tliis
Protective Order may make written notes ofthe documents and tlieir contents. Notes of any
classifiedportions ofthese documents, however, shall not be disseminated or disclosed hi any
manner or form to any person not subject to tins Protective Order, Such notes will be secured in
accordance with the terms ofthis Protective Order, Persons permitted to have access to
classified documents will be allowed to view tlieir notes witliin an area designated byasecLirity
officer. No person peniiitfed to inspect classified documents by tliis Protective Order, including
defense counsel, shall copy or reproduce any part of said documents or their contents in any
manner or form, except as provided byasecurity officer, after he has consulted witli file trial
counsel.
Ii. The persons subject to this Protective Order shall not disclose tlie contents of any
classified documents or infomiation to any person nottiamedherehi, except tlie trial counsel and
military judge.

19594

IMNDMHHZA
SUBJECT: PiotectiveOiderforClassifiedlnfoniiation^Uiiited Statesv.PFC Bradley Manning
i. All persons given access to classified information puisLiant to this Protective Order are
advised tliat all iiif:^miation to which they obtain access by the Protective Order is now and will
forever remain the propet^y ofthe United States Goveniineiit. They shall return all materials
which may have come into their possession, or for which they ai et espotisible because of such
access,upon demand byasecurity officer.
j . All persons subject to this Protective Order shall sign the Acl^iowledgmetit,tticludtng the
defense counsel and accused. The signing and filing ofthis Acknowledgment isacotidttion
piecedetit to the disclosuteofaiiy classified infonnation to any person subject to tilts Protective
Order
7. Tliis Protective Order supersedes all previous protective orders. Nothing contained in this
Protective Older shall be constnied asawaiver of any light ofthe accused.

CARLRCOFFMAN^JR
COL,AV
Coiinnandiiig
DISTRIBUTION:
I-Trial Counsel
1-CiviIian Defense Counsel
I-Senior Military Defense Counsel
1-Accused
1-Defeiise Experts
1-R C M 706 Inquiry Boaid

19595

UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Motion
V.

for Protective Order
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 4
21 February 2012

19596

I^^^ORA^OU^PORConveningAuthority
:^^^8^^t^^ Ackno^l^^^m^ntof^rotective Order for Classifiedfnformation^UnitedStatesvPPC
Bradley l^annini^
1 I, ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ understand thatlmay be the recipient ofinformation and
intelligence that concerns the present and future security of the United States and that belongs to the
United States. This information and intelligence, togetherwith the methods ofcollecting and handling it,
ar^ classified according to security standards set by theU.S.Govemment. Ihave read and understand the
provisions of the espionage laws(I^U.SC^^ 7^3,7^4,and 7^^) concemingthedisclosureof
information relating to the national defense and the provisionsofthe Intelligence Identities Protection Act
(^^U.S.C^421)andlam familiar with the penalties for the violation thereof Ihave also read and
understand the provisions ofArmyRegulation3^^-^,concerningsafeguarding, disseminating,
transmitting and transporting, storage and destructions and loss or compromise of classified information,
lunderstand these provisions of the law and Army Regulation are available at the I^ilitary Justice
Section, Office of the StaffJudge Advocated U.S.Army lyfilitaryOistrictof^ashington, Port f^esleyJ
l^c^air,OC,2t^3l^
2. lunderstand that the unauthorised disclosure, unauthorised retention, and negligent handling of
classified infomiation bymecouldcausedamageorineparableinjurytotheUnitedStatesorcouldbe
used to advantage byaforeign nation or enemy ofthe United States. Ihereby agree thatlwill never
divulge classified information to anyone unless:(a)lhaveofliciallyverified that therecipienthas been
properly authori:^ed by the United States Government to receive classified information; (b)lhave been
given prior written notice of the authori^tion of the United states Government Department or Agency
responsible for the classification of the information or last granting measecurity clearance that such
disclosure is permitted; or(c)asorderedby the ConveningAuthority. lunderstand that iflam uncertain
about theclassi^cationstatusofinformation,lam required to confirm from an authorised official thatthe
information is unclassified beforelmay disclose the information, except as provided in(a),(b),or(c)
abov^. Ifurther understand thatlam obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the
unauthorised disclosure of classified information, lunderstand that any breach ofthis agreement may
result inthetermination of any access to classified information Irecogni^e that this agreement including
its provision for the termination of accessto classified information doesnotconstituteawaiver of the
United States right to prosecute me for any statutory violation
3 lunderstand thatlwill remain boundto this agreement aftertheconclusion of riroceedin^s in United
StatesvPl^C Bradley Ivfanning.
^. ^read and understand th^ ProtectiveOrder by the Convening Authority, dated 17September 2010,^
the ease ofUnited states v. PPC bradlev banning, relating toclassified information, andlagree to
comply with the provisions thereof
^. lunderstand that iflamalavvyer,noncompliance with this Protectiv^^^d^r^ll be reported to any
State 8arwherelam admitted to practice law
^ ^
DAT^

^

^

^
SIG^^^R^

witnessed, sworn and subscribedto before me this^^day of H ^ ^ ^

,^|^ .

^ ^ 1 ^
DAT^

SlGl^ATUI
^^^^^^

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^^I^^^^^IB^^^

19597

MEMORANDUM FOR Convening Authority
SUB.IECT: Acknewledgment of Protective Order for Classified Infonnation - United States v. PFC
Bradley Manning
1. i , r ^ , ^ j , j i
Co^'^Lk
understand that I may be the recipient of infonnation and
intelligence that concerns the present and future security ofthe United States and that belongs to the
United States, This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it.
are classified according to security standards set by the U.S. Government. I have read and understand the
provisions of the espionage laws (18 U.S.C, §§ 793. 794. and 798) concerning the disclosure of
infonnation relating to the national defense and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act
(50 U.S. C. § 421) and 1 am familiar with the penalties for the violation thereof I have also read and
understand the provisions of Anny Regulation 380-5, conceining safeguarding, disseminating,
transmitting and transporting, storage and destruction, and loss or compromise of classified infonnation.
I understand these provisions of the law and Army Regulation are available at the Military Justice
Section. Office of the StaffJudge Advocate. U.S. Army Military District of Washington, Fort Uesley J.
McNair. DC.30319.
2. I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, and negligent handling of
classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be
used to advantage by a foreign nation or enemy of the United States. I hereby agree that I will never
divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified that the recipient has been
properly authorized by the United States Government to receiveclassified information; (b) I have been
given prior written notice of the authorization of the United States Government Department ©r Agency
responsible for the classification of the information or last granting me a security clearance that such
disclosure is permitted; or (c) as ordered by the Convening Authority. I understand that if I am uncertain
about the classification status of infomiation, 1 am required to confirm from an authorized official that the
information is unclassified before I may disclose the infbrmation. except as provided in (a), (b), or (c)
above. I further understand that 1 am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. I understand that any breach of this agreement may
result in the termination of any access to classified infonnation. I recognize that this agreement including
its provision for the lennination of access to classilied infomiation does not constitute a waiver of the
United States'rightto prosecute me for any statutory violation.
3. I understand that I will remain bound to this agreement after the conclusion of proceedings in United

States V- PFC Bradlev Manning.
4. 1 read and understand the Protective Order by the Convening Authority, dated 17 September 2010, in
the case of United States v. PFC Bradley Manning, relating to classified infonnation, and I agree to
comply with the provisions thereof
5. I understand that if I am a lawyer, noncompliance with this Protective Order will be reported to any
State Bar where I am admitted to practice law.
y

9 rVJ.' 3olo
DATE

,
SIGNATURE

_ yf\
Witnessed, sworn and subscribed to before me this j j day of ^ / j j
//////f)
DATE

£jjL^Li*i^^tJ^

19598

MEMORANDUM FOR Convening Authority
SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of ProtectivB Order for Classified Information - United States v. PFC
Rrmllev M^^y^^g

1. 1, ^_|PT^ iRtuI ^oucXeirJl , understand that I may be the recipient of information and
intelligence that concerns the present and future security of the United States and that belongs to the
United States, This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it,
are classified according to securi^ standards set by the U.S. Oovemment. I have read and understand the
provisions of the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, and 798) concerning the disclosure of
information relating to the national defense and the provisions ofthe Intelligence Identities Protection Act
(SO U.S. C. § 421) and I am familiar with the penalties for the violation thereof I have also read and
understand the provisions of Army Regulation 380-5, concerning safeguarding, disseminating,
transmitting and transporting, storage and destruction, and loss or compromise of classified information.
I understand these provisions of the law and Army Regulation are available at the Military Justice
Section. Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S, Army Military District of Washington, Fort Lesley J.
McNair, DC, 20319,
2. I understand tfiat the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, and negligent handling of
classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be
used to advantage by a foreign nadon or enemy of the United States. I hereby agree that I will never
divulge classified infonnation to anyone unless: (a) 1 have officially verified diat the recipient has been
properly authori%d by the United States Government to receive classified infonnation; (b) I have been
given prior written notice of the authorization of the United States Government Department or Agency
responsible for the classification ofthe information or last granting me a security clearance that such
disclosure is permitted; or (c) as ordered by the Convening Authority. I imderstand that if 1 am uncertain
about the classification status ofinformation, I am required to confiim from an authorized official that the
information is unclassified before I may disclose the infonnation, except as provided in (a), (b), or (c)
above. 1 ftirther imderstand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information, I understand that any breach of this agreement may
result in the tennination of any access to classified information. I recognize that this agreement including
its provision for the termination of access to classified information does not constitute a waiver of the
United States'rightto prosecute me for any statutory violation.
3. I understand that I will remain bound to this agreement after the conclusion of proceedings in United
States V. PFC Bradlev Manning.
4. I read and understand the Protective Order by the Convening Authority, dated 17 September 2010, in
the case ofUnited States v. Ppr ^rarflfy Mapning. relating to classified information, and I agree to
comply with the provisions thereof.
5. I understand that if I am a lawyer, noncompliance with tbis^Bratpctive Order will be reported to any
State Bar where I am admitted to practice law.

^

/VcfU DO/D

DATE

'SIGNATURE
^

.

^

Witnessed,swomandsubscribedtobefbremethis^ day of
^

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B

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DATE

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SIGNATURE

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^^^^

19599

M I : M { ) R A N D U M FOR

convening Authority

SlJBJl.XT: Acknowledgment of Protective Order for Classified Information - United States v. PFC
iiitldlcv Manning
1. I, ^ | f ^ l T H & / _ ^ jfO^Y^S
understand that I may be tlie recipient ofinformation and
intelligence lhat concerns the present and future security of llie United States and lhat belongs to the
United Stiites. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it,
arc classified according to security standards set by tlie U.S. Government. I have read and understand the
provisions of the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, and 798) concerning the disclosure of
i(iIi)M)uitioii relating to the national defense and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act
[>0 U.S. C. i) 42 i) and I ;un familiar with the penalties for the violation thereof I have also read and '
understand the provisions o: Army Regulation 380-5, concerning safeguarding, disseminating,
transmitting and transporting, storage and destruction, and loss or compromise of classified information.
I uni.ler.siand these provisions ofthe law and Army Regulation arc available at the Military Justice
Section, OH'iee of the Sta If Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Military District of Washington, Fort Lesley J.
McNair. DC, 20319.
2. I liiulcrstiind that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, and negligent handling of
classified inlbrmiiiion by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to tlie United States or could be
used to advantage by u foreign nut ion or enemy of the United Stales. I hereby agree Ihtil 1 will never
ttivulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have otTicialiy verified that the recipient has been
properly aLitliuri/ed by the United States Governmeni to receive classified information; (b) I have been
given prior written notice of the authorization of the United States Government Department or Agency
ri.";poiisible lor the classification ofthe information or last granting me a security cleaiance that such
disetnsurc is permitted; or (c) as ordered by the Convening Authority, 1 understand that if 1 am unccitain
;'ihiMU the classification status of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the
information is unclassified before I may disclose the information, except as provided in (a), (b), or (c)
above, ! I'urUier understand lhat I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the
uiiatnhori/,cd disclosure of classified information, I understand that any breach of this agreement may
result in the termination of any access to classified information, 1 recognize that this agreement including
its prevision for the termination of access to classified infomiation docs not constitute a waiver of the
United Stales' right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
.3. I understand thai I will remain bound to this agreement after the conclusion oi'proceedings in United
States V. PI C Bradlev Manning.
I I read and understand the Protective Order by tlie Convening Autliorit)\ dated 17 September 2010, in
the case of United States v. PFC Bradley Manning, relating to classified information, and I agree to
comply with the provi.sions thereof
X 1 uiKierslLiiHl thai if t am a lawyer, noncompliance with this Protective Order will be reported to any
Stale liar where I uin admitted to practice law.
if hiv

to/0

DA IT

SIGNATURE!

Witnessed, sworn and subscrilied lo before me this

day of /I^Jtfu^lti,

? Ajo-v Z^)(t)
OATI:

^,

P



-t:*i|i||| le:

^IGNATU^

l ? \ f ^ g 8 % / ^ #

19600

Ml^MOPAl^OUMPOl^ Convening Authority
^UBJPCT AcknowledgmentofProteetiveOrderfbrClassifiedhifbrmation^UnitedStatesv.PPC
Bradl^y^annin^
1. I, ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ 1 , ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ B ^ understand thatlmay be the recipient ofinformation and
intelligence that cone^ns the present and future security ofthe United Stated and that belongs to the
United States.This information and intelligence, togetherwith the methods of collecting and handling it,
are classified accordingtosectirity standards set bythe U.S. Government. Ihave read and understand the
provisions of the espionage lawsO^U.SC. ^^793, 794, and 798) concerning the disclosure of
infbrmation relating to the national defi^nse and the provisions ofthe Intelligenceldentittes Protection Act
(^0U.S.C.^42Oandlam familiar with the penalties forthe violation thereof Ihave also read and
understand the provisions ofArmyl^egulation 380-^, concerning safi^guarding, disseminating,
transmitting and transporting, storage and destruction, and loss or compromise of classified infbrmation.
lunderstand these provisions ofthe law and Army l^egulation are available at the Military Justice
Section, Office ofthe StaffJudge Advocate, U.S. Army Military District ofWashington, Port Lesley J.
MeNair,DC,203l9.
2. lunderstand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, and negligent handling of
classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be
used to advantage byafbreignnafion or enemy ofthe United States. Ihereby agree thatlwill never
divulge classified infbrmation to anyone unless: (a^lhaveoffielally verified that the recipient has f ^ n
properly authorized bythe United States Government to receive classified information; (b)lhave been
given priorwritten notice of the authorization of the United States Government Department or Agency
responsible for the classification of the information or last granting measecurity clearance that such
disclosure is permitted; or(c)asordered by the ConveningAuthority. lunderstand that iflam uncertain
about the classification status ofinformation,lam required to confirm from an authorized official that the
initiation is unclassified beforelmay disclose the information, except as provided in(a^,(b),or(c)
above. Iftirtherunderstandthatlam obligated toeomplywith laws and regulations that prohibitthe
unauthorized disclosure of classified infbrmation. lunderstand that any breach of this agreement may
result in the termination ofany access toelassified infbrmation, Ireeognize that this agreement including
its provision for the termination ofaccess to classified infbrmation does not constituteawaiver of the
United States^rightto prosecute me for any statutory violation.
3. lund^i^tand thatlwill remain bound to this agreement affer the conclusion of proceedings in I^J^^^^
State^v.PPC Bradlev Manning.
4. Iread and understand the Protective t^rder by the Convening Authority,datedl7September 2010, in
the case ofUnited Statesv.PfC Bradley Manning, relating to classified infbrmation. andlagree to
comply with the provisions thereof.
^. lunderstand that iflamalawyer, noncompliance with tfii^,^^tectivet^er will be reported to any
State Barwherelam admitted to practice law.

dt TwL c)0^f
DATE

J

SIGNATURE
of
Witnessed, sworn and subscribed to before me this^A^^y i

•p\ 4 ^ \ M ^jpARTMENTOFTHEARk^
un U
IIQAft
SIC
HQ.
SAQ,FPAAU
QQM
^w^mm^^
USftwW
OMice ofthe StaffJudge Advocat^^^^^^^^ \
4217 Roberts Ave
^Wc^O^
Fort George G. Meade. MD 20755«)30
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

DATE

CAo rtcnrsAi i loc A i u v

TTwkf Anth If) U.S.C. 1044a

19601

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Motion
T.

for Protective Order
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 5
21 February 2012

19602

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HAUL
204 LEE AVENUE
FORT MYER, VIRGINIA 22211-1199
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

17 September 2010

IMND-MHH-ZA

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. David E. Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel
SUBJECT: Appointment of Defense Security Expert Consultant- U.S. v. PFC Bradley Maiming

I appoint Mr. Charles Ganiel, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, as an expert consultant
in security matters for the defense in the above-named case. I further direct that Mr. Ganiel be
designated a member of the defense team under U.S. v. Toledo, 25 M.J. 270 (CM. A. 1987) and
Military Rule of Evidence 502. This expert appointment is at no expense to tlie United States
beyond mileage reimbursement, if applicable.

CARL R. COFFMAN, JR.
COL, AV
Commanding

19603

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE
FORT MYER. VIRGINIA 22211-1198
RgPlY TO
ATTaXTIONOf

1 2 OCT 20)0
IMND-MHH-ZA
MEMORANDU M FOR Mr. David E. Coombs. Civilian Defense Counsel
SUBJECT: Appointment of Additional Defense Security Expert Consultant - U.S. v. PFC
Bradley Manning
In response to your request for an additional security expert dated 28 September 2010,1 anoint
Mr. Cassius N. Hall. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, as an additional expert
consultant in security matters for the defense in the above-named case. I further direct that Mr.
Hall be designated a member of the defense team under U.S. v. Toledo. 25 M.J. 270 (C.M.A.
19X7) and Military Rule of Evidence 502. This expert appointment is at no expense to die
United States beyond mileage reimbursement, if applicable.

ttciJjL CARL R. COFFMAN. JR.
COL. AV
Commanding

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vi

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



19604

Prosecution Motion
for Protective Order

Enclosure 6

21 February 2012





19605

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE

FORT MYER, VIRGINIA 22211-1199
REPLY To
ATTENTION OF

17 September 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. David E. Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel

SUBJECT: Preliminary Classi?cation Review of the Accused?s Mental Impressions - U.S v.
PFC Bradley Manning

1. According to your four requests, dated 25 August 2010, 26 August 2010, 3 September 2010
(Expert), and 3 September 2010 (Defense Team), the accused?s mental impressions are
potentially classi?ed which would require defense counsel, the RCM 706 board, and
any defense expert to possess security clearances at the level, in order to allow the
accused to fully participate in his defense and board.

2. Order. No later than 24 September 2010 and absent an extension by me, the accused is
ordered to meet with your security expert consultant and disclose the classi?ed information, he
wishes to discuss with you, the defense team, his detailed behavioral health providers, and the
RCM 706 board. Your security expert will take notes and conduct a preliminary classi?cation
review of this information.

3. Preliminary Classi?cation Review. No later than 4 October 2010 and absent an extension
by me, the defense security expert consultant will conduct his preliminary classi?cation review
of the information and provide you and the Trial Counsel with a brief summary of the review,
without releasing any privileged and substantive information from the accused?s disclosures.

4. Should the defense expert initially classify the disclosed information at a level above Secret,
the United States will continue to work diligently to comply with your requests to have defense
counsel, the defense expert, and the RCM 706 board fully cleared to discuss classi?ed matters
with the accused.

5. The notes from the defense security expert?s meeting with the accused will remain privileged
and be turned over to you at the conclusion of the preliminary review, subject to any security
concerns that may be raised by the information.

R. COF MAN, JR.
COL, AV
Commanding



19606

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
.IoIu1' BASE HYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE
FORT VIRGINIA 22211-1199

IMND-MHH-ZA 22 September 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. David E. Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel

SUBJECT: Preliminary Classi?cation Review of the Accused?s Mental Impressions - [15 v,
PFC Bradley Manning

1. According to your four requests, dated 25 August 2010, 26 August 2010, 3 September 2010
(Expert), and 3 September 2010 (Defense Team), the accused?s mental impressions are
potentially classi?ed which would require defense counsel, the RCM 706 board, and
any defense expert to possess security clearances at the level, in order to allow the
accused to fully participate in his defense and board.

2. Order. No later than 8 October 2010 and absent an extension by me, the accused is ordered
to meet with your security expert consultant and disclose the classi?ed information the accused
wishes to discuss with you, the defense team, his detailed behavioral health providers, and the
RCM 706 board. Your security expert will take notes and conduct a preliminary classi?cation
review of this information.

3. Preliminary Classi?cation Review. No later than two weeks after the accused?s ?nal
interview and absent an extension by me, the defense security expert consultant will conduct his
preliminary classi?cation review of the information and provide an unclassi?ed written response
to the following questions:

a. Is the information provided by the accused classi?ed at a level above Secret (?Yes or
?No

b. If any of the information provided by the accused is classified above Secret, does any of the
information fall within SCI compartments, and if so, what compartments?

4. Should the defense expert initially classify the disclosed information at a level above Secret,
the United States will continue to work diligently to comply with your requests to have defense
counsel, the defense expert, and the RCM 706 board fully cleared to discuss classi?ed matters
with the accused. I will also make a determination on whether to authorize the accused to
disclose his classi?ed information to the RCM 706 board and his behavioral health providers.

5. The notes from the defense security expert?s meeting with the accused will remain privileged
and be turned over to you at the conclusion of the preliminary review, subject to any security
concerns that may be raised by the information. Under no circumstances should your security



19607

IMND-MHH-ZA
SUBJECT: Preliminary Classi?cation Review of the Accused?s Mental Impressions ?i

EFC Bradley Manning

expert consultant release any privileged or substantive information ?'om the accused?s
disclosures to anyone outside of the defense team.

6. The sole purpose of this preliminary classi?cation review is to provide the defense and United
States with a basis for granting security clearances to the defense team and the accused?s
behavioral health providers, and determining the appropriate level of classi?cation for the RCM
706 board. This preliminary classi?cation review is not a substitute for an official classi?cation
review conducted by an original classi?cation authority (OCA) or an official designated by an
OCA.

7. This order supersedes my order dated 17 September 2010.

R. COFFMAN, JR.
COL, AV
Commanding



19608

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE

roar MYER, VIRGINIA 22211-1199
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

lo NOV 20m

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. David E. Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel

SUBJECT: Supplemental Guidance for Preliminary Classi?cation Review ofthe Accused's
Mental Impressions - U.S v. PFC Bradley Manning

1. PURPOSE. This purpose ofthis memorandum is to provide supplemental guidance on the
defense expert consultant?s access to classi?ed information and infomiation systems while
assisting the defense team in this case.

2. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS. In
accordance with the enclosed authorization provided by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence. U.S. Anny, the defense security experts may have access to classi?ed information
up to and including TOP SECRET (SCI) for purposes ofconducting the preliminary
classi?cation review of the accused?s mental impressions and to provide con?dential security
expert assistance to you throughout the case. This authorization includes access to the Secret
lntemet Protocol Router Network (SIPRN ET) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communication System (JWICS) for the sole purpose ofconducting a preliminary classi?cation
review of the accused?s mental impressions.

3. COMPUTER HARDWARE. ln accordance with the enclosed authorization, INSCOM will
issue a dedicated government laptop computer or workstation with access to the SIPRN ET and
the JWICS. as necessary. for your security expert consultants to conduct their preliminary
classi?cation review. The expert consultants will also be issued portable external hard drives,
authorized for use on and SIPRN ET, to conduct their review and to segregate and
securely store ?con?dential defense information? derived from their review.

4. STORAGE. In addition to my facility and storage order, dated I2 October 2010, INSCOM
will provide appropriate storage space for the expert consultants to store information and
information systems that may be classi?ed up to the TOP SECRET (SCI) level.

5. LIMITATIONS. This memorandum does authorize the expert consultants to disclose
any classi?ed information to the remainder of the defense team without prior written
authorization from the undersigned; however, after the preliminary classi?cation review, I will
make an additional request for the remainder of the defense team to have appropriate access to
discuss and view this infonnation. This memorandum does not authorize the expert
consultants to use JWICS, SIPRNET, or any other classi?ed information system beyond
that necessary to conduct the preliminary classi?cation review of the accused?s mental

19609

HH-7.A
SUBJECT: Supplemental Guidance for Preliminary Classi?cation Review ofthe Accused?s

Mental Impressions - U.S v. PFC Manning

impressions. Should the defense team request further use of these or other classi?ed
information systems, you must submit a written request along with the proper justification.

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is CPT Ashden I-?ein at-.

End CARI, R. COFFMAN. JR.
HQDA G2 Memo. IO Nov 10 COL. AV
Commanding



19610

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES ARUY TEST AND EVALUATICN COHHAND
4120 SUSQUEHANNA AVENUE
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND. MD 21005-3103

l3 December 2010

MEMORANDUM THRU Staff Judge Advocate, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. US Army
Military District of Washington. Fort Lesley]. McNair, Washington D.C. 30219

FOR Commander, US Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia
2221

SUBJECT: Preliminary lassification Review of the Accused?s Mental Impressions United
States v. PFC Bradley Manning

1. The defense security expert consultants have completed their preliminary classi?cation
review. Based upon your memorandum dated 22 September 2010, here are the unclassified
written responses to your questions:

a) Is the information provided by the accused classi?ed at a level above Secret?
Answer: Yes.

b) If any ofthe information provided by the accused is classified above Secret, does any of
the information fall within SCI compartments? Answer: Yes.

c) Which compartments? Answer: Gamma, HUMINT and SIGINT.

2. The points of contact for this memorandum are the undersigned Mr. Charles J. Ganiel

?and Mr. Cassius N. Hall at


(?rt/l/U j/
CHARLES J. GANIEL SIUS .

Command, SSO Informati Security Division, G2
Army Test Evaluation Command Intelligence and Security Command
Alexandria, VA Fort Belvoir, VA

19611

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Motion
for Protective Order
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 7
21 February 2012

19612

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE
FORT MYER. VIRGINIA 22211-1199

1 2 OCT .010

IMND-MHII-ZA

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Approved Facility and Storage for Classified Infonnation - U.S. v. PFC Bradlev
Manning

1, APPROVED FACILITY. The preliminaiy security classification review and any subsequent
meetings requiring access to a Sensitive Compartmented Intbrmation facility (SCIF) will occur at
the Field Investigative Unit(FIU). U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, 7701 Telegraph
Road #2591. Alexandria. VA. 22315. Ilie FlU will provide a conference room within its SCIF to
provide the prosecution or defense team adequate space to conduct meetings which may include
infbrmation classified at a level higher than "SFCRHT." The defense team must coordinate through
the (rial counsel to schedule the dates and times to use the facility.
2. STORAGE. All classified information shall be stored in accordance with the following
instructions:
a. Prosecution Team. "SECRFT"' information will be stored in the two safes assigned to the
Office ofthe StalVJudge Advocate. MDW located in Building 32. Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC Any
information classified above the "SFCRHT' level will be stored in the MDW SCIF located in
Building -16. For! Lesley J. McNair. DC.
b. Defense Team. '•SI-X'RKT" infonnation will be stored in a safe assigned to the Trial Defense
Service ORice. Fort Myer located in Building 229. Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall. VA, Any
information classified or presumed to be classified above the "SFCRFT" level will be stored in a
separate drawer or safe with its own unique combination at HQ, INSCOM, located on Fort Belvoir.
VA and storage will be coordinated through Mr. flail. Defense Security Fxpeit Consultant.

dlnu-

CARLR, COFFMAN. JR.
COL. AV
Commanding
DISTRIBUTION;
1-Trial Counsel
1- Civilian Defense Counsel
2- Military Defense Counsel
2 Defense Security Expert Consultants
l-Commandcr. I lU
1-Security Manager. JBM-Mll
l-Security Manager. MDW

19613

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE
FORT MYER, VIRGINIA 22211-1199
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

2Z3UkN 11

IMND-MHH-ZA
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Approved Facility and Storage for Classified Information - United States v. PFC Bradley
Manning
1. FACnJTY.
a. "SECRET' and "CONFIDENTIAL" Information. All meedngs requiring access to "SECRET'and
"CONFIDENTIAL" information will only occur in approved facilities. Prior to accessing classified
information or having classified discussions, the prosecution and defense are required to verify whether
the facility is properly approved for use by a local security officer.
b. "TOP SECRET' and "SCI" Information. All meetings requiring the discussion or viewing of
information classified at a level above "SECRET' will occur in a pre-approved Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility (SCIF). The defense team will coordinate through trial counsel to schedule dates and
times to use a SCIF.
2. STORAGE. All classified information shall be stored in accordance with the following instructions:
a. Prosecution Team. "CONFIDENTIAL" and "SECRET' information will be stored in the two safes
assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington (MDW). Any
information classified above the "SECRET" level will be stored in the MDW SCIF located in Building
46, Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC.
b. Defense Team. "CONFIDENTIAL" and "SECRET" information will be stored in the safe assigned
to the Trial Defense Service Office on Fort Myer, located in Building 229, Joint Base Myer-Henderson
Hall, VA, or a safe assigned to the Trial Defense Service Office on Fort Leavenworth, located in Building
244, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Any information classified or presumed to be classified above the
"SECRET" level will be stored in a separate drawer or safe with its own unique combination at
Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, located on Fort Belvoir, VA, and storage
will be coordinated through Mr. Cassius Hall, Defense Security Expert Consultant.

-tosc
CARL R. COFFMAN, JR.
COL, AV
Commanding
DISTRIBUTION:
Trial Counsel
Civilian Defense Counsel
Military Defense Counsel
Defense Security Expert Consultants

19614

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JOINT BASE MYER-HENDERSON HALL
204 LEE AVENUE
FORT MYER, VIRGINIA 22211-1199
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

IMND-MHH-ZA

(\

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Approved Facility and Storage for Classified Information - United States v. PFC
Bradley Manning

1. FACILITY.
a. "SECRET" and "CONFIDENTIAL" Information. All meetings requiring access to
"SECRET" and "CONFIDENTIAL" information will only occur in approved facilities. Prior to
accessing classified information or having classified discussions, the prosecution and defense arc
required to verify whether the facility is property approved for use by a local security officer.
b. "TOP SECRET" and "SCI" Information. All meetings requiring the discussion or viewing
of information classified at a level above "SECRET" will occur in a pre-approved Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). The defense team will coordinate through trial
counsel to schedule dates and times to use a SCIF.
2. STORAGE. All classified information shall be stored in accordance with the following
instructions:
a. Prosecution Team. "CONFIDENTIAL" and "SECRET" information will be stored in the
two safes assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington
(MDW). Any information classified above the "SECRET" level will be stored in the MDW
SCIF located in Building 46, Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC.
b. Defense Team. "CONFIDENTIAL" and "SECRET" information will be stored in the safe
assigned to the Trial Defense Service Office on Fort Myer, located in Building 229, Joint Base
Myer-Henderson Hall, VA, a safe assigned to the Trial Defense Service Office on Fort
Leavenworth, located in Building 244, Fort Leavenworth, KS, or a safe assigned to the Trial
Defense Service Office on Fort George G. Meade. Any information classified or presumed to be
classified above the "SECRET" level will be stored in a separate drawer or safe with its own
unique combination at Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, located on
Fort Belvoir, VA, and storage will be coordinated through Mr. Cassius Hall.

19615

IMNDMHHZA
SUBJECT: ApprovedFacilityandStorageforClassifiedlnformation
Bradley Manning

United Statesv.PFC

^COl^PUTERF^ORENSICANALYSIS.Thedefensecomputerforensicexperi consultants
will conduct their analysis in theTrial Defense Service Office on Fort GeorgeG.Meade. All
fheirclassified material will be stored lAWparagraph 2.

^^^^^^^^^

^

CARLRCOFFMAN,JR
COL,AV
Commanding
DISTRIBUTION:
Trial Counsel
Civilian Defense Counsel
Military Defense Counsel
Defense Security Expert Consultants

MT

19616

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

21 February 2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Motion
v.
for Protective Order
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 8






19617

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
umeo STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE sErtvIcE. ATLANTIC rtEeIorI
Four men FIELD OFFICE
roar MYER. VIRGINIA 22211

REPLY TO
AT TENTION OF:

ANJA-TDS 20 September 201 1

MEMORANDUM Commander, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, 204 Lee Avenue, Fort
Myer, Virginia 222 1-1 199

SUBJECT: Request for Courier Cards

l. 1 am requesting your assistance with issuing CONUSISECRET courier cards to designated
members of the defense team representing PFC Bradley Manning. For the reasons below, we are
requesting courier cards from the government as soon as possible.

2. There is an immediate legitimate need for the defense team to transport classi?ed evidence.
The government delivered three classi?ed laptops and four compact discs containing classified
data to my office yesterday. Defense team members need courier cards to allow us to transport
the laptops and computers to other locations where our defense experts can use them to prepare
for the case. In addition, we will need courier cards to travel between the TDS offices, and
eventually to the trial which is expected to take place at Fort Meade.

3. Cards are required for the following defense members:

a. MAJ Matthew Kemkes, Fort Myer TDS
b. CPT Paul Bouchard. Fort Meade TDS

c. CPT Josh Tooman, Fort Leavenworth TDS
CW2 Melissa Santiago, Fort Myer TDS

e. SS6 Cherise Purcell, Fort Myer TDS

Thank you

4. You may contact me at
for your consideration of my request.


MAJ, A

Senior Defense Counsel
I. The above request is (approved) ?d-ioappro-I-adv).

2. If approved, each command security manager will issue a DD Form 2501, with an authorized
level up to to each member of the defense listed above. If travel must occur outside
of the local geographic limit, then an additional courier authorization letter will be issued for
each individual per trip. Prior to utilizing a courier card or authorization, each member of the
defense listed above, must received courier training from a defense security expert.

-t?;wdcet~

28 SEP 2011 CARL R. COFFMAN, JR.
COL, AV
Commanding

19618

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ProseeutionMotlon
V.

for Protective Order
Manning,BradleyE.
PFCUS.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

Enclosures
21February2fll2

19619

UNTTED STATES OF AMERICA

)
^

^.^
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCUS.Army,
HHC,U.S.ArmyGarrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

)
^
^
^
^
^
^

ProtectiveOrder
for
Classified Information
2^ February 2012

1. The purposeofthis Order is to prevent the unauthorised disclosure or dissemination of
classified national security information in the suh^^ect named case. This Order covers all
information and documents previously availal^le to the accused in the course ofhis employment
with the United States Government or which have l^een, or will l^e, reviewed or made availal^le
to the accused, defense counsel, and other recipientsof classified in^rmation in titis case.
2. "Persons sul^^ect to this Order^^ include the following: (a) the Accuseds (I^)Military and
Civilian Defense Counsel and Detailed Military ParalegaIs^(c)andMeml^ers ofthe Defense
Team appointed by any convening authority pursuant to M.R.E.^f^2andU.S.V.Toledo,2^ M.J.
27f^(C.M.A.1^^7), including the defense security officers.
^. In order to protect the national security and pursuant to tlie authority granted under Military
RuleofEvidence (MRE) ^0^,relevant executive ordersofthe President ofthe United States, and
regulations ofthe Departments ofDefense and ofthe Army,it is hereby ORDERED:
a. Tbe procedures set forth in this Order and the authorities referred to above ^ i l l apply to
all pretrial, trial, post-trial, and appellate matters eoneeming this case.
b. The term "classified information^^ refers to:
(1) any classified document(or infbrmation contained therein)^
(2) infbrmation known or that reasonably should be known by persons subject to this
Order to be classifiable. Ifpersons subject to this Order are uncertain as to whether the
^ B^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^O^
infbrmation is classified, they must confirm whether the infbrmation is classifieds
^ ^
(3) classified documents(or infbrmation contained tberein) disclosed to persons subject
to this Order as part ofthe proceedings in this case^
(4) classified documents and infbrmation which have otherwise been made known to
persons subject to this Order and v^hieh have been marked or described as: "CONFIDENTIAL^^,
"SECRET^,or^^TOP SECRETE
e. All such classified documents and infbrmation contained therein shall remain classified
unless such classified infbrmation bear clear indication they have been declassified by the
govertm^ent agency or department that originated the document or infbrmation contained therein
(hereinafter referred to as"original classification authority^^).
1

19620

d. The words "documents" or "associated materials" as used in this Order include, but are
not limited to, all written or printed matterofany kind, fbrmal or informal, including the
originals and all non-identical copies,whether different ^om the original by reason ofany
notation made on such copies or otherwise, including, without limitation, papers,
correspondence, memoranda, notes, letters, telegrams, reports, summaries, inter office and infraoffice communications, notations of any sort, bulletins, teletypes, telefax, invoiees,worksheets,
and all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes, and amendment ofany kind to the fbregoing,
graphic or aural records or representations ofany kind, ineluding,without limitation,
photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfiIm,video tapes, sound recordings ofany kind,
motion pictures, any electronic, mechanical or electric records or representationsofany kind,
ineluding,without limitation, tapes, cassettes, CDs,DVDs,thumbdrives, hard drives, other
recordings, films, typewriter ribbons and word processor discs or tapes.
e. The ^ord"or^^ should be interpreted as including "and^^,and vice versa^"he^^ should be
interpreted as including "she^^, and vice versa.
f Persons subject to this Order are advised that direct or indirect unauthorised disclosure,
retention, or negligent handling ofclassified infbrmation could cause serious and, in some cases,
exceptionally grave damage to the national securityofthe United States, or may be used to the
advantage ofafbreign nation against the interestsofthe United States. These security
procedures are designed to ensure that persons subject to this Order will never divulge the
classified infbrmation disclosed to them to anyone who is not authori:^ed to receive it,without
prior written authorisation ^om the original classification authority and in confbrmitywith these
procedures.
g. Persons subject to this Order are admonished that they are obligated by la^ and regulation
not to disclose any classified infbrmation in an unauthorised fashion.
h. Person^.W)ject to this Order are admonished that^y tee^ of the security procedures
this Order imy i;gsult in the termination of their access to classified information. In addition,
they are aafnbmshed that any unauthorized disclosure, possession, or handling of classified
information may constitute violations ofUnited States criminal laws, including but not limited
to, the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, United States Code, and
Sections 421 and 783(b), Title 50, United States Code. In addition, for thosepersoBS_^idm_a(e
attorneys, a report will be filed with their State Bar Association.
/
Xisxf^-^
4. Mr. Jay Prather, Department of the Army G2, is detailed to the Court and appointed as the ^ ^ c y V i i ^ ^
Court Security Officer. The defense security expert consultants are appointed as the Defense
,
Security Officers.
-TTW'
5. If the prosecution determines that certain classified information or documents may not be
CA [}\disclosed to the accused but may be disclosed to defense counsel only, then the defense counsel
shall not disclose such information or documents to the accused without prior concurrence of the
original classification authority through the prosecution. The defense counsel shall have the
opportunity to motion for appropriate relief during an in camera proceeding under MRE 505(i).

19621

6. Personnel Security Investigations and Clearances
a. The storage, handling, and control ofclassified infbrmationrequires special seettrity
precautions mandated by statute, executive orders, and regulations, and access to classified
infbrmation requiresasecurity clearance.
b. Onceaperson subject to this Order obtainsasecurity clearance and executesanon
disclosure agreement (SF312), that person is eligible for access to classified infbrmation, subject
to the convening authority^sdisclosure determination.
c. Asacondition ofreeeiving classified infbrmation, anyretained civilian defense counsel
will agree to the conditions specified herein and execute all necessary forms so that the
Department ofthe Army may complete the necessary personnel security investigation to makea
determination whether to grant access. Any retained civilian defense counsel will also sign the
Acknowledgment of Order (hereinafter"Aeknowledgment"). Any retained civilian defense
eotinsel shall also signastandard ^rmnondisclosure agreement (SF312)asaeondition of
access to classified infbrmation.
d. In addition to the Acknowledgment, any person who asaresult ofthis case gains access to
infbrmation contained in any Department ofthe Army Special Access Program, as that term is
defined in Executive Orderl3526^or for events occtuT^ng before 27 June 2f^lO,E.0.12958^,or
to Sensitive Compartmented Infbrmation (SCI), shall sign any nondisclosure agreement which is
specific to that Special Access Program orto that Settsitive Compartmented Infbrmation.
e. All other requests for clearances for access to classified infbrmation in this case for
persons not named in this Order or for clearances toahigher levelofelassification, shall be
made through the trial counsel to the convening authority.
f The security procedures contained in this Order shall apply to any civilian defense counsel
retained by the accused, and to any other persons who may later receive classified infbrmation
^omtheU.S.Department ofthe Army in connection with this case.
7. Handling and Protection ofclassified Infbrmation
a. All persons subject to this Order shall seek guidance fi^omtheirrespective seettrity officers
with regard to the appropriate storage and use ofclassified infbrmation.
b. The defense security officer will ensure appropriate physical security protection fbr any
materials prepared or compiled by the defense, or by any person in relation to the preparation of
the aeeused^sdefense or submission under MRE 5f^5. The materials and documents(defined
above)requiring physical security include,without limitation, any notes, carbon papers, letters,
pbotographs, drafts, discarded drafts, memoranda, typewriter ribbons, computer diskette,
CD^DVDs, magnetic recording, digital recordings, or other doeumentsofany kind or
description "CONFIDENTIAL"and "SECRET" infbrmation shall be stored in the following
locations: (I)the safe assigned to theTrial Defense Service Office on Fort Myer, located ttt

19622

Building 229,Joint Base MyerHenderson Hall,Virginia^ (2) the safe assigned to theTrial
Defense Service Office on Fort Leavenworth, located in Building244, Fort Leavenworth,
l^nsas^(3)the safe assigned to theTrial Defense Service Office on Fort Meade, located in
Building 4217,Fort George G.Meade, Maryland^ (4) the safe located in the defense trailer
v^ithin the secure structure outside the courthouses and(5) the safe assigned to the court security
officer, located in the courtroom in Building 4432,Fort George G.Meade, Maryland. Any
infbrmation classified or presumed to be classified above the "SECRET" level shall be stored in
aseparate drawer or safe with its own unique combination at Headquarters,U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command, located on Fort BeIvoir,Virginia, and storage will be
coordinated through the defense securityofficer.
c. Classified infbrmation, or infbrmation believed to be classified, shall only be discussed in
an area approved byasecurity officer, and in which persons not authorized to possess such
infbrmation cannot overhear such discussions. All discussions and meetings requiring access to
"SECRET" and "CONFIDENTIAL"infbrmationwiIl only oeeurinapprovedUnitedStates
Government ^cilities. Prior to accessing classified infbrmation or having classified discussions,
the prosecution and defense are required to verify whether the facility is properly approved fbr
use byaloeal security officer.
d. All meetings requiring the discussion or viewing ofinformation classified atalevel above
"SECRET" will occur inapre approved Sensitive Compartmented Infbrmation Facility(SCIF).
All persons subject to this Order shall coordinate through trial counsel to schedule dates and
times to useaSCIF.
e. No one shall discuss any classified infbrmation overastandard commercial telephone
instrument, an inter office communication system, or in the presence of any person who is not
authorized to possess such infbrmation.
f Written materials prepared fbr this case by persons subject to this Order shall be
transcribed, recorded, typed, duplicated, copied, or otherwise prepared only by persons who have
received access to classified infbrmation pursuant to the security procedures contained in this
Order
g. All mechanical devices, ofany kind, used in the preparation or transmission ofclassified
infbrmation in this case may be used only with the approval ofasecurity officer.
h. Upon reasonable advance notice to the trial counsel orasecurity officer, de^nse counsel
shall be given access during normal business hours and at other times on reasonable request, to
classified documents which the government is required to make available to de^nse counsel but
elects to keep in its possession. Persons permitted to inspect classified documents by this Order
may make written notesofthe documents and their contents. Notesofany classified portions of
these documents, however, shall not be disseminated or disclosed in any manner or form to any
person not subject to this Order. Such notes will be secured in accordance with the terms ofthis
Order. Persons permitted to have access to classified documents will be allowed to view their
notes within an area designated byasecurityofficer. No person permitted to inspect classified
documents by this Order, including defense counsel, shall copy or reproduce any part ofsaid

19623

documents or their contents in any manner or fbrm, except as providedbyasecurityofficer, after
he has consulted with the trial counsel.
i. The persons subject to this Order shall not disclose the contentsofany classified
documents or infbrmation to any person not named herein, except the trial counsel and military
jttdge.
^. All persons given access to classified infbrmation pursuant to this Order are advised that
all infbrmation to which they obtain access by the Order is now and will fbreverremain the
propertyofthe United States Government. They shall return all materials which may have come
into their possession, or fbr which they are responsible because ofsuch access, upon demand by
aseettrity officer.
k. All persons subject to this Order shall sign the Acknowledgment, including the defense
counsel and accused. The signing and filing ofthis Acknowledgment isacondition precedent to
the disclosure ofany classified infbrmation to any person subject to this Order.
8. Tbis Order adopts the Special Court-Martial Convening Authority's protective order, datedI7
September 2010. Nothing contained in this Order shall be construed asawaiver of any right of
the accused.

DENISERLIND
Colonel, U.S. Army
Circuit Judge

19624

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ProseeutionMotlon
for Protective Order
Manning,BradleyE.
PFCUS.^^tny,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure Iff
21February 21112

19625

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Y,
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)

Acknowledgment
of
Protective Order

1. I imderstands that I may be the recipient of information and intelligence that concerns the
present and future security of the United States and that belongs to the United States. This
information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are
classified according to security standards set by the United States Government. I have read and
understand the provisions of the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, and 798) concerning the
disclosure of information relating to the national defense and the provisions of the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act (50 U.S. C. § 421) and I am familiar with the penalties for the violation
thereof I have also read and understand the provisions of Army Regulation 380-5, concerning
safeguarding, disseminating, transmitting and transporting, storage and destruction, and loss or
compromise of classified information.
2. I imderstand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, and negligent handling
of classified information by me could cause damage or irreparable injiu-y to the United States or
could be used to advantage by a foreign nation or enemy of the United States. I hereby agree
that I will never divulge classified information to anyone unless: (a) I have officially verified
that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive
classified information; (b) I have been given prior written notice of the authorization of the
United States Govermnent Department or Agency responsible for the classification of the
information or last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted; or (c) as
ordered by the Military Judge. I imderstand that if I am uncertain about the classification status
of information, I am required to confirm from an authorized official that the information is
unclassified before I may disclose the information, except as provided in (a), (b), or (c) above. I
further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. I understand that any breach of this agreement
may result in the termination of any access to classified information. I recognize that this
agreement including its provision for the termination of access to classified information does not
constitute a waiver of the United States' right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.
3. I understand that I will remain bound to this agreement after the conclusion of proceedings in
the above named case.
4. I read and understand the Protective Order by the Military Judge, dated 23 February 2012, in
the case ofUnited States v. PFC Bradley Manning, relating to classified information, and I agree
to comply with the provisions thereof

19626

5. lunderstand that i f f amalawyer,noncompliance with this Protective Order will be reported
to any State Barwherelam admitted to practice law.

SIGNATURE:

DATE:

NAME:
Witnessed, sworn and subscribed to before me this

day of

SIGNATURE:

DATE:

NAME:

AUTHORITY:

19627

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 22211

16 February 2012

FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES I
DEFENSE MOTION FOR
v. APPROPRIATE RELIEF UNDER
R.C.M. 906(b)(6)
MANNING, Bradley E., PFC I
U.S. Army, I BILL OF PARTICULARS
I
I
I

RELIEF SOUGHT

1. PFC Bradley E. Manning, by and through counsel, moves this court, pursuant to R.C.M.
906(b)(6) and the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution to direct
the Government to file a hill of particulars in the subject case on the ground that it is necessary
for him to understand the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare his defense and
not be subjected to unfair surprise at trial.

BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

2. As the moving party, the Defense has the burden of persuasion. R.C.M. 905(c)(2). The
burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C.M. 905(c)(1).

FACTS

3. PFC Manning is charged with ?ve speci?cations ofviolating a lawful general regulation, one
speci?cation of aiding the enemy, one speci?cation of disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline and service discrediting, eight speci?cations of communicating
classi?ed information, ?ve speci?cations of stealing or knowingly converting Government
property, and two speci?cations of knowingly exceeding authorized access to a Government
computer, in violation of Articles 92, 104, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
10 U.S.C. 892, 904, 934 (2010).

4. The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the
convening authority on 18 March 201 1. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 201 1.
On 16 December through 22 December 201 1, these charges were investigated by an Article 32
Investigating Of?cer. The charges were referred without special instructions to a general court-
martial on 3 February 2012.

19628



5. The Defense does not request any witnesses be produced for this motion. The Defense
respectfully requests this court to consider the referred charge sheet in support of its motion.

LEGAL AND ARGUMENT

6. Under 906(b)(6) of the Rules for Courts?Martial, an accused is entitled to a bill of
particulars at any time, subject to conditions as justice may pennit. The discussion to this rule
states in pertinent part:

The purposes of a bill of particulars are to infomi the accused of the nature of the
charge with suf?cient precision to enable the accused to prepare for trial, to avoid
or minimize the danger of surprise at the time of the trial and to enable the
accused to plead the acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the
same offense when the specification itself is too vague and inde?nite for such
purposes.

This mirrors federal civilian criminal practice, and Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure sets out similar standards. See Wong Tat? v. United States, 273 .S. 77, 80-81, 82
United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1066 (3d Cir. I989) (explaining that the dra?ers of
Rule 7(t) intended to ?encourage a more liberal attitude by the courts toward bills of particulars?)
(internal quotations omitted); United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 .2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432 (1895) (?It is always open to the defendant to move the judge before whom trial is had to
order the prosecuting attorney to give a more particular description, in the nature of a
speci?cation or bill of particulars, of the acts on which he intends to rely, and to suspend the trial
until this can be done; and such an order will be made whenever it appears to be necessary to
enable the defendant to meet the charge against him. or to avoid the danger of injustice?)
(internal citations omitted); United States v. Miller, 543 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1108 (1977).

7. ln military practice, the defense typically needs to secure specific details by ?ling a bill of
particulars ?[b]ecausc the military uses a short fonn of pleading and a recitation of the manner
and means of committing the crime is not ordinarily contained in the United
States Newman, 25 MJ. 604, 606 n.3 (A.C.M.R. 1987) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 66 (I942), partially superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)). While a bill of particulars should not be used to conduct
discovery of the Govemment?s theory of the case, it can be used to find out ?what the
Government claims.? Id. In other words, a bill of particulars may be used to clarify the specific
theory upon which the Government intends to rely. Id. Therefore, defense counsel may always
use a bill of particulars to challenge an uncertain or vague speci?cation. United States v. Alef, 3
MJ. 414, 419 n.18 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Saintaude, 56 M.J. 888, 889 n.2 (A.C.C.A.
2002). Or, put in another way, a ?general averment of criminal conduct? is ?always subject to a
motion for further particularization.? Newman, 25 M.J. at 606 (citing United States v. Williams,

IQ

19629

31 .M.R. 269, 271 (C.M.A. 1962)); see United States v. Paulk, 32 C.M.R. 456, 458 (C.M.A.
1963) (explaining that ?the purpose of a bill of particulars is to narrow the scope of the
pleadings?). In addition to the standards set out in R.C.M. 906(b)(6), the following traditional
test provides further guidance to determine sufficient specificity:

Not whether it could have been made more de?nite and certain, but whether it
contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and suf?ciently
apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet; and in case any other
proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows
with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.

United States v. Schwarz, 15 M.J. 109, 111 (C .M.A. 1983) (quoting United States v. Sell, 1]
C.M.R. 202, 206 (C.M.A. 1953)); see Hamling v. United States. 418 U.S. 87, 1 I7 (1974).
Finally, ?a request for a bill of particulars has constitutional implications, as it is intended to
avoid unfair vagueness in a charge and potential consequent due process and double jeopardy
violations.? United States v. Harris, 52 M.J. 665, 667 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2000).

Article I 04 Aiding the Enemy
8. In the instant case, PFC Marming is charged with one specification of aiding the enemy. The
Specification of Charge 1 reads as follows:

In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army. did, at or near
Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1 November
2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, without proper authority, knowingly give
intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means.

With regard to this charge, the Defense requests the following particulars:

a. Who is the alleged enemy? The charge sheet only states that PFC Manning knowingly
gave intelligence to the enemy. Thus, it fails to specify who the alleged ?enemy? is for purposes
of the specification. Under R.C.M. 906(b)(6), this failure to state with ?sufficient precision? the
identity of the alleged enemy will hamper PFC Manning?s ability to adequately prepare for trial.
Under the Military Judges? Benchbook, ?enemy? is de?ned as including not only organized
opposing forces in a time of war, but also any other hostile body that our forces may oppose and
any citizen of an enemy Government. In light of this broad definition, PFC Manning cannot
adequately defend himself without knowing the identity of the alleged enemy. Therefore, PFC
Manning needs to be informed of this information so that he can exercise his Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense.

b. Ilow did PFC Manning knowingly give intelligence to the enemy? The charge sheet states
that PFC Manning did ?knowingly give intelligence to the enemy.? Article 104 of the UCMJ
prohibits any unauthorized communication with an enemy and identifies ?[g]iving intelligence to
the enemy [a]s a particular case of corresponding with the enemy made more serious by the fact
that the communication contains intelligence.? In order for PFC Manning to prepare for trial, he
needs to be informed of how the Government claims this offense occurred. The Defense is not
requesting disclosure of the Govemment?s theory of the case. Rather, the requested information

la.)

19630

is necessary for the Defense to understand speci?cally what conduct of PFC Marming is
considered by the Government to constitute ?knowingly giv[ing] intelligence to the enemy.?
Without such information, PFC Manning will not be able to adequately exercise his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense.

c. What was the ?indirect? means allegedly used in order to aid the enemy? The charge sheet
states that these offenses were allegedly committed through ?indirect means.? The specification
fails to specify by what manner the alleged offense of aiding the enemy was perpetrated.
Knowledge of the means by which this crime is alleged to have been perpetrated is essential to
the adequate preparation of PFC Manning?s defense. See Schwarz, 15 M.J. at 111. Therefore,
the Govemment?s blanket allegation that PFC Manning aided the enemy through ?indirect
means? does not help PFC Marming in preparing his defense. In fact, PFC Manning is
susceptible to unfair surprise at trial since he does not know what the Government will argue as
to the indirect means through which he allegedly aided the enemy. Without clari?cation from
the Government, PFC Manning will not know what type of evidence to present to refute the
Govemment?s contentions at trial. Therefore, he may be forced to waste valuable time preparing
for all contingencies due to the vagueness of the charge, while the Government hones in on its
single theory. See Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 575 (finding that the accused must not be compelled
to wade through thousands of documents in an effort to locate materials essential to his defense);
see also Newman, 25 at 606,? Alef, 3 MJ. at 419.

d. What ?intelligence? is the Government alleging PFC Manning gave to the enemy? The
charge sheet states that, without proper authority. PFC Manning knowingly gave intelligence to
the enemy. The specification fails to specify what intelligence is alleged to have been given to
the enemy. Knowledge of the specific intelligence allegedly given to the enemy is essential to
the adequate preparation of PFC Manning?s defense. See Schwarz, 15 M.J. at 111. As with the
term ?indirect means,? the Govemment?s allegation that PFC Marming knowingly gave
intelligence to the enemy does not help PFC Manning in preparing his defense. PFC Manning is
susceptible to unfair surprise at trial since he does not know what intelligence information the
Government believes supports the charged offense. Without clarification from the Government,
PFC Marming will not know what type of evidence to present to refute the Govemment?s
contentions at trial. See Bormovsky, 820 F.2d at 575; Newman, 25 MJ. at 606; Alef, 3 M.J. at
419.

General Article 134 Wrongfully and Wantonlv ('.'au.s'ing Intelligence (0 be Published

9. In addition to the charge of aiding the enemy, PFC Manning is charged with one specification
of a violation of Article 134, UCMJ, in that he is alleged to have ?wrongfully and wantonly
cause[d] to be published on the intemet intelligence belonging to the United States Government,
having knowledge that intelligence published on the intemet is accessible to the The
Defense requests a bill of particulars on the same areas detailed above. See discussion in
paragraph 8, supra.

a. Who is the alleged enemy?

b. In what manner did PFC Manning wrongfully and wantonly cause intelligence to be
published on the intemet? In order for PFC Manning to prepare for trial, he needs to be

19631

informed of how the Government claims this offense occurred. The requested information is
necessary for the Defense to understand speci?cally what conduct of PFC Marming is considered
by the Government to constitute ?wrongfully and wantonly cause intelligence to be published.?
Without such information, PFC Manning will not be able to adequately exercise his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense.

General Article 134 Stealing, Purloining or Converting in Violation of 18 U. S. C. Section 6-1!
10. PFC Manning is also charged with ?ve speci?cations of a violation of Article 134, UCMJ
dealing with 18 U.S.C. Section 64]. With respect to these Speci?cations under Charge II. the
Defense requests the following additional information:

a. What speci?c theory of culpability does the Government intend to rely upon? In other
words, does the Government allege that PFC Manning ?stole?, ?purloined? or ?converted??
While a bill of particulars should not be used to conduct discovery of the Govemment?s theory of
the case, it may be used to clarify the speci?c theory upon which the Government intends to rely.
See discussion in paragraph 7, supra. The Govemment?s general allegation that PFC Manning
did ?steal, purloin, or knowingly convert? the charged information does not help PFC Manning
in preparing his defense. In fact, PFC Manning is susceptible to unfair surprise at trial since he
does not know what the Government which theory the government will argue. Without
clari?cation from the Government, PFC Manning will not know what type of evidence to present
to refute the charged offense. Therefore, he may be forced to waste valuable time preparing for
all contingencies due to the vagueness of the charge, while the Government hones in on its single
theory. See Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 575; Newman, 25 MJ. at 606; Alef 3 M.J. at 419.

b. If the government is alleging that PFC Manning stole, purloined an_d converted the charged
items, does each theory of culpability apply equally to every charged item?

General Article 13-! Espionage in Violation of?l8 U. Section 793 (0)

ll. PFC Manning is also charged with eight specifications of a violation of Article 134, UCMJ
dealing with 18 U.S.C. Section 793(e). With respect to these Speci?cations under Charge II, the
Defense requests the following additional information:

a. In Speci?cation 3, the Government alleges ?more than one classi?ed memorandum
produced by a United States Government intelligence agency. . The Defense requests that the
Government identify the exact number and speci?c records it believes supports this speci?cation
for the Defense?s review.

b. In Specification 5, the Government alleges ?more than twenty classi?ed records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database. . The Defense requests that the
Government identify the exact number and specific records it believes supports this speci?cation
for the Defense?s review.

c. In Speci?cation 7, the Government alleges ?more than twenty classi?ed records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database. . The Defense requests
that the Government identify the exact number and speci?c records it believes supports this
speci?cation for the Defense?s review.

19632

d. In Speci?cation 9, the Government alleges ?more than three classi?ed records from a
United States Southern Command database. . The Defense requests that the Government
identify the exact number and speci?c records it believes supports this speci?cation for the
Defense?s review.

e. In Speci?cation 10, the Government alleges ?more than ?ve classi?ed records relating to a
military operation in Farah Province. Afghanistan occurring on or about 4 May The
Defense requests that the Govermnent identify the exact number and speci?c records it believes
supports this speci?cation for the Defense?s review.

f. In Speci?cation I3, the Government alleges ?more than seventy-?ve classi?ed United
States Department of State cables. . The Defense requests that the Government identify the
exact number and speci?c records it believes supports this speci?cation for the Defense?s
review.

General Article 134 Knowingly Exceeding Authorized Acce.s'.s' in Violation of 18 Section
1030(a2(1)

12. PFC Manning is also charged with two speci?cations of a violation of Article 134, UCMJ,
alleging that he ?knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network computer, and by means of such conduct . . . obtained namely,
diplomatic cables, in violation of 18 United States Code Section 1030(a)(1). The Defense
requests the Government to provide the following particulars:

a. How did PFC Manning ?knowingly exceed[] authorized access on a Secret Internet
Protocol Router Network computer in Speci?cation 13 of Charge This information is
necessary so that PFC Manning may adequately prepare a defense to the offense charged in these
two speci?cations. The Government fails to specify in what manner PFC Manning exceeded his
authorized access to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer. This infonnation is
essential to PFC Manning?s adequate preparation of his defense. See Schwarz, 15 M.J. at 1 11;
see also discussion in paragraph 7, supra.

b. IIow did PFC Manning ?knowingly exceed[] authorized access on a Secret lntemet
Protocol Router Network computer in Speci?cation 14 of Charge ll??

Article 92 Violation of a lawful general regulation

13. Finally, PFC Manning is also charged with ?ve speci?cations of a violation of UCMJ
Article 92. With respect to the Speci?cations under Charge the Defense requests the
following particulars:

a. In Specification 1, what is the alleged conduct that the Government believes was an
attempt to bypass network or information system security mechanisms?

b. In Speci?cation 2 and 3, what is the unauthorized software alleged to have been added
to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer?

19633

c. In Speci?cation 2 and 3, which computer is the Government alleging the software was
added to?

cl. In Specification 2 and 3, how is the Government alleging the software was added to
the computers?

e. In Speci?cation 4, how does the Government allege PFC Marming used an
information system in a manner other than its intended purpose??

Although the reasons for these narrowing questions appear self-evident due to the vagueness of
the speci?cations as charged, further elaboration will be provided during argument upon this
Court?s request.

14. In sum, these vague speci?cations are unconstitutional in that they infringe upon PFC
Marming?s Sixth Amendment right to prepare and present a defense. See United States v.
Williams, 40 MJ. 379, 380 (C .M.A. 1994) (citing Fawcett v. Bablitch, 962 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.
1992). The failure of the Government to furnish the information sought, well in advance of trial,

would be a denial of due process and a clear violation of the rights guaranteed by the i?h, Sixth.

and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. See generally Birmley, 529
F.2d. 108 (6th Cir. Chambers v. Mississippi, 4l0 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Cole v. Arkansas,
333 U.S. 196 (1948).

CONCLUSION
15. Based on the above, the Defense requests that the Court order the Government to ?le a bill

of particulars on the above requested information.

Respectfully submitted,



DAVID EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

UNITED STATES

V.

MANNING, Bradley E., PFC
us. Anny,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.

Army Garrison. Joint Base Myer?Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 22211

19634

DEFENSE MOTION TO
COMPEL DEPOSITIONS

16 February 2012



SOUGHT

1. In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 702(c)(2), the Defense requests that
an oral deposition of the below listed individuals be conducted prior to trial.

a. CPT James Kolkv, ls? Caval Division, Fort Hood, Texas, Brigade S-2,
He will testify about his classification review of the three

Apache gun videos that were sent to his Division by FORSCOM. Specifically, he will
testify that the videos were not classified at the time of their alleged release. However, he
will testify that he believes that videos should have been classified. He will also testify
regarding his classification determination. The requested deposition is needed due to the
Article 32 Investigating Off1cer?s improper determination that CPT Kolky was not
reasonably available at the Article 32 hearing. PT Kolky was an essential witness and
should have been produced in person at the Article 32 hearing. Additionally, given the
fact CPT Kolky believes the matter that the Defense wishes to discuss with him is
classified, the Govemment needs to arrange for a proper location for the deposition. The
Defense requests that an oral deposition be conducted.

RADM Kevin M. Donegan, Director of Op?tions for United States

l. RADM Donegan conducted classification rewews
on two PowerPoint slide presentations of official reports originated by USCENTCOM.
The PowerPoint presentations are the subject of Speci?cation 10 of Charge II. RADM
Donegan will testify regarding his classi?cation determination and his belief of the impact
on national security due to the release of the information. The requested deposition is
needed due to the Article 32 Investigating Off1cer?s improper determination that RADM
Donegan was not reasonably available at the Article 32 hearing. RADM Donegan was an
essential witness and should have been produced in person at the Article 32 hearing.
Additionally, given the classified nature of his testimony. the Government needs to
arrange for a proper location for the deposition. The Defense requests that an oral
deposition be conducted.





Robert E. Betz, SCYBERCOM Chief Classification Advisory Officer, the Govemment
has not provided the defense with contact information for Mr. Betz. Mr. Betz will testify

d.

19635

about his classi?cation determination concerning the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo
and PFC Bradley Manning. Speci?cally. he will testify about his classi?cation
assessment of infomiation discussed in the alleged chat logs. The requested deposition is
needed due to the Article 32 Investigating O?'icer?s improper determination that Mr. Bet?/.
was not reasonably available at the Article 32 hearing. Mr. Betz was an essential witness
and should have been produced in person at the Article 32 hearing. Additionally. given
the classi?ed nature ofhis testimony. the Government needs to arrange for a proper
location for the deposition. The Defense requests that an oral deposition be conducted.

LtGen Robert Schmidle, Jr., Deputy Commander U.S. Cyber Command.

- LtGen Schmidle. is the Original lassi?c on
Authority (OCA) over the infomiation discussed by Mr. Bctz. LtGen Schmidle will
testify that he concurs with the classification determination and impact statements made
by Mr. Betz. The Defense would like to question him regarding his declaration and the
basis for his belief. The requested deposition is needed due to the Article 32 Investigating
Oflicer?s improper determination that LtGen Schmidle was not reasonably available at the
Article 32 hearing. LtGen Schmidle was an essential witness and should have been
produced in person at the Article 32 hearing. Additionally. given the classified nature of
his testimony, the Government needs to arrange for a proper location for the deposition.
The Defense requests that an oral deposition be conducted.

VADM Robert S. Harward, LJ SC ENTCOM, Deputy Commander, MacDill Air Force
Base, Florida 33621. - . VADM Harward will
testify eonceming his classification review and classification determination concerning
the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, CIDNE Iraq Events, other briefings and the BE22
PAX.wmv video. Specifically, VADM Harward will testify concerning his classi?cation
determination and his beliefof the impact on national security from having this
infomiation released to the public. The requested deposition is needed due to the Article
32 Investigating Officer?s improper determination that VADM Harward was not
reasonably available at the Article 32 hearing. VADM Harward was an essential witness
and should have been produced in person at the Article 32 hearing. Additionally, given
the classi?ed nature ofhis testimony, the Government needs to arrange for a proper
location for the deposition. The Defense requests that an oral deposition be conducted.

Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary ofState for Management. The Govemment has not
provided contact information for Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy will testify concerning his
review of the disclosure of Department of State Diplomatic Cables stored within the Net-
Centric Diplomacy server and pan Mr. Kennedy will testify concerning his
classification determination and the impact of the release of the infonnation on national
security. The requested deposition is needed due to the Article 32 Investigating Of?cer?s
improper determination that Mr. Kennedy was not reasonably available at the Article 32
hearing. Mr. Kemiedy was an essential witness and should have been produced in person
at the Article 32 hearing. Additionally. given the classi?ed nature of his testimony. the
Government needs to arrange for a proper location for the deposition. The Defense
requests that an oral deposition be conducted.

IJ

19636

g. RADM David B. Woods, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (J TF-GTMO),
RADM Woods will testify concerning his

review of the disclosure of ?ve documents, totaling twenty-two pages. RADM Woods
will testify concerning his classi?cation determination and his belief regarding the impact
of the release of the information on national security. The requested deposition is needed
due to the Article 32 Investigating Officer?s improper determination that RADM Woods
was not reasonably available at the Article 32 hearing. RADM Woods was an essential
witness and should have been produced in person at the Article 32 hearing. Additionally,
given the classi?ed nature of his testimony, the Government needs to arrange for a proper
location for the deposition. The Defense requests that an oral deposition be conducted.

h. Mr. Robert Roland. The government has not provided contact information for Mr.
Roland. The requested deposition is needed due to Mr. Roland not being produced by the
Government at the Article 32 hearing. Mr. Roland was an essential witness and should
have been produced in person at the Article 32 hearing. Additionally, given the classi?ed
nature of his testimony, the Government needs to arrange for a proper location for the
deposition. The Defense requests that an oral deposition be conducted.

BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

2. As the moving party, the Defense has the burden of persuasion. R.C.M. 905(c)(2). The
burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C.M. 905(c)(1).

FACTS

3. PFC Manning is charged with ?ve speci?cations of violating a lawful general regulation, one
speci?cation of aiding the enemy, one speci?cation of disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline and service discrediting, eight speci?cations of communicating
classi?ed information, ?ve speci?cations of stealing or knowingly converting Government
property, and two speci?cations of knowingly exceeding authorized access to a Government
computer, in violation of Articles 92, 104, and 134, UCMJ, l0 U.S.C. 892, 904, 934 (2010).

4. The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the
convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 201 1.
On 16 December through 22 December 201 1, these charges were investigated by an Article 32
10. The charges were referred without special instructions to a general court-martial on 3

ebruary 2012.

5. The Defense began asking for the classi?cation determinations during discovery as
early as 15 November 2010, approximately 14 months ago. See Attachment A. On multiple
subsequent occasions, the Defense renewed its request for the classi?cation
determinations. For over a year, the Government justi?cd its need for excludable delay to the
Convening Authority, in part, due to the requirement to obtain these classi?cation
determinations. The Government provided these determinations to the Defense piecemeal. It

9)

19637

was not until the late fall (approximately November 201]) that the Defense had in its possession
all of the OCA classi?cation detenninations. See Attachment B.

6. On 2 December 201 1, the Defense submitted its witness list to the Article 32 lnvesti gating
Of?cer, naming the seven as witnesses and explaining in detail the relevance of each of
the testimony. See Attachment C. That same day, the Government also submitted its
witness list; it did not place any of the OCAs on its list. See Attachment D. On 7 December, the
Government responded to the Defense?s witness list. See Attachment E. With the exception of
CPT James Kolky, the Government did not deny that the testimony of the OCA was relevant.
Instead, the Government asked the Investigating Officer to find each OCA ?not reasonably
available for the Article 32 given his position as Id at pp. 9-10. On 8 December 2011, the
Defense submitted a ?Witness Justification? memorandum to the Investigating Of?cer, wherein
it challenged the Govemment?s blanket avennents that the OCAS were not reasonably available.
See Attachment F. In particular, the Defense wrote at p. 5, ?The government objected to the
defense request for any of these witnesses. The government, without justification, requested that
you ?nd the requested witnesses were not reasonably available given the importance of their
respective position. The government seems to argue that in matters of military justice, if you
have too important a position, you should not be bothered. Military justice should not be
controlled by the importance of your duty position. Each individual took the time to provide an
unswom affidavit. The defense should be provided with the opportunity to examine these
witnesses at the Article 32 hearing.? Id.

7. The Defense also objected to the G0vemment?s attempt to adduce the unswom
statements in lieu of sworn statements at the Article 32. In this respect, the Defense argued:

In the event these witnesses are not produced, the defense objects to the Investigating
Officer considering their unswom statements. R.C.M. Unswom
statements under 28 U.S.C. 1746 cannot be considered by the Investigating Officer.
The Manual for Courts-Martial requires that testimony given at an Article 32 be under
oath. R.C.M. If a witness is deemed not reasonably available. the
Investigating Of?cer can consider sworn statements. R.C.M. An
unswom statement provided under 28 U.S.C. 1746 is not a sworn statement. In order
for an unswom statement provided under 28 U.S.C. 1746 to be admissible. it must be
subscribed and signed ?in a judicial proceeding or course of justice? in order to subject
the declarant to the penalty of perjury at the Article 32 hearing. See Article 131 e(3)
(noting that ?Section 1746 does not change the requirement that a deposition be given
under oath or alter the situation where an oath is required to be taken before a speci?c
person?); See also 28 U.S.C. 1746 (noting that the unswom declaration is not effective
in ?depositions or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified
Id. at p. 5.

8. The Government did not respond fonnally to the Defense?s position. Rather, the Government
sent the Investigating Of?cer an email where it responded to miscellaneous matters. With
respect to the sworn/unswom statements, the Government wrote:

At the time, there were seven identi?ed OCAs. A subsequent OCA was requested as soon as his identity was
known to the Defense.

19638

The United States objects to your consideration of Article 131, Perjury, as a reference in
determining whether a statement is properly sworn. Article 131 is a punitive article
intended to criminalize sworn statements by Servicemembers during ajudicial
proceeding. The original classi?cation authority (OCA) reviews are simply sworn
statements made ?under penalty of perjury? IAW 28 U.S.C. 1746. Rather than Article
13 the United States recommends you consider Article 134, False Swearing, and
specifically the portion under the explanation which states, does not include such
statements made in a judicial proceeding or course of justice, as these are under Article
131, See MCM, part IV. paragraph 79c(1). Under the defense?s proposed
analysis, the only sworn statements that you could consider during this investigation, are
previously sworn statements given under oath at an Article 32 investigation or court-
martial. See Attachment G.

9. That same day, the Defense responded by email stating, declaration under 28 .S.C.
Section 1746 is an ?Unswom Statement.? As such, unlike sworn statements under 2823, these
statements are not admissible over defense objection unless signed during the Article 32 hearing.
A plain reading of 28 U.S.C. Section 1746 and R.C.M. 405(h)(] undercuts the govemment?s
position. The analysis to Article 131 also reaffirms the defense?s position." See Attachment H.

10. On l2 December 2011, the parties participated in an 802 conference to discuss various
matters. The Investigating Officer had not, at this point, made any determination as to what
witnesses would appear at the Article 32 hearing, even though the hearing was scheduled for a
few days later. However, he had done independent research and provided the parties with
several cases which showed that he was inclined to treat the unswom statements as sworn
statements for the Article 32. He asked the parties to respond to the cases he had found. The
Defense looked up these cases and prepared a statement on why these cases were inapposite,
sending this to the Investigating Officer and the Government later that day. In that email, the
Defense wrote:

28 U.S.C. 1746 Statements

In response to your request for us to look at 2010 WL 2265833 and 2002 WL 243445, the
defense?s position is that both cases are inapplicable to the situation at hand. In Faison,
the found that TRD was unavailable and that her videotaped statement was sworn.
Such a determination was appropriate given the fact TRD responded to questions
indicating that she knew the difference between the truth and a lie and promised to tell
the truthCCA correctly concluded, this colloquy more than
adequately satisfied the oath/affirmation requirement so as to make videotaped
statement a sworn statement under R.C.M. In the instant case, unswom
statements under 28 U.S.C. 1746 do not share any of the same hallmarks of a sworn
statement. The statements are not made in front of anyone and the statements are not
similar, in that they are not made in front of a person authorized to administer oaths.

Likewise, Elsevier dealt with a videotaped interview that was done without a formal
swearing or oath. However. it quali?ed as a sworn statement in accordance with R.C.M.
since on a later date the unavailable witness did swear to the truth of the

19639

statements contained therein. The correctly found this to be a sworn adoption of the
videotaped interviews that, pursuant to United States v. Wood, 36 M.J. 651 (A.C.M.R.
I992), rendered it admissible. None of the individuals who provided the unswom
statements under 28 U.S. C. 1746 have subsequently provided a sworn adoption of their
unswom statement in accordance with R.C.M.

An unswom statement provided under 28 .S.C. 1746 does not qualify as a sworn
statement. In order for an unswom statement provided under 28 .S.C. 1746 to be
admissible, it must be subscribed and signed ?in a judicial proceeding or course of
justice? at the Article 32 hearing. A plain reading of 28 U.S.C Section 1746 and R.C.M.
405(h)(1)(A) undercuts any argument to the contrary. See Attachment 1.

11. The Govemment?s one line response was, ?The United States maintains its previously stated
position on the validity of the sworn statements." See Attachment J. The Investigating
Of?cer did not ask the Government to respond speci?cally to the Defense?s argument or to
advance its own interpretation of the cases.

12. On 14 December 2011, the Investigating Of?cer ruled in favor of the Government on the
unswom statements. See Attachment K. In support of its ruling, the Investigating Of?cer
produced three new cases that he believed supported the proposition the Government was
advancing.2 In making his ruling, the Investigating Of?cer stated, also note that the
classification review statements at issue all indicate that they are in the ?course of justice? as
they all indicate the persons making the statements knew they were being prepared for use in this
case. As such, I consider these statements to have the same indicia of reliability as sworn
statements.? Id. The last line of the Investigating Off1cer?s ruling clearly reveals that he did not
deem an unswom statement made under penalty of perjury to be equivalent to a ?swom
statement? under Rather, he determined that an unswom statement should be
admissible because it carried with it ?the same indicia of reliability as sworn statements.? Id.
The Dcfense?s position was that the Investigating Of?cer fabricated a new ground upon which to
admit statements under 405(g)(4)(B) that the statement carries ?the same indicia of reliability
as sworn statements? which is not permitted under military law.3

13. At the time the Investigating Of?cer had made the determination that the unswom
statements would admissible because they carried the same indicia of reliability as sworn
statements, he had not yet even formally ruled on whether the OCAs were ?reasonably available
or would be produced at trial. Clearly, the implication of the Investigating Of?cer?s ruling on

93

2 Only one of these was a military case; two were federal appellate cases. The defense maintains that none of the
cases offers support for the proposition that an unswom statement under 28 U.S. C. 1746 can be converted into a
sworn statement under R.C.M. In fact, the only military case cited by the Investigating Of?cer,
United States v. Gunderman, 67 M.J. 683 (C .A.A.F. 2009) appears to lend more support to the defense?s position
that that of the govemment/Investigating Officer. The Army Court of Criminal Appeals in Gunderman emphasizes
that, ?To be admissible before this court, factual assertions must be admitted in a proper fom1 Indeed, our
own internal rules re?ect this requirement for some form of solemnity." Id. at 686-7. The court continued, ?By
reaf?nning this requirement, we do not exalt form over substance However, assertions of fact must either be
contained in the record or be offered in an admissible form.? Id. at 688. In short, Gunderman establishes that form
is important and evidence proffered by either party must be ?in an admissible fonn.?

3 Note that this determination by the Investigating Of?cer formed one of four bases for the Defense?s Motion for the
Investigating Of?cer to recuse himself. See Attachment M.

19640

the unswom statements meant that he had determined that they would not be required to appear
but he had yet to provide a basis for that ruling. Later that night, the Investigating Of?eer ?nally
made his first (in a series) of witness determinations. He determined that the testimony of six of
the seven OCAS was ?relevant? but that the signi?cance of the expected testimony did
not ?outweigh the dif?culty, expense and effect on military operations? so as to justify the
presence at the Article 32.4 See Attachment L. Ile found the CPT James Kolky?s
expected testimony was not relevant to the form of the charges, the truth of the charges, or
information necessary to make an informed recommendation. Id

14. During the course of the Article 32 hearing, and after the Defense made a motion for the
Investigating Officer to recuse himself,5 the Investigating Officer advised the Government that
he might require the presence by telephone and asked the Government to have telephonic
contact information available and to ensure that the OCAs were ready to testify by telephone.
The Government agreed to do so. The Defense objected to this request and explained that it
needed the OCAs to testify in person such that it could hand them various documents and
exhibits. At this point, the Investigating Officer reverted back to his ruling that he would
consider the unswom statements in lieu of calling the OCAs to testify either telephonically or in
person. The Investigating Officer considered the unswom declarations of the OCAs and
ultimately recommended that all charges be referred to a general court-martial.

15. On 12 January 2012, the Defense ?led a Request for Oral Deposition with the Special Court-
Martial Convening Authority (SPCMA). See Attachment N. On 16 January, 2012, the Defense
?led another Request for Oral Deposition naming two additional OCAs. See Attachment 0. On
18 January, 2012, the disapproved the Defense?s request. See Attachment P. With
respect to six of the OCAs (para. 2), the wrote, ?The 10 determined that the difficulty,
expense and or/effect on military operations outweighed the signi?cance of the expected
testimony There is no evidence that the witnesses will not be available for trial if their
testimony is determined relevant and proper Id. With respect to Mr. Roland, the
disapproved of the request because ?The defense did not request Mr. Roland as an Article 32
witness. There is no evidence that the witness will not be available at trial if their testimony is
determined relevant and necessary.? Id.

16. On 23 January 2012. the Defense ?led a Request for Oral Deposition with the General
Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA). See Attachment Q. On 1 February 2012, the
GCMCA denied the Defense?s request on virtually identical grounds. See Attachment R.

17. On 20 January 2012, the Defense ?led with the Government a Discovery Request wherein it
asked for complete contact information for various OCAs. See Attachment S. On 27 January,

2012, the Government responded that it would not provide contact information for the OCAS on
the grounds that ?the defense has failed to provide any basis for the request." See Attachment T.

l8. The Defense was confused by the Govemment?s refusal to provide contact information for
the OCAS. The Defense knows that such information is readily available as the Government
represented to the Investigating Officer that they would be prepared to contact the OCAs by

4 Although the wording differed with respect to each OCA, the thrust of the detennination was identical.
5 See Attachment M.

19641

telephone during the Article 32. In response to the Govemment?s refusal, the Defense sent an
email to the Government reading, in part:

I am a little confused by the govemment?s response concerning contact information for
Mr. Roland, Ambassador Kennedy, and Mr. Bctz. Is it the govemment?s position that
even though you have ready access to the contact information for these potential
witnesses, you will not provide this information to the defense? If so, can you elaborate
on the basis for your denial to provide this information that is consistent with the
requirements of Article 45. See Attachment U.

19. The Government responded:

As for the contact information for Mr. Betz, Ambassador Kennedy, and Mr. Roland- All
three are not currently identified as government witnesses. If they are identified as
witnesses, then their contact information will be provided pursuant to the govemment?s
requirements under Article 46, UCMJ and relevant portions of the RCM. If this is not
responsive, the defense is invited to renew its request with a more specific basis and the
proper authority for receiving the contact information. Id.

20. The Defense wrote back:

I am still confused by the government?s refusal to provide contact infonnation for Mr.
Roland, Ambassador Kennedy, and Mr. Betz. At this point, it appears that the
government is improperly impeding the defense?s access to these potential witnesses. In
discovery, the government provided the defense with an unswom declaration from each
of these potential witnesses. Additionally, you introduced these declarations into
evidence at the Article 32, and were prepared to call each by telephone should the IO
deem the unswom declarations inadmissible. Therefore, the defense would like to
interview Mr. Roland, Ambassador Kennedy and Mr. Betz.

The requirements of Article 46 are not dependent upon whether the government
ultimately decides to list a particular individual on their witness list or not. Instead, it
speaks to the right of the trial counsel, defense counsel, and court-martial to obtain
witnesses and other evidence. Please provide contact information for Mr. Roland,
Ambassador Kennedy and Mr. Betz by1700 tomorrow. Id.

21. Again, the Government refused to provide contact information:

At this time, we will not provide the contact information for Mr. Roland, Ambassador
Kennedy, or Mr. Betz; however, if they are designated as government witnesses we will
not only provide the information, but coordinate meetings for the defense to interview
these senior level officials, and any other senior officials designated as government
witnesses. These meetings will be well before trial so that each party has adequate
opportunity to prepare its case and equal opportunity to interview witnesses.

As of today, none of these three individuals will be witnesses at a court-martial, if the

19642

case is referred. Although the United States intends to call senior military/govemment
officials as witnesses, we have not identi?ed these individuals as our witnesses. The
United States understands its obligations under Article 46, CMJ applicable rules, and
applicable case law, and is con?dent the defense will have equal opportunity to obtain
witnesses, as defined by these sources and overseen by a military judge. Id

22. The Defense then indicated that it ?would like to explore the possibility of calling these
individuals as defense witnesses. Please be so kind as to provide contact information for

them. Thank you.? On I February, 2012, the Government responded ?Absolutely. We will start
working with each organization to determine the best way for the defense to contact the
individuals.? Id. Over two weeks later, the Government has still not provided the Defense with
the relevant contact information.



23. The Defense does not request any witnesses be produced for this motion. The Defense
respectfully requests this court to consider the referred charge sheet in support of its motion, as
well as the Attachments referenced herein.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

24. Although the stated purpose of depositions is generally to preserve the testimony of an
unavailable witness, a deposition may be taken when there was an improper denial of a witness
request at an Article 32 hearing or where the government has improperly impeded defense access
to a witness. See R.C.M. 702(3)(discussion). See also United States v. Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154
(C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Cumberledge, 6 M.J. 203, 205, n. 13 (C.M.A. 1979); United
States v. Chuculate, 5 M.J. 143 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Chestnut, 2 M.J. 84 (C.M.A.
1976). In this case, the original denial of the OCA witness request at the Article 32 was
improper. Additionally, the Government has impeded the Defense?s access to the OCA
witnesses. Accordingly, the Defense requests that you order a deposition of the OCAs under
R.C.M. 702.

25. The Defense has taken proactive steps indeed, every step it possibly could to protect the
rights of PFC Manning. It asked for the OCAs to appear in person at the Article 32; it objected
to the introduction of unswom statements for consideration by the Investigating Officer; it
requested from the and the GCMCA that it be permitted to depose the it
requested contact infonnation for the OCAs from the Government. The Defense has ?timely
urge [the accused?s] pretrial rights? and thus requests that this Court order that the OCAs be
deposed. See United States v. Chuculate, 5 M.J. 143, 145 (CMA 1978) (??Thus, if an accused is
deprived of a substantial pretrial right on timely objection, he is entitled to judicial enforcement
of his right, without regard to whether such enforcement will benefit him at

26. For over a year, PFC Marming?s trial was delayed because the Government needed to obtain
the appropriate classi?cation reviews from the relevant OCAs. Time after time, the Government

19643

hid behind the OCA approval process in denying Defense requests for discovery. Finally, a
month before the Article 32, the Government secured all relevant OCA approvals and the court-
martial process was able to begin.

27. When the Defense asked that the OCAS appear personally at the Article 32 so that the
Defense could cross-examine them about their classi?cation determinations, the Government
balked. While the Government conceded they were relevant, it maintained that they were, in
effect, too important to appear at an Article 32 hearing. The Investigating Of?cer agreed with
the Government. He determined that the testimony of six of the seven OCAs was relevant but
that the signi?cance of the expected testimony did not ?outweigh the dif?culty, expense
and effect on military operations? so as to justify the presence at the Article 32. See
Attachment L. It is ironic that, after over a year of waiting for the OCAS to complete their
important work, the work was deemed not important enough to justify them personally
appearing at the Article 32 hearing.

28. The Investigating Of?cer did not provide any support or reasons to buttress his conclusion
that the OCAs were ?not reasonably available.? United States v. Samuels, 1959 WL 3613
(C.M.A.) (the investigating of?cer should set out the circumstances upon which the conclusion
of the unavailability is predicated). Moreover, the Defense believes that the Investigating
Of?cer?s determination was not thoughtful and considered, but merely a rote recitation of the test
for availability. This is supported by the fact that the Investigating Of?cer was completely
?wishy-washy? on whether the OCAs would be required to testify. First, he determined two
days before the Article 32 hearing that the OCAS were not reasonably available. At the hearing,
he then suggested that the OCAs would be compelled to testify (and thus, were reasonably
available at least telephonically). He then reaf?rmed that the OCAs were not reasonably
available and that he would consider only their unswom statements. This prevarication suggests
that the Investigating Of?cer did not carefully weigh the relevant interests, but rather made his
decision on a whim. It is illogical to think that a witness could be ?not reasonably available? one
day and then miraculously ?reasonably available" another day.

29. The Government went to great pains to ensure that the unswom statements of the OCAs
were considered by the Investigating Of?cer. The Defense objected to the Govemment?s proffer
of unswom statements as being in contravention of R.C.M. 405. The Investigating Of?cer, who
had consistently made rulings in favor of the Government during the Article 32 process, was
prepared to ?nd the statements admissible even though they were in improper form. He
determined that the statements were unswom, but carried with them the same ?indicia of
reliability? as sworn statements. The lnvesti gating Of?cer proceeded to consider the unswom
statements of the as such, the Defense did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the
OCAS at the Article 32. The Defense submits that given: a) the Govemment?s extensive efforts
to ensure that the Investigating Of?cer would consider the unswom statements and b) the
Investigating Of?cer ?bending over backwards? to ensure that he could consider such statements
despite being proffered in an inadmissible form, the Defense should have an opportunity to
depose these OCAs. The Government had the full benefit of having its evidence considered by
the Investigating Of?cer, but none of the burdens cross-examination). See United States v.
Cabrera-Frattini, 65 MJ. 950 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App., 2008) (a deposition may be ordered to allow
the defense an opportunity to cross-examine an essential witness who was not available at the

19644

Article 32 investigation.); United States v. Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37, 43 (an Article 32
investigation serves a twofold purpose as a discovery proceeding on behalf of the accused and as
a means of establishing probable cause as a guard against the referral to trial of baseless
charges).

30. After the Article 32, the Defense ?led two Requests for Oral Depositions with the
and the GCMCA. Both were denied. Both conceded that the testimony was relevant but
deferred to the Investigating Of?cer?s determination that the dif?culty, expense and or/effect on
military operations outweighed the signi?cance of the expected testimony. Both the
and the GCMCA indicated that there was no evidence that the witnesses would not be available
for trial if deemed relevant and proper. The Defense had now faced four perfunctory denials of
its requests to cross-examine or depose the OCAS.

31. While all concede that the testimony is relevant, all make blanket assertions that the
dif?culty, expense and or/effect on military operations outweighs the signi?cance of the
expected testimony. Essentially, the Investigating Of?cer adopted the Govemment?s conclusory
assertion that each OCA was ?not reasonably available for the Article 32 given his position as
See Attachment at pp. 9-10. In tum, the adopted the Investigating Of?cer?s
conclusory assertion that ?the difficulty, expense and or/effect on military operations outweighs
the signi?cance of the expected testimony.? See Attachment L. In turn, the GCMCA adopted
the Investigating Officer and the conclusory assertion that ?the dif?culty, expense
and or/effect on military operations outweighs the signi?cance of the expected testimony.? See
Attachment R. Such unquestioning reliance on bald assertions of unavailability is improper. See
United States v. umberledge, 6 M.J. 203, 205 (C.M.A. 1979) (accepting defendant?s argument
that military judge erred in ?adopting the reasoning of the staff judge advocate and the
Article 32 investigating of?cer on the question of the availability of [2 witnesses] for the Article
32 hearing [T]he evidence demonstrates that the Government [had] suf?cient funds and
the ability to secure these witnesses? presence at the Article 32 hearing

32. No one has provided any explanation as to why or how the burdens of testifying at an Article
32 or at a deposition outweigh the relevance of the testimony. The Defense has simply had to
rely on the say-so of the Government, which was wholesale adopted by the Investigating Of?cer,
and which, in turn, was wholesale adopted by the and the GCMCA. In United States
v. Chestnut, 2 MJ. 84 (CMA 1976), the Court of Military Appeals criticized the investigating
officer and trial judge for using ?assumptions of [the] witness? availability, rather than
[requiring] evidence demonstrating circumstances or exigencies warranting the excusal of [the
witness] from the Article 32 hearing.?

33. The Defense would like to question the OCAS about materials that they prepared in response
to this case and apparently are prepared to stand by.6 How dif?cult can it be to answer questions
that test the basis of a statement that one has made under penalty of perjury? Presumably, prior
to submitting such a statement, an OCA would have a very good grasp of all the issues contained
therein. Moreover, what is the ?expense? involved?? The cost of transportation? Surely in a case
of national importance, the cost of a few ?ights is not too much for the U.S. government to bear.

6 The Defense takes this to be the logical corollary of the Govemment?s position that the unswom statements are
actually sworn statements because they are made under penalty of perjury.

19645

Finally, how are military operations signi?cantly impacted by requiring an OCA to answer
questions about his unswom statement? It is hard to believe that military operations would
suffer by having an OCA take a few hours or at most a day out ofhis schedule. United
States v. Ledbetter, 2 MJ. 37 (C.M.A. 1976) (?In addition, there was no showing that military
exigencies or other extraordinary circumstances warranted excusal of the witness, who was
subject to military orders?).

34. It seems that the Government, the Investigating Officer, the and the GCMCA
keep on passing the buck and saying that the Defense can examine these witnesses ?later.?
?Later? is now. The Defense should not be in a position where it is speaking with the OCAS for
that first time at trial.

35. In an effort to reach out to some of the OCAs on its own, the Defense requested their contact
information. The Government, despite having this contact information readily available, refused
to provide it to the Defense. The Govemment?s position appeared to be that because, at this
point in time, the Government was inclined not to call the OCAS as witnesses, it would not share
their contact information with the Defense. The Defense ?nds this position illogical and
indefensible. The Defense?s ability to speak to a relevant witness does not ebb and ?ow in
conformity with the whims of the Government. See United States v. Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154, 159
(C .M.A. I980) .. the record of trial here reveals that the rights of the [defendant] were not
adequately safeguarded. Mckilroy was clearly a potential witness for the prosecution. Even in
the last communication to defense counsel, the trial counsel recognized [that

36. The Government has signaled that these OCA determinations are critically important both
by virtue of the time expended obtaining them over the year, and the effort to ensure that they
were considered by the Investigating Officer (even in improper form) at the Article 32. The
Government cannot now ?change its mind? and downplay the signi?cance of these
determinations.

37. When the Defense indicated that it might consider calling the OCAS as witnesses for the
Defense, the Government then ?absolutely? agreed to provide the contact information. It is two
weeks later, and the Defense still does not have any of the three phone numbers. United States v.
Cumberledge, 6 M.J. 203, 205 n. 13 (C.M.A. 1979) (?it is nevertheless incumbent upon the
Government to provide the defense counsel with timely and meaningful access to the
in original). The Defense believes that the Government has been
improperly impeding the Defense?s access to these witnesses, to the point where the Government
re?exively and repeatedly refused to provide Contact information. It has certainly not provided
either ?timely? or ?meaningful? access to the OCAS.

19646

V. RELIEF REQUESTED

38. Accordingly, pursuant to the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 702(c)(2), the Defense
requests that an oral deposition of the above-listed OCAS be conducted prior to trial.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel




Attachment A



UNITED STATES
DEFENSE DISCOVERY
REQUEST

MANNING, Bradley PFC

US. Amty,

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. 11.8.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall.
Fort Myer. VA 2221

DATED: 15 November 2010



1. In accordance with the Rules for Courts~Martial and the Military Rules of
Evidence, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 2008, Article 46.
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and other applicable law, request for
supplemental discovery is hereby made for the charged offenses in the case of
United States v. Bradley E. Manning.

2. The defense requests that the govermnent respond to each item listed in its
29 October 20l0 discovery request and the following additional discovery:

21. The names and Contact information for all government investigators who
have participated or who are presently participating in the investigation of the
case, previously requested on 29 October 2010. Speci?cally, the names of
the investigators and an inventory ofthe items seized from the home of Ms.
Debra Van l-192 Selworthy Road. Potomac. MD 20854 on 2
November 2t)l 0. Additionally, a list of items seized from Mr. David House
and a copy of all reports or analysis of the items seized by the Department of
Homeland Security. the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). or any other
govemment agency on 3 November 2010. Finally. a copy of all ?eld
interviews and reports conducted by the FBI or any other govemmental
organization involving witnesses from Boston, Massachusetts or any other
city from 24 May 2010 to the present involved in this case.

b. The entire counseling packet for PFC Manning. Specifically, any
counseling or assessments done of PFC Manning by his chain of command,
MSG Paul Adkins. PT Casey Martin, SSG Peter Bigelow, CPT Matthew
Freeburg, or ISG Mark Woodworth.

c. All Behavioral Health Assessments (BHA) or mental evaluations of PFC
Manning. previously requested by the defense on 29 October 2010. The
defense requests any assessment by CAPT Kenneth J. lverson, CAPT Bruce
Balfour, CAPT William Hocter. PT Eden Critchfield, CPT Dale Hill or any
other individual who has evaluated or commented on PFC Manning?s mental
state at any time. Speci?cally. the defense requests the 22 May and 28 May



0 19649

Defense Discovery Request PFC Bradley E. Manning

2010 BHA, and all assessments for POI recommendations to t.he Quantico
Confinement Facility.

Any and all documents or emails considered by CPT Kevin Ley as the
military magistrate to support his search and seizure authorizations.

e. Recorded video footage of when PFC Manning collapsed in con?nement
as referenced at 000095 an.d any other recorded audio or video footage of
PF Manning while in con?nement either in Iraq, Kuwait, or the United
States.

f. Network logs for all computers searched by CPT Thomas Cherepko or any
other government employee or investigator as referenced at 000186-87.

g. The application. Security and System Network logs obtained from PFC
Blake Dudley as referenced at 0000187.

h. The results of SA Calder Robertson and SA David Shaver?s
analysis of any computers analyzed in this case as well as copies of any
investigative notes or assessments by Computer Crimes Investigative Unit
(CCIU). Additionally, the names of all individuals from the CCIU or any
other govemment agency that have performed or are performing any
computer forensic analysis in this case.

i. All documentation or information provided by the government to LTC
Craig Merutl-ta. Speci?cally, copies of the chat logs referenced at 000455 and
copies of the CCIU reports referenced at 000463.

j. The results of inquiry/investigation and all discussions and assessments

done in compliance with Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5210.50.
Directive 5200.1 Chapter 10. S-5 105.21-M-1, Instruction
5240.4. and Executive Order 13526. Specifically, the defense requests the
answers to the following required investigative determinations by the above
Directives, Instruction, and Executive Order: When, where, and how
did the incident occur? What persons, situations, or conditions caused or
contributed to the incident?? What classified information was compromised??
If a compromise occurred, what speci?c classi?ed information and/or
material was involved? If classi?ed information is alleged to have been lost,
what steps were taken to locate the material? In what specific media article
or program did the classified information appear? To what extent was the
compromised information disseminated? Was the information properly
classi?ed?? Was the information officially reieased? Are there any ieads to
be investigated that might lead to identi?cation of the person(s) responsible
for the compromise??



Defense Discovery Request Bradley E. Manning

k. The defense also requests copies of any noti?cation to the Original
Classi?cation Authorities (OCA), the Contact infonnation for the OC/ts, and
the required answers by Directive that states when noti?ed of the
compromise of classi?ed information or material, the original classi?cation
authority for that information or material shall: Verify the classi?cation and
duration of classi?cation initially assigned to the information: Reevaluate the
classi?cation of the information to determine whether the classi?cation
should be continued or changed; and complete a damage assessment in
accordance with Instruction and Directive. The veri?cation,
reevaluation and damage assessment process is required by Directive to
be completed as soon as possible following noti?cation of a compromise.

3. The defense requests that the government informs the defense counsel if it
does not intend to comply with any specific provision of this request.

4. It is understood that this is a continuing request.

5. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by email on l5
November 2010.




DAV
Civilian Defense Counsel

?g

0
Attachment

19652

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADOUARTERS
1ST AIR CAVALRY BRIGADE
1 ST CAVALRY DIVISION
FORT MOOO. TEXAS 76544

^
REPLY HJ

AvrBiimoe-

AFVA-lACB-S2

23 August 2010

MUM0R4NDIM1 HRlf SJA. 1st Cavalry Division. Fort flood. Texas, 76544
FOR SJA, United States Army Forces Command, Fori McPherson. (jeoraia, 30.330
SUBJECT: Classification Review of Materials- United States v. Manning

1. On 10 Augu.sT 2010, the 1 si Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Brigade S-2. CPT James
Kolky and the Brigade Judge Advocate, CM' Stephanie Cooper viewed the tiiree .Apache gun videos
that were sent to Division by FORSCOM.
2. In answering the questions posed by FORSCOM, each version of the gun video was reviewed.
a. "Is the la{x; properly classilied?'"
(1) "At the time it was produced?"
It is impossible to tell whether these videos were properly classified when
produced. When the videos arc creaied by the aviator during the mission,
there is no way for him lo record the sequence of events vviih a clsssillcation
marking automatically inserted. After the mission is complete, the tactical
operations officer/sergeam who uploads ihe tape inserts a powerjjoinl
classification slide at the beginning and the end of every gun video. I he
classification slide depicts a blue screen with red words stilting "SECRET"'
and a declassilication date listed in smaller print. This runs for
approximately the first five seconds and the last five seconds of each video.
The process of pulling a classification label on the gun tapes was conducted
each time a tape was downloaded. By watching these videos one cannot teil
whether they were primly classified upon production, since the individual
with possession ofthese copies could have edited out the classillcatioii slide.
Without viewing the originally produced version oi" the video, it is impossible
to dctcrniine whether it was properly classified when produced.
(2) "As of Nov 09-Apr 10 when it likely was downloaded and forwarded to
Wikileaks?"
There is no way to leil whether the videos had a classificaxion marking when
downloaded and forwarded to Wikileaks. ilie process of uploading gun
video from the camera in the Apache onto a SI PR portal always included
inserting a classification slide at the beginning and end. However, whoever

ManningB_00376851

19653

AFVA-1ACB-S2
SUBJECT: Classification Review of Materials - United States v. Manning
accessed the video from the SIPR portal could have edited out the
classificaiion slides when downloaded and tbrwarded to Wikileaks. Without
viewing the original version ofthe video that was downloaded off the SIPR
portal, i! is impossible to know whether ihe video was properly classified.
(3) "today?"
l"hc videos are not properly classified. Bach should be classified ai a
minimum as ".secret'" since they are Theater Full Motion Video (i-MVj with
visible telemetric data and a visible l arge* .Requisition Display system.
b. " Who classified it? {by position or process)"'
By position, it was the tactical operations officer/sergeant who would insert the
elassiilcation slides to the videos. The process of classifying FMVs was done
pursuiini lo Security Classification Guides (SCO) issued by U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM), Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-l), United Slates forces-Iraq
(I.!SF-i), and in accordance with .4miy Regulation (.A.R) 380-5, para.2-8 and
fixecutive Order (EO) 12958. See. 1-5. The Security (iuides referenced above are
classified "secret." Ihe USCENTCOM guide am be downloaded off the
USCENICOM SIPR portal. A copy ofthe MNF-l SCO, 2007 Version, can be emailed to a SIPR address provided by EORSCOM. A copy ofthe USf-l SC(.i. 2008
Version, can "be found on SIPRnet at https:/.'forces.interaet.s-iraq.centcom.smil.mil.
c. "Were other similar Apache gun tapes made during this time frame (2007) and'or later
similarly classilied?"'
Yes. There were numerous .'\paclie gun tapes made during this time frame. I he
Brigade had a SIPR access site where videos were stored and used to assist ground
IbreeE in their respective Baghdad security zones. Hverv- gun \ ideo was classified a-s
"seerei," stored on a SIPR drive and uploaded onto a SIPR portal. In order to
download video from the portal an individual would have to have access to a SIPR
computer and own a SIPR account.
d. "Under what authority was the tape classilied? Was it classified pursuant to a security
classification guide or the exercise of original classification authority or was it derivatively
classified from other sourees,''authorities?'"
theater I'MVs with visible telemetric data were always ckwsiflcd as ' secret'"
pursuant to ihe MNF-I SCO, Tab A, Section D-23 (2007 Version) and USF-f SCO
Section D-24 (2008 Version).

ManningB_00376852

19654

AFVA-1ACB-S2
SU.BJEC F: Ciassiiication Review of Maierials - United States v. Mannina
e. "Under what classification category speettled in Execudve Order 13526. paragraph 1.4
does the content ofthe tapes fail?"
At the time these videos were created. KO 12958. as amended by EO 13292.
provided classification guidance. The categories under FO i 2958, Sec 1.5, that
affect this ciassiiication are listed above in the Security Classification Guides.
f. "What aspects ofthe tape are classified?
Aspects ofthe tapes that are classified include:
(I I Telemelric Data to include the Target Acquisition Display System (TADS) and
the Speed, Height, and Direction of ihe .Apache
- US CEN rCOM sec. CCR 380-14. App., A. #28.
- MNF-I SCO, Tab A. Sec D-22. D-23.
- USF-I SCO, Tab A, Sec. D-24 and lab B, See 3.2 D-23.
(2) Weapons capabilities and Targeting selection
- US CENTCOM SCO. CCR 380-14, App., A. #27.
MNETSCG.TabA. SccB-l.
-USFT SCO, Tab A, Sec B-I.
(3) Grid coordinates
- US CENTCOM SCO, CCR 380-14. App.. A. #24.
- MNF-l SCO Tab A, Sec A-17.
- USF-l SCO Tab A, Sec A-17.
(4) Radio Transmissions, Weekly Radio COMSEC, Call signs
- US CEN TCOM SCCi. CCR 380-14, App.. A. #39.
-MNF-l SCO, Tab A, Sec G-l.
3. The point of contact for this memorandum is CPT Stephanie R. Cooper, Brigade Judge
(b and the
Advocate, at (b)(6)
or via e-mail a(b)(6)
or via c-rnail at )
undersigned. CP'f James Kolky, Brigade S-2, at (b)(6)
(6
(b)(6)
I.
)

/ ) " T^r^

6AMES KOl.KY
CM, Ml
Brigade S-2

ManningB_00376853

'

19655

UNCLASSEFKED

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101
22 Febmary 2011

CCJ3-0
MEMORANDUM For Office ofthe StaffJudge Advocate
SUBJECT: PFC Manning (Wikileaks) Classification Review Request

1. In accordance with the request firom the Staff Judge Advocate for the US Army District of
Washington dated 20 November 2010, USCENTCOM CC.J3 conducted a classification
review of two PowerPoint presentations to determine: whether the information was
appropriately classified at the time of production; the current classification level ofthe
documents; and whether or not disclosure of the documents would cause harm to the national
security of the US.
2. RADM Kevin Donegan signed an affidavit attesting to the correct classification of the
documents both at the time of production as well as at the present time and the damage caused
by their unauthorized release.
3. The J3 POC for this memorandum is the undersigned, CCJ3-0-CAS,(b)(6)

HW. ELLISON m
''Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Central Asian States Action Officer

ManningB_00376871

19656

DECLARATION
I,

Rear Admiral Kevin N. Donegan, d e c l a r e and s t a t e :

I am a Naval Flag O f f i c e r , and I have served i n v a r i o u s u n i t e d
States Navy and j o i n t s e r v i c e assignments f o r over 30 years. I am t h e
D i r e c t o r o f Operations f o r U n i t e d States C e n t r a l Command (USCENTCOM), and
I am r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p l a n n i n g , o r g a n i z i n g , d i r e c t i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g
j o i n t and combined m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e Commander
U n i t e d States. C e n t r a l Command. I advise the Commander on a l l matters
p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l employment o f assigned
f o r c e s , t h e conduct o f j o i n t and combined o p e r a t i o n s and o t h e r necessary
f u n c t i o n s o f t h e command r e q u i r e d t o accomplish our assigned tasks and
missions. As D i r e c t o r o f Operations, I have been delegated O r i g i n a l
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n A u t h o r i t y by the Secretary o f Defense a t t h e Secret l e v e l .
I have h e l d my c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n f o r seven months.
PURPOSE OF DECLARATION
I submit t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n , i n the matter o f U n i t e d States v.
P r i v a t e F i r s t Class Bradley Manning, t o demonstrate t o t h e best o f my
knowledge and b e l i e f t h a t d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i d e n t i f i e d below
reasonably could be expected t o cause s e r i o u s damage t o the n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y o f the United S t a t e s . I n making t h e f o l l o w i n g statement
r e g a r d i n g t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s case, I r e l y on my
personal knowledge and experience, upon i n f o r m a t i o n made a v a i l a b l e t o me
i n my o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y , upon advice and conclusions reached and
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s made i n accordance t h e r e w i t h .

I d e l i b e r a t e l y s t r u c t u r e d t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n i n an u n c l a s s i f i e d form
t o f a c i l i t a t e i t s h a n d l i n g and use d u r i n g any j u d i c i a l proceeding.
DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
I n f o r m a t i o n which r e q u i r e s p r o t e c t i o n i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f n a t i o n a l
s e c u r i t y o f t h e United States i s designated CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION per Executive Order 13526, C l a s s i f i e d N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y
I n f o r m a t i o n , signed by President Obama on December 29, 2009. The p r i o r
Executive Order concerning c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was Executive Order 12958
signed by President C l i n t o n on A p r i l 20, 1995 as amended by President
George W. Bush on March 25, 2003. As s p e c i f i e d a t Section 1.2 o f EO
13526, i n f o r m a t i o n i s c l a s s i f i e d i n l e v e l s commensurate w i t h t h e
assessment t h a t unauthorized d i s c l o s u r e could cause t h e f o l l o w i n g
expected damage t o n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y :
a. Top Secret i n f o r m a t i o n
e x c e p t i o n a l l y grave damage
b. Secret i n f o r m a t i o n - s e r i o u s damage
c. C o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n - damage

IVIanningB_00376872

19657

U n c l a s s i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n does n o t r e q u i r e a s e c u r i t y clearance f o r
access, b u t nonetheless may be o f a s e n s i t i v e n a t u r e .

CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION
I reviewed t h e m a t e r i a l r e l a t e d t o t h i s case which was p r o v i d e d by
the S t a f f ^^udge Advocate f o r M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t o f Washington. The
documents i n q u e s t i o n a r e two PowerPoint s l i d e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f o f f i c i a l
r e p o r t s o r i g i n a t e d by USCENTCOM. The documents a r e c u r r e n t l y c l a s s i f i e d
a t t h e SECRET l e v e l . The documents were a p p r o p r i a t e l y c l a s s i f i e d a t the
SECRET l e v e l a t t h e time they were generated. They remain c u r r e n t l y and
p r o p e r l y c l a s s i f i e d SECRET under s e c t i o n s 1 . 2 ( a ) ( 2 ) , l . ^ ( a ) and l . ^ ( c ) o f
Executive Order 13526.
8oth PowerPoint s l i d e p r e s e n t a t i o n s d e s c r i b e t h e
A f t e r A c t i o n Review o f the Farah CI^CAS I n v e s t i g a t i o n t o General David
Petraeus. The f i l e names o f these two p r e s e n t a t i o n s have t h e dates ^5 May
2009 and 8 Uune 2009 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY I F INFOR^^ATION RELEASED
Unauthorized d i s c l o s u r e o f t h e c l a s s i f i e d m a t e r i a l s p e c i f i e d above
would r e v e a l i n t e l l i g e n c e sources and methods, C^SOTF-^A techniques and
procedures, as w e l l as s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t could a f f e c t r e l a t i o n s
between t h e US and i t s a l l i e s i n t h e r e g i o n .
Pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. ^1^^6, I declare under p e n a l t y of p e r j u r y t h a t t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d h e r e i n i s t r u e and c o r r e c t t o t h e best o f my^
knowledge.

^E^IN M. DONEGAN
RAt^, USN
D i r e c t o r o f Operations

Executed t h i s 15th day o f February 2011.

ManningB_00376873

19658

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
P O BOX 549
FORT MEADE. MARYLAND 20755-0549

^^^r^o: Chief of Staff (DS)

JUN 0 6 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR TRIAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE,
U.S. ARMY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 210 A STREET,
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319-5013
SUBJECT: Classification Review - United States v. Private First Class CPFO Bradlev E.
Manning
Reference: Your Memorandum, Subject: Request for Classification Review, 14 March 2011

1. As the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Chief of Staff, I am an original
classification authority (OCA.) with respect to DlSA-generated data. I tasked technical staff
in our Network Services Directorate to assess CENTAUR logs provided to you earlier on
a compact disc. CENTAUR is one of several DISA system security fimctionalities used on
DoD networks. The CENTAUR database, as a whole, aggregating extensive sensor information
about DoD networks, is classified. However, after assessment by DISA subject matter experts,

we have determined the extracted CENTAUR logs, a very limited subset of data logged relating
to the Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNet), to be unclassified. DISA regards
this data as sensitive, however, and asks that these specific logs not be released to the public.
2. With respect to data not created or owned by DISA, please note the SIPRNet is DoD's largest
interoperable command and control data network; it is a transport system. DoD and federal
organizations use SIPRNet transport to connect their independent classified enclaves to other
entities. Within die various enclaves, data is 'owned' and classified by the organization that
generates the data. DISA has no classification authority over the data in those enclaves.
3. My technical point of contact for this classification review is Mr. Dennis Ruth, at
or (b)(6)
My legal point of contact for this matter is
at (b)(6)
or (b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

\x;
iNDLER
Brigadier General, US.A.
Chief of Staff

ManningB_00376874

19659

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) DECLARATION
(U) 1, KOBRRT n,,K[::i;Z. declare and state:

(U) BACKGROUND
(U) ! am a Classification .Advisory Officer with 6 years of experience. My cuircnt position is IJSC'Y BERC(.).Vi Chief
Classification .Advisory Officer, whicli is responsible for supporting and advising Commander and Deputy
Commander, USCY15BRC0M as the command's senior classification expert. I report to the USCYBIiRCOM Chief
of Stiiff. 1 have held my current position for 2 years, and have over 6 years of experience in evaluating and applying
national security information classification regulations.
(U) PURPOSE OE DECLARATION
(I;) 1 submit this declaration, in the matter ofUnited States v. Private First Class Bradley Maimiriii.. lo demonstrate
to the best of my knowledge and belief that disclosure of the information identified below reasonably could be
cxpecteti to cause SLiRlOUS i).-\;v:A(ili to the national security ofthe United States. In making the following
.statement regarding the classified infonnation in this case, 1 rely on my personal knowledge and experience,
Executive Order 13526 Cia.s.s-ifieJ ,\'u!iomi/ Scciiri/y inJiiniiulUiii, Department of Defense Instruction 0-36()().U2
liifonualioii Operalion.^ {lO} Scciirify Cki.s.'iifk-al'ion Guidance. Department of Defense Regulation 5200.1 -R
Informal ion Scciiriiy Pivgnwi, and gdditional information available to me in my official capacity.

(U) I deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified form to facilitate its handling and use during any
judicial proceeding.
(U) DESIGNATION OE INI ORVIATION
(IJ) Information which requires piotcction in the interest of national security ofthe United States is designated
CLASSIFIED NA FIONA!. SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive Order 13526, Cla.'tsifk'd National S(;airiiy
In/oniuilion, signed by President Obama on December 29, 2009 [prior to .tune 27, 2010. refer to Executive Order
12958 signed by President Clinton on April 20, 1995 as amended by President George W. Bush on March 25, 2003].
Information is classified in levels commensurate with the assessment that unauthorized disclosure could cause the
following expected damage to national security:
a. (IJ) Top Secret information exceptionally grave damage

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 1 of 4

ManningB_00376875

19660

UNCLASSIFIED

b. (l.l) Secret information serious damage

c. (U) Confidential information damage
(U) Unclassified information does not require a security clearance for access, but nonetheless may be ofa sensitive
nature.
(U) PROTECTION OF INF ORMATION
(U) Within the Department of Defense, classified information is handled and protected in accordance with
Department of Defense Regulation 5200,1 -R Information Security Program. Classified information should be
handled and examined only under such conditions as are adequate to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining
access. Classified material may not be removed from designated work areas or moved from infonnation systems,
e.g. classified databases, computer networks, servers, or computers, except in the performance of official duties and
under special conditions which provide protection for the classified material.
(V) CLASS!EICATION DETERMINATION
(U) I reviewed the material related to this case, which was provided by the Prosecution in a memorandum dated 1X
Maieh 2011. The item in question is tJicisyclloiLotlaeomjMw

Ihe log has no classification markings

but contains national security information properly classified at the SECRET level per Department of Defense
Instruction 0-3600.02 infonuunnii Operation.^ (10) Security Chri.si/'iculion Guidance dated 28 November 2005, and
Strategic Command Instruction (SI) 720-1 Global Injoiinanon Grid (GIG) NF.TOPS Sccvrity Cla.'i.'iification Guide
dated 15 July 2009.The information in the log was classified SECRET at the time it was generated, and at no time
has it been declassified. It is currently and properly classified SECRET. It contains the following national .sccurilv
iB.kniiation,


(U) U.S. (jovemment knowledge that a .specific offensive cyber capability is operational in cyberspace and
under the control ofa specific adversary



(U) U.S. Ciovernment detailed knowledge of specific cyber activity being conducted against the U.S. by a
specific adversary



(U) U.S. Government attribution of .specific cyber activity conducted against the U.S. to a specific
adversary

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 2 of 4

ManningB_00376876

19661

UNCLASSIFIED



(U) The association ofa "family group" of UNCLASSIFIED cover terms (i.e. code words) with the
classified information they are intended to protect.



(U) 'Ihe association of a specific UNCLASSIFIED cover term (i.e. code word) with the classified
information it is intended to protect



(U) The level and type of success of specific cyber operations by a .specific adversary against U.S.
information systems



(U) The level of effort the U.S. Ciovernment expends dealing with specific cyber activity ofa specific
adversary.



(U) The U.S. Governments assessment of the offensive cyber capability and capacity ofa specific
adversary
(U) IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IE INFORMATION RELEASED

(U) Unauthorized disclosure of the classified material specified above would


(U) Reveal U.S. capability to detect sophisticated cyber activity conducted against the U.S.



(U) Reveal U.S. capability to attribute cyber activity to sophisticated adversaries



(U) Reveal the level U.S, Government of knowledge and understanding ofa specific eybcr threat



(U) Cause the U.S. Government to expend personnel andfinancialresources to apply new protections to
the disclosed classified information and undisclosed but related infonnation



(U) Create a negative impact on U.S. (jovemment international relationships based on the assessment that
specific cyber activity against the U.S. is being conducted by a specified adversary



(U) Reduce U.S. allies' confidence in the U.S. (iovernment's ability to protect classified information
affecting their own national security.

(L ) Pursuant to 2X U.S.C. S1746,1 declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided herein is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge.

. ,

Robert E. Betz
Chief Classification Advisory Officer. U.S. Cyber Command

, it
Executed this j i i

IS,
day of

2011.
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 3 of 4

ManningB_00376877

19662

UNCLASSIFIED
(U) As an Original Classification Authority with control ovci the national security infonnation discussed herein and
responsibility for its protection, 1 concur with the with the classification deteniiination and impact statements made
herein. I further endorse this declaration as the official statement ofUnited States Cyber Command in regard to the
matter ofUnited States v. Private First Class Bradlev Manning.

Robert E. Schmidle, Jr.
Lieutenant General. United States Marine Corps
Deputy Commander U.S. Cyber Command

Executed this

day of

2011.

M'
\

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 4 of 4

ManningB_00376878

19663

UNCLASSIFIED
(U) DECLARATION
(U) I, VICE ADMIRAL ROBF.Rl S. HAR.WARD. declare and stale:
(U) BACKGROUND
(10 i am a Vice Admiral in the United States Na\y with 32 years ofscdve service. S currmUy serve as Deputy
Cotntnander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) at MacDiO .\ir Force Base. I have heM this posidota since 11
July 2011. My responsibilities include exercising TOP SECRET and below Original Classification authority, which
indudes rendering « detKmmatioQ of USCENTCOM generated infwmation &r classincation purposes puMuant to a
writteni delegation nom the Deputj' Secrs-aty of Defense. (See Memorandum from the Depisty Secretary of
Defense,, Subject: Delegation of Top Secret Classification .Authorit)', dated 5. May 201 i (Enclosure 1)).
fU) PURPOSE OF DECL.ARATION
(U) i submit this decferador:, in ihe matter of United States v. Private First Class BrMtev M.3n:mr:^. to demonstrate
to the best of my knowledge and belie Ahat disclosure of the infonnation identified below reasonably could be
expected to cause SERIOUS DAMAGE to the national security of the United States. In making the following
sta-etneEtt regarding the classified inSMmatton in tiiis case. I rely on my personal knowledge and experietscs.
Executive Order 13526 CiassifiedN'atiandSeairtty iri/birmcitiofi or for materials classsfi-eil priorto June 27. 2010,
on Executive Order 13297... and Central Commitnd Regxjiation .380-14 Security Classiihaiitm Guide (veisions 0501,
0109, and 0130), and additional inibrmation available to me in my ofScial capacity.
(U) I deliberately structisred this declaration in an unclassified fonn tofeciiitateits haxsdlHig m i tise during any
Judicial proceeding.
(U) DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
(IJjlfjformatioo which requires protection in &e interest ofDatiooafsecEarity ofthe ISaijed States is desissaled
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive Order 13326, C/ar#ed'A'afwW6'gcKMry
Information, signed by President Barack Obatna on December 29.2009 [prior to June 27,2010, reter to Executive
Order 1295 % signed by President Clinton on Ajsril 1 ! 995 as atnended by President George W Bush on March 25,
20031. Isformation i.-i classiSled in levels eo;nmenstua!e with Ae as*eEs;nen- that unauthorized disclosure could
cause the following expected dsxjiage to jsational ^curity;
a. (U) Top Secret ioAxmalion - exceptionally grave damage

b. (U) Secret information ••• serious damage
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 1 of 3

ManningB_00376879

19664

UNCLASSIFIED
c. (U) ConOdentiaii-iforniatson - damage

{I}) l.SrtciassiSed information does not require a security clsaraaee

access, but nonetheless may \>c ofa seitsitive

nature.
(I?) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION
(U) Within the USCENTCOM, classified infwmadon is handled and protected in accordance with Executive Orders
13326 atjd 12958, as amended and Central Command Regulation

.Ssatriiy Ch.^smcs{im Gm'ds. Ihe

USCENTCOM Special Security OfRce (SSO) issues this guide Jind addrM*: inquiries concerning its conten: and
interpretation The national defen.se requires that certain infbrmalicm be maintsin&d m conGdence in order to protect
our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and intbrmation should be handled and examined only under such conditions as ars adequate to prevent unauthorized
persons from gainijig access. Classsfsed material njay not be removed Som designated work areas or moved fron;
in&rmation iq-^tcms. e.g. clarified database), computer nelwxis, xrver*. or ctmqMAars, excepi in )he peigxraancg
of official duties and under special conditions which provide protection for the classified material
(U) CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION
({.!) I reviewed the material fos warded to CJSCF.NTCOM by government prosecuiors in the matter of United States
V. Private First Class Bradlsv Manning, which was provided by LTC Chris F. Callen, USAR, at the USCENTCOM
Staff Judge .Advocate OfHce. Thisreaterislwas staffed through the fbllowing USCENTCOMDsrecsoraJes:
Intelligence (J2), Operations (13), and the Strategy, Plans, and Policy (j.5). Hje results ofthis .staffing were
provided to me and consolidated into this affidavit. The results of the review of these documents are located in
Enckaure 2 - CIDNE A#aniaan EvmK Bickaifc 3 - CIDNE Iraq EvetAs, Enclosure 4 - CXhcr Bncftngs, and
Enclosure 5 - Video. As identified in Enclosures 2 through .5, items contain national security intbrmation properly
classified at the SECRET level per Executive Order 13292, or Executive Order 13526, and CCR 3S0-14. The
intbrmation contained within the listed items was properly classified SECRET as the time it was generated and at no
tsflse has ii been deciajs=fied. It is currently and pjoperK' classified SECRET. As outlined in Enclosures 2 tiwo-sgh 5,
the documents contain the following types of national security inforination:
»

(U) U.S. Government intelligence acsivities (including coven action), intelligence sources or methods, or
crypic'logy

UNCLASSIFIED
Page2of3

ManningB_00376880

19665

UWriASSIFIED
«

(U) U.S. Government military plans, weapons systems, or operations

«

(U) U.S. Govenjraent operational code words identified with mission operations

*

(U) Participating mi's, including types, vulnerabilities, locations, quantities, readiness status, deplo^^ments,
redeployments, and details of movement of US siendiy forties

«

(U) Signifkant iKlioms relakd to Act of and genwal type (vehkle.b(mB*, fte)of impmvW explosive
attacks

»

(U) ShHiincant action event summaries

*

(U) Limitations and vulnerabilities of US fbrcss in combat area

»

(LO .Fosx!8g3 goverfiraetst Infonristion
IMPACT ON NATM)NAL SECLRrTY IF 1NF(»MATION RELEASED

(U) Unauthorized disclosure
»

the classilied material specified above would;

(U) Cause the U.S. Government to expend personnel and financial resources to apply new protections to
the disclosed classified information and undisclosed but related information

»

(U) Reduce U.S. ailies* co-dWence in the U.S. Government's ability to proicct classified inforrnation
affecting their own national security

*

(U) Pose a threat lo the security of US asid coalition forces in Sh« Iraq Cpmbined^ioiiit Operations Area

(CJOA)
*

(U) Pose a thrcs! to

security of US and coalision forces iti the Afghanistan Combined/Joint Operations

Area (CJOA)
*

(U) Hinder on-going military operations, ititelWeience activities and sources and nsethods. and negatively
affea foreign government w-telllgencs andrelatkms.

(U) Pursuant to 2% U.S.C. f1746,1 declare under penalty of penujy that the information provided herein is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge.
^ . / "
Robest 5. Harvard
Vice .Admiral, U.S. Na%'y
Executed -his

day of ,0.c.fc.. lOIL

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 3 of 3

MannlngB_00376881

/ /

19666

DEPUTY SECRETARY O f DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, OC 203011010

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARDSS OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFRCER
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
CENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, aPERATI(»4AL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
INSPECrtXl GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR. ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOIS OFTHE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACnVrriES
SUBJECT: D e k ^ m of Top SecMt O n g W ClamSoalmm AWmity
The isscwsfeeats of the posstiosjs sskatsSssd m (be aMmched Bstfeg we tweby mzAonzxNi to
exaciae Top Secrat odginml chamAcadoo mAhoHty m mcWMrdaact w & Execwtlvt Ohkf 135261,
"tHmwISWNatMOidSemgitylnBMmmtkA** Thk oimhomodum wpenedmi pKviow dekgadoa.

Enclosure

ManningB_00376882

I

19667

,9f

ORIGINAL TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION AUTHORrMES

OqwXySAgppgryofDtAaK
SpecWAsaimnt* AeSecKtarymwlDqpKy Secm^

Priadpa! Depuly Uqd* SeenWy of Ddkae fa- Policy
Dqwty Under SeottKy of D«6w# for Policy Intcgtmbon & Chief of StafF
Ditectij?, Ddaoae Sscimly Coopenmioa Agency
D«pu*y Under SecMtmy of Dc&a»e fm Slndcgy, Plana and Forwa
A»w*anf S: (Speck
3k)WSWie(pc<
Asss5teii SeoRtmy of Ekfeme (Awan and PadSc SecuAy A25ant)
Principal D«pu*y ASD (Asian mod Padgk: Security Affairs)
Principal Depay ASD (Homeland De&oan)
Assbtaat Secrttmy of Defesse (Ixdemational Security Polity)
Piwpal Deputy ASD (Memaxkod Soamty Policy)

Und«r Sterttmry «^ Dafema* (CampWUar)

sktive AHairs)
Asskstmt (o &e Secrttmy ofDe&nsa (IntdHgmce Ovemigjkt)
Asssstaisj Secrctaxy of Dc&naa for Networks and In&mWon Inkgradoo/DoD CIO

G
fh:

Enclosure 1

ManningB_00376883

19668

9f
Dqaify Ganapd Cdtmsd, btomadooad
Deputy QcaenA Coymel, bdaHigcnce

I^^^^^A^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

^^^^1^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

jcsfcjcm
Am#m* (o theCWnnam, ICS
Direckf, Jdnt Staa^(DJS)
Vic«OWam;J«mS(afF(VDJS)
DireetMr for Mwpoww and Peaomel (DJl)
Dlfector of MeliigeMe (DJ2) •
Vice Diitoof of Welligeace (VDJ2) - Pwkka awinWaad &y DXA
Depwry DixWw S^pedal Op*raliomi (DDSO)
DuWof for StMkgy PWn» and Policy (DJ:
ViceDiKUorarStndegyManaandPol
Chief of Staffj DawteMe fo? SiraSepc
Director fbr Coommand, CofitJtsI, Commimicadooa, & Computer (C4) SyAaow (DJIS)
Vice Director f&t C4 Systema (VDJ6)
elopment (DJT)
Vice Di*ec(or fm Opcralkmgl Plam and
Fo*ce Devekpment (VDJ7)
Dimeter for F«R* Somdw;, Reaourcea,
I)
Vice DiiWor for Force Structure, Raor
Defkma Advaneed Reaemrch Pmjeet; Agangy (DARP^

DinKtor(DD)
(CS)
DepuQf Dutcfor % f InteBigmce (Jl)
DefNQ'DixwWr&r Human bAlKgexKefDH)

Enclosuref

ManningB_00376884

19669

INAL^I
Depw*yDiPcUOfS*MASINTaadTecWc@lCoUectioa(DT)
The Defense Att@d»6a (DAO) i
Director, Nafional Me&a Exp),
ChieC Nadona* MASINT Management OfGce (NM)
W m s ^ k m Sif$$em* Agency miSA^

idpsi Director SJT 010
TWwmdWWa

,

DlMc*@r,

i

C«eap*da».bW«@ane* Aymey (NCA)

DirectM.NSA/CWet CemW I
Deputy Director, NSA
SIGINT DiMctor
SIGINT Chief of SWF
SIGINT Directonde Deputy Ouef &r SIGINT Policy and Corpora^
SIGINT DircctmAe Aoociak Deputy ChidF fiw SIGINT PoUcy
Dcptdy Krector for Data Acqwaition
ChieC InANsaadoe Sharing Serv kea
CWet Cf)3Aaxi*ly*a and Exploitation S«vicea
In&noation Awunoace Dinector
IrformMioa Assmrn^x Tecksics
Aaaociage Director for CtmmWty Inkgntion, Policy and Records
Dcptity Aaaociate Director for Policy and Recorda
AawciateDimAy Ar Security and Co*mnann)eUig*ice
Diiector &r Foaagn Aj%ir#
Assoctai® DimAxr for ImWWom and Logiadca

Enclosure'1

ManningB_00376885

19670

L ^ l SECRET CLASSmCATION AUT
ORIGINALTDP

TDK

'mm
Dsrwtor

Pn%M:W
Director, Imagwy InWHipmce Syatema AeqidsMios. Directorate

Direc(Of,Si#nabWniMgeM*SyateinaAoqd»i^
Director, Commmiiadoaa Syi&ema Acqumtion and Opemdooa Dix%ctorM«
Director, Mia^oa (^eratima DireAonde
DirecbN, Sp*cM Communicationa Office

IXrectOf, OSI« of Space Lmmcb

UnW

Amm* romamnW mSAFRICOMl

Deputy to &e Commander for Military Open*(xona
Deputy to the Commamder%fCiiilMil*WyActlv^
ITn&ed StaW C^mmd Command fUSCENTCOM)
CosffiSMidef

fV^XKVCVM)
OfflSWiaiids

Chief of Staff

.'3-

ManningB_00376886

Enclosure 1

19671

pmCINAL TOP SECRET CLASSmCATKMS AlTTHORmES
Unhed S*a$ea PW#! Cemmaf^ mSPACOMI
Deputy Commander
Foreign Policy Adviwr (Gnmted by DepartmeiA ofState)
CommaDde, US Fom» Japm
Commandrr, US Force* Korea

^'mM

^mW %9ni#m# CvnnmiiM ^ssocoM^

Commandfr, Joist Spocisl Opaatioaa Command
UaAed State*

Command fUSSOUTHCOM>

COJSSJESKds?

Military Deputy Command*

C^O!3SJS1S£3£t£T {J^[^0)l

OcpuQf ComziwaKkr (JOCD)

CmmW (WTMWP?
Commander (rCCQ

KWW,

O^W-jgommmmd, {lJSCYBEltCOM>

Commander

Enclosure 1

ManningB_00376887

19672

Fndnwre

^^^^

OONF AfGKANfSTAN FVENITS

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EO 12958 as amended.
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|
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1

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EO XZBSB as amended,
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\

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CCR 380-14 {OiOS}, Pages A-:CCR 380-14 fOiiO), Page A |
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1/15

ManningB_00376888

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A- |
J3, Item 11; SO 13526
|
Section 3 4 |a);b;
S

"1
CCS 330-14 (0110), Page A- j
23, kern 11: EO 13525
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Section 1.4 t^jsb)
J

19673

Sndosnre 3; ClDNEAMHANKrw* CvafTS P«* 2

1
Irsb

Identified Doc^merrt

ISn f ofmstUyn Qasstiied
per CCR 380-14, EO
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Classification

SaSs for C«f reret
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EO 12958 35 amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A- |
22, item 6; Page A-23, item
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£0 12953 as amended.
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CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A- |
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£012958 as amended.
Section 1.4 {a){b)

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CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A- |
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iof arxJ general type
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^location on specific
Idate;
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i
CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A- |
23,ttemli;£013S26
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Section 1.4 (a)
j

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Ep 12358 as amended.
Section 1.4 {a)(b)

S

CCfi 380-14 (0109). Pages A CCR 380-14 (QUO), Page A- j
2.5, A-24; EO 12958 as
22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item |
amended. Section 1 4 !>i 11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a) 1

1
2/15

ManningB_00376889

J

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380 -14 (0110), Page A- |
23, A-24; EO 12958 as
22, Item 7; Page A-23 Item |
amended. Section 1.4 (a) 11; EO 1.5526 Section 1.4 (a) I

: JVSisit-l'V olcs'^S

^S!SACTS rebted to fact
iof and general type
^(vshic'e-borne, etc) of
^ i£D attack at specific
pocation on specific
Mate,
iiOserationaf code
;word(5)when
: identified witi"! mission
ioperatio-is

. „ „

19674

'

i

'

!

fnfofmaison ClasaKed:
{Jtff CCR 380-14. £ 0
12958 as Asweiacted,
TaJj

and/or SO 13S26

SsJeniffied Osscjjment

Basis for Oftgina^

Basis for C u r e n t

Classification

Classification

^5iiitsry pl«.^s,

t87£01 A4-99F5-466A-gt>3aP

Ctassificatiopi

weapons systems, or

803107805933

operations; Foreign

5/9/2007

S

giX'erntrient

Pages?

23, Item 11; EO 13526

Section 1.4 (a)(1))

Section 1.-1 (a}{bi

infci.'rristion

1

ReportSey F98227A4.28614EAC-A3Cf-602SC6?0A78A
Q

CC.f5 380-14 (0110), Page A- ;

£0 12958 asamended,

DateOccurred 10/13/2006

Foreign government

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info.'-mation

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EOl^^^ended,

i

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ReportKey OSa360i0-9HliCA0-iCS540A34263A818
DateOccurMNi@/28/2008
,
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#12%8 as Amended, ;
|a-id/or t O 13526
j Oassification
Cperat'ona; code

VIDEO
word{si wheri

2009

identified with mission

CCR 380 1-1 (0109), Page AS

Section 1 4 (a)

operations

15/15

ManningB_00376902

24; EO 12958 as amended.

|

CCR 3B0 14 (0110) Page A- |
23, Item 11; EG 13525
Secton 1.4 (a)
j

19687

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DECLARATION
I, Rear Admiral David Woods, declare and state:
BACKGROUND
I am a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy with 30 years of active service.
My current position is Commander, Joint Task Force - Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. My responsibilities include the review of JTF-GTMO
information for classification purposes pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13526
("Classified National Security Information"). I have held this position since 24 August
2011 and report to General Douglas Fraser, Commander, US Southern Command.
PURPOSE OF DECLARATION
I submit this declaration in the matter ofUnited States v. Private First Class
Bradley Manning, to demonstrate to the best of my knowledge and belief that disclosure
of the information identified below reasonably could be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security of the United States. In making the following statement
regarding the classification of information in this case, I rely on my personal knowledge
and experience, upon the information made available to me in my ofGcial capacity, upon
the advice and conclusions reached, and determinations made in accordance therewith.
DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
Information that requires protection in the interest of national security of the
United States is designated CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
under Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, signed by
President Obama on December 29,2009. Information is classified in levels

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ManningB_00378646

19688

FOR OFFICIAL USEONLY

commensurate with the assessment that unauthorii^ed disclosure could cause the
allowing expected damages to national security^
9^

TopSecretinl^rmation—exceptionally grave damage

1^.

Secret information—serious damage

6.

Confidential information—damage

Unclassified information does not requireasecurity clearance l^r access, but
nonetheless may be ofasensitive nature.
The current basis for classification of national security in^rmation is ^und in
E013526. SectionL3ofE0 13526authori^esanOriginalClassificationAuthority
(OCA) to classil^ information owned, produced, or controlled by the United States
government i f i t ^ l s within certain classification categories. One such category,^und
at SectionL4(c)ofE0 13526, concerns in^rmation that pertains to an intelligence
activity (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology.
Five documents, totaling twenty-two pages, have been provided to JTF-GTMO
fbraclassification review. These documents were originated by JTF-GTMO and are
identified as the enclosures to the prosecution requests, datedI^March201Iand4
August20IL Allfivedocuments bear "SECRET" markings.
CLASSIFICATIONDETERMINAT^ON
The five documents are classified pursuantto Section 1.4(c)ofE013526, because
they contain in^rmation concerning intelligence sources and methods, and in^rmation
that, ifreleased, could cause serious damage to national security. This information is
classifiedattheSECRETlevel.

FOR OFFICIAL USEONLY
^af^ningB^00378847

19689

FOR OFFICIAL USEONLY

The documents contain intelligence data compiled about detainees or summaries
ofsuch data. Intelligence data included in this category of withholdingstypically
describes the detainee^s biographical inlbrmation, the circumstances ofhis capture and
what he had in his possession when he was captured, the circumstances and date ofhis
transfer to Guantanamo, his travel, his affiliations with individuals and organi2^tions of
intelligence interest, and his activities in support ofthoseorgani^tions. The intelligence
data in this category also includes inlbrmation about other persons and organisations.
Ihave determined that the intelligence data contained in the documents reveal
details about intelligence we have gleaned regarding individuals and organi^tions of
intelligence interest. Additionally,this information reveals the sources of our
intelligence, as well as methods andapproaches^r collecting intelligence. At the time of
their creation, the documents and the intelligence data contained in them was classified at
the SECRET level through theactionoftheCommander,JTFGTMO
IMPACT ONNATIONALSECURITYIFINFORMATIONRELEASED
Ihave determined that the documents and in^rmation remain properly classified,
and that their release reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security because it would reveal in^rmation concerning intelligence sources, the
specific in^rmation obtained ^om such sources, or both. Accordingly, this in^rmation
was and is properly classified at the SECRET level, pursuantto Section I.4(c)ofEO
13526.

In accordance v^th2^U.S.C.^I^46,Ideclare under penalty of perjury that the ^regoing
is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

^
^annifigB^00378848

FOR OFFICI/^ USEONLY

19690

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dated: ^

November 2011
^ ^ - ^ W I D WOODS
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ManningB_00378649

^t^S

19691

..^tx

,-.,v '' •>

DECLARATION
if'-.t!!;^''

I, Patrick F. Kennedy, declare and state:
BACKGROUND
I am a Career Minister in the Foreign Service with 38 years of experience with the United
States Government specializing in national security and foreign affairs. My current position is
Under Secretary of State for Management, which is responsible for the activities of ten bureaus
and offices that are responsible for management improvement initiatives; diplomatic security and
foreign missions; information resources management; support services for domestic and overseas
operations; consular affairs; human resources; the Foreign Service Institute; overseas buildings;
medical services andfinancialresources management. I report to Hillary Rodham Clinton, the
Secretary of State. I have held my current position for four years, and have over 18 years of
experience in classification management of national security information, security, and
intelligence, including serving as the State Department Senior Agency Official for Classification
in addition to the Deputy Director ofNational Intelligence for Management for two years and
heading the Transition Team that set up the newly created Office of the Director ofNational I f ,
Intelligence.
PURPOSE OF DECLARATION
I submit this declaration, in the matter ofUnited States v. Private First Class Bradlev
Manning, to demonstrate, to the best of my knowledge and belief that disclosure of the
information identified below as classified reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security ofthe United States. In making the following statement regarding the classified
information in this case, I rely on my personal knowledge and experience, E.O. 13526 on
Classified National Security Information and the Department of State Classification Guide, and
additional information available to me in my official capacity as the State Department's
designated Senior Agency Official responsible for directing and administering the Department's
program for classifying national security information.
I deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified form to facilitate its handling
and use during any judicial proceeding.
DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
f

-

Information which requires protection in the interest of national security of the United
States is designated CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive
Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, signed by President Obama on December
29,2009 [prior to June 27, 2010, refer to Executive Order 12958 signed by President Clinton on
April 20, 1995 as amended by President George W. Bush on March 25, 2003]. Infonnation is

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classified in levelscommensuratewith the assessment thatunauthorizeddisclosurecould cause
the fbllowing expected damage to national security:
a. Top Secret infbrmation exceptionally grave damage
b. Secret infbrmation serious damage
c. Confidential infbrmation damage

^

The Mission ofthe DepartmentofState encompasses the conduct of fbreignrelations of
the United States which dictates that the Department relies particularlyupon two classification
categories when protectingnationalsecurityinfbrmation.Thesearedescribed in Section 1.4of
E.O. 13526 which states in pertinentpart:
^ ^^^^^^^

Infbrmation shallnotbe considered fbrclassification unless it
concerns:...(b)fbreign government information;...(d) foreign
relations or foreign activities ofthe United States, including
confidential sources....

^

Forei^ government informations defined in partas infbrmation provided to the United
States Government byafbreigngovemmentor governments or an international organi:2^ation of
governments is contained in many ofthe documents described in this declaration and is classified
underSection1.4(b)ofE.O. 13526. An essential understanding that governs all diplomatic
intercourse, and that constitutes an essential element in all successful diplomatic exchanges, is
that confidentialitywill be observed. Mutual trustinthisrealmisvitalfbrthedevelopmentof
cordial and productive diplomatic relations. Unwillingness orinabilityto maintain
confidentialityin diplomatic exchanges would inevitably chill ourrelations with other countries
and lead to diminished access to sourcesofinfbrmation important to the successful formulation
andimplementationofU.S. foreign policy,andtherebywouId damage the national security.
Theabilityto obtain infbrmationfi^mforeign governments is essential to the formulation
and successful implementation ofU.S. foreign policy. Disclosureoffbreign government
infbrmation providedinconfidencewould cause foreign officials to believethatU.S.officials
arenotableorwillingto observe theconfidentialityexpectedinsuchinterchanges.
^.^
Governments would become less willing in thefiituretofiimishinfbrmation important to the
conductofU.S. fbreignrelations, and in general less disposed to cooperate with the United
States in the achievement of foreign policy objectives of common interest. Disclosureofthis
infbrmation ^treasonably could be expected to resultin damage to the national security" (Section
11(a)(4),E.O. 13526)
Infbrmation in almost all ofthedocumentsdescribedin this deolarationhavel^een
^
classified under Section1.4(d)ofE.O. 13526, which protectsinfbrmation concerning fbrei^
relations or fbreii^ activities ofthe United States, including confidential sources. Documents
describedbelowrecountdetailsoftherelationshipbetweentheUnitedStatesandanumberof ^
Page^of^l

)^annirigB^0037^9(^4

-^^^-;—
19693

foreign countries. The documents covernotonlythe traditional diplomatic, political and
economic relations, but also include important areas such as humanrights protection and security
cooperation. Manyofthedocumentsare intended to inform policymakers in Washington ofthe
true situation on the ground and therefore containfi^ankcomments and criticisms, as well as
analyses that, if released, reasonably could damageU.S. relations with the countries concerned.
Otherdocumentscontain infbrmation derivedfi^omsources who provided the infbrmation with
the expectation that theiridentities will be protected. Release ofthis infbrmation reasonably
couldrisk the life or safetyofthe confidential sources. Failure to preserve the expected
confidentiality couldriskfiitureaccess not only to these sources, but also to others who might .
provide sensitive infbrmation to U.S.officials. Thisclassification category has also been applied
to foreign government infbrmation in addition to the 1.4(b)category,as release of infbrmation
fi^m foreign governments could damage U.S. foreign relations.
Documents described in this declaration have also been protected under classification
categories 1.4(a) (militaryplans, weapons systems or operations), 1.4(e)(scientific,
technologicaloreconomicmatters)and 1.4(g), vulnerabilitiesandcapabilitiesofsystemsand^^^^^^^^^^^
installations.) The reason ^ r application ofthese categories is included with the document
^
descriptions.
^^^^;„

PROTECTION OFINFORMATION
Within the Department ofState, classifiedinfbrmationis handled and protected in
accordance with: 1.) E.O. 13526 (and predecessor orders)on Classified National Security
Infbrmation, 2.) Information SecurityOversightOffice(ISOO)ImpIementingDirective,
ClassifiedNational Security Infbrmation,32CFRParts2001 and 2003, and 3.)the12^vo1ume
ofthe Foreign Affairs Manual ( F / ^ ) , section 500, titled Infbrmation Security. Classified
infbrmation should be handled and examined only under such conditions as are adequate to
prevent unauthorized personsfi^omgaining access. Classified material maynot be removed fi^om
designated work areas ormovedfi^om infbrmation systems, e.g. classified databases, computer
networks, servers, or computers, except in the perfbrmanceof official duties and under special
conditionswhichprovideprotectionfbrtheclassifiedmaterial.
CLASSIFICATIONDETERMINATION
Ireviewed the material related to this case, which was provided bythe prosecution team
at the Department ofthe Army.
L

NCD Server Logs
D0CUMENTIDENTIFICAT10NANDCLASSIFICATI0N

NCDServerLogs(^oucher07810,Item^:1)consistofNet-CentricDiplomacy(NCD)
server access, audit, and application activity loggingfi^mJanuary,2009throughJune,2010.
These logs reside onanational security system accredited to operate at the Secret level. They
Page3of51

^ann^ngB^00370905

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19694

contain application activity logging, usersession and search activity infbrmation, and external
browse-downdata. NCD loggingisacontinuous,on-goingprocess based on system and user
activity Assuch,noactiontoexplicitlyclassifytheNCDserverlogsoccurswhileadditional
activity logging is beingappended and no original determination ofclassification was made
when the events that generated the log activitytook place. Asubsequentreview ofthe logs by
subjectmatterexpertsdeterminedthattheproperclassificationofthelogactivitydatais
SECRET underSectionsl.4(d)(g)ofE.O. 13526. The audit logs contain associations between
classifiedservernamesandTransmission Control Protocol^temet Protocol (TCP^) addresses.
Application logs include entries thatreveal internal system application attributes. Access logs
contain associations between TCP^ addresses, usernames(iflogged on through Passport), data
on telegrams being searched, and actual search terms.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would expose
capabilities and identities ofclassifiednational security systems rendering them vulnerable to
hostile actions. The compilation ofusernames, telegram data, and actual search terms contains
associations that could damage fbreignrelations ofthe U.S.and reveal confidential sources.
2.

NCDFirewallLogs
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

Firewall Logs (voucher 151 10, Item ^:1) consist ofFirewall activity logging fi^om
November, 2009 through May,2010. These logs reside onanational security system accredited
to operate at the Secret level. Theycontaininfbrmationregardinginbound and outbound access
sessionsthrough the State Department'sperimetersecurity systems. Firewall logging isa
continuous, ongoingprocess based on system and user activity. As such, no action to explicitly
classify the Firewall server logs occurs while additional activity logging is being appended and
no original determination ofclassification was made when the events that generated the log
activitytook place. Asubsequentreview of the logs by subject matter experts determined that
the propercla^^ifieation ofthe log activity dataisSECRETunderSection1.4(g)ofE.O. 13526.
The Firewall logscontain associations between classified hostnamesandTransmission Control
Protocol^t^et Protocol (TCP/IP) addresses. Firewall logs also contain infbrmation by site
name listing both inbound and outbound classifiedaccess activities and application usage along
witiidatathatrevealsintemalcontentfilteringpolicies
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would expose
capabilities and identities ofclassified national security systems rendering them vulnerable to
hostile actions. The compilation ofcontent-filtering transactions contains associations that
reveal protection servicesrelatedto the national security.
^.

ManningB_00376906

Page4of51

^^^^^^(^^^^^^^^^^^^
19695

^i^B

3.

10REYKJA^13
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

10R^Y^A^^13 is an official telegramfi^mEmbassy Reykjavik, datedJanuary 13,
2010to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFfDENTIAL at the time itwas generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 underSection8l.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concerns an international dispute stemming fiom the collapse of an
Icelandic bank that had offered high interest savings accounts(named^^Icesave'^ accounts) to ^
depositors in the UnitedKingdom and the Netherlands. It reports on three conversations with
the U.S.Embassy'sCharged'Affaires (CDA) the person in chargeoftheEmbassyin the
absenceofthe Ambassador. In one meeting, the CDAspokewith two senior Icelandic officials.
In another, he spoke withasenior Icelandic diplomat. Inthethird, he spoke withaBritish
diplomat. The sources arenamedin the telegram. They offered theirviews in confidence to the
U.S.government. The telegram reports theirpersonal views on this ongoing dispute and the
optionstheirgovemments were considering. Publicreleaseoftheoptionsunder consideration
could undermine the negotiatingpositions of the governments involved. Unauthorized
disclosureoftheclassifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations with Iceland
and the United Kingdom and diminish the willingnessoffbreign officials to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
4.

x124 Charging Documents

.
, ^ ^^^^^ ^

DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

^

99ISLAMABAD495 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Islamabad, datedJanuary 25,
1999 to the DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram
remain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under Section1.4(d) and those portions were
reclassified on August 9, 2011by an Original ClassificationAuthority(OCA).
^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram analyses public attitudes towards the messages ofmoderate and radical
Islam and increasingly anti /^erican and anti-Western attitudes in Pakistan. It describes the
sometimes unsatisfactoryresultsofpreviouspublic diplomacy efforts andmakes proposals fbr
future public diplomacypolicy actions. In doing so it expresses views ofvarious potential
audiences and likely receptivityto various proposals. Unauthorized disclosure ofthis material
could be drawn upon, in or outof context, and used by our adversaries against us not only in

Page 5 of 5 1

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19696

Pakistan but intiiewider Islamic world. Thus, itwould be directly counterproductive to the
policypurpose ofthe document.
;^

^

DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
05ALGIERS1836 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Algiers, datedAugust 29, 2005 to
the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 13526 underSections14(b)and(d),
^,,2-

IMPACTOFRELEASE
^

^^^..,^B

^

,:

Theexempted portions describe some ofthe responses ofthe U.S./^bassador's
interiocutorsduringhis confidential conversations with Govemmentof Algeria officials
fbllowingthe visit to the region ofSenatorLugar, who had conducted sensitive negotiations on
the releaseofPolisario prisoners long held by Morocco. The clear expectation ofthe Algerian
officials in the Ambassador'smeetings was that theirremarks,which included expressions of
private regret, were not fbrpublic dissemination. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Government of Algeria and
diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials
and visiting legislative branch persons.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06ALGIERS1961 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Algiers, dated November 12^
2006 to the Department ofState. Six pages. Thetelegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTTALinpartunderE.O. 12958 atthetimeitwasgenerated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O.13526 underSection 1.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE

^^^^^

B

The exempted portions identifyanon-official source who was speaking to U.S.officials
on internal political and economic matters in the expectation of complete confidentiality. That
person'sabilityto function in that society,andpossiblythe ability ofhis associates to fimction,
would be harmed by revelation ofhis identity. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the individual concerned and diminish his
and others'willingnessto conduct confidential business with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06BAG1^AD2646isanofficiaItelegramfi^mEmbassyBaghdad,datedJuly24,2006
to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.O. 12958 attiietime itwas generated.Thete1egramremains SECRET under E.O. 13526
underSection 1.4(d).
Page8of51

^anniogB^00376908

19697

IMPACTOFRELEASE
The report discussesasensitive internal matter, the revelation of which would to this day
create anger and instabilityamongasignificantsegment of thepopulation in Iraq. In addition, it
is based on privilegedinfbrmationobtainedinstrictconfidencefi^om sources who expected longterm protection. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to relations with the Government oflraq and diminish its officials' and other
privateparties' willingness to confide in U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06BAGHDAD4205 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Baghdad, dated November 10,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains
CONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526 underSection14(d)
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document describesaconversation between two very senior U.S.officials and the
leadersofaleading Iraqi political group. Discussion centered on internal politics and the Iraqi
participants clearly had the expectation that they were speaking in complete confidentiality.
Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations
with the important organization the interlocutorsrepresented and diminish its leaders'- and
otherlraqioppositionists' willingness to communicate fi^anklywith U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIF1CATION
06BEIRUT3603 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Beirut, dated Novemberll,2006
to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.O. 12958 atthe time itwasgenerated.Thete1egramremains SECRET under E.O. 13526
under Sections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThereportdescribestheU.S.Ambassador'sconversations with visiting international
organization officials onanumber of sensitive issues inaregion then in confiict. The officials
spoke with candorin the clear expectation that the Ambassadorwould hold their comments in
strict confidence. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to U.S.relations with the concerned agency and otherintemational organizations,
and diminish their officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials.

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(^annii^gB 0037^909

19698

D0CUMENTIDENTIFICATI0NANDCLASSIFICAT10N
06BEIRUT3604 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Beirut, dated November 12, 2006
to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.O. 12958 atthetime itwas generated.ThetelegramremainsSECRETunder E.O. 13526
under Section1.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThedocumentreportsaconversationbetweentheU.S. Ambassadorandaseniorand
still active Lebanese politician, who spoke in the expectation of complete confidentiality.
Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause serious harm to
theUnitedStates by diminishingthewillingnessofthe individual and, by extension, other
Lebanese leaders to conductconfidential exchanges in candorwithU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06BEIRUT3703 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassyBeirut, dated November 27,2006
to the Department ofState. Fourpages. Portionsofthe telegram were properly classified
SECRETunder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
SECRET under E.0.13526underSection1.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions describe the U.S.Ambassador'sconfidential conversation witha
prominent Lebanese person who is still alive. The conversation centers on sensitive issues and
personalities on the Lebanese political scene, and was conducted in the expectation of complete
confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to relations with the fbllowersofthe individual and diminish U.S. officials'ability
tocommunicatewith the various Lebanese factions. In the extreme, it couldalso endanger his
life in the volatile political/sectarian climate prevalent in that nation.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06BELGRADE1681 is an official telegramfi^mEmbassy Belgrade, dated Octoberl7,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Five pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTI/^ under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram severely criticizes the response of senior Serbian officials toaset of
proposals that the United States had made to the Serbian government designed to capture an
alleged war criminal wanted bythe International CriminalTribunal fbrthe fbrmer Yugoslavia.
The telegram also reports infbrmation provided bynamedfbreign officials to the U.S.
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government in the expectationtiiatit would be kept confidential. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would harm relations with the Government ofSerbia and
especiallywiththeinfiuential persons who are directly criticized. Its release would also
diminish the willingnessof officials from Serbia, the International CriminalTribunal fbrthe
fbrmer Yugoslavia, and elsewhere to conduct confidential diplomatic business withU.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06COLOMBO1889 is an official telegram from Embassy Colombo, dated November 10,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Four pages. Thetelegram wasproperly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderEO 12958 atthe timeitwas generated Portions oftiie telegram
remain CONFIDENTIALunderE.0 13526underSections1.4(b)(d)
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reportsadiscussion between the Ambassador and senior Sri Lankan
officialsabout the scope and intensityofrecent Government ofSriLankamilitary action against
therebel Tamil Tigers towards the endofthe long fbught insurgency in thatcountry.
Descriptionsofthe actions and possibleupcoming actions need no longer be classified in view of
the termination ofhostilities and the passageoftime. Material that remains classified reveals the
identitiesofthe officials and infbrmation about military and capabilities^vulnerabilities. It also
expresses the Ambassador'sjudgment ofthe views expressed bytheofficials themselves and in
comparison to previouslyreported infbrmation. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified
material could be used to politically damage the officials involved and thereby cause damage to
relations withthe Government ofSri Lanka.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5420 is an official telegram fi^om Embassy Kabul, dated November 10, 2006
to the Department ofState.Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the/^bassador'smeeting with President Karzai and senior security
officials about steps being taken to refbrm the Afghan National Police. Some portions that
remainCONFIDENTIALreportKarzai'semphasisonspecific factors, including ethnic
representation and othersensitivematters. Italso reports the Ambassador'simplioit evaluation
ofthosecomments.Otherportions reveal advicebeing given by specific participants including
one European allied official. Unauthorized disclosureofthis material would reveal the identities

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ofindividualswho were giving their views to the President and thereby would undermine the
confidence ofPresidentKarzai, and ofother persons present, in future such exchanges.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5421 is an official telegram from Embassy Kabul, dated November 10,2006
to the Depariment ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram wasproperly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderE.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reports on the actions ofarecently arrived GovemorofUruzgan Province
in creatingamilitiaand describes its use in several intervening events. It further discusses the
possible integration of this and othermilitias into an auxiliarypolice. The portions that remain
classified describe confiictingversionsofthe events and allegations concerning motivations of
various parties. They also reveal the Embassy'sassessment of the events as they refiect on the
official who remains inhigh office. One portion also reveals related infbrmation given in
confidence by allied personnel in Afghanistan. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material
withheld would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofAfghanistan and diminish the
willingness ofour allies to exchange confidences with us.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5435 is an official telegramfi:omEmbassy Kabul, dated November 12,2006
tothe DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSections14(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reports on actions taken byanew Acting Commander ofthe Afghan
Border Police inKhostProvinceafierawalkout by about one fif^ ofthe force underthe
previous commander and discussesprospects fbr the future including likelypersonnel
movements, sometimes inapolitical context. Some portions report remarks by some foreign
official andnon-official sources about the natureoftheprevious problems and the actions and
motivations ofindividuals and groups. The cable also gives the Embassy'sassessmentofthe
situation. Someoftheinfbrmationneedno longer be classified. Unauthorized disclosure of
otherreported events, allegations and ofthe sources could be damaging to individuals identified
and the Embassy'srelationswith them, and inhibittheEmbassy'sabilitytoelicitsimilarly
confidential infbrmation from fiiture interlocutors.

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19701

DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KATIIMANDU3023 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Kathmandu, dated
November 10, 2006 to the DepartmentofState. Five pages. The telegram was properly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthe time it was generated. Portions of
thetelegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram describes the U.S.Ambassador'sdiscussions with the UN representative in
Nepal concemingaproposed UN role in the implementation of an impending agreement
between the Government ofNepalandMaoist insurgents to end their long confiict, including the
need fbraUN Security Council Resolution. Portions being withheld report the representative's
thinking about how he will proceed and what he envisions the UN role to be. It further expresses
the ambassador'sviews which are at odds with someofthat thinking. Representatives of the UN
and its constituent bodies expect that their discussions with us ofthis nature will be kept in
confidence. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specifiedabovecould be used
against us and thoseofficialsbypersons or governments of countries withastake in matters
beingdiscussed.ThusitwouIdadverselyaflectourdiplomats'abilitytoconductsimilar
discussionswith all UN representatives worldwide, thereby damaging U.S.fbreignrelations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06KATHMANDU3024 is an official telegram fi^om Embassy Kathmandu, dated
NovemberlO, 2006 to the DepartmentofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly
classified CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 attiietime itwas generated.Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram describes the U.S. Ambassador'sconfidential conversations with the
NepalesePrime Minister and his foreign policyadvisoraboutthe prospects fbr an agreement
with the Nepalese Maoists af^eralong civil war and about the nature ofthe international
involvement. The portions thatremain CONFIDENTIAL reveal the Prime Minister'sand the
Advisor'sexpressed personal views as well as Government ofNepal thinking about: 1)the
nature ofthe international involvement in reaching and implementing an agreement; 2) attitudes
of certain otherparties; 3) internal political and legal aspects and 4)the likely attitude ofthe
insurgent elements. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterialspecified above could still
be used adversely by elementswithinNepalnot sympathetic with the government and would
betray confidentialities expected by the Nepaleseo^cials.

Page 11 of 51

ManningB_00376913

19702

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING AND ARRANGING RECORD OF TRIAL
USE OF FORM - Use this form and MCM, 1984,
Appendix 14, will be used by the trial counsel and
the reporter as a guide to the preparation of the
record of trial in general and special court-martial
cases in which a verbatim record is prepared. Air
Force uses this form and departmental
instructions as a guide to the preparation of the
record of trial in general and special court-martial
cases in which a summarized record is authorized.
Army and Navy use DD Form 491 for records of
trial in general and special court-martial cases in
which a summarized record is authorized.
Inapplicable words of the printed text will be
deleted.

8. Matters submitted by the accused pursuant to
Article 60 (MCM, 1984, RCM 1105).

COPIES - See MCM, 1984, RCM 1103(g). The
convening authority may direct the preparation of
additional copies.

12. Advice of staff judge advocate or legal officer,
when prepared pursuant to Article 34 or otherwise.

ARRANGEMENT - When forwarded to the
appropriate Judge Advocate General or for judge
advocate review pursuant to Article 64(a), the
record will be arranged and bound with allied
papers in the sequence indicated below. Trial
counsel is responsible for arranging the record as
indicated, except that items 6, 7, and 15e will be
inserted by the convening or reviewing authority,
as appropriate, and items 10 and 14 will be
inserted by either trial counsel or the convening or
reviewing authority, whichever has custody of
them.

13. Requests by counsel and action of the
convening authority taken thereon (e.g., requests
concerning delay, witnesses and depositions).

1. Front cover and inside front cover (chronology
sheet) of DD Form 490.
2. Judge advocate's review pursuant to Article
64(a), if any.
3. Request of accused for appellate defense
counsel, or waiver/withdrawal of appellate rights,
if applicable.
4. Briefs of counsel submitted after trial, if any
(Article 38(c)).
5. DD Form 494, "Court-Martial Data Sheet."

9. DD Form 458, "Charge Sheet" (unless included
at the point of arraignment in the record).
10. Congressional inquiries and replies, if any.
11. DD Form 457, "Investigating Officer's Report,"
pursuant to Article 32, if such investigation was
conducted, followed by any other papers which
accompanied the charges when referred for trial,
unless included in the record of trial proper.

14. Records of former trials.
15. Record of trial in the following order:
a. Errata sheet, if any.
b. Index sheet with reverse side containing
receipt of accused or defense counsel for copy of
record or certificate in lieu of receipt.
c. Record of proceedings in court, including
Article 39(a) sessions, if any.
d. Authentication sheet, followed by certificate
of correction, if any.
e. Action of convening authority and, if appropriate, action of officer exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction.
f. Exhibits admitted in evidence.

6. Court-martial orders promulgating the result of
trial as to each accused, in 10 copies when the
record is verbatim and in 4 copies when it is
summarized.

g. Exhibits not received in evidence. The page
of the record of trial where each exhibit was
offered and rejected will be noted on the front of
each exhibit.

7. When required, signed recommendation of
staff judge advocate or legal officer, in duplicate,
together with all clemency papers, including
clemency recommendations by court members.

h. Appellate exhibits, such as proposed instructions, written offers of proof or preliminary
evidence (real or documentary), and briefs of
counsel submitted at trial.

DD FORM 490, MAY 2000

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