Title: Volume FOIA 063

Release Date: 2014-03-20

Text: 20035

Volume 63 of 111
SJAR ROT
FOIA Version

VERBAT IM 1

RECORD OF TRIAL2

(and accompanying papers)

of
(Name: Last, First, Middie initiai) (Sociai Security Number) (Rank)
Headquarters and
Headquarters Company,
United States Army Garrison U-S- Army FCDIJC Ml/er: VA 22211
(Unit/Command Name) (Branch of Service) (Station or Snip)
By
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
Convened by Commander

(Titie of Con vening Authority)

UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
(Unit/Command of Con vening Authority)

Tried at

Fort. Meade, MD on see below

(Piace or Piaces of Triai) (Date or Dates of Triai-9

Date or Dates of Trial:

23 February 2012, 15-16 March 2012, 24-26 April 2012, 6-8 June 2012, 25 June 2012,

16-19 July 2012, 28-30 August 2012, 2 October 2012, 12 October 2012, 17-18 October 2012,
7-8 November 2012, 27 November - 2 December 2012, 5-7 December 2012, 10-11 December 2012,
8-9 January 2013, 16 January 2013, 26 February - 1 March 2013, 8 March 2013,

10 April 2013, 7-8 May 2013, 21 May 2013, 3-5 June 2013, 10-12 June 2013, 17-18 June 2013,
25-28 June 2013, 1-2 July 2013, 8-10 July 2013, 15 July 2013, 18-19 July 2013,

25-26 July 2013, 28 July - 2 August 2013, 5-9 August 2013, 12-14 August 2013,

16 August 2013, and 19-21 August 2013.

1 insert ?verbatirri or ?surrimari'zeo? as appropriate. This form be used by the Army and Navy for verbatim records of triai

2 See inside back co ver for instructions as to preparation and arrangement.

DD FORM 490, MAY 2000 PREWOUS OBSOLETE Front Cover

20036

^^
U.S.v.Manning,CCM, MDW ^ ^(sessions
at Fort Meade)
15-16 March2012, 0900 Article 39(a) session-motions

4. Attached isacopy of the final pre-trial publicity order incorporating
the recommendations of the parties with minor edits. Review and advise of any
objections by 1400 today. I f there are n o n e , I w i l l sign it and send to the
parties for action.
5. Summary of post-arraignmentRCMS02^
a. The parties w i l l review the Court'sproposed pretrial publicity order
and provide input to the court by 1200 on 24 Feb 12.
b. Mr. Coombs w i l l advise the Court whether he can de-conflict his
schedule for 1516 Mar 12 by2^Feb 12.
c. The parties w i l l confer and provide the Court with amended proposed
suspense/motion/trial schedule by 29 Febl2. The schedule w i l l provide f o r 2
weeks response time for motions filed a n d l w e e k between response and date of
Article 39(a) for the Court to consider the filings. The parties w i l l provide
the Courtamotion for continuance deemed appropriate for any particular
motion. The Defense intends to submit2proposals, one proposing May trial
dates i f the Defense Motion for Deposition is denied; another proposing June
trial dates i f the motion is granted.
d. The Covemment advised the Court that, although it has been
extensively engaged i n evaluating executive branch/sub-branch files for
discoverable information prior to referral, the Covemment'sBrady/Williams
duty to find, evaluate, and disclose favorable and material evidence to the
Defense (phase4of the Covemments original proposed trial schedule) w i l l
take additional time because of the need to cull through voluminous classified
and unclassified information contained throughout executive branch/sub-branch
agencies that have been involved inWikileak classified information
disclosures. The Defense advised the Court of its continuing interest i n a
speedy trial and that i f the Covernment could proffer to the Defense the
efforts the Govemment exercised i n due diligence i n seeking Brady/Williams
material, the Defense would consider waiving on the record the Government's
duty to look for additional Brady/Williams material to expedite the trial
date.
e. Motions to be litigated at the 15-16 Mar 12 article 39(a) session
are^ Government/Defense motions for protective order; and the defense motions
for^ bill of particulars, compel deposition, compel discovery. The
APPEI^A^E^^^I^^

^^^^^^^^^^P^^^^^9

20037

Govemment w i l l also advise the Court of the results of its efforts t ^
determine i f the Govemment is receiving all emails from the Court to include
the email sent 15 Febl2 at 1^43 p.m..
6, The parties agreed to confer and attempt to reachamutually acceptable
protective order. Attached is an emaillreceived from Mr. Prather, the Court
Security Officer, foryour consideration.
D
Denise R. Lind
COL,JA
Chief Judge, 1st Judicial Circuit
OriginalMessage
From^ coombs@armycourtmartialdefense.com
[mailto^coombs@armycourtmartialdefense.com]
Sent^Friday,February24,2012S^52AM
To^ Lind, DeniseRCOLUSARMY (US)
Cc^Kemkes,MatthewJMAJUSARMY (US); Bouchard, PaulRCPTUSARMY (US);
Santiago,MelissaSCW2 USARMY (US); Morrow I I I , JoDean, CPTUSA JFHQNCR/MDW
SJA;Overgaard,AngelMCPTUSARMY(US);Whyte,JeffreyHCPTUSARMY(US);
Ford,ArthurDJr W O l USARMY (US); Fein,AshdenCPTUSARMY (US)
Subjects RF^ Publicity Order Update
COL Lind,
Below are the Govemment'srecommended changes to the Order. The Defense does
not object to the minor changes. With regards to the added paragraph, the
Defense does not object i f the Court believes it is needed.
V/R
David

David F. Coombs, Esq.
Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906
Toll Free: 1-800-588-4156
Local: (508) 689-4616
Fax: (508) 689-9282
coombs@armycourtmartialdefense.com
APPELLATE EXHIBIT X I
P««e_5L.ofPage(s) 9

20038

^f<
www.armycourtmartialdefense.com

^^^Confidentiality Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain confidential attomey-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorised disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is prohibited.^^^

OriginalMessage
Subject: Publicity Order Update
From: "Fein,Ashden CPTUSA JFHQNCR/MDW SJA"
(b) (6)

Date:Fri,Febmary24,20128:40am
To:
Cc: "Kemkes,MatthewJMILUSA'"Bouchard, PaulRCPTUSARMY(US)'"Santiago, MelissaSCW2 USARMY (US)"(b) (6)
"Morrow III, JoDean, CPTUSA JFHQNCR/MDW SJA"
(b) (6)
>, ""Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA
(b)
(6)
JFHQ-NCR/MDW SJA"
,""Whyte,
Jeffrey H. CPTUSA JFHQNCR/MDW SJA
(b) (6)
,""Ford, ArthurD. WOl USA
(b)
(6)
JFHQ NCR/MDW SJA"
David,
Good morning. Wehave reviewed the publicity order and propose the following
updates:
The United States recommends the following proposed updates to the publicity
order:
1. Delete the last four of the accusedssocial security number from the
caption.
2. In paragraphland 4, after "Office of the Staff Judge Advocate" add"',
U.S.Army Military District ofWashington".In the MDW geography,there are
multiple OSJAs.
3. In the last sentence of paragraph 3c, after " military"'add 'or civilian "
^

AP^^^AIEEXIIIBIT^^,^
P^,^^^^^P^^^^^^

20039

4. Change paragraph number4tonumber5, and add the following as paragraph

This order is not intended to limit or restrict any official purpose for
remaining informed regarding matters related to this case or involving the
publication of alleged classified information by WikiLeaks. If you are
presently assigned toaposition that requires your ongoing access to such
information, and you cannot reasonably remove yourself from that portion of
your duties without an adverse impact on you or your mission, then you shall
obtainamemorandum from your military or civilian supervisor documenting
your continued requirement for access and provide that memorandum with your
acknowledgment of this order. Once the memorandum is received by the Office
of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Military District ofWashington, then
you are authorised continued access to this information for the limited
purpose of continuing your military duties.
Please let me know whether you concur/nonconcur and whether you have any
proposed updates.
v/r
Ashden

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

APPELLATE EXHIBIT X \

Pag«!.3—«fP"«e(s) 9

20040

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Prosecution Supplement
to Prosecution Proposed
Case Calendar

8 March 2012

The United States respectfully requests the Court deny Defense Proposed Case
Management Order (hereinafter "Defense's Proposal") and instead adopt the Prosecution
Proposed Case Calendar Update (hereinafter "Prosecution's Proposal") for the reasons that
follow.
I:

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BACKGROUND.

1. The accused is charged with Aiding the Enemy by Giving Intelligence, a violation of Article
104, UCMJ. The accused is also charged under Article 134, UCMJ, with transmitting national
defense and foreign relations information to persons or organizations not entitled to receive it, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1). Finally, the accused is charged
under Article 134 with stealing government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and
various offenses under Article 92, UCMJ.
2. This case involves both classified and unclassified information in significant volume.
Additionally, the government's charges involve completed offenses, not attempts. As a result of
the substance of the charged compromises of classified and unclassified information, the United
States Government's response has been widespread, spanning multiple Executive Branch
departments, agencies, and military commands (hereinafter "federal organizations"), and
requiring interagency coordination in response to the national security issues raised by the
comprormses.
II:

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

1. Information may be originally classified only if done so by an original classification authority
(OCA). Executive Order 13526 § 1.1(a). Additionally, the information must be owned by,
produced by or for, or under the control of the United States Government and must fall within
one or more of the following categories: military plans, weapons systems, or operations; foreign
government information; intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or
methods, or cryptology; foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including
confidential sources; scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national
security; United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or
protection services relating to the national security; or the development, production, or use of
weapons of mass destruction. See Executive Order 13526 §§ 1.1(a), 1.4(a)-(h). Finally, the
OCA must determine "that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be
expected to result in damage to the national security" and be able to identify or describe the
1

20041

expected damage. See Executive Order 13526 § 1.1(a) (emphasis added). OCAs make their
classification designations based on their authority under Executive Order 13526, Classified
National Security Information (signed by President Barack Obama on 29 December 2009) or for
materials classified prior to 27 June 2010 on Executive Order 12958 (signed by President Clinton
on 17 April 1995 and amended by Executive Order 13292 signed by President Bush on 25 March
2003), as well as relevant classification guides.
2. The authority to classify information is limited to (1) the President and the Vice President; (2)
agency heads and officials designated by the President; and (3) United States Government
officials delegated this authority pursuant to paragraph (c) of section 1.3(a). Executive Order
13526 § 1.3(a).
III:

ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY THE ACCUSED AND
DEFENSE COUNSEL.

1. Attorneys representing military personnel are considered persons outside the Executive
Branch, regardless of any military affiliation the attorney may have. See Executive Order 13526;
Army Regulation 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 2008 with Rapid Action
Review, 4 August 2011, paragraph 3-23f (hereinafter "AR 380-67"). As such, disclosure of
classified information to defense counsel is governed by the rules for disclosing classified
information to any individuals or agencies outside of the Executive Branch. Therefore, in a
military justice case involving classified information, the trial counsel is prohibited from
providing defense counsel with copies of: or access to, classified information, unless
preapproved by the appropriate authority. Id. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United
States Army, or his delegate, is the approving authority for granting security clearances and
general access to classified information within the Army and for courts-martial. Id. However,
before disclosing any classified information to defense counsel, the trial counsel must have
authority from the OCA of the federal organization that "owns" the classified information. See
Executive Order 13526. In this case, the accused, all defense counsel, and all expert consultants
appointed to the defense team have been granted security clearances and general access to
classified information.
2. Authority to disclose classified information to the accused and defense counsel generally
begins with a request from the trial counsel to a federal organization's litigation division or
general counsel's office. See Enclosure 1 (Sample Request for Consent to Disclose Classified
Information to the Accused and the Defense, dated 14 March 2011). The assigned attorney from
the organization usually works with experts to attempt to identify the specific OCA from within
the organization for the requested classified information. Many federal organizations have many
OCAs, with each OCA responsible for different categories of classified information within the
federal organization. After the litigation attorney identifies the component/department or OCA
responsible for the information and makes a recommendation as to disposition, the information is
typically reviewed for classification to determine if the underlying information is too sensitive to
tum over to the defense. This decision is made by balancing the ongoing national security
concerns with granting access to the accused and defense counsel, as well as determinations
concerning whether an alternative is adequate.

2

20042

3. Once the OCA who owns the actual document approves the request and authorizes disclosure
of the information, the document is vetted to ensure there are no other OCAs within the
executive branch that have classified information equities within the document. In many cases,
intelligence work-product contains sources from across the intelligence community, particularly
analytic reports or assessments. In the case of a classified analytic report or assessment, the
product could involve the equities of several OCAs, requiring the classified information to be
vetted through other federal organizations with interests, before disclosure to the defense. Many
of the classified documents in this case contain classified information owned by several different
OCAs. In this case, the accused, all defense counsel, and all expert consultants have been
granted access to the classified documents, which make up the bases for many of the charges and
their specifications.
·

IV:

CATEGORIES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE.

The classified information in this case can be characterized in three different categories:
(1) the charged documents or information, which serve as the basis for many of the charges and
their specifications; (2) other classified evidence, produced by the United States, applicable to
the case-in-chief; and (3) other classified evidence.
1. The charged documents or information, which serve as the basis for many of the charges and
their specifications.
When the United States refers to classified "charged documents or information" relating
to this case, including databases containing classified information, it is referring to the datasets
listed below, as described in the relevant classification reviews.
A.
Combined. Information Data Network Exchange Iraq (CIDNE-I). CIDNE-I is a
Department of Defense database containing more than 300,000 Significant Activity (SIGACT)
reports regarding the Iraq war, many of which included information pertaining to military plans,
weapons systems, operations, and improvised explosive device attacks. See CENTCOM
Classification Review, 21 October 2011, BATES 00376893 (enclosed in Enclosure 1 to
Supplement to Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8 March 2012).
B.
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan (CIDNE-A).
CIDNE-A is a Department of Defense database containing more than 91,000 SIGACT reports
regarding the Afghanistan war, many of which included information pertaining to military plans,
weapons systems, operations, and improvised explosive device attacks. See CENTCOM
Classification Review, 21 October 2011, BATES 00376889 (enclosed in Enclosure 1 to
Supplement to Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8 March 2012).
C.
Two analytic products produced by a government intelligence agency containing
classified information. See Classification Review, 31 October 2011, BATES 00378151
(enclosed in Enclosure 1 to Supplement to Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8
March 2012).

3

20043

D.
Multiple classified documents from an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation
relating to a military operation inFarah Province, Afghanistan in May 2009. Many of these
documents included information pertaining to military plans, weapons systems, operations,
vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, and code words identified with mission operations. See
CENTCOM Classification Review, 21 October 2011, BATES 00376902 (enclosed in Enclosure
1 to Supplement to Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8 March 2012).
E.
A video from an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation relating to a military
operation inFarah Province, Afghanistan in May 2009. See CENTCOM Classification Review,
21 October 2011, BATES 00376902 (enclosed in Enclosure 1 to Supplement to Prosecution
Motion for Protective Order, dated 8 March 2012).
F.
An analytic product produced by an Army intelligence organization containing
classified information. See Classification Review, 2 December 2012, BATES 00410626
(enclosed in Enclosure 1 to Supplement to Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8
March 2012).
Net-Centric Diplomacy (NCD) and Department of State Cables. NCD is a
G.
Department of State database containing more than 280,000 diplomatic cables or messages
concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States. See Department of State
Classification Review, 30 October 2011, BATES 00376904-5 (enclosed in Enclosure 1 to
Supplement to Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8 March 2012).
.

H.
A United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) database. This database
contains more than 700 records, many of which contain intelligence sources and methods. See
SOUTHCOM Classification Review, 4 November 2011, BATES 00378647 (enclosed in
Enclosure 1 to Supplement to Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8 March 2012).
2. Other classified evidence, produced by the United States, applicable to the case-in-chief
In addition to the charged documents, the United States intends to use classified
information as evidence to prove the elements of many of the specifications. As part of the
discovery process, the United States produced other pieces of classified information after
coordination with, and the approval of, the different OCAs. This information generally falls
within two sub-categories: (A) digital media, including associated forensic reports and data
extracted from the media, and (B) audit data or "logs" collected from SIPRNET systems.
A.

Digital media, including associated forensic reports and data extracted from the

media.
(1)
The United States Army Criminal Investigative Command (CID) collected
more than fifty individual digital media devices. After initial forensic examination, CID
determined that twenty-three contained relevant information pertaining to the accused, and
completed a full forensic examination of these hard drive and removable media drives. At least
twenty of these devices contained classified information, and many contained the analytic work

4

20044

product of intelligence analysts. Specifically, the work computers used by the accsued contained
classified information owned by multiple federal organizations and OCAs.
(2)
Prior to producing forensic images of the collected drives, and the
derivatively classified forensic reports, trial counsel had to consult with each federal organization
and their OCAs that had an equity in the drives. After conducting a due diligence search of the
drives with the assistance of security experts, trial counsel sent requests for consent to produce
classified information in discovery to the OCAs of the charged documents or information, and
any other OCAs that could reasonably be identified during the search of the hard drives. Based
on classified information being inextricably commingled on the digital media, trial counsel was
required to withhold discovery until consent was received from all the relevant OCAs, either
because they were the OCA of a charged document or because they were an OCA identified as a
result of the due diligence search of the digital media. See Enclosure 1 (Sample Request for
Consent to Disclose Classified Information to the Accused and the Defense, dated 14 March
2011). The Government will have to employ a similar "due diligence" process to identify OCAs
for any other classified digital media ordered to be produced in this case.
B.
Audit data collected from SIPRNET systems. Based on the charged misconduct
originating from the use of SIPRNET computers in Iraq, CID collected multiple sets of audit data
(hereinafter "logs") for computer networks, databases, and systems. These logs were collected
from five federal organizations. Many of the logs are completely classified, while others contain
unclassified and classified information. Additionally, some of the logs contain search terms used
on SIPRNET, which may also be classified. See Enclosure of Enclosure 1 to Supplement to
Prosecution Motion for Protective Order, dated 8 March 2012.
3. Other classified evidence or information.
A.
The prosecution intends to present or otherwise produce additional classified
information as part of its presentencing case. Additionally, mitigation evidence may exist, which
the prosecution recognizes it must produce in some form. Furthermore, the Court may compel
the production of other information, such as a classified assessment, as a result of the defense
motion to compel discovery. At this time, the prosecution believes that the Court's order to
produce any assessment, if one exists, would likely require the coordination of a minimum of
three federal organizations and their OCAs.
B.
For example, the Secretary of Defense directed the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) to establish the Information Review TaskForce (IRTF) to lead a comprehensive
Department of Defense review of classified documents posted to the WikiLeaks website-a
review of everything released, including Department of State (DoS) information, from the DoD
perspective. See Enclosure 2 (Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, dated 5 August 2010). As a
result, if the Court compels the production of the IRTF report, that report will, at the very least,
require coordination with the Department of State before a decision may be made on
classification, disclosure, or asserting the MRE 505 privilege.
C.
In preparation for litigation, trial counsel have also actively sought to review
certain information from multiple federal organization. See Enclosure 3 (Sample Search and
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20045

Preservation Request, dated 14 June 2011). After reviewing tens-of-thousands of pages of
documents from multiple federal organizations pursuant to these requests, trial counsel are
confident that other analytic products produced within the intelligence community contain
references to information otherwise "owned" by other organizations within the intelligence
community; therefore, any production of this material will likely take time to coordinate because
of all the parties involved.
V:

ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITIES

1. As discussed above, the case involves multiple federal organizations because of the scale of
the alleged disclosures of classified information. These organizations fall within the three
categories below. If a federal organization contains an "* " next to its name, the United States
anticipates that documents originating from that federal organization will contain information
from multiple OCAs.
A.
evidence.

Federal organizations with equities in charged documents or digital forensic

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Department of State*
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Defense Information Systems Agency
United States Central Command
United States Southern Command
Government Agency*
United States Cyber Command

B.
Other federal organizations with equities, but not in charged document or digital
forensic evidence.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
C.

Federal Bureau ofinvestigation
Government Agency*
Department of Defense*
Defense Intelligence Agency*

Other federal organizations that have very limited involvement

2. The United States estimates that any Court order to disclose classified information, will likely
require coordination with multiple federal organizations in categories (1) and (2), and roughly
estimates forty-five to sixty days to aggressively coordinate a response across all equity holders.
Within the sixty day window, it would likely take approximately one to two weeks to identify
equity holders and distribute the product amongst the relevant federal organizations and their
OCAs. Thirty days to analyze the product to identify the sources of classified information and
evaluate the level of protection that must be given to that information. Two additional weeks for
the OCAs to coordinate a response, for example to approve full disclosure, limited disclosure,
some variation, or invoke the privilege. If an OCA invokes the classified information privilege,
it may take additional time to conduct a classification review and route the document to the
6

20046

"head of the executive or military department or government agency concerned" for proper
invocation. See MRE 505(c).
VI:

USE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION DURING TRIAL

1. Issues relating to classified information are likely to arise in connection with the use of such
information during trial. Under MRE 505(h), if the accused reasonably expects to disclose or
cause the disclosure of classified information in any manner in connection with a court-martial
proceeding, the accused must provide notice to the United States to allow the United States the
opportunity to be heard utilizing the procedures outlined under MRE 505(i). In this case, the
United States does not anticipate extensive litigation during this phase. However, depending on
what information the accused intends to disclose or cause the disclosure of at trial, the process
could be somewhat lengthy if the United States needs to contact an OCA or multiple OCAs for a
classification review of the material.
2. With respect to the use of classified information by the United States during trial, the United
States expects to use classified information during the merits and presentencing phases of the
court-martial. Assuming the Court sets a date closer to trial to consider whether the standard for
closure of the courtroom is met under RCM 806(b)(2), the United States expects to have an
evidence presentation plan in place for the court's consideration that is narrowly-tailored to
protect classified information and the accused's right to, and the public's interest in, a public
trial. Additionally, the United States intends to file a motion in limine seeking a preliminary
ruling on the admissibility of certain classified evidence in an attempt to minimize issues at trial.
Because the substance of the classified information will likely be relevant to a determination of
whether the evidence is admissible, the United States expects to file a motion requesting the
Court close the courtroom during this proceeding as well. Finally, the defense may also file a
motion in limine seeking a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of classified evidence, if the
defense contends that certain classified evidence is more prejudicial than probative.
VII:

CONCLUSION

Classified information litigation is a complex area of law. In the case at bar, the
complexity is magnified given the amount of information allegedly compromised. In light of the
above issues, the United States respectfully requests the Court adopt the Prosecution's Proposal.

~

ASHDENFEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

7

20047

I certify that I served or caused to be served a true copy of the above on Defense Counsel,
via electronic mail, on 8 March 2012.

ASHDENFEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

8



. . 20048
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
u.s. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MOHAIR. DC 20319-5013
ANJA-CL 14 March 201 1

MEMORANDUM THRU Of?ce of the Judge Advocate General David
May?eld), 2200 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310

FOR Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI-ZB), 2200 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC
20310

SUBJECT: Request for Consent to Disclose Classi?ed Infonnation to the Accused and the

Defense - United States v. Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Marming

1. PURPOSE. The prosecution team in the above-referenced case requests, in accordance with
Executive Orders 12958 and 13526 (as applicable), consent to disclose classi?ed infonnation
originating in your department or agency to PFC Marming and his appropriately cleared defense
team, subject to the protections described below. This consent is required for discovery under
Article 46, Unifonn Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 405 and
70 and applicable case law.

2. BACKGROUND. PFC Manning is charged with downloading various classi?ed documents,
photographs, and videos from Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SI PRNET) websites and
transferring them to his personal computer. PFC Manning is also charged with transmitting this
infonnation to persons or organizations not entitled to receive it, in violation of United States
law.? During the course of the investigation and examination of digital media and documents
associated with this case, investigators encountered information originally classi?ed by your
department or agency.

3. USE AT TRIAL. Consenting to the disclosure of classi?ed information to the defense during
discovery does mt authorize the use of this information or material by the defense during trial.
The defense team?s use of such infonnation at trial would require speci?c authorization by the
military judge in accordance with the following procedures. Under Militaiy Rule of Evidence
(MRE) 505(h)(l the defense is required to notify the United States and military judge, in
writing, prior to any disclosure of classi?ed information during a court-martial proceeding?

PFC Manning is cunently charged with multiple violations of the UCMJ, including violating Articles
92, I04, and 134 ofthe UCMJ (18 U.S.C. 793 and 18 U.S.C. 1030). See Enclosures 1 and 2.

2 ?lf the accused reasonably expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure of classi?ed information in any
manner in connection with a court-martial proceeding, the accused shall notify the trial counsel in writing
of such intention and ?le a copy of such notice with the militaryjudge. Such notice shall be given within

the time speci?ed by the militaryjudge under subdivision or, if no time has been speci?ed, prior to

arraignment of the accused.? MRE 50S(h)(l

FOR USE ONLY

0 20049
mu USE ONLY

ANJA-CL
SUBJECT: Request for Consent to Disclose Classi?ed Information to the Accused and the
Defense - United States v. Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning

After this noti?cation, the United States may contest whether the classi?ed information is
relevant and necessary to an element of the offense or a legally cognizable defense. -If a military
judge determines that the classi?ed information is relevant, necessary, and otherwise admissible
in evidence, the defense may use that information on the merits during a court-martial, subject to
the military judge?s ruling on the use of permissible unclassi?ed alternatives, including
redactions and summaries, or closure of the courtroom and exclusion of the public from that
portion of the court-martial containing classi?ed evidence.3

4. APPLICABLE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. The classi?ed information for this
request consists of the classi?ed digital evidence, forensic copies of the digital evidence, and
copies of the documentary evidence collected in this case that contain classi?ed information
identi?ed as originating from the Department of Defense. This evidence is l.isted on Enclosure 3.
This request also includes derivative uses of the classi?ed information originating from the
evidence listed on Enclosure 3 and contained in forensic reports, general law enforcement
reports, and other compiled documentation within the law enforcement and prosecution case
?les.

5. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

a. Retain Classi?cation. This request will r_1o_t affect the classi?cation of any of the subject
information.

b. Protective Order. Prior to disclosure and subsequent access to classi?ed information, each
member of the defense team will sign a protective order, acknowledging their limitations of
access and use. See Enclosure 4.

c. Clearances. Each member of the defense team has security clearances at the minimum level
of ?Secret.? Only cleared individuals appointed to the defense team by the convening authority
and PFC Marming will have access to the disclosed information, under supervision. All panel
members and the military judge will have security clearances at the minimum level of ?Top
Secret.?

d. Secure Facility. All classi?ed information will be stored in a United States government
approved secure facility and storage container. The information will only be viewed or tested
within a secure facility, pursuant to Executive Order and U.S. Army regulations.

4;

3 ?Courts-martial shall be open to the public unless there is a substantial probability that an overriding
interest will be prejudiced if the proceedings remain open; (2) closure is no broader than necessary to
protect the overriding interest; (3) reasonable alternatives to closure were considered and found
inadequate; and (4) the military judge makes case-speci?c ?ndings on the record justifying closure.?
RCM 806(b)(2). A classi?cation review of the infonnation is the usual method of demonstrating the
?overriding interest? that will be prejudiced if the proceedings remain open.

2

FOR USE ONLY



. 20050
a mu usr: ONLY

ANJA-CL
SUBJECT: Request for Consent to Disclose Classi?ed Information to the Accused and the
Defense - United States v. Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning

e. Securig At all times during the viewing or testing of the classi?ed information, at
least one defense security expert, appointed and employed by the United States, will be present
to oversee the proper handling and storage of the classi?ed information. A government security
expert will be present for all pretrial and trial proceedings.

6. SUSPEN SE. The prosecution te_am requests this consent by 21 March 201 l. The purpose of
this short suspense is to provide the defense with copies of the forensic data, derivative forensic
reports, and other related material for discovery purposes and to facilitate potential plea
negotiations, if any. The prosecution team also requests your response to this memorandum be
kept ?Unclassi?ed? and, if required, any classi?ed material should be attached as an enclosure.

7. The int of contact for this uest is the undersigned at

-
4 Encls ASHDEN FEIN
1. Charge Sheet, 5 Jul 10 CPT, JA
2. Charge Sheet, 1 Mar 1 1 Chief, Military Justice

3. Classi?ed Evidence List, 14 Mar ll
4. Protective Order, 17 Sep 10

CF: (w/encls)



3

FOR USE ONLY

0 0 20051

Enclosure 3

Department of Defense (General) and Department of the Army
Evidence and Information for Disclosure

1. Computers and Hard drives operated by PFC Manning
a. Voucher 066-IO Item I: Seagate Hard Drive, SN 3MH036MI, extracted from
USG SIPR Computer, from SCIF workplace) .22
b. Voucher 066-I0, Item 2: Unknown Make/Model Hard Drive, SN SMHOHWKN,



.40

c. Voucher 067-I0, Item I: Apple Laptop Computer, SN W8939AZ066E, from
Room 4C93 room)

d. Voucher O70-I 0. Item I: Toshiba Hard Drive, ZSF I422S 6P2 EC A,
extracted from USG SIPR computer assigned to SPC WALSH

e. Voucher 076-I0, Item 1: HDD removed from LAMO's Lenovo Thinkpad laptop
computer

f. Voucher 077-I 0. Item I Laptop computer, Hewlett Packard, received from
LAMO

g. Voucher I I9-I0, Item I: Hard drive containing the Access Data logical evidence
of the Network Shares from the SJA and the bradIey.manning account

h. Voucher I23-I0. Item I: Hard drive, seagate brand, SN I, containing
an EnCase logical image ?le of folder named "farah" etc

i. Voucher l3l-I0. Item I: Server, NetApp brand Model RS-I404, SN 30000442,
containing 14 300GB hard drives

j. Voucher I33-I0, Item I: Server, NetApp brand Model: SN
SHU7660500ID4C4, containing I4 300GB hard drives

k. Voucher I35-I0, Item I: Hard drive, SN 3QPOE4S2, taken from 10th MTN DIV

conex

I. Voucher I35-I0, Item 2: Hard drive, SN taken from l0th MTN DIV
conex

rn. Voucher 135-10 Item 3: Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7A057KS, taken
from IOth MTN DIV conex

n. Voucher I35-I0, Item 4: Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7A057PN, taken
from 10th MTN DIV conex

o. Voucher 135-1 0, Item 5: Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7A057NG, taken
from l0th MTN DIV conex

p. Voucher I35-I0. Item 6: Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7904PF 7, taken
?'om I0th MTN DIV conex



I

pic?

20052

q. Voucher I35-I0. Item 7:
from IOth MTN DIV conex
r. Voucher I35-IO, Item 8:
from I0th MTN DIV conex
s. Voucher I35-IO. Item 9:
from l0th MTN DIV conex
t. Voucher I35-I0. Item I0
from I0th MTN DIV conex
u.
taken ?'om 10th MTN DIV conex
v.
taken from I0th MTN DIV conex
w.
taken from 10th MTN DIV conex
x.
froml0th MTN DIV conex
y.
taken from 10th MTN DIV conex
z.
from I0th MTN DIV conex
aa.
taken froml0th MTN DIV conex
bb.
taken from 10th MTN DIV conex
cc.
from 10th MTN DIV conex
dd.
taken from I0th MTN DIV conex
ee.
from I0th MTN DIV conex
ff.
from |0th MTN DIV conex
88-
taken from I0th MTN DIV conex
hh.
taken from I0th MTN DIV conex
n.
taken from I0th MTN DIV conex
II-
from I0th MTN DIV conex

Voucher I35-IO. Item I I:

Voucher I35-I0. Item I2:

Voucher I35-I0, Item I3:

Voucher I35-I0, Item I4:

Voucher I35-I0, Item I5:

Voucher 135- I 0, Item I6:

Voucher Item I7:

Voucher I35- I 0, Item 18:

Voucher I35-I0, Item I9:

Voucher I35-I0, Item 20:

Voucher I35-I0. Item 2 I:

Voucher I35-I0, Item 22:

Voucher I35-I0 Item 23:



Voucher I35-IO. Item 24:

Voucher I35-I0, Item 25:

Voucher I35-I0. Item 26:

Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7AO57EK, taken
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7904PDJ, taken
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DAO3P7A057F7, taken

Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7AO57F8, taken
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DAO3P7A057FL,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7904PDY,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7C05JNF,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7A057P5, taken
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7A057N5,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P76049F4, taken
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7904PDP,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DAO3P76049WJ,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DAO3PCO5J R4, taken
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P76049YW,
Hard Drive, Seagate brand, SN: 3KR3ZM5G, taken
Hard Drive, Seagate brand, SN: 3KR4DC5R, taken
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7A057FD,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03P7A057K.I,
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN: DA03 P7A057EG,

Hard Drive, Seagate brand, SN: 3KR3XN25, taken

kk. Voucher I35-I0. Item 27:

from 10th MTN DIV conex

II. Voucher I35-I0. Item 28:

taken from l0th MTN DIV conex

mm. Voucher I35-IO, Item 29:

taken from I0th MTN DIV conex
nn.
l0th MTN DIV conex

Voucher I35-I0, Item 30:

oo. Voucher I35-I0. Item 31:
taken from 10th MTN DIV conex

pp. Voucher I35-I0, Item 32:
taken from 10th MTN DIV conex

qq. Voucher I35-I0, Item 33:
from 10th MTN DIV cone

rr. Voucher I35-I0, Item 34:

taken from 10th MTN DIV conex
ss.
taken from 10th MTN DIV conex

tt. Voucher I35-I 0, Item 36:

taken from I0th MTN DIV conex
uu.
taken from 10th MTN DIV conex
vv.
takenfrom I0th MTN DIV conex

ww. Voucher I35-I 0, Item 39:

taken from 10th MTN DIV conex

xx. Voucher 135-10. Item 40:

from 10th MTN DIV conex

yy. Voucher I35-I0, Item 41:

taken ?om I0th MTN DIV conex
22.
from 10th MTN DIV conex

Voucher I35-I0, Item 43:

from 10th MTN DIV conex

Voucher I35-IO. Item 44:

taken from 10th MTN DIV conex

I4 hitachi 300GB Hard drives

Voucher I35-I0, Item 35:

Voucher I35-I0, Item 37:

Voucher I35-I0, Item 38:

Voucher I35-I0. Item 42:

Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:

Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:

20053

taken

DAO3 P7A057KR,

DA03P7A057FC,

Hard Drive, Seagate brand, SN: 3kr43fd3, taken from

Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:
Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:

Hard Drive, Fujitsu brand, SN:

DA03P7A057NS,
DAO3 P7A057LF,
DA03P7A057P6, taken
DAO3 P72034MU,
DAO3 P7303PGH,
DAO3P7303M6B,
DA03P7A057FH,
DA03P7AO57EW,
DA03P7AO57FR,
DAO3 P7AO57F6, taken
DA03P7A057DW,
DA03P7A057FI taken
DA03 P6C02P6F, taken

DA03P7A05 7NV,

Voucher I45-I0. Item I: Server (secret) NetApp brand, SN 30000442, containing

Voucher l45- I 0. Item 2: Server (secret) Sun Microsystems, SN: 0733BD20EC,

containing 4 146GB hard drives

3



20054

Voucher I45-I 0. Item 3: Server (secret) Sun Microsystems brand, SN:
0732BDI FEC, containing 4 146GB hard disks

Voucher I45-I0, Item 4: Server (secret) Dell Brand, SN containing 6
hard drives.

Voucher I46-IO, Item I: Server, Sun Microsystem brand, SN:
containing 4 146GB hard drives

Voucher I47-IO, Item I: Hard drive, Hitachi brand, unknown capacity, SN
K3HBYJ DH. property of l0th

Voucher 147-IO, Item 2: Hard drive, Hitachi brand, SN:


Voucher I47-I0, Item 3: Hard Drive, Hitachi brand, SN:
IOOGB

Voucher I65-IO, Item 1: Hard Drive, Western Digital brand, SN
WX70C89S8878, purportedly containing Iraq CIDNE logs

Ill. Voucher I72-IO. Item I: Hard drive, Seagatc Brand, Model FrceAgcnt Go,
500GB, SN: 2GE7HPOD (SECRET) - purportedly containing CIDNE logs from Afghanistan.
Registered Mail #CD5 DVDs Other Media

. . 20055



3. Documentary Evidence
a. None

4. Documentary Information



20056

002 8 lO CI02 2 1 T G l l ?
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
lOOO DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHfNcrrON, DC 20301-1000

^yg

J

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MDLIT.^RY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER. SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEP.ARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, NET ASSF-SSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FTEID ACTrVTTIES
Subject: Task Force to Review Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Infbrmation (FOUO)
(U//FOUO) On July 28, 2010,1 directed the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) to establish an Informaticn Review Task Force (IRTF) to lead a conq>idiensivc
Department ofDefense (DoD) review of classified documents posted to the WikiLeaks
website (www.wikileaks.org) on July 25,2010, and any other associated materials.
Department ofDefense Components should provide DIA any assistance required to ensure
the timely completion of the review.
(U//FOUO) The IRTF will review the impact of the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information specified above. The IRTF will coordinate throughout the
Intelhgence Community in conducting this time-sensitive review and integrate its efforts
. witib those of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
(U/,TOUO) The IRTF will provide regular updates to the OfBce of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) on itsfindings.A more comprehensive inteiim report will be provided as
the effort progresses. That report will include the following items:
• (U.//FOUO) Any released infbrmation with immediate force protection inylications;
• (U/zTQUO) . ^ y released information conceming allies or coalition partners that may
negatively impact foreign policy;

-

"-l»lW
w

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LAW BIFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
ManningB_00024349

4^

IZ

20057

OOP 8 10 C/D2 2 T ] G 117
U"NCI ASSIHED/TFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

• (U.A'FOUO) Any intelligence reporting;
• (U//FOUO) Anyreleasedinfoimation concerning intelligence sources or methods;
• (U/;FOUO) Any infonnatioD on civilian casualdes not previously released;
• (U/'/TOUO) Any derogatory comments regarding Afghan culture or Islam; and
• (U//FOUO) Any related datatiiatmay have also have been released to WikiLeaks,
but not posted.
Afinalreport will be produced once all documents are assessed.
(Uy/FOUO) The IRTF is the single DoD organization with authority and responsibility to
conduct the DoDreviewregardingthis unauthorized disclosure. By separate tasking, 1 am
directing USD(I) to conduct an assessment of the Dqsaitment's procedures for accessing
and transporting classified irifomiation.
(U//F0UO) This review is separate &om, and unrelated to, any criminal investigation of
the leaked information. The assessment and review of the leaked documents is not intended
to, and shall not limit in any way, the ability of Department, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation
or any other federal criminal investigators, trial counsel and prosecutors to conduct
investigative and trial proceedings in support of possible prosecutions under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice or federal criminal provisions.

"i^-Ji-g^
oc:
Director ofl^atiocai Intelligence
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence & Research
National Counterintelligence Center

UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LAW ENFORCEMB-n SENSITIVE
ManningB_00024350





0 20058
mu ()Hl(TlAl. o.\1.v

DEPARTMENV OF THE ARMY
US. ARMY MILITARY 05
are A smear
roar LESLEY J. ncuatn. oc 20319-snra

Criminal Law Division, Offiu: of the Staff Judge Advocate





Defense Intelligence Agency
2(1) MacDill Boulevard

Washington, DC 20050-6563 .
3
Re: United States v. Pr'vatc st PFC Bradle . ?n

wait

The U.S. Army Prosecutors in the abave?referenoed hereby make a two-fold
request to the Defense intelligence Agency (?agcn t. the prosecution requests that your
agency conduct a thorough and comprehensive records for information which
concerns or references PFC Manning and/or is, including certain information, detailed
below, which directly implicates the cvid 'e-referenced case. Secondly, the
prosecution requests that your agency ta

and necessary steps to preserve any
responsive ?les gathered as a result of for information.

Office of the General Counsel

PFC Manning is the subject investigation and criminal prosecution based
on the alleged illegal collection re of national defense and foreign relations
information to the WikiLeaks organ 1. PFC Manning is currently charged with multiple
violations of federal law unde U?form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including
violations of 18 U.S.C. S.C. 1030, and 18 U.S.C. 641. PFC Manning is also
charged with Aiding the Erie Giving Intelligence. in violation of 10 U.S.C. 904.
Enclosed with this letter a copy of the charge sheet. PFC Manning was apprehended by the
U.S. Army Criminal lion Command in Iraq on May 27, 2010 and has been in pretrial
con?nement since a 10. WikiLcaks released national defense and foreign relations
information to them by PFC Manning on the internet.

.1

PFC dward Manning is an enlisted member of the United States Army. He was

born on Dew l987, and his Social Security Number is has been

associate following physical addresses:
2085 ar perating Base Hammer. Iraq. APO AE 09308; and Headquarters and
Hear rs ompany (HHC), 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), lOth Mountain Division

(Li??r?a ry), Building ll)200, Fort Drum. New York, 13602. PFC Manning is also believed






cation:

to lids. iatcd with the name Breanna Elizabeth Manning and the following means of
e%?r

7'-Kiri

Email:

FOR USE (DNLY

get?).

. 20059
ion on

-2-



b. Social Networking:



c. IP Addresses:


\uests that you conduct an immediate and thorough

As indicated above, the prose

prudential search of your records rrnation provided above, and also for any

infor ation direct] ce 'n but not limited to a do uments that
discuss damage or harm caused anning and Wilor taken in response to th ct 'es 0 PFC Manning and WikiLeaks. The search for WikiLeaks
related information should to all records from November 1, 2009 to the present
associated with the disclosure 0 assified information to Wikilxaks, the possession of
classified information ?ikiLeaks, or the dissemination of classified information by








Wikibsaks.

This reque igned to allow the prosecutors to assess the totality of information
available and ords by other government agencies. It is not intended to, nor should it
be interprete as bing any legal relevance, including whether such information may be
provided i ry, to the information requested. The prosecutors require such materials
er to expedite this process. please provide the requested inforrpation
that!

or information classi?ed or controlled as ?sensitive compartmented
inii?r



should be made available for inspection. We anticipate making future requests as
rises, and specifically before the trial, if the case is referred to court-martial.

FOR USIE ONLY

I am forwardini: a copy of this letter 1

. mu 1151:; ?my .

-3-


for



As stated above, the prosecution rcquesLs that you preserve all responsive
information, including data stored on electronic media, gathered as a result of yo







based on PFC Manning's rights under Article 46, UCMJ, the Rules fqt?ay -
applicable case law.

1

mi
Army




5.0%

Enclosure

FOR USE ONLY

20061

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Prosecution Response
to Defense Motion for Appropriate Relief
Under Military Rule of Evidence 505

8 March 2012

RELIEF SOUGHT

The United States respectfully requests the Court deny, in part, the Defense Motion for
Appropriate Relief under Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 505 (the "Motion") and the Defense
Supplement to the Motion (the "Supplement") for the reasons provided herein. The United
States requests oral argument.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

As the moving party, the Defense bears the burden of persuasion and must prove any
factual issues necessary to decide this motion by a preponderance of the evidence. See Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 905(c) (2008).
FACTS

The United States agrees to those facts cited by Defense in its Motion and Supplement,
except for any allegations that the referenced classification determination fails to comply with
Executive Order No. 13526, that the organization's public statements are "inconsistent" with the
classification determination, or that question the interpretation of the classification
determination.
WITNESSES/EVIDENCE

The United States does not request any witnesses or evidence be produced for this
response.
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

The United States respectfully requests the Court deny Defense request for the following:
(1) an Article 39(a) session for the purpose of obtaining "clarification" from a referenced
Original Classification Authority (OCA); (2) issuance of the Defense's proposed Protective
Order ("Defense's PO"); (3) the production of the referenced OCA as a witness; (4) the
production of Mr. Jay Prather, Court Security Officer, as a witness; and (5) the Defense's
proposed Protective Order to the Court Security Officer.

1

20062

I:

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THE COURT HOLD AN
ARTICLE

39(a)

SESSION UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF MRE SOS(e).

The United States supports Defense request, in part, for an Article 39(a) session. MRE
505(e) states that "after referral of charges and prior to arraignment, any party may move for a
session under Article 39(a) to consider matters relating to classified information that may arise in
connection with the trial." M.R.E. 505(e). Otherwise, the Rule continues that
sua sponte, the military judge promptly shall hold a session under
Article 39(a) to establish the timing of requests for discovery, the
provision of notice under subdivision (h), and the initiation of the
procedure under subdivision (i). In addition, the military judge
may consider any other matters that relate to classified information
or that may promote a fair and expeditious trial.

Id. In its Motion, the Defense requested that the Court hold an Article 39(a) session to "issue a
Protective Order under MRE 505(g)(l), establish timing for discovery and notice under MRE
505(h), and obtain clarification from the OCA for Specification 3 and 15 of Charge II." The
United States supports Defense request for an Article 39(a) session, but not for the purpose of
obtaining "clarification" from the referenced OCA. As outlined below in section (IV), the
United States respectfully requests that the Court deny production of the OCA as testimony that
is not "relevant and necessary " and outside the spirit of MRE 505(e). See R.C.M. 703(b); see
also M.R.E. 505(e) (to establish the timing of discovery requests, MRE 505(h) provisions, and
MRE 505(i) procedures).
II:

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THE COURT DENY
DEFENSE'S PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER.

The United States respectfully requests that the Court deny Defense's PO because it
contains countless legal and factual errors and violates the spirit of MRE 505(g)(l).
A major concern in Defense's PO is the role of the Court Security Officer (CSO), namely
that the CSO absorbs duties designed for the Trial Counsel and the Security Experts assigned to
the Defense. For example, Defense's PO assigns the CSO with many responsibilities ordinarily
assigned to the Trial Counsel, including, inter alia, the following: ( 1) verifying and processing
security clearances; (2) coordinating the purchase of equipment for the Defense; (3) coordinating
the designation of areas for classified communication; and (4) coordinating the designation of a
storage facility for the storage, handling, and control of classified information. See Defense
Motion, para. 3(c)(4), 3(h)(2), 3(h)(3)(A), 3(k), 3(n)(4}, 3(n)(5), 3(n)(6). Additionally, Defense's
PO assigns the CSO with responsibilities of the United States Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, namely giving the civilian defense counsel access to classified information and
approving any mechanical devices used in the preparation or transmission of classified
information. See Defense Motion, para. 3(i), 3(n)(6). Requiring the CSO to absorb all of these
tasks, in conjunction with those duties necessary to properly and timely assist the Court, may
cause future delays, in addition to unnecessary burden an expert upon whom the parties and the
Court rely heavily.
2

20063

Outside clerical errors, Defense's PO also, inter alia, improperly defines its scope, fails
to include all defense members such as security experts detailed to the defense, contains
information relating to MRE 505(h) which is more proper in a separate order, narrowly defmes
"Government intelligence employees, " and fails to include any restrictions on the accused's
access to classified discovery.1 See Defense Motion, para. 3(a), 3(c)(6), 3(h)(3), 3(m), 3(n)(12).
The Defense's PO violates the spirit of MRE 505(g)(1). "If the Government agrees to
disclose classified information to the accused, " the rule requires the military judge to enter an
appropriate protective order "at the request of the Government." M.R.E. 505(g)(1) (''the military
judge, at the request of the Government, shall enter an appropriate protective order to guard
against the compromise of the information disclosed to the accused'') (emphasis added)). The
rule is intended to protect that information which the Government agrees to disclose to the
accused. Accordingly, the United States respectfully requestd that the Court enter a protective
order, but only at the request of the United States who, on behalf of the Government, has agreed
to provide defense access to classified information. See id.
The United States respectfully requests that the Court deny Defense's PO in light of these
concerns.
III:

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THE COURT DENY
DEFENSE REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THE OCA.

The United States respectfully requests the Court deny Defense request for the production
of the OCA relating to Specification 3 and 15 of Charge II. Defense requests the production of
this witness to "obtain clarification...regarding the scope of its classification determination on
referencing the OCA w1thin court filings and open court." Such anticipated testimony, however,
is not legally "relevant and necessary." See R.C.M. 703(b).
RCM 703(b) states that "[ e]ach party is entitled to the production of any witness whose
testimony on a matter in issue on the merits ...would be relevant and necessary." R.C.M. 703(b);
see also R.C.M. 401 (relevant evidence "means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence"); see also R.C.M. 703(b) discussion
("[r]elevant testimony is necessary when it is not cumulative and when it would contribute to a
party's presentation of the case in some positive way on a matter in issue"). The rule does not
govern the production of classified information. See R.C.M. 701(f); see also R.C.M. 703(f)
analysis; see also Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Mil. R. Evid. 505(a) (''this rule
applies to all stages of the proceedings").
Information may be originally classified only if done so by an Original Classification
Authority (OCA). Executive Order 13526 § 1.1(a). Additionally, the information must be
owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the United States Government and must
fall within one or more of the following categories: military plans, weapons systems, or
operations; foreign government information; intelligence activities (including covert action),
1

See Defense Motion, para. 3(c)(l)(A-B) (Executive Order 13526).

3

20064

intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; foreign relations or foreign activities of the
United States, including confidential sources; scientific, technological, or economic matters
relating to the national security; United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear
materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures,
projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security; or the development,
production, or use of weapons of mass destruction. See Executive Order 13526 § § 1.1(a), 1.4(a)­
(h). Finally, the OCA must determine determine "that the unauthorized disclosure of the
information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security" and be
able to identify or describe the expected damage. See Executive Order 13526 § 1.1(a) (emphasis
added).
OCAs make their classification designations based on their authority under Executive
Order 13526, Classified National Security Information (signed by President Barack Obama on
29 December 2009) or for materials classified prior to 27 June 2010 on Executive Order 12958
(signed by President Clinton on 17 April 1995 and amended by Executive Order 13292 signed
by President Bush on 25 March 2003), as well as relevant classification guides.
The authority to classify information is limited to (1) the President and the Vice
President; (2) agency heads and officials designated by the President; and (3) United States
Government officials delegated this authority pursuant to paragraph (c) of section 1.3(a). See
Executive Order 13526 § 1.3(a).
The President delegated the authority to make classification determinations to heads of
selection agencies and it remains an Executive function. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 527 (1988) (''The authority to protect [classified] information falls on the President as head
of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief"). The authority has been held in the
relevant agencies because they have the expertise to review the information and determine the
potential impact the release of that information would have on the United States as well as who
can have access to that information. Id.; see, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) ("[A]
court's decision whether an intelligence source will be harmed if his identity is revealed will
often require complex political, historical, and psychological judgments. . . . There is no reason
for a potential intelligence source, whose welfare and safety may be at stake, to have great
confidence in the ability of the judges to make those judgments correctly.").
Once an OCA has made a classification determination it is presumed proper and it is not
the province of the court to question these determinations. See United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d
12 15, 1217 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he government . . . may determine what information is
classified. A defendant cannot challenge this classification. A court cannot question it."),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985); see also United States v.
Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 717 (E.D. Va. 2007) ("Of course, classification decisions are for the
Executive Branch . . . ."). The decision of the owner of the information must be given great
deference. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 176 (''The decisions of the Director, who must of course be
familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the
magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake"); see also Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) ("Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are
rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention"); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
4

20065

580 (1952) (such matters "are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference").
In sum, the Defense has failed to articulate why the anticipated testimony of the
referenced OCA is "relevant and necessary." See R.C.M. 703(b). The witness' anticipated
testimony, specifically to "obtain clarification...regarding the scope of its classification
determination on referencing the OCA within court filings and open court, " is not "relevant and
necessary, " but instead simply requested to assist the Defense in safeguarding classified
information.
IV:

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THE COURT DENY
DEFENSE REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MR. JAY PRATHER,
THE COURT SECURITY OFFICER.

The United States respectfully requests the Court deny Defense request for the production
of Mr. Jay Prather, the Court Security Officer. Defense articulates no basis for why his
testimony is "relevant and necessary." See R.C.M. 703(b). The United States can envision no
reason why Mr. Prather's testimony would be "relevant and necessary" with respect to the
matters regarding MRE 505(h) or MRE 505(i). The United States can only assume that Defense
requests Mr. Prather's testimony regarding the language of the Protective Order. Assuming,
arguendo, this is the case, Mr. Prather's testimony again is not "relevant and necessary." See
R.C.M. 703(b). The United States agrees with Defense's assumed position that the Court should
receive guidance from Mr. Prather; however, it is recommended that the Court consult with Mr.
Prather ex parte, if it should have any questions regarding the language of the Protective Order.
Subjecting Mr. Prather to sworn, in-court testimony is unnecessary and inefficient.
V:

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THE COURT DENY
DEFENSE'S PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER TO THE COURT
SECURITY OFFICER.

The United States respectfully requests that the Court deny Defense's proposed
Protective Order to the Security Officer. The proposed Order is flawed given the many
unnecessary and inefficient procedures set forth therein and Defense's overly broad
interpretation of the CSO's role, as outlined above. See Defense's proposed Protective Order to:
Security Officer, para. 3(c) (prohibiting the CSO from divulging the contents of any ex parte
filings to any person when, if classified information is contained therein, the CSO will be
required to consult with the applicable OCA; 3(d) (regardless of classification, requiring the CSO
to provide the Court and the defense a written declaration for all filings, an unnecessary measure
that may cause delay), 3(e) (requiring the CSO to alert Defense if its filings are unclassified
before filings are submitted to the Court, an unnecessary measure that may cause delay). The
Protective Order proposed by the United States eliminates the need for a separate Protective
Order for the CSO.

5

20066

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the United States requests that the Court deny, in part, the Defense
Motion for Appropriate Relief under MRE 505 and the Defense Supplement to the Motion.

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

I certify that I served or caused to be served a true copy of the above on Defense Counsel,
via electronic mail, on 8 March 2012.

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

6

20067

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

)
)

TO DEFENSE MOTION FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS

)
)
)
)
)

PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

8 March 2012

RELIEF SOUGHT

COMES NOW the United States of America, by and through undersigned counsel, and
respectfully requests this Court deny, in part, the defense motion to direct the United States to
file a bill of particulars in the above-captioned case. The United States submits the enclosed
particulars in response to paragraphs 8a-8d, 9a-9b, lla-llf, 13a-13c, and 13e of the Defense
Motion for Appropriate Relief Under Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 906(b)(6). See Enclosure
1.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

As the moving party, the defense has the burden of persuasion on any factual issue the
resolution of which is necessary to decide the motion. RCM 905(c)(2). The burden of proof is
by a preponderance of the evidence. RCM 905(c)(l).
FACTS

The United States stipulates to the facts as set forth in the defense motion. Additionally,
on 8 November 2011, the United States met with the defense team, including experts, to provide
a classified briefing of the evidence supporting the charges and specifications. See Enclosure 2.
On 17-18 November 20ll,the prosecution travelled to Fort Leavenworth and provided a
modified version of the 8 November briefmg to the accused and defense counsel. See Enclosure
2. On 2 December 2011, the United States served its evidence list for the Article 32
Investigation on the Investigating Officer and defense counsel. The evidence memorandum
included a classified enclosure, which listed the "charged documents" by BATES number. See
Enclosure 3 and its classified supplement.
WITNESSES/EVIDENCE

The United States requests the Court consider the referred charge sheet in support of its
motion, as well as Enclosures 1-3.
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

The purpose of a bill of particulars is three-fold: (1) to inform the accused of the nature of
the charge with sufficient precision to enable the accused to prepare for trial; (2) to avoid or
minimize the danger of surprise at the time of trial; and (3) to enable the accused to plead the
1

20068

acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense when the specification
itself is too vague and indefmite for such purposes. RCM 906(b)(6). A bill of particulars is not
appropriate when used to conduct discovery of the Government's theory of the case, to force
detailed disclosure of acts underlying a charge, or to restrict the Government's proof at trial. !d.

I.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE DIRECTED TO SUBMIT A BILL OF
PARTICULARS IN RESPONSE TO PARAGRAPHS 12A AND 12B OF THE
DEFENSE MOTION.
The defense request for particulars in paragraphs 12a and 12b of the defense motion is an

attempt to conduct discovery of the Government's theory of the case. The defense requests the
United States identify "how" the accused ''knowingly exceeded authorized access" in
Specifications 13 and 14 of Charge II. (Def. Mot. at 6. ) In other words, the defense seeks the
manner in which "PFC Manning exceeded his authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network computer. " However, the purpose of a bill of particulars is to secure facts, not
legal theories. Rose

v.

United States, 149 F. 2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1945). The defense is clearly

seeking an explanation of the United States' legal theory for the two specifications in question;
specifically "how" the accused violated the statute in question. The defense is not entitled to
such a detailed explanation of the United States' legal theory, as "exceeds authorized access" is
defined by 18 U.S. C. §1030. 18 U. S. C. §1030 (e)(6) (2008). Furthermore, both specifications
sufficiently inform the accused of the nature of the charge, including the classification of the
computer, such that there is no danger of surprise at the time of trial. The specifications are not
vague or indefmite as the accused claims. They specify where and when the accused allegedly
committed the misconduct, the specific type and amount of information at issue, the
classification of the material obtained, and the classification of the computer the accused is
alleged to have exceeded authorized access while using. The purpose of a bill of particulars "is
not to find out what the government knows, but what the government claims. " United States

v.

Newman, 25 M.J. 604, 606 n. 3 (A. C.M. R. 1987). In this case, the accused is on notice of the

"claims" and the United States should not be directed to provide particulars explaining the
evidence in detail.

II.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE DIRECTED TO SUBMIT A BILL OF
PARTICULARS IN RESPONSE TO PARAGRAPH 13D OF THE DEFENSE
MOTION.
The defense request for particulars in paragraph 13d of the defense motion is also an

attempt to conduct discovery of the Government's theory of the case. The defense requests the
United States identify "how" unauthorized software was added to a Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network (SIPRNET) computer on two separate occasions-the manner in which the
accused added software to a SIPRNET computer. However, the United States has provided
particulars with respect to the name of the unauthorized software added and which SIPRNET
computer the software was added to during the relevant time period. See Enclosure 1. The
United States should not be directed to explain to the accused and defense counsel "how" the
software was added, as that would force the United States to explain its theory of the case for the

2

20069

two specifications in question. The defense has access to two computer forensic experts, as well
as forensic duplicates of the specific computer in question. These experts can explain in detail
the various methods of adding software to a computer, specifically the actual computer used by
the accused. The relevant specification provides sufficient notice of what the United States
claims- the accused violated a lawful general regulation by adding unauthorized software- and
the defense is not entitled to particulars explaining what the United States knows with respect to
the method of adding software. See Newman, 25 M. J. at 606.

III.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE DIRECTED TO SUBMIT A BILL OF
PARTICULARS IN RESPONSE TO PARAGRAPH lOA OF THE DEFENSE
MOTION.
The defense request for particulars in paragraph lOa of the defense motion attempts to

restrict the Government's proof at trial. The defense relies on Newman for the proposition that a
bill of particulars may be used to "clarify the specific theory upon which the Government intends
to rely. " (Def Mot. at 5.) That language or proposition does not appear in the opinion, nor is the
United States aware of any authority that suggests such a wide-reaching purpose for a bill of
particulars. The defense also asserts that the specifications at issue under this paragraph make
the accused susceptible to unfair surprise at trial. In fact, the specification is clear-the accused
is on notice that the United States alleges he stole, purloined, or knowingly converted
Government property. As a practical matter, "steal" and "purloin" have the same meaning under
the law. United States Attorneys' Manual, Criminal Resource Manual at 1639,
http://www. justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_roornlusarnltitle9/crm01639.htm. Any
argument the accused will be misled or paralyzed by decisions over what evidence to present to
refute whether conduct constituted "stealing" or "knowing conversion" is without merit.
Furthermore, the theft-related offenses alleged in this case are of specific, identified databases.
There is no danger the accused will be subject to prosecution for the same offense at a later date
because each specification is clear regarding what property is at issue.
CONCLUSION

The United States requests the Court DENY, in part, the defense motion for appropriate
relief in the form of a bill of particulars. With respect to the remaining particulars requested by·
the defense, the United States submits Enclosure 1 for the Court's consideration.

\\(L�
�;:

Trial Counsel

3

20070

I certify that I served or caused to be served a true copy of the above on Mr. David E.
Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel, via electronic mail, on 8 March 2012.

\1�
t: �

F

Trial Counsel

4

20071

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Y.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO DEFENSE MOTION FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS
ENCLOSURE 1
8 March 2012

20072

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
BILLOFPARTICULARS
ENCLOSUREl
8Mareh2012

Manning,BradleyE.
PFC,U.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

COMES NOW the United States ofAmerica, by and through undersigned counsel, and
provides this bill ofparticulars in response to the Defense Motion fbr Appropriate ReliefUnder
Rule fbr Courts-Martial 906(b)(6). This enclosure supplements the Government response to the
Defense Motion fbr Appropriate ReliefUnder Rule fbr Courts-Martial 906(b)(6), dated8March
2012.
BILLOFPARTICULARS
The Specification of Char^el
Who is the alleged enemy?
Answer: Al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The United States will supplement this
response in a separate classified document.
How did PFC Manning knowingly give intelligence to the enemy?
Answer: By transmitting certain intelligence, specified in a separate classified document, to the
enemy through the WikiLeaks website.
What was the indirect means allegedly used in order to aid the enemy?
Answer: The WikiLeaks website.
What "intelligence " is the Government alleging PFC Manning gave to the enemy?
Answer: The United States will respond in a separate classified document.
Specification I of Charge II
Who is the alleged enemy?
Answer: Al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The United States will supplement this
response in a separate classified document.
In what manner did PFC Manning wrongfully and wantonly cause intelligence to be published
on the internet?
Answer: By leaking thousands of documents gathered from the SIPRNET, including several
databases, to the WikiLeaks organization.
Specification 3 of Charge 11

20073

Identify the exact number and specific records.
Answer: Two records; found at BATES 00378084 and 00378087. The United States produced
these records and their associated classification review (beginning at BATES 00378148) on 8
November 2011.
Specification 5 of Charge II
Identify the exact number and specific records.
Answer: Fifty-three records; found in one file beginning at BATES 00377912. The United
States produced these records and their associated classification review (beginning at BATES
00376879) on 8 November 2011.
Specification 7 of Charge 11
Identify the exact number and specific records.
Answer: Thirty-seven records; found in two files beginning at BATES 00377846 and 00377890.
The United States produced these records and their associated classification review (beginning at
BATES 00376879) on 8 November 2011.
Specification 9 of Charge 11
Identify the exact number and specific records.
Answer: Five records; found in files beginning at BATES 00378123, 00378125, 00378126,
00378127, and 00378130. The United States produced these records and their associated
classification review (beginning at BATES 00378646) on 8 November 2011.
Specification 10 of Charge II
Identify the exact number and specific records.
Answer: Thirteen (13) records; found at BATES 00377425-00377498, 00377627, 0037767200377675, 00378029-00378083. The United States produced these records and their associated
classification review (beginning at BATES 00376879) on 8 November 2011.
Specification 13 of Charge 11
Identify the exact number and specific records.
Answer: 116 records; found in BATES range 00376974-00377404. The United States produced
these records and their associated classification review (beginning at BATES 00376903) on 8
November 2011. The classification review specifies which documents in the BATES range are
still classified.
Specification I of Charge 111
What is the alleged conduct that the Government believes was an attempt to bypass network or
information system security mechanisms?

20074

Answer: The accused attempted to secure the password to the "FTPUSER" account on one ofhis
SIPRNET computers. On 4 November 2011, the United States provided the defense with the
computer forensic report (beginning at BATES 00199494) that explains the conduct forming the
basis of this charge.
Specifications 2 and 3 of Charge III
What is the unauthorized software alleged to have been added to the SIPRNET computer?
Answer: The program named "Wget." On 4 November 2011, the United States provided the
defense with a computer forensic report (beginning at BATES 00211037) that details the
presence of Wget on the accused's computer.
Which computer is the Government alleging the software was added to?
Answer: The accused's primary SfPRNET computer with the internet protocol address of
"22.225.41.22." On 4 November 2011, the United States provided the defense with the computer
forensic report (beginning at BATES 00211037) for this computer.
Specification 4 of Charge III
How does the Government allege PFC Manning used an information system in a manner other
than its intended purpose?
Answer: By downloading the United States Forces - Iraq Microsoft Outlook / SharePoint
Exchange Server Global Address List (GAL) for an improper purpose while using a Non-secure
Internet Protocol Router Network computer to perform this task. On 4 November 2011, the
United States provided the defense with the computer forensic report (beginning at BATES
00199556) that explains the conduct forming the basis of this charge.

20075

ALppellate Exhibit 14
Enclosure 1 (supplement)

page
ordered sealed for Reason 2
Milttary Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 20 13
stored in the original Record
ofTrial
1

20076

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
v. TO DEFENSE MOTION FOR
BILL OF PARTICULARS
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army, ENCLOSURE 2
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 8 March 2012
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211
End 2 *0

APPELLATE
PAGE
PAGE or PAGES

20077

From:

T0:
Cc:
Subject: US V. PFC BM (8 Nov Meeting)

Date: Monday, November 07, 2011 4:31:08 PM

Attachments:


Importance: High
All-

Attached is a de?nition of common terms and acronyms list for tomorrow's
meeting.

Our meeting will occur at NDU. Please meet SGT Bradley at the front of
Building 64 (Lincoln Hall) at 0855 tomorrow moming. There should be plenty
of parking (see attached Map). Once everyone arrives, SGT Bradley will
escort you up to the meeting room.

Additionally, please bring two large security bags and courier cards with
you. We intend to hand over additional classi?ed information and the
forensic cube for your experts.

Thank you.

v/r
Ashden

20078

UNCLASSIFIED ll LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

De?nition of Common Terms
?Mac? A?s personal Macintosh computer.
IP address (22.225.4l.22) for N5 primary SIPRNET computer located in the SCIF.
IP address (22.225.4l .40) for N5 secondary SIPRNET computer located in the SCIF.

Card? A memory card used in portable electronics, such as cameras. Unless otherwise
noted, Card? refers to the A?s digital camera card found at his aunt?s house.

?Hash Value? A "digital ?ngerprint" of a ?le or data set created using a mathematical
algorithm. Because the value produced by the algorithm for a particular ?le or set of data is
unique (if the proper algorithm is used), any other ?les or data sets that result in the same value
as the original are accepted as exact, byte-for-byte copies of the original.

?Unallocated Clusters or ?Unallocated Space? The data area on a disk that does not
contain active data. Remnants of data previously stored in these locations can often be found
and recovered from unallocated clusters, even after the active data has been deleted from the
disk.

?Wipe? To wipe data means to use a speci?c tool or technique to overwrite information
residing on a piece of digital media (such as a hard drive or SD card) in a way that prevents the
data from being recovered, even from the ?unallocated clusters.? There are hardware and
software tools speci?cally manufactured to wipe digital media.

?Rainbow table? A table used to reverse hash functions to crack passwords for
the purpose of circumventing administrator access.

?Wget? A utility (program) used to retrieve ?les from a Web server using the most commonly
used intemet protocols. It is freely available on commercial intemet websites and not on
SIPRNET. Allows a user to expedite downloads of information by automating the process.

?Intelink-S? The central SIPRNET search engine, analogous to Google and Bing, and can
only be used to search for websites and information on SIPRNET.

?Intellipedia? The online data sharing system for the Intelligence Community and commonly
used to research issues by topic, such as types of enemy weapons (IEDs) or countries (Icleland).

?Open Source Center? A database of foreign open source collected from media outlets world??
wide.

?Base64? An encoding scheme used when there is a need to encode binary data that needs to
be stored and transferred over media that are designed to deal with textual data. This is to ensure
that the data remains intact without modi?cation during transport.

Note: This document is provided to the defense as a reference for the presentation of information on 8
November 2011 and not as the factual basis for any element of the charge.

20079

UNCLASSIFIED LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Common Acronyms

- Army Counterintelligence Center
Containerized Housing Unit
Combined Information Data Network Exchange for Iraq and Afghanistan
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
Comma Separated Values
- Detainee Assessment Branch
Global Address List
Ground Penetrating Radar
Indirect Fire
Improvised Explosive Device
- Intelligence Preparation of the Battle?eld
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
Joint Readiness Training Center
- Medical Evacuations
Message Record Number
Net?Centric Diplomacy
Non?secure Internet Protocol Router Network
Personally Identi?able Information
Signi?cant Activity Report
Signals Intelligence
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

United States Forces Iraq

Note: This document is provided to the defense as a reference for the presentation of information on 8
November 2011 and not as the factual basis for any element of the charge.

20080



From: mm

To: Em.&
Subject: Re: US v. PFC BM (Discovery

Date: Tuesday, November 08, 2011 6:30:11 PM
Ashden,

Did you receive my message regarding bringing Manning next Friday for the forensic portion of your
brie?ng? Give me a call tomorrow morning to discuss.

Best,
David
Sent from my Verizon wireless BlackBerry



From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJ

Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 17:42:47
-





Subject: US v. PFC BM (Discovery)

David,

Good evening. This afternoon we gave you a highlights with a printout
of its contents. Additionally we gave you a discovery production. Below is a
summary of that production.

Portions of ACICA Report (BATES 00375130-00375182)

Portions of the CID Case File, Schmiedl emails, and Unclassi?ed
Classi?cation Reviews (BATES 00375198-00376953)

CD Volume Mounting list (also in the forensic report) (BATES 00378176)
Classi?ed Charged Documents, Report, and one Classi?ed Classi?cation
review (BATES 00376954?00378175)

The United States is still working on the last two classi?cation reviews.
They will be completed in the next few weeks.

v/
Ashden

20081

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Bill of Particulars Motion
Enclosure 3
8 March 2012

evNc\ 3s

APPELLATE EXHIBIT IM
PAGE REFERENCED:
PAGE OF PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED/ZEES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ ENCLOSURES)

20082

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARIUIY
U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319-5013
REPLY TO
ArrENTION OF

ANJA-CL

2 December 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC Paul Almanza, 150th Judge Advocate General Detachment, Legal
Support Organization, MG Albert C. Lieber USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria,
VA 22310
SUBJECT: Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Investigation - United States v. PFC Bradlev
Manning
1. The United States requests you consider the following evidence during the Article 32
proceeding in the above-referenced case:
a. Charged Documents.
(1) Batch #1 (00376954 - 00377572). See Enclosure 1,
(2) Batch #2 (00377626 - 00377675). See Enclosure 1,
(3) Batch #3 (00377845 - 00378140). See Enclosure 1.
b. Classification Reviews.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Classification Review (CENTCOM) (00376871 - 00376873).
Classification Review (DISA) (00376890 - 00376890).
Classification Review (CYBERCOM) (00376875 - 00376878).
Classification Review (CENTCOM) (00376879 - 00376902).
Classification Review (DoS) (00376903 - 00376953).
Classification Review (Other) (00378148 - 00378175).
Classification Review (SOUTHCOM) (00378646 - 00378649).

c. Accused's Personnel Records.
(1)
(2)
(3)

PFC Bradley E. Manning's OMPF (00000116 - 00000164).
PFC Bradley E. Manning's ERB (00000006).
Security Clearance Documents.
(a) Batch #1 (00015617 - 00015619).
(b) Batch #2 (00022898-00022913).
(c) Batch #3 (00022947 - 00022949).
(d) Batch #4 (00036801 - 00036802).

d. Accused's Training.
(1)

Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Training.

UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ENCLOSURES)

20083

UNCLASSIFIED//LES(SECRET//ORCON/NOFORNw/ENCLOSURES)
ANJACL
SUBJECT: Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Investigation-United Statesv.PFC Bradlev
Manning
(a) Batch #1 (00001052 - 00011344).
(b) Batch #2 (00011649 - 00012569).
(2)

The Accused's AIT Corrective Training Slideshow (00125314 - 00125316).

(3)

The Accused's Information Assurance Training.
(a) lA Exam (00375768-00375771).
(b) lA Training Requirement (00375772).
(c) lA Virtual Training (00375773).
(d) lA Virtual Training #2 (00375774).
(e) Test Results (00022348).
e. Law Enforcement Investigations.
(1)

CID Case File.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

(2)

Batch #1 (00000179 - 00000376).
Batch #2 (00000402 - 00000411).
Batch #3 (00021364 - 00025526).
Batch #4 (00026079 - 00026082).
Batch #5 (00026356 - 00036786).
Batch #6 (00045302 - 00046073).
Batch #7 (00375183-00375724).
Batch #8 (00378219 - 00378623).
Batch #9 (00378626 - 00378645).
Batch #10 (00407991 - 00408088).

CID Forensic Reports.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
G)
(k)
(1)
(m)
(n)
(o)

10th Mountain Shares (00046074 - 00046451).
Army Intelligence Report (00046452 - 00046566).
CENTAUR Logs (00046567 - 00052616).
CENTCOM Server (00052617 - 00054311).
CIDNE Files (00054312 - 00054319).
Department of State Files (00054320 - 00119042).
SOUTHCOM Comparison (00375008 - 00375115).
Intelink Logs (00119043 - 00375129).
Lamo Chats (00124107 - 00124282).
Manning's Personal Computer (00124283 - 00125269).
Manning's External Hard Drive (00125270 - 00125318).
Manning's SD Card (00125319 - 00199473).
Computers 148.17.172.115 and 22.225.28.54 (00199474 - 00199485).
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.29.185 (00199486 - 00199493).
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.40 (00199494 - 00199510).

2
UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ ENCLOSURES)

20084

UNCLASSIFIED/ZEES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ ENCLOSURES)
ANJA-CL
SUBJECT: Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Investigation - United States v. PFC Bradley
Manning
(p)
(q)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)
00374370).

Manning's CD (00199511 - 00199523).
NIPRNET Computer 144.107.17.139 (00199524 - 00199555).
NIPRNET Computer 144.107.19 (00199556 - 00211019).
NIPRNET Computer 147.198.178.143 (00211020 - 00211027).
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.28.216 (00211028 - 00211036).
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.22 (00211037 - 00243945) & (00243882

(v) OGA Documents (00374371 - 00375007).
f. Militarv Intelligence Investigations.
(1)

Investigation #1.
(a) Batch #1 (00044865 - 00045301).
(b) Batch #2 (00375173 - 00375182).
(c) Batch #3 (00377582 - 00377625).
(d) Batch #4 (00377748 - 00377844).
(e) Batch #5 (00378203-00378218).
(2) Investigation #2.
(a) Batch #1 (00375130 - 00375172).
(b) Batch #2 (00377573 - 00377581).
(c) Batch #3 (00377736 - 00377747).
(d) Batch #4 (00378177 - 00378202).
(3) Investigation #3 (00377676 - 00377735).
g. Administrative Investigations.
(1) AR 380-5 Investigation (00000663 - 00000771).
(2) USF-I AR 15-6 Investigation (00012721 - 00012903).
(3) SecArmy AR 15-6 Investigation.
(a) Batch #1 (00013162 - 00020152),
(b) Batch #2 (00036787 - 00036788).
h. Enemy Possession of WikiLeaks Material.
(1) Al-Qa'ida Recruiting Video (00408202 - 00408236).
(2) Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula Magazine (00012570 - 00012711).
(3) Enemy Number 1 Possession Report. See Enclosure 2.
(4) Enemy Number 2 Possession Report. See Enclosure 2.
i. Miscellaneous Documents.
(1) DCGS-A Logon Banner (00376856 - 00376856),
(2) C3 Document (00378141 - 00378147).

3
UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ENCLOSURES)

20085

UNCLASSIFIED/ZEES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ ENCLOSURES)
ANJA-CL
SUBJECT: Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Investigation - United States v. PFC Bradlev
Manning
j . Common References.
(1)

United States Code.
(a) 18 use 793(e).
(b) 18 use 641.
(c) 18 use 1030(a)(1).
(2) Executive Orders.
(a) Executive Order 12958.
(b) Executive Order 13292.
(c) Executive Order 13526.
(3) Regulations.
(a) AR 380-5 (00001408-00001718).
(c) AR 25-2 (00038974 - 00039076).
(c) CENTCOM Regulation 25-206 (00016128 - 00016229).
(4) Public Law 107-40, The Authorization for Use of Military Force, 18 Sep 01.
2. If necessary, the prosecution may request you consider additional evidence which is relevant,
and not cumulative, to the investigation.

2 Ends
1. Charged Documents
2. Additional Classified Evidence

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

4
UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ENCLOSURES)

20086

Appellate Exhibit 14
Enclosure 3 (Supplement)
9 pages
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed for Reason 2
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record of Trial

20087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Prosecution Response
to Defense Motion to
Compel Depositions

8 March 2012

·

RELIEF SOUGHT

The prosecution in the above case respectfully requests the Court deny all eight of the
defense requested oral depositions.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

As the moving party, the defense has the burden of persuasion and must prove any factual
issues necessary to decide this motion by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule for Courts­
Martial (RCM) 905(c).
FACTS

The prosecution does not dispute defense paragraph 3 or 4.
The prosecution does not dispute defense paragraph 5.
The prosecution disputes defense paragraph 6, in part. The following is the prosecution's
recitation of the same basic facts:
On 2 December 2012, both the prosecution and the defense submitted their witness lists
to the investigating officer (IO). See enclosures 2 and 3. The defense witness list contained the
names of seven of the eight witnesses requested in this Defense Motion to Compel Depositions.
See enclosure 3. The defense listed the contact information for all but two of the requested
witnesses-Mr. Betz and Under Secretary Kennedy. See id. Mr. Robert Roland, the other
witness that defense claimed they did not have the contact information for, was not on the
1
witness list. See id. The defense gave the following reasons for requesting the seven witnesses
at the Article 32:
CPT James Kolky- "He will testify about his classification review of the three Apache
gun videos that were sent to his Division by FORSCOM. Specifically, he will testify that the
videos were not classified at the time of their alleged release. However, he will testify that he
believes that videos should have been classified. He will testify regarding his classification
determination." See enclosure 3.
1 The 10, however, made a determination on the relevance and availability of all eight of the witnesses. See
enclosure 19.

20088

RADM Kevin M. Donegan- "RADM Donegan conducted classification reviews on two
PowerPoint slide presentations of official reports originated by USCENTCOM. The Power Point
presentations are the subject of Specification 10 of Charge II. RADM Donegan will testify
regarding his classification determination and his belief of the impact on national security due to
the release of the information." See enclosure 3.
Mr. Robert E. Betz- "Mr. Betz will testify about his classification determination
concerning the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Bradley Manning. Specifically, he
will testify about his classification assessment of information discussed in the alleged chat logs.
Mr. Betz believes the limited discussion caused "serious damage" to national security." See
enclosure 3.
LtGen Robert E. Schmidle, Jr.- "LtGen Schmidle, as the Original Classification
Authority (OCA) over the information discussed by Mr. Betz. LtGen Schmidle will testify that
he concurs with the classification determination and impact statements made by Mr. Betz. The
defense would like to question him regarding his declaration and the basis for his belief" See
enclosure 3.
VADM Robert S. Harward- ''VADM Harward will testify concerning his classification
review and classification determination concerning the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, CIDNE Iraq
Events, other briefmgs and the BE22 PAX.wmv video. Specifically, VADM Harward will testify
concerning his classification determination and his belief of the impact on national security from
having this information released to the public." See enclosure 3.
Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick F. Kennedy- "Mr. Kennedy will
testify concerning his review of the disclosure of Department of State Diplomatic Cables stored
within the Net-Centric Diplomacy server and part of SIPDIS. Mr. Kennedy will testify
concerning his classification determination and the impact of the release of the information on
national security." See enclosure 3.
RADM David B. Woods- "RADM Woods will testify concerning his review of the
disclosure of five documents, totaling twenty-two pages. RADM Woods will testify, concerning
his classification determination and the impact of the release of the information on national
security." See enclosure 3.
On 2 December 2011, the prosecution also submitted its requested evidence list. See
enclosure 4. The list was supplemented on 7 December 2011. See enclosure 5. The evidence
lists contained requests for the IO to consider the relevant classification reviews. See enclosures
4 and 5. The classification reviews were sworn under penalty of perjury lAW 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
See enclosures 6-11. If the defense had not objected, the IO could have considered the sworn
statements regardless of whether or not the OCA witnesses were going to testify. See RCM
405(g)(4)(A)(i).
On 7 December 2011, the prosecution responded to the defense witness list, objecting to
CPT Kolky because his testimony was not relevant to the Article 32 and objecting to RADM
2

20089

Donegan, Mr. Betz, LtGen Schmidle, VADM Harward, Under Secretary Kennedy, and RADM
Woods because, given their positions, the "difficulty, expense, delay, and effect on military
operations" of obtaining the testimony outweighs its significance. Enclosure 12.
On 8 December 2011, the defense submitted a witness justification memorandum to the
IO to reply to the prosecution's response to the defense witness list. See enclosure 13. The
justification provided for the in-person testimony of the witnesses was that "military justice
should not be controlled by the importance of your duty position" and the defense also noted that
each individual took the time to provide the affidavits. Id. The defense further objected to the
consideration of the statements that were sworn under penalty of perjury lAW 28 U.S.C. § 1746,
alleging that they were not sworn. Id. The defense further alleged that to be under penalty of
perjury, a statement must be subscribed and signed "in a judicial proceeding or course of
justice." Id.
The prosecution disputes defense paragraph 7, only in that the statements are sworn
statements under RCM 405(g)(4)(A)(ii) as they were properly sworn under the penalty of perjury
lAW 28 U.S.C. § 1746. See enclosures 6-11.
The prosecution does not dispute defense paragraph 8. See enclosure 14 for entire email.
The prosecution does not dispute defense paragraph 9.
The prosecution disputes defense paragraph 10. On 12 December 2011, the prosecution
and the defense had a conversation with the IO to discuss which witnesses would be produced,
the production of evidence, and a defense closure motion. See enclosure 15. After the
telephonic meeting, the defense emailed the IO again arguing that the statements made under
penalty of perjury lAW 28 USC § 1746 were not sworn statements. See enclosure 16.
The prosecution does not dispute defense paragraph 11. See enclosure 17 for entire
email.
The prosecution disputes defense paragraphs 12, 13, and 14. On the evening of 12
December 2011, the IO emailed his witness list for the investigation to the parties and stated in
the email that he would distribute a signed witness list as soon as possible. See enclosures 18
and 19. In a follow-up email, the IO advised that "[he] intend[ed] to ask his legal advisor for
advice on whether a statement under penalty of perjury should be considered a 'sworn statement'
that can be considered by the IO over defense objection if the witness is not reasonably
available." See enclosure 20. The defense acknowledged receiving the email and requested "a
ruling " on whether the witnesses not listed were "deemed as either not relevant, cumulative, or
not reasonably available" and objected to those determinations under RCM 405(g)(2)(D). See
enclosure 21. The prosecution joined the defense in its request to annotate for the record which
witnesses were deemed not relevant and which witnesses were deemed relevant but cumulative.
See enclosure 22. The prosecution also requested to call the unavailable witnesses
telephonically, if the IO was not considering their sworn statements. Id.

3

20090

On the morning of 13 December 2011, the 10 responded to the parties with the requested
.
clarification. See enclosure 23. He intended the reasonably available witnesses to be produced
for in-person testimony and intended to consider an alternative form of testimony for the
witnesses listed as not reasonably available. ld. The 10 also noted that he intended to consider
telephonic testimony from all the witnesses deemed not reasonably available except the
requested witnesses who made statements under penalty of perjury regarding classifications as he
was still determining whether he would consider the written statements. ld. On 13 December
2011, the 10 sent out the same witness list with the office symbol corrected and stated that he
could provide a signed copy once he printed the document. See enclosures 24 and 25.
On the morning of 14 December 2011, the prosecution updated the 10 on the availability
of witnesses and requested reconsideration on the determinations of several witnesses based on
the updated information. See enclosure 26. As the 10 had not yet made ·a determination on the
alternative form of testimony he would be considering from RADM Donegan, Mr. Betz, LtGen
Schmidle, VADM Harward, Under Secretary Kennedy, RADM Woods, and Mr. Roland, the
prosecution provided an update on the telephonic availability of those witnesses. ld. The
defense responded and again requested that the OCA witnesses testify in person. See enclosure
27. The defense also objeCted to having the OCA witnesses testify by telephone and informed
the 10 that the defense intended to discuss classified information with the witnesses. ld. The
prosecution replied that telephonic testimony, if available, should suffice given the declarations
and the irrelevant basis for the defense's request. See enclosure 28. The prosecution stated that
it could provide secure phone lines for classified conversation if necessary. Id. The prosecution
joined the defense in requesting a list of the evidence that the 10 was going to consider. ld.
On 14 December 2011, the 10 distributed an evidence list noting the defense objections
to prosecution-requested evidence, as well as an evidence list of only the evidence that the 10
was going to consider? See enclosures 29, 30, and 31. The 10 determined that he would
consider the statements given under penalty of perjury by the witnesses discussing the
3
classification of documents, as they qualified as sworn statements under MRE 405(g)(4)(B).
See enclosures 29 and 30. This was in accordance with advice from the IO's legal advisor. ld.
On 14 December 2011, the 10 distributed his statement of reasons for his defense witness
determinations. See enclosure 33 and 34. The 10 determined that CPT Kolky was irrelevant and
thus not going to be called as a witness because "his expected testimony is not relevant to the
form of the charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition." Enclosure 34. The 10 determined RADM
Donegan, Mr. Betz, LtGen Schmidle, VADM Harward, Under Secretary Kennedy, and RADM
Woods were not reasonably available because, in general, the significance of the expected
testimony with respect to his classification determinations does not outweigh the difficulty,
expense, and/or effect on military operations of obtaining the individual's presence at the
investigation. Enclosure 34; see II.A. below for a more in-depth discussion. The 10 did not give

2

The IO's determinations as to defense requested evidence was distributed the following day. See enclosure 39.
The 10 also articulated this deterillination in his report �enclosure 1, page 49) and on the record � enclosure
32). The 10 repeatedly discussed RCM 405 and its application in making proper determinations of not only
alternatives to testimony, but as to determinations of relevance and availability of witnesses. See enclosure 32.
3

4

20091

his reason for determining Mr. Robert Roland was unavailable. See enclosure 34. He was not
requested as a defense witness for the Article 32. See enclosure 3.
In that same email, the IO specified the format of the alternative form of testimony he
would receive from the witnesses deemed not reasonably available. See enclosure 33. The
determinations regarding the relevance and availability of CPT Kolky, RADM Kevin Donegan,
Mr. Robert Betz, LtGen Robert Schmidle, Jr., VADM Robert Harward, Under Secretary of State .
for Management Patrick Kennedy, RADM David Woods, and Mr. Robert Roland4 had not
changed from the 12 December 2011 list. See enclosures 33 and 34.
Based on subsequent objections and requests from both parties, the list underwent
revisions (see enclosures 35, 36, and 37) and the final list was memorialized on 17 December
2011. See enclosure 38. None of the determinations regarding the relevance and availability of
the eight deposition requested witnesses changed. See enclosures 19, 25, 33-38. The IO
considered the sworn statements of RADM Kevin Donegan, Mr. Robert Betz, LtGen Robert
Schmidle, Jr., VADM Robert Harward, Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick
Kennedy, RADM David Woods, and Mr. Robert Roland and did ultimately recommend that all
charges be referred to a general court-martial. See enclosure 1.
The prosecution does not dispute defense paragraphs 15-22.
On 29 February 2012, the government obtained and forwarded to the defense the point of
contact for Mr. Betz, one of the three requested individuals for whom the defense has not been
able to ascertain contact information. See enclosure 40.
WITNESSES/EVIDENCE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
4

Article 32 Report, DA Form 457, 11 Jan 12
Government Witness List, 2 Dec 11
Defense Witness List, 2 Dec 11
Government Evidence List, 2 Dec 11
Government Additional Requested Evidence List, 7 Dec 11
Classification Review, RADM Donegan
Classification Review, Mr. Betz & LtGen Schmidle
Classification Review, VADM Harward
Classification Review, Under Secretary Kennedy
Classification Review, RADM Woods
Classification Review, Mr. Roland (See classified enclosure)
Government Response to Defense Witness List, 7 Dec 11
Defense Witness Justification, 8 Dec 11
Government Email Response to Defense Witness Justification,
Defense Email Re: Pre-32 Conference with IO, 11 Dec 11
Defense Email Re: 28 USC § 1746, 12 Dec 11
Government Response Email Re: 28 USC § 1746, 12 Dec 11
IO Email with Original Witness List, 12 Dec 11

8

Dec 11

The IO referred to him as the person subscribing bates numbers 003 78 148-00378 175 and 004 10623-004 10634.
5

20092

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

I0 Original Witness List, 12 Dec 11
IO Follow-up Email Re: Witness List, 12 Dec 11
Defense Email Re: I0 Witness List, 12 Dec 11
Government Email Re: IO Witness List, 12 Dec 11
IO Response to Parties Emails Re: IO Witness List, 13 Dec 11
IO Email with Witness List (Revised Office Symbol), 13 Dec 11
IO Witness List (Revised Office Symbol), 13 Dec 11
Government Email Re: Update on Witness Availability, 14 Dec 11
Defense Response to Email Re: Update on Witness Availability, 14 Dec 11
Government Email Re: Witness Relevance and Availability, 14 Dec 11
IO Email Re: 28 USC § 1746, 14 Dec 11
Government Evidence List with Defense Objections, 14 Dec 11
IO Article 32 Evidence List, 14 Dec 11
Article 32 Transcript, Select Portions
IO Email with Alternative Forms of Testimony, 14 Dec 11
IO Determinations as to Defense Witnesses, 14 Dec 11
IO Email Re: Evidence and Witness Determinations, 15 Dec 11
IO Determinations as to Defense Witnesses, 15 Dec 11
IO Determinations as to Defense Witnesses, 16 Dec 11
IO Determinations as to Defense Witnesses, 17 Dec 11
I0 Determinations as to Defense Requested Evidence, 15 Dec 11
Government Email Re: POC for Mr. Betz, 29 Feb 12
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

The defense alleges that they should be allowed to depose the eight named witnesses
because the denial of the defense request for the witnesses to appear in person at the Article 32
investigation (hereinafter "investigation") was improper and the Government impeded the
defense's access to the witnesses.
Specifically, the defense objects to the determination that CPT Kolky was not relevant
and that RADM Donegan, Mr. Betz, LtGen Schmidle, VADM Harward, Under Secretary
Kennedy, RADM Woods, and Mr. Roland were determined not reasonably available. The
defense improperly characterizes all the witnesses as original classification authority witnesses
(OCAs), which is not accurate. Only six of the eight witnesses, however, are actually OCAs.
As background, information may be originally classified only if done so by an original
classification authority. Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.1(a), 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
Additionally, the information must be owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the
United States Government and must fall within one or more of the categories of following
categories: military plans, weapons systems, or operations; foreign government information;
intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; United States
Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or
capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services
6

20093

relating to the national security; or the development, production, or use of weapons of mass
destruction. Exec. Order No. 13,526 § § 1.1(a), 1.4(a)-(h). Finally, the OCA must determine
that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in
damage to the national security and be able to identify or describe the expected damage. Exec.
Order No. 13,526 § 1.1(a).
OCAs make their classification designations based on their authority under Executive
Order 13,526, Classified National Security Information (signed by President Barack Obama on
29 December 2009) or for materials classified prior to 27 June 2010 on Executive Order 12,958
(signed by President Clinton on 17 April 1995 and amended by Executive Order J 3,292 signed
by President Bush on 25 March 2003), as well as relevant classification guides.
The authority to classify information is limited to (1) the President and the Vice
President; (2) agency heads and officials designated by the President; and (3) United States
Government officials delegated this authority pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. Exec.
Order 13,5 26 § 1.3(a).
The President delegated the authority to make classification determinations to heads of
select agencies and it remains an Executive function. Department of Navy v. E gan, 484 U.S.
518, 527 (1988) (''The authority to protect [classified] information falls on the President as head
of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief"). The authority has been held in the
relevant agencies because they have the expertise to review the information and determine the
potential impact the release of that information would have on the United States as well as who
can have access to that information. Id.; see, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) ("[A]
court's decision whether an intelligence source will be harmed if his identity is revealed will
often require complex political, historical, and psychological judgments. . . . There is no reason
for a potential intelligence source, whose welfare and safety may be at stake, to have great
confidence in the ability of the judges to make those judgments correctly.") .
Once an OCA has made a classification determination it is presumed proper and it is not
the province of the court to question these determinations. See United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d
1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he government . . . may determine what information is
classified. A defendant cannot challenge this classification. A court cannot question it."),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 780 F. 2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985); see also United States v.
Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 717 (E.D. Va. 2007) ("Of course, classification decisions are for the
Executive Branch . . . ."). The decision of the owner of the information must be given great
deference. Sims, 471 U.S. at 176 ("The decisions of the Director, who must of course be
familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the
magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake.").
Defense repeatedly conflates damage and potential impact on security. The two topics
are distinct-actual damage caused by the compromise of classified information is not the same
as the damage that could reasonably be expected to be caused by the compromise of classified
information. See Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.2(a). The OCAs determine the latter and their
determinations cannot be challenged in court. They are the experts on the particular information
that they classify.
7

20094

I.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY REQUESTED POTENTIAL WITNESS
WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR TRIAL.

RCM 702 permits a deposition to be ordered when, due to exceptional circumstances of
the case, it is in the interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective witness be taken and
preserved for use at the Article 32 investigation or at the court-martial. RCM 702(a). A
convening authority or military judge may deny depositions only for good cause. RCM 702(b)
and RCM 702(c)(3)(A). "[T]he primary purpose of this rule is to preserve the testimony of
unavailable witnesses for use at trial." Analysis ofRCM 702(a). As such, examples of good
cause for denial include "failure to show the probable relevance of the witness' testimony;" ''that
the witness' testimony would be unnecessary";or that ''the witness is or will be available for trial
. . . in the absence of unusual circumstances." RCM 702(c)(3)(A) discussion.
There is no evidence that any of the requested witnesses will not be available for trial if
they are determined relevant, and the defense does not argue that the witnesses will not be
available at trial. The defense argument hinges upon the presence of unusual circumstances.
II.

THERE ARE NO UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT THAT REQUIRE
DEPOSITIONS.

The defense claims that unusual circumstances exist in the case at bar which require
depositions;specifically, that one of the witnesses requested at the Article 32 was improperly
denied as irrelevant and seven of the potential witnesses were improperly deemed unavailable at
the Article 32 by the 10. See Defense Motion to Compel Depositions [hereinafter "Defense
Motion"]. The defense further alleges that the prosecution has improperly impeded access to
three of the eight requested individuals. See Defense Motion.
·

Unusual circumstances that could enable defense to conduct a deposition regardless of
the witness's availability at trial include the following: "improper denial of a witness request at
an Article 32 hearing, unavailability of an essential witness at an Article 32 hearing, or when the
Government has improperly impeded defense access to a witness." RCM 702(c)(3)(A)
discussion.
None of these unusual circumstances exist in this case. The prosecution will first address
the defense's Article 32 arguments, specifically looking at the IO's determinations regarding
relevance and availability of the eight witnesses, and then the defense's argument that the
prosecution has improperly impeded the defense's access to three witnesses.
A. The IO's Determinations were Proper
The IO determines which witnesses will give testimony that is relevant to the
investigation and not cumulative, as well as the availability of witnesses. RCM 405(g)(l)(A) and
RCM 405(g)(2). "A witness is 'reasonably available' when the witness is located within 100
miles of . . . the investigation and the significance of the testimony and personal appearance of

8

20095

the witness outweighs the difficulty, expense, delay, and effect on military operations of
obtaining the witness' appearance." RCM 405(g)(l)(A).
While personal appearance is preferred, ''the investigating officer should consider
whether, in light of the probable importance of a witness' testimony, an alternative to testimony
under subsection (g)(4)(A) of this rule would be sufficient." RCM 405(g)(l)(B) discussion. The
investigating officer is in the best position to determine the need to produce a particular witness.
Analysis of RCM 405(g). The IO performs a balancing test of the potential significance of the
witness weighed against such factors as cost, difficulty, and delay. Id.; see also United States v.
Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37, 44 (CMA 1976).
To support its proposition, the defense cites cases that deal with allegedly defective
Article 32s, where the defense has asked to reopen the Article 32 and a deposition is a remedy
suggested by the court. 5
In United States v. Chestnut, the Court of Military Appeals found that the trial judge
should have reopened the Article 32 investigation where the IO chose to rely on the sworn
statement of the victim in a rape case and determined that the victim was not available because
she was a civilian who was employed 50 miles away. 2 M.J. at 85. The court not only relied on
the fact that the unavailable witness was ''the prosecutrix" but also that the IO never asked her
whether or not she would appear, and she had appeared at the air base where the Article 32
occurred on two separate occasions and had written in her sworn statement that she would be
available for any court-martial. Id.
In United States v. Ledbetter, the Court of Military Appeals found that it was error to
deny the accused's request for the presence of the government's "key witness" at the Article 32
investigation and a new Article 32 was ordered. 2 M.J. at 43. The witness provided the
information that led investigators to the Accused and provided the only direct evidence at trial on
the Accused's participation in the charged larcenies. Id. Although the witness PCS'ed to
Thailand two weeks before the Article 32, the Court stated that "[t]he significance of the witness'
testimony must be weighed against the relative difficulty and expense of obtaining the witness'
presence at the investigation." Id. at 44. Furthermore, the Court noted that ''there was no
showing that military exigencies or other extraordinary circumstances warranted excusal of the
witness, who was subject to military orders." Id.; see also United States v. Cumberled ge, 6 M.J.
203, 206 n.13 (CMA 1979) (the Court mentions but does not order depositions as a potential
remedy where the Government deliberately blocked access to the two key witnesses for the
charges against the accused).
United States v. Cabrera-Frattini, 65 M.J. 950, 952-53 (N.M.C.C.A. 2008) simply
references a lower court ordering the deposition of the victim who was not available at the
Afticle 32 after the defense had requested a new Article 32 and the Court determined that the
investigation was conducted in substantial compliance with RCM 405.
5

The standard of review to reopen an Article 32 is if an accused has been deprived of a substantial pretrial right on
timely objection, without regard to whether such enforcement will benefit him at trial. United States v. Chuculate, 5
M.J. 143, 145 (CMA 1978) (citing United States v. Mickel, 26 C.M.R 104, 107 (1958)). This, however, is not a
request to reopen an Article 32.
9

20096

None of the cases are factual on point, in that none of them deal with a deposition being
requested apart from a request to reopen an Article 32, and all of them involve detenninations
regarding essential witnesses. Unlike the above cases, the defense requested deposition
witnesses are not essential to the case at bar, they do have exigencies that prevent them from
being readily available, their credibility is not in issue in that their classification detenninations
cannot be questioned in court so their in-person testimony is not necessary, and the defense
already has the substance of their testimony in sworn declarations.
The defense-cited cases are conceptually on point in that all use a balancing test to
detennine whether or not the witness should have produced for in-person testimony. In the case
at bar, the balance weighs against in-person testimony for all the defense requested deposition
witnesses.
The following is a fact specific analysis of why the IO's detenninations regarding
availability and relevance were proper.
1.

The Investigating Officer's Denial of CPT Kolky as Irrelevant was
Proper

a. I0 Detennination
The IO made detailed findings as to why he determined CPT Kolky's testimony was not
relevant to the investigation in the following written detennination:
his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges, the truth
of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; specifically, whether three Apache gun
videos that were sent to his Division were not classified at the time of their
alleged release and whether they should have been, recognizing that the
governnient states the video is not classified and does not allege it is
classified, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those
charges should be.
Enclosure 34.
b. Value of Testimony
The defense failed to state any facts that make CPT Kolky's testimony relevant. The
defense proffered CPT Kolky's testimony as pertaining to his "classification review" of the
Apache videos; specifically, that the Apache videos were not classified, but CPT Kolky thought
they should have been. Enclosure 3. The Apache video was not classified, and the prosecution
does not allege otherwise and did not allege otherwise at the time of the Article 32. CPT
Kolky's testimony on the subject, therefore, would address no fact at issue. Furthermore, CPT
Kolky is not and never was an OCA who could offer relevant testimony as to why the OCA
10

20097

classified information in a particular manner. This is particularly true since the information was
not classified. Although CPT Kolky prepared an opinion on the classification of the information,
he has no authority under Executive Order 13,526 to classify any information or to offer
anything more than an S2's opinion on whether or not information was classified. See MRE
401.
Based on the defense's proffered testimony and IO's review of the facts of the case, the IO
did not err in determining that CPT Kolky had no relevant testimony to offer in the case at bar.
The defense has failed to show any probable relevance of the witness' testimony both at the
Article 32 and at trial.
2.

The Investigating Officer's Deter:ntinations Regarding Witness
Availability Were Proper

The IO determined that each of the remaining defense requested deposition witnesses was
not reasonable available. See enclosure 19. Below are the IO's findings for six of the seven
witnesses, discussed separately in light of the balancing test articulated in RCM 405(g)(l)(A).
The IO did not make specific findings for Mr. Roland beyond the determination that he was not
reasonably available as he was not a defense requested witness at the Article 32. For the other
six witnesses, the IO determined that the difficulty, expense, and/or effect on military operations
outweighed the significance of the expected testimony of each.
a.

RADM Kevin Donegan
1.

I0 Determination

The IO made detailed findings as to why he determined RADM Donegan was not
reasonably available. The IO made the following written determination: "he is not
reasonably available because while his testimony is relevant, he is located in Florida and
is CENTCOM's Director of Operations; the significance of his expected testimony with
respect to his classification determinations concerning the two PowerPoints at issue does
not outweigh the difficulty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his
presence at the investigation." Enclosure 34.
u.

Value of Testimony

The in-hearing testimony of RADM Donegan, while relevant to two records, would have
had minimal evidentiary value. As the original classification authority for two classified
PowerPoint slide presentations of official reports [hereinafter "PowerPoints"], RADM Donegan
could have testified that the PowerPoints were properly classified, that they were classified at the
level charged, and why the PowerPoints were classified. However, the Powerpoints were
marked clearly marked with the relevant classification when they were compromised and at the
time of the Article 32 investigation. Information is presumed to continue.to meet the
classification requirements and require protection unless other guidance is given by an OCA.
Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 3.1(d);AR 380-5, para. 3.2(b). The PowerPoints, therefore, were
presumed classified regardless of whether or not the classification review was completed.
11

20098

111.

Difficulty of Obtaining Testimony

RADM Donegan was the Director of Operations for USCENTCOM, located at MacDill
Air Force Base, Florida, and was responsible for planning, organizing, directing, and controlling
joint and combined military operations at the direction of the Commander, USCENTCOM. See
enclosure 6. He advised the Commander on all matters pertaining to the strategic and
operational employment of assigned forces, the conduct of joint and combined operations and
other necessary functions of the command required to accomplish assigned tasks and missions.
Id. Being an original classification authority was only one of his many responsibilities.
On balance, the minimal significance of RADM Donegan's testimony would not have
outweighed the difficulty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his physical
presence at the investigation. This was especially true given the sworn declaration that he
provided to the parties contained all his relevant testimony, and his classification of documents
cannot be challenged in a court of law. The IO did not err in his determination.
b.

·

Mr. Robert Betz
1.

IO Determination

The IO made detailed findings as to why he determined Mr. Betz was not
reasonably available. The IO made the following written determination: "he is not
reasonably available because while his testimony is relevant, he is CYBERCOM's Chief
Classification Advisory Officer;the significance of his expected testimony with respect
to his classification determinations concerning the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo
and PFC Manning does not outweigh the effect on military operations of obtaining his
presence at the investigation." Enclosure 34.
n.

Value of Testimony

The in-hearing testimony of the Mr. Betz had no evidentiary value. Mr. Betz
drafted a classification review of the chat logs between the Accused and Mr. Adrian
Lamo for LtGen Schmidle. While relevant to how to properly handle classified
information in the chat logs, which were not marked as classified when made, the fact
that the documents were classified and why was not relevant to any of the charges. The
Accused was not charged with any of the compromises made during the chats.
111.

Difficulty of Obtaining Testimony

Mr. Betz was the USCYBERCOM Chief Classification Advisory Officer, located at Fort
Meade, Maryland, and was responsible for supporting and advising the Commancl.er and Deputy
Commander USCYBERCOM as the command's senior classification expert. See enclosure 7.

12

20099

On balance, the significance of Mr. Betz's testimony, which was not relevant to the
charged misconduct, would not have outweighed the effect on military operations of obtaining
his physical presence at the investigation. The IO did not err in his determination.
c.

LtGen Robert Schmidle; Jr.
1.

I0 Determination

The IO made detailed findings as to why he determinedLtGen Schmidle was not
reasonably available. The IO made the following written determination: "he is not
reasonably available because while his testimony is relevant, he is CYBERCOM's
Deputy Commander; the significance of his expected testimony with respect to his
classification determinations concerning the alleged chat logs between Mr.Lamo and
PFC Manning does not outweigh the effect on military operations of obtaining his
presence at the investigation." Enclosure 34.
11.

Value of Testimony

The in-hearing testimony ofLtGen Schmidle had no evidentiary value. LtGen
Schmidle, as the OCA for the chat logs of the Accused and Mr.Lamo, endorsed the
classification review drafted by Mr. Betz. While relevant to how to properly handle
classified information in the chat logs, which were not marked as classified when made,
the fact that the documents were classified and why was not relevant to any of the
charges. The Accused was not charged with any of the compromises made during the
chats.
111.

Difficulty of Obtaining Testimony

LtGen Schmidle was the Deputy Commander USCYBERCOM, located at Fort Meade,
Maryland. See enclosure 7.
On balance, the significance ofLtGen Schmidle's testimony, which was not relevant to
the charged misconduct, would not have outweighed the effect on military operations of
obtaining his physical presence at the investigation, given his position as Deputy Commander
USCYBERCOM. The IO did not err in his determination.
d.

VADM Robert Harward
1.

IO Determination

The IO made detailed findings as to why he determined VADM Harward was not
reasonably available. The IO made the following written determination: "he is not reasonably
available because while his testimony is relevant, he is located in Florida and is CENTCOM's
Deputy Commander; the significance of his expected testimony with respect to his classification
determinations concerning the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, CIDNE Iraq Events, other briefings

13

20100

and the BE22 PAX.wmv video does not outweigh the difficulty, expense, and effect on military
operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation."6 Enclosure 34.
11.

Value of Testimony

The in-hearing testimony of VADM Harward, while relevant to the charged documents,
would have had minimal evidentiary value. As the original classification authority for the
charged CIDNE-A records; CIDNE-I records; "BE22 PAX.wmv"; and records relating to Farah
Province, Afghanistan, VADM Harward could have testified that the charged information was
properly classified, that the information was classified as charged, and why the information was
classified. The CIDNE-A records; CIDNE-I records; and records relating to Farah Province,
Afghanistan, which were charged as classified, were all marked with the appropriate
classification or with the appropriate color of the classification. This was when they were
compromised and at the time of the Article 32 investigation. Information is presumed to
continue to meet the classification requirements and require protection unless other guidance is
given by an OCA. Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 3.1(d); AR 380-5, para. 3.2(b). All the documents
were charged as classified; therefore, were presumed classified regardless of whether or not the
classification review was completed.
·

111.

Difficulty of Obtaining Testimony

As the IO correctly noted, VADM Harward was the Deputy Commander,
USCENTCOM, located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. He was one on a very short list of
individuals specifically delegated Top Secret Original Classification Authority by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense pursuant to Executive Order 13,526. See enclosure 8. Being an original
classification authority was only one of his many responsibilities.
On balance, the minimal significance of VADM Harward's testimony would not have
outweighed the difficulty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his physical
presence at the investigation. This was especially true given the sworn declaration that he
provided to the parties contained all his relevant testimony, and his classification of documents
cannot be challenged in a court of law. The IO did not err in his determination.
e.

Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick Kennedy
1.

IO Determination

The IO made detailed findings as to why he determined Under Secretary Kennedy was
not reasonably available. The IO made the following written determination: "he is not
reasonably available because while his testimony is relevant, he is Undersecretary of State for
Management; the significance of his expected testimony with respect to his classification
6

"CIDNE" is the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (hereinafter "CIDNE-A" or "CIDNE-1"). CIDNE
is USCENTCOM's directed reporting tool for the majority of operational reporting within Afghanistan and Iraq. It
is a database that was created to collect and analyze critical battlefield data to provide daily operational and
intelligence community reporting relevant to a commander's daily decision-marking processes. CIDNE®,
http://www.issinc.com/programs/cidne.html (last visited Mar. 8, 20 12).
14

20101

determinations concerning diplomatic cables does not outweigh the difficulty of obtaining his
presence at the investigation." Enclosure 34.
11.

Value of Testimony

The in-hearing testimony of Under Secretary Kennedy, while relevant to the charged
cables, would have had minimal evidentiary value. As the OCA for the classified charged
Department of State cables, Under Secretary Kennedy would have testified that the charged
cables were properly classified, that the cables were classified as charged, and why the cables
were classified. The charged cables were all clearly marked with the appropriate classification at
the time of their compromise and at the time of the Article 32 investigation. Information is
presumed to continue to meet the classification requirements and require protection unless other
guidance is given by an OCA. Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 3.l(d); AR 380-5, para. 3.2(b). The
cables, therefore, were presumed classified regardless of whether or not the classification review
was completed.
111.

Difficulty of Obtaining Testimony

Under Secretary Kennedy was the Under Secretary of State for Management, a
Presidential Appointee requiring Senate Confirmation who reports to the Secretary of State. He
was responsible for the activities of ten bureaus and offices that are responsible for management
improvement initiatives; diplomatic security and foreign missions; information resources
management; support services for domestic and overseas operations; consular affairs; human
resources; the Foreign Service Institute; overseas buildings; medical services; and financial
resources management. See enclosure 9.
On balance, the minimal significance of Under Secretary Kennedy's testimony would not
have outweighed the difficulty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his
physical presence at the investigation. This was especially true given the sworn declaration that
he provided to the parties contained all his relevant testimony, and his classification of
documents cannot be challenged in a court of law. The IO did not err in his determination.
f.

RADM David Woods
1.

IO Determination

The IO made detailed findings regarding RADM Woods was the following: "he is not
reasonably available because while his testimony is relevant, he is Commander of the Joint Task
Force-Guantanamo; the significance of his expected testimony with respect to his classification
determinations concerning the documents at issue does not outweigh the difficulty, expense, and
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation." Enclosure 34.
11.

Value of Testimony

The in-hearing testimony of RADM Woods, while relevant to classified charged
documents, would have had minimal evidentiary value. As the original classification authority
15

20102

for the charged SOUTHCOM records, RADM Woods could have testified that the charged
records were properly classified, that the records were classified as charged, and why the records
were classified. The charged records were all clearly marked with the appropriate classification
when they were compromised and at the time of the Article 32 investigation. Information is
presumed to continue to meet the classification requirements and require protection unless other
guidance is given by an OCA. Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 3.1(d);AR 380-5, para. 3.2(b). The
records, therefore, were presumed classified even without the classification review.
111.

Difficulty of Obtaining Testimony

As the IO correctly noted, RADM Woods was the Commander, JTF-GTMO, located in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Being an original classification authority was only one of his many
responsibilities . See enclosure 10.
On balance, the minimal significance of RADM Woods's testimony would not have
outweighed the difficulty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his physical
presence at the investigation. This was especially true given the sworn declaration that he
provided to the parties contained all his relevant testimony, and his classification of documents
cannot be challenged in a court of law. The IO did not err in his determination.
g.

Mr. Robert Roland
1.

I0 Determination

The defense did not request Mr. Roland as a witness at the Article 32. See enclosure 3.
The IO, therefore, did not make a written determination for Mr. Roland apart from the finding
that he was not reasonably available and that the IO would consider his sworn declaration.
11.

Value of Testimony

See classified supplement.
111.

Difficulty of Obtaining Testimony

See classified supplement.
The IO did not err in any ofhis determinations. The Accused, therefore, was denied no
substantial pretrial right.
B. The Prosecution has Not Improperly Impeded Defense Access to Any Witness.
The defense claims that unusual circumstances exist in the case at bar which require
depositions;specifically, that the prosecution has improperly impeded access to three of the eight
requested individuals. See Defense Motion.

16

20103

To support its proposition, the defense cites United States v. Cumberled ge, 6 M.J. at 203
and United States v. Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154 (C.M.A. 1980).
In Cumberled ge, the Court determined that although the government had not produced
"key " witnesses, and the SJA had blocked access to the witnesses until one month before trial
because of a concern for their safety, there was no prejudicial denial of right of access of
witnesses where the defense was able to interview the witnesses at length, the .witnesses had
previously testified in a companion case to virtually the same information and defense had a
transcript of the testimony, and no motion for a continuance was made to allow further pretrial
examination of witnesses. 6 M.J. at 205-06. The Court mentions but does not order depositions.
Id. at 206 n.13.
Similarly, in Killebrew, the Court mentions, but does not order, a deposition as a
possibility when the government deliberately blocked the defense counsel's access to a potential
witness who was in protective custody. 9 M.J. at 154. The defense alleged the witness could
support the affirmative defense of entrapment, and the prosecution admitted that they may call
the witness in rebuttal, but the prosecution still would not allow the defense to meet with the
witness before trial. Id. at 158. The Court specifically noted that typically the trial counsel need
not arrange for defense interviews of witnesses; however, because the prosecution moved the
witness out of reach of the defense, and the defense had no way to contact the witness, unusual
circumstances existed in which the prosecution had to assist the defense in arranging its witness
interview. Id. at 160.
Neither case cited by defense is relevant to the case at bar. Firstly, the request is
premature. The defense requested individuals were found not reasonably available at the Article
3 2 and have not been named as witnesses for trial. The prosecution will provide defense counsel
with timely and meaningful access to all trial witnesses as the prosecution did at the Article 3 2.
Secondly, the prosecution has not impeded the defense access to the requested witnesses.
Unlike, Killebrew, the prosecution has not moved witnesses to a location where only the
prosecution can access them. The Defense Article 3 2 Witness List, dated 2 December 2011,
listed the contact informat ion for all but three of the witnesses for whom defense is requesting.
See enclosure 3. As for the three remaining witnesses for whom the defense has not been able to
ascertain contact information, just the opposite is true. Since the defense alleged that the three
individuals could be potential defense witnesses, the prosecution has worked with the relevant
agencies to ascertain contact information. In fact, on 29 February 201 2, the government was
able to obtain and forward to the defense the point of contact for one of the three requested
individuals. The requested contact information requires coordination with other individuals, as
the potential witnesses are in highly demanding positions of authority in the U.S. Government.
Finally, the witnesses are not essential to the prosecution's case and the prosecution
produced the witness's sworn statements which document the substance of their potential
testimony. The defense has also not articulated a reason as to why the witnesses are even
relevant to its case.

17

20104

CONCLUSION

Since no evidence exists that the defense requested deposition witnesses will not be
available for trial, and no unusual circumstances exist, including improper Article 32
determinations or prosecution impeding access to witnesses, there is no reason to conduct a
deposition. All the defense deposition requests, therefore, should be denied.

� cf--ANGEL M. OVERGAARD
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

I certify that I served or caused to be served a true copy of the above on Defense Counsel,
via electronic mail, on 8 March 2012.

ANGEL M.
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

18

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HI-IC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20105

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 1

8 March 2012

otPqe(I)

20106

A-
UNCLASSIFIED (S WITH IO EXHIBIT 55 Encls)
INVESTIGATING REPORT
(Of Charges Under Article 32. UCMJ and RC M. 405. Manual for Courts-Martial)
0Vavne o/nmugam mm. b. GRADE 1; ORGANIZATION u.
1.48:. Ftm. M)
Almnnu, Paul R. 0-S 150th Legal Support Detachment (LSO) I I Jan 20I2
2a. rm (Name of0?_5cer who directedthe b. TITLE c. ORGANIZATION
invamgurion - last, First. MI) us. Amy Garrison

Co?-mm? Cu,? In Commander Joint Base Myer-Hendelson Hall, Font Myer, VA 22211

33. wui? or Accu?o (am. First. m) b. c. ssu a. ORGANIZATION e. on?: or CHARGES-
Mmming, Bradley E. E-3 HHC. USAG, JB Myer-Hen. Hall I March 20! I

(Check qapropriate answer) YES NO
4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 32. UCMJ. AND R.C.M. 405, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL.
I HAVE NVESTIGATED THE CHARGES APPENDED PERETO (Exhibit 1)
5. THE ACCUSED WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL (I not. see 9 below)
6. COUNSEL WHO REPRESENTED THE ACCUSED WAS QUALIFIED UNDER R.C.M. 405(0) (2). 502(d)
hams
Coombs, David E. CIV Kemkes, Matthew J. O-4
qpumm) c.
U.S. Army Trial Defense Service. Atlantic Region

a. ADDRESS d. ADDRESS

II South Ansell St., Suite 317 229 Forrest Circle

Providence, RI OZW6 Fort Myer, VA 222! I

9. (To be signed by accusedffaccuud wuivcs counsel. Ifaccuuddocs not sign. invcsiigating o?icer will aplain in detail by Iran

a PLACE b.

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF MY RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED IN THIS INVESTIGATION BY COUNSEL. INCLUDING MY RIGHT TO
CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY CHOICE IF REASONABLY AVAILABLE. I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO COINSEL IN THIS INVESTIGATION.

AEWED


ITI
U)
5

10. AT TIE BEGINNING OF TIE INVESTIGATION I IBFORMED TIE ACCUSED OF: (Check appropriate amwa)

THE UNDER NVESTIGATION

THEDENTITYOFTHEACCUSER

THE RIG-IT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE 31

THE PURPOSE THE NVESTIGATICN



THE WITNESSES NO OTHER EVIECE KNOWN TO ME WHICH I EXPECTED TO PRESENT

TI-E RIGHT TO IMTNESSES

TI-E RIGHT TO HAVE AVAILABLE WTTIGSSES AND EVIECE PRESENTED

TI-E RIGHTTO PRESBIIT ANYTHING DEFENSE. EXTENUATIGI. OR MITIGATION


Przo?pnopp

118. TTE ACCUSED NC ACCUSEUS OOLNSEI. VERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (lflhe Grind
or counsel were abunt daring any pet ofthe praemation complete below.)





070?



NOTE:IladditIomlspoeoIsmqoIrod oron auporauohoot.
the propornumorlealand. Ifapptop?ato, intend holding (Example: securely attach any addllonal and adds note In


EDITIONOFOCTBQISOBSOLETE.
UNCLASSIFIED WITH IO EXHIBIT 55 EFICIS)

20107

UNCLASSIFIED (SECRETIIORCONINOFORN WITH IO EXHIBIT 55 Encls)

12a. THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES TESTIFIED UNDER OATH: (Check appropriate answer)
NAME (Last, First. MI) GRADE (If any) ORGANIZATIONIADDRESS (Whichever is appropriate)

YES

NO

Tom nd t( Scho?cld Barracks
102 MP De CID

Robertson? Calder Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, CID, Germany

Manda, Mark Computer Invesuganve Umt, CID, Qmnnoo, VA

U.S. Treasury Depanment (fonnerly of Computer Crimes

Tm? Investigative Unit, cm)

Buckeye, AZ

Madrid, Bryan H. E-7 (Ret.)



See continuation sheet

D: THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THESE WITNESSES HAS BEEN REDUCED TO WRITING AND IS ATTACHED.

13a. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS. DOCUMENT S. OR MATTERS WERE THE ACCUSED WAS PERMITTED TO
EXAMINE QCH.

DESCRIPTION OF ITEM LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (i?zol attached)

ri-

":ssv~i

See continuation sheet

b. EACH ITEM CONSIDERED. OR A COPY OR RECITAL OF THE SUBSTANCE OR NATURE THEREOF, IS ATTACHED

14. THERE ARE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT MENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OR NOT
COMPEFENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSE. (See R.C.M. 909.

15. THE DEFENSE DID REQUEST OBJECTIONS TO BE NOTED IN THIS REPORT (IfYes, specify in Item 2] below.)

16. ALL ESSENTIAI. WITNESSES WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF TRIAL

17. THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS ARE IN PROPER FORM

18. REASONABLE GROUNDS EXIST TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE ALLEGED

19. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUNDS WHICH WOULD DISOUALIFY ME FROM ACTING AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER.
(See R.C.M. 405(aD (I).



. D:
3- TRIAL BY CI summnv specuu GENERAL COURT-MARTTAL
b. omen (Specyfy in Item 21 below)
(incluaie. as necessary. explanation for any delays in the investigation, and arpkmalion for my "no"

See continuation sheet.

aabqve.)

(For classi?ed testimony and exhibits, see classi?ed armex. An unclassi?ed memorandum concerning the classi?ed armex is attached as IO Ex. 55.)

22a. wpco NAME or INVESTIGATING omcen b. GRADE c. ORGANIZATION
3- 0'5 150:1: Judge Advocate General Detachment (LSO)
a. sacmruae or orncen e. DATE

11 Jan 2012
'E5'Form 4FFReverse, AUG14

UNCLASSIFIED (SECRETIIORCONINOFORN WITH IO EXHIBIT 55 Encls)

20108

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Item 8a, assistant defense counsel:

Paul R. Bouchard, O-3 (P), U.S. Anny Trial Defense Service, Atlantic Branch, 4217 Roberts
Ave., 3rd Floor, Fort Meade, MD 20755

Item 12a. witnesses who testi?ed under oath:

-Lim, Steven ., O-3, HQ, First Anny Division-East, Fort Meade, MD

Fulton, Casey M., 0-3, 2nd Bde, 10th Mountain Div., Fort Drum, NY

Adkins, Paul 13., E-7, 10th Mountain Div., Fort Drum,

Balonek, Kyle 1., wo1, 10th Mountain Div., Fort Drum,

Madaras, Chad M., E-5, 2nd Bde, 10th Mountain Div., Fort Drum, NY

Milliman, Jason A., Palmyra, VA

Cherepko, Thomas M., 0-3, NATO Force Command Madrid, Spain

Shaver, David, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC, Quantico, VA
Baker, Eric S., E-4, 62nd Military Police Detachment, Fort Drum, NY

Johnson, Mark, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC, Quantico, VA
Showman, Jihrleah, Syracuse, NY

Bigelow, Peter ., AF SOUTH BN Naples, Italy

Williamson, Alfred, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC, Quantico, VA
Edwards, Antonio, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC, Quantico, VA
Lamo, Adrian, Carmichael, CA

Padgett, Daniel, B-5, 2nd Bde, 10th Mountain Div., Fort Drum, NY

Keay, Barclay D., O-3, 2nd Bde, 10th Mountain Div., Fort Drum, NY

Item 1321. stgtements, documents. or matters considered:

The documents considered are listed Evidence List). As the defense
objected on the basis of lack of authentication to several categories of documentsDeterminations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence), I
determined I would consider certain documents subject to authentication. Those documents are
listed below:

IA Exam (Bates 00375768-771)

IA Training Requirement (Bates 00375772)

IA Virtual Training (Bates 00375773)

IA Virtual Training 2 (Bates 00375774)

Test Results (Bates 00022348)

Al?Qaida Recruiting Video (Bates 00408202-36)

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula Magazine (Bates 00012570-711)

Enemy 1 Possession Evidence (IIR 6 089 0563 11 (Redacted), Bates 00410660-64; Metadata
display, Bates 00410658-59; and Forensically recovered material, Bates 00410654-57)

SFC Adkins invoked his Article 31 rights; I therefore determined he was unavailable and considered his sworn
statements (Bates 00013371-76; 00013378-82; 00013384-87).

2 Balonek invoked his Article 31 rights; I therefore determined he was unavailable and considered his sworn
statement (Bates 00013416-20).

20109

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

C3 Document (Bates 00378141 -47)

PFC Manning?s Military Intelligence Work Product (Range Story Board, Bates 00410607-09;
multiple SIPRNET email dated 100112, Bates 00410613-14; Multiple SIPRNET email (Bates
00410615-18; SIPRNET email dated 091 130 (Bates 00410600-02)

Afghanistan War Logs Posted by WikiLeaks (Bates 00410668-70)

IIR 5 332 0069 10 (Bates 00410619-22)

DISA Trickler Report (Bates 00410653)

CIDNE data on the Internet (Bates 00410554)

NCD Valuation Documents (Bates 00410556-60)

Additionally, I considered the sworn statements of SFC Adkins (Bates 00013371-76;
00013378?82; 00013384?87) and W01 Balonek (Bates 00013416-20), who invoked their
Article 31 rights.

Attached are the following marked exhibits:

10 Ex. Notice of Appearance, Mr. Coombs

10 Ex. Defense Motion Requesting Recusal of Investigating O?icer, 16 December 2011
10 Ex. 3 Writ Seeking Access to the Proceedings (not considered)

IO Ex. Sealed Defense Stipulation of Expected Testimony (not considered)

10 Ex. 5 Closed Hearing Checklist, 18 December 2011 (not considered)

IO Ex. 6 Govemment Request for Closed Session, 15 December 2011

I0 Ex. 7 Open Hearing Checklist, 18 December 2011 (not considered)

IO Ex. 8 Closed Hearing Checklist, 19 December 2011 (not considered)

10 Ex. 9 Open Hearing Checklist, 19 December 2011 (not considered)

IO Ex. Bates 00409680-84, 00409719-21

10 Ex. Bates 00376856, 00409685-718

IO Ex. 12 Closed Hearing Checklist, 19 December 2011 (not considered)

IO Ex. 13 Open Hearing Checklist, 19 December 2011 (not considered)

IO Ex. l4(D) Defense Assertion of Privilege Under M.R.E. 503, 19 December 2011

I0 Ex. l5(P) Government Response to Defense Assertion of Privilege Under M.R.E. 503,

20 December 201 1

IO Ex. 16 Unclassi?ed Closed Hearing Checklist, 20 December 2011 (not considered)
IO Ex. 17 Unclassi?ed Open Hearing Checklist, 20 December 2011 (not considered)
10 Ex. Bates 00410555, 00409679

10 Ex. Lamo Chat

IO Ex. 20 Writ-Appeal Seeking Access to the Proceedings (not considered)

IO Ex. Defense Article 32 Exhibits

10 Ex. 22 10 Appointment Memorandum, 4 August 2010

10 Ex. 23 Directive to Investigate Additional Charges Memorandum, 18 March 2011
I0 Ex. 24 Special Instructions for Article 32 Investigation Memorandum,

16 November 201 1
10 Ex. 25 Charge Sheet containing Additional Charges I-111 and their Speci?cations,
1 March 201 1
IO Ex. 26 Defense Notice Under M.R.E. 505(h)(3), 22 November 2011
10 Ex. 27 Article 32 Investigation Noti?cation Memorandum, 23 November 11

2

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Article 32 Investigation Noti?cation Memorandum Acknowledgement,
28 November 11

Defense Motion for Closed Hearing Under R.C.M 405(h)(3), 28 November 2011
Defense Request for Production of Evidence

Government Response to Defense Request ?for Production of Evidence,
30 November 201 1

Defense Request to Compel Production of Evidence, 1 December 2011
Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses, 2 December 2011
Govemment Requested Evidence List, 2 December 2011

Government Response to Defense Request to Close Article 32 Hearing,
4 December 201 1

Defense Response to Govemment?s 405(h)(3) Filing, 4 December 2011
Government Response to Defense Notice Under M.R.E. 505(h)(3),

5 December 201 1

Government Additional Requested Evidence List, 7 December 2011
Government Response to Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses,

7 December 201 1

Defense Witness Justi?cation, 8 December 2011

Witness List, 13 December 2011

Closure Determination, 13 December 2011

Evidence List, 14 December 2011

Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence,
14 December 201 1

Determinations as to Defense Requested Evidence, 15 December 2011

Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses, 15 December 2011

Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised, 16 December 2011
Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised, 17 December 2011
Reconsideration of Closure Determination, 20 December 2011

Determination on Defense Assertion of Privilege Under M.R.E. S03,

21 December 2011

Defense Notice of Evidence, 23 December 2011

Memoranda concerning excludable delay, various dates

E?maiIs discussing consideration of statements under penalty of perjury, various
dates

10 Chronology

Unclassi?ed memorandum, without enclosures, concerning classi?ed annex to
this report containing 10 Exhibits (C) 1 - (C) 5, 11 January 2012

Transcript of Hearing (Verbatim 16 December 2011, Summarized 17-22
December 2011)

20111

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Item 21 remarks:



1. Analysis of the Additional Charges and Their Speci?cations?

The following supports my determination that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the
accused committed the offenses alleged in Additional Charges I-111 and their Speci?cations. In
order that this document may remain unclassi?ed, I have referenced Bates numbers of classi?ed
documents in the record where necessary and have only included unclassi?ed references to the
information contained in those documents Also, in light of the voluminous record in this case, I
typically simply refer to Bates numbers of documents instead of referring to documents attached
as hard copy exhibits.

Additional Charge I and its Speci?cation (Art. 104, UCMJ):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following four elements:

(1) thatat or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1
November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, the accused, without proper authority, knowingly
gave intelligence information to certain persons, namely: Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula, and a person or entity speci?ed in Bates 00410660-64;

(2) that the accused did so through indirect means;

(-3) that Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and a person or entity speci?ed in Bates
00410660-64 were enemies; and

(4) that this intelligence information was true, at least in part

?Intelligence? means any helpful information, given to and received by the enemy, which is true,
at least in part.

?Enemy? includes not only organized opposing forces in time of war, but also any other hostile
body that our forces may be opposing such as a rebellious mob or a band of renegadw and
includes civilians as well as members of military organizations.

Under US v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.R. 144, 158 (C.M.A. 1956), ?Article 104(2) of the Code does
not require a speci?c criminal intent of any sort? and thus is a _general intent crime.

3 Charges were initially preferred against the accused on 5 July 2010. On 18 Mar 201], the convening authority
infonned me that those original charges were dismissed and directed me not to consider them. See [0 Ex. 23.

4

20112

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Facts

The evidence showed that PFC Manning knew the enemy received information ?'om
WikiLeaks.4 The evidence also showed that ?'om November 2009 through May 2010, there
were over one hundred searches for WikiLeal-3 under PFC Manning?s user pro?les on his
primary and secondary SIPRNET computers.5 More generally, the evidence showed the accused
knew that our adversaries, including enemy governments and non-government organizations
such as terrorists, obtained information via the Internet because he was required to conduct a
training presentation on Operational Security as corrective training when he was at Advanced
Individual Training on 13 June 2008.6

Additionally, the evidence showed that the accused was a trained intelligence analyst who was
developing his skills during the deployment? Finally, the evidence showed that PFC Manning
signed non-disclosure agreements stating that ?unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed
information by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used
to advantage by a foreign nation.? It is reasonable to infer ?'om these facts that the accused
knew enemies of the United States would receive information released by WikiLealts.

The evidence showed that the accused, at or near Contingency Operating Base I-Iammer,9
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, knowingly gave
intelligence information to Wikibeaks, including: a vida) ?le named ?l2 JUL 07 CZ
ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC. Anyone.avi;? more than one classi?ed memorandum produced
by a United States Government intelligence agency; the database; the CIDNE

. Afghanistan database; a United States Southern Command database, more than ?ve classi?ed

records relating to a military operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan, occurring on or about 4
May 2009; a ?le named PAX.zip? containing a video named 22 PAX.wmv;? the
Depanment of State Net-Centric Diplomacy database; a classi?ed record produced, by a United
States Army intelligence organization, dated 18 March 2008; and the United States Forces Iraq
Microsoft Outlook/Sharepoint Exchange Server global address list.? While some of this
information was not classi?ed, the evidence showed that it is all ?intelligence information? in
that it would be helpful for the enemy to possess and was true, at least in part. For example, the
CIDNE databases contained a vast amount of information concerning enemy tactics and the U.S.
military?s response to those tactics," while the last item listed, the global address list, would be .

See Army Intelligence Forensic Report, Bates 0046452-66 and attachments.

5 Testimony of SA Shaver.

'5 See PFC Manning?s External Hard Drive Forensic Report, Bates 00125270-318, in particular Bates 00125314-
16, for a copy of the PowerPoint presentation the accused gave. SFC Madrid also testi?ed that the accused's
corrective training presentation explained that it could be dangerous to disclose classi?ed because
outside entities could seek U.S. information. Additionally, SFC Madrid testi?ed that the accused also submitted in
typed document providing more detail, including references to the relevant regulations.

7 Testimony of CPT Fulton.

3 See PFC Manning?s Non-Disclosure-Agreements, Bates 00022912-13, 00036801-02.

9 Throughout the hearing, the witnesses typically referred to Hammer? rather than ?Contingency Operating
Base Hammer.? It was clear, however, that they were referring to the same place.

The analysis of Speci?cations 2-16 of Additional ciiatge 11 provides more detail about the otrense conduct
involving each of these items.

Testimony of CPT Fulton.

20113

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

helpful for the enemy to possess in that it would enable the enemy to engage in ?Spear?shing,? a
targeted attempt to gain information from an unsuspecting source by masquerading as someone
the source trusts; speci?c information such as knowledge of full names and emails facilitates
spear?shinlg because it is more likely to make the targeted source believe the spear?sher is
legitimate.

While the evidence did not show that PFC Manning directly provided this intelligence
infomiation to Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or the person or entity speci?ed in
Bates 00410660-64, the evidence did show that PFC Manning provided this intelligence
information to WikiLeaks, and that enemies of the United States possessed this information. For
example, the video named ?l2 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 20 GC Anyone.avi? is
contained in the recruiting video produced by Al-Qaida?s media arm" and is described as
?footage published by the Wikibeaks website,? which clearly indicates that the enemy obtained
this video from WikiLealDepartment cable, which indicates they obtained the cable ?'om WikiLeaks, and also references
WikiLeaks documents describing communications by leaders in Islamic countries with the
United States, which also indicates they are referring to State Department cables they obtained
from WikiLeaks Another example is that the evidence showed the CIDNE-Afghanistan
information was available to the enemy via the Internet.? The accused therefore indirectly
provided this intelligence information to the enemy by providing it to WikiLeaks.

The evidence also showed that Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the classi?ed
person or entity specified in Bates 00410660-64 are enemies of the United States. First, the
recruiting video produced by Al?Qaida?s media at-in? exhorts the viewer to attack the United
States. Similarly, the Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula ?Inspire? magazines and associated
explanatory materials? make clear that AQAP is also an enemy of the United States. Finally, the
description of the classi?ed person or entityspeci?ed in Bates O04l0660~64 leaves little doubt
as to whether that person or entity is an enemy of the United States.

The evidence also showed that the information at issue is true, at least in part For example, the
video entitled ?l 2 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC. Anyone.avi? depicts what it
depicts. There was no evidence that any of the information at issue was false.

Although this offense is a general intent crime, the evidence showed that PFC Manning made
statements during a counseling session with then?SPC Showman prior to the deployment to the
effect that the American ?ag meant nothing to him and that he held no allegiance to this country
or to its people.? While this statement was made in the context of a counseling session that PFC
Manning was not pleased to be participating in, and thus may have been made primarily to ?push
the buttons? of the person counseling him, PFC Manning was a trained intelligence analyst and
should have known not to make such a statement ?ippantly. Accordingly, there are reasonable

'2 Testimony of SA Bettencourt.

'3 Bates 00408202-236.

CIDNE Data on the lntemet, Bates 00410554.

Bates 00408202-236.

Bates 00012570-711.

'7 Testimony of Ms. Showman in defense-requested closed session.

6

20114

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, US. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

grounds to believe that PFC Manning meant what he said, which turn would support the requisite
criminal intent were this a speci?c intent crime.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Additional Charge I and its Speci?cation.

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation I (Art. 134, UCMJ):

Law
In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following two elements:

(1) that at our near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1
November 2009 and on or about .27 May 2010, the accused wrongfully and wantonly caused
intelligence belonging to the United States to be published on the Internet, having knowledge
that intelligence published on the Internet is accessible to the enemy; and

(2) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

?Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline" is conduct which causes a reasonably direct
and obvious injury to good order and discipline. ?Service discrediting conduct? is conduct
which tends to harm the reputation of the service or lower it in public esteem.

Facts

The facts at issue here are similar to those discussed above concerning Additional Charge I and
its Speci?cation. Speci?cally, there is little doubt that between the dates and at the location
alleged, PFC Manning caused intelligence belonging to the United States to be published on the
Internet by providing it to WikiLealthe Internet is accessible to the enemy.

Additionally, testimony was presented that PFC Manning?s conduct was prejudicial to good
order and discipline and service discrediting '3 The evidence showed that it is impossible to
control or verify each and every download or transfer of information that intelligence
conduct, due to the tempo of operations in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility such
as the facility where PFC Manning worked in Iraq. Because of this, the evidence showed that
trust is important in protecting classi?ed information.? PFC Manning?s violations of that trust
prejudiced good order and discipline and also discredited the service.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 1 of Additional Charge II.

'3 Testimony of CPT Lim.
?9 Testimony of CPTS Lim and Fulton.

20115

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 2 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 793(e)):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 15
February 2010 and on or about 5 April 2010, the accused had unauthorized possession of
information relating to the national defense, to wit: a video ?le named ?12 JUL 07 CZ
ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.avi?;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, transmitted, or caused to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a person not entitled to receive

It;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and

(5) that the accused?s conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces
and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.?

Facts

The evidence showed that ?12 Jul 07? was searched for ?om both of PFC Manning?s primary
and secondary SIPRNET computers.? The evidence also showed that the Apache air strike
video located on the network share drive belonging to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, exactly matched a video identi?ed in
PFC Manning's user pro?le on PFC Manm'ng?s primary SIPRNET computer.? The evidence
also showed that a CD-RW containing a video named ?12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE
30 GC An one.wmv? was accessed using PFC Manning?s personal Macintosh computer on 15
Feb 2010. Additionally, the evidence showed that a CD-RW created on 27 April 2010
containing a video named ?l 2 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 3 0 GC Anyonewmv? (which
did not have all of the content of the video found on PFC Manning's primary SIPRNET
computer), with a sticker on it, was found in PFC Manning?s on-post quarters.? The
evidence showed that WikiLeaks released this video on 5 April 2010.2

While there was no digital forensic evidence ?'om PFC Manning's personal computer directly
indicating that this video was uploaded to WikiLeaks, the forensic examination did ?nd evidence
in Unallocated Clusters (UC) (brie?y, areas on a disk where the data has been ?deleted? but still

2? These elements are a tailored version of Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 6.18.1030A.

2? lntelink Logs Forensic Report, Bates 00375116-129, at page 11 (this document also has the relevant dates).

2? 10?? Momitain Shares Forensic Report, Bates 00046074-00046097, at 22.

13 See PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at pages 48-49.

1? See PFC Manning's CD Forensic Report, Bates 00199511-522, at pages 1, 7-8.

2? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at Attachment S, Bates 00125269
(carved_]3 7890_724730l 8408_72473024123_vCollateral Murdenpdf).

8

20116

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

remains on the disk and can be recovered forensically) of multiple references to the WikiLeaks
upload webpage, including a webpage containing a link to
upload documents to WikiLeaks, and also references indicating a possible upload of the Farah
records see discussion of Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLeaks
website. Moreover, PFC Manning?s chats with a person using the
user name, aliased as Nathaniel Frank from 22 February 2010 to
25 March 2010, and as Julian Assange (editor of WikiLeaks) from 17 May 2010 to 24 May 2010
discussed uploading material to WikiLeaks27 These facts, taken together, provide circumstantial
evidence that PFC Marming uploaded the video to WikiLeaks.

The evidence also showed that on 19 May 2010, in an email exchange with Eric
Schmiedl, PFC Manning wrote, ?Are you familiar with WikiLeaks,? and then after receiving an
affirmative reply from Mr. Schmiedl, then wrote, was the source of the 12 JUL 07 video from
the Apache Weapons Team, which killed the two journalists and injured two kids!?

Additionally, the evidence showed that the accused, in his chats with Mr. Lamo, admitted
forwarding the video that is the subject of this speci?cation, also referred to as the ?collateral
murder? or video, to WikiLeaks. In those chats, a person using the ?bradass87? screen
name, who Mr. Lamo determined to be the accused, made the following statements: l) ?the CM
video came from a server in our domain! and not a single person noticed;" (2) in response to
Lamo?s question about what CM meant, ?Apache Weapons Team video of 12 Jul 07 airstrike on
Reuters journos. .. some sketchy but fairly normal street-folk. . . and civilians;? (3) in response to
Lamo?s question of where he (Lamo) could transmit similar material if he had it, ?wl.org
submission system?; and (4) ?i just. .. couldn?t let these things stay inside of the system. . . and
inside of my head i recognized the value of some knew what they dug
deeper i watched that video cold, for instance at ?rst it wasjust a bunch ofguys
getting shot up by a no big about two dozen more where that came from
but something struck me as odd with the van and also the fact it was being stored
in a JAG of?cer?s so i looked into eventually tracked down the date, and then
the exact GPS co-ordthats what then i went to the
regular intemet. .. and it was still on my so i typed into goog. .. the date, and the
and then I see this 13/world/middleeast/1 3iraq.html
i kegtg that in my mind for probably a month and a before I forwarded it to
em.? .

2? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-3 62, at 65-67, 77-78.

1? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

2' See PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report. Bates 00124283-362, atpage 44. Note that the login
pasword fa PFC Marming?s personal computer was which also was the fa PFC
Manning?s GPG keyring which contained a key used to emails between Schmiedl and PFC Manning. The
forensic examiner concluded ?it is likely that PFC Manning neglected to enable when sending the
message quoted above. Id, at 45. ?TWinkl492!l? was also identi?ed as a password fa? several instant messaging

accounts, including AIM)
(Jabber), and (Jabber); a variation of this pasword,
., was enti edasthepasswo Id at I4. The

cornmonalitylamong these passwords indicates that the same in em.
2? Lamo Chat, 10 Ex l9(D), at 25-26. (This chat is also in the forensic reports at Lamo Foremic Report, Bates
00124 I07-3 at Attachment J.) During his testimony, Mr. Lamo explained that the person tsing the ?bradass87"

9










20117

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

The evidence showed that WikiLealentitled to receive this video, which relates to the national defense because it depicts the
activities of the Also, the evidence shows that PFC Manning had reason to believe that
the video could be used to the injury of the United States in that PFC Manning knew the enemy
accessed information available on the Internet Additionally, 18 U.S.C. 793(e) exists. Finally,
PFC Mam1ing?s conduct in providing this video to WikiLeaks is prejudicial to good order and
discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 2 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 3 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 793(e)):

Law
In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following five elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 22 March
2010 and on or about 26 March 2010, the accused had unauthorized possession of information
relating to the national defense, to wit: more than one classi?ed memorandum produced by a
United States Government intelligence agency;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, transmitted, or caused to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a person not entitled to receive

It;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and
(5) that the accused?s conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces
and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Facts

The memoranda at issue are at Bates 00378084-090 and were produced by a United States
government intelligence agency. The evidence showed they were properly classi?ed.?

online identity identi?ed himself as Bradley Manning by sending Lamo a friend request when Lamo asked if he was
a facebook user and also by providing Lamo PFC Manning's AKO account user name and password

3? lntelink Logs Forensic Report, Bates 003751 16-129, at 9.

31 See document at Bates 00378148475.

10

20118

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Moreover, the evidence showed that PFC Manning knew they were classi?ed because they were
properly marked.

Testimony during the classi?ed portion of the hearing described the accessing and manipulation
of these memoranda on PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer.?

Analysis of PFC Manning's personal computer showed a containing a ?le named
?blah.zip? was burned on an unknown Windows computer at 12:55 on 22 March 2010 and was
accessed on PFC Manning?s personal computer.? The evidence also showed tint on 22 March
2010, a user of PFC Marming?s user account viewed .pdf ?les of the memoranda at issue on his
primary SIPRNET account; the forensic examiner concluded tint the sequence of viewing the
?les and then accessing the ?blah.zip? ?le ?could indicate [the memoranda at issue] were
compressed in blah.zip.?34

The contents of the memoranda are such that a person familiar with them would conclude that if
released they could be used to the injury of the United States.

While there was no digital forensic evidence from PFC Manning's personal computer directly
indicating that these mernoranda were uploaded to WikiLeaks, the forensic examination did ?nd
evidence in Unallocated Clusters (UC) (brie?y, areas on a disk where the data has been ?deleted?
but still remains on the disk and can be recovered forensically) of multiple references to the
WikiLeaks upload webpage, including a webpage containing
a link to upload documents to .WikiLealts, and also references indicating a possible upload of the
Farah records (see discussion of Additional Charge H, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLeaks
website.? Moreover, PFC Manning?s chats with a person using the

user name, aliased as Nathaniel Frank from 22 February 2010 to
25 March 2010, and as Julian Assange (editor of WikiLcaks) from 17 May 2010 to 24 May 2010
discussed uploading material to WikiLeaks.3? These facts, taken together, provide circumstantial
evidence that PFC Manning uploaded the memoranda to WikiLeaks.

Wikibeaks was not entitled to receive these memoranda, which relate to the national defense.
Also, the evidence shows that PFC Manning had reason to believe that the video could be used to
the injury of the United States in that PFC Manning knew the enemy accessed information
available on the Internet. Additionally, l8 U.S.C. 793 exists. Finally, PFC Manning?s conduct
in providing this video to Wikileaks is prejudicial to good order and discipline and service
discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Specification 3 of Additional Charge 11.

"Classi?ed testimony of SA Shaver, 10 Ex. (C) 5 (including relevant dates).

10th Mountain Shares Forensic report, Bates oo4oo74-97, at 21-22; PFC Manning?s Personal Computer
Forereic Report, Bates oo1242s3?3o2, at 49.

PFC Manning's Primary SIPRN ET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021 1037-110, at 50, 72.

PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362,a1 65-67, 77-73.

PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

11

20119

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 4 (Art. 134, I8 U.S.C. 641):
Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31
December 2009 and on or about 5 January 2010, the accused voluntarily, intentionally and
knowingly stole, purloined, or converted a thing of value, to wit: the Combined Information Data
Network Iraq database containing more than 380,000 recordsanother;

(2) that the thing of value belonged to the United States and had a value in excess of One
Thousand Dollars

(3) thatthe accused did so with intent to deprive the owner of the use or bene?t of the thing of
value so taken;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 641 exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bringdiscredit upon the armed forces.

The word ?value? means the face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail,
whichever is greater.

A ?thing of value? can be tangible or intangible property.

It is not necessary to prove that the accused knew that the Government owned the property at the
time of the wrongful taking so long as it is established that the Government did in fact own the
money or property involved, that it had a value in excess of One Thousand Dollars and
that the accused knowingly and willfully _stole, purloined, or converted it.?

Facts

The evidence showed that an SD Card recovered ?'om the residence of PFC Manning?s aunt
contained an archive ?le named When
using the ?TWink1492! password mentioned above, this ?le contained the complete
CIDNE databases for Afghanistan (91,911 reports) and Iraq (391,883 reports). It also contained
a file describing the contents and stating, ?It?s already been sanitized of any source
identifying information. You might need to sit on this information, perhaps 90-180 days, to
?gure out how best to release such a large amount of data, and to protect source. This is possibly
one of the more signi?cant documents of our time, removing the fog of war, and revealing the
true nature of 2 1st century asymmenic warfare. Have a good day.?3

3? These elements ate a tailored version of Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 6.18.64 1.
3" PFC Manning?s SD Card Forensic Report, Bates 00l253l9?3l, at 1-2, 9.

12

20120

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

The evidence showed that PFC Manning was at his aunt?s residence on or about 26 January
2010.39 The evidence also showed that WikiLeaks released 391,840 reports from the CIDNE-
Iraq database.? The evidence also showed that in Unallocated Clusters on PFC Manning?s
personal computer, there was information ?likely obtained? ?'om the database and
that documents containing the same text and associated photographs were found in PFC
Manning?s SIPRNET shared folder; the forensic examiner concluded is likely the photos
and documents in PFC SIPRNET shared folder were copied to [his] personal
computer through the use of removable media.??"

While there was no digital forensic evidence from PFC Manning?s personal computer directly
indicating that the database was uploaded to WikiLeaks, the forensic examination
did find evidence in Unallocated Clusters of multiple references to the WikiLeaks upload
webpage, including a webpage containing a link to upload
documents to WikiLeaks, and also references indicating a possible upload of the Farah records
(see discussion of Additional Charge 11, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLeaks website."
Moreover, PFC Manning?s chats with a person using user
name, aliased as Nathaniel Frank ?'om 22 February 2010 to 25 March 2010, and as Julian
Assange (editor of WikiLeaks) from 17 May 2010 to 24 May 2010 discussed uploading material
to WikiLeaks.?3 These facts, taken together, provide circumstantial evidence that PFC Manning
uploaded the database to WikiLeaks.

PFC Manning?s comments in the ?read me? document quoted above indicate that be converted
the database another in that he wanted to make this information
public and thus deprive its owner, the United States, of its use or bene?t. While PFC Manning in
his duties as an intelligence analyst deployed to Iraq had reason to use the database
every day,? he had no authorization to take this database from its owner and thus his taking it
constituted stealing it.

While there was no direct evidence provided of the value of the database, there was
evidence rovided that the valuation of the Net-Centric Diplomacy database was over $4
million.? This circumstantial evidence supports a conclusion that the value of the
database was over $1,000.

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 641 exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in stealing the
database and converting WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order
and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the o?ense
alleged in Speci?cation 4 of Additional Charge II.

PFC Manning's so Card Forensic Report, Bates oor253 19-3 1, at 7.

CIDNE Files Forensic Report, Bates at 5; Testimony of SA Bettencourt database
released in October 2010).

PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 62-63.

?2 PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report. Bates 00124283-362, at 65-67, 77-78.

'3 PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

Testimony of CPT Lim.

NCD Valuation Documents, Bates 004: 0556-60.

13



20121

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 5 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 793(e)):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following five elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31
December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010, the accused had unauthorized possession of
information relating to the national defense, to wit: more than twenty classi?ed records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he possessed could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Facts

The evidence showed that an SD Card recovered from the residence of PFC Manning?s aunt
contained an archive ?le named When
using the ?TWink1492!!? password mentioned above, this ?le contained the complete
CIDNE databases for Afghanistan (91,911 reports) and Iraq (391,883 reports). It also contained
a ?le describing the contents and stating, ?It?s already been sanitized of any source
identifying information. You might need to sit on this information, perhaps 90-180 days, to
?gure out how best to release such a large amount of data, and to protect source. This is possibly
one of the more signi?cant documents of our time, removing the fog of war, and revealing the
true nature of 2 1st century asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.? -

The evidence showed that PFC Manning was at his aunt?s residence on or about 26 January
2o1eo.?" The evidence also showed that WikiLeaks released 391,340 reports from the CIDNE-
Iraq database.? The evidence also showed that in Unallocated Clusters on PFC Manning?s
personal computer, there was information ?likely obtained? ?om the database and
that documents containing the same text and associated photographs were found in PFC
Manning?s SIPRNET shared folder; the forensic examiner concluded is likely the photos

46 PFC Manning?s SD Card Forensic Report, Bates 00125319-31, at 1-2, 9.

47 PFC Manning?s SD Card Forensic Report, Bates 00125319-31, at 7.

CIDNE Files Forensic Report, Bates 00054312-17, at 5; Testimony of SA Bettencourt database
released in October 2010).

14



20122

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

and documents in PFC SIPRN ET shared folder were copied to [his] personal
computer through the use of removable media.?49

While there was no digital forensic evidence ?'om PFC Manning?s personal computer directly
indicating that the database was uploaded to WikiLealdid ?nd evidence in Unallocated Clusters of multiple references to the WikiLeaks upload
webpage, including a webpage containing a link to upload
documents to WikiLeaks, and also references indicating a possible upload of the Farah records
(see discussion of Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLeaks website.?
Moreover, PFC Manning?s chats with a person using the user
name, aliased as Nathaniel Frank ??om 22 February 2010 to 25 March 2010, and as Julian
Assange (editor of WikiLeaks) from 17 May 2010 to 24 May 2010 discussed uploading material
to WikiLeaks.5l These facts, taken together, provide circumstantial evidence that PFC Marming
uploaded the database to Wil-iiLeaks.

PFC Manning?s comments in the ?read me? document quoted above indicate that he knew the
database would be released and that the information contained in the reports, by ?removing the
fog of war? concerning actions in which U.S. military forces were involved, could be used to the
injury of the United States. His statement in that document that the recipient needed to ?sit on
the information to protect source? indicates that he knew WikiLeaks was not entitled to

receive this information.

The evidence showed that there were more than twenty of these documents? and that they were
properly classi?ed and remain classi?ed.?

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 793(e) exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in providing
the database to Wikileaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 5 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Specification 6 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 641):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 62-63.

5? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 65-67, 77-78.
5? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

5? Bates 00377912-373027.

5? Classi?cation Review, Bates 00376879-902.



20123

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31
December 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010, the accused voluntarily, intentionally and
knowingly stole, purloined, or converted a thing of value, to wit: the Combined Information Data
Network Afghanistan database containing more than 90,000 recordsanother,

(2) that the thing of value belonged to the United States and had a value in excess of One
Thousand Dollars

(3) that the accused did so with intent to deprive the owner of the use or bene?t of the thing of
value so taken;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 641 exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Facts

The evidence showed that an SD Card recovered from the residence of PFC Manning?s aunt
contained an archive ?le named When
using the ?TWinl-11492! 1? password mentioned above, this ?le contained the complete
CIDNE databases for Afghanistan (91,911 reports) and Iraq (391,883 reports). It also contained
a ?le describing the contents and stating, ?It's already been sanitized of any source
identifying infomiation. You might need to sit on this information, perhaps 90-180 days, to
?gure out how best to release such a large amount of data, and to protect source. This is possibly
one of the more signi?cant documents of our time, removing the fosg of war, and revealing the
true nature of 21st century asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.?

The evidence showed that PFC Manning was at his aunt?s residence on or about 26 January
2010.55 The evidence also showed that WikiLeaks released 74,778 reports from the CIDNE-
Afghanistan database.?

- The evidence showed that between 1 January 2010 and 7 January 2010, there were 372

connections from the server containing the CIDNE-Afghanistan database and PFC Ma.nning?s
secondary SIPRNET computer, resulting in the transfer of 256.76 MB of data to PFC Manning?s
secondary SIPRN ET computer.5 7 The evidence showed that the ?last modi?ed? date for the
CIDNE-Afghanistan ?le contained in the yata.tar.bz2.nc ?le mentioned above was 8 January

5? PFC Manning?s SD Card Forensic Report, Bates 00l253l9?31, at 1-2, 9.

PFC Manning's so Card Forensic Report, Bates oo12s319.31, at 7.

5? CIDNE Files Forensic Report, Bates 00054312-17, at 5; Testimony of SA Bettencourt (ClDNE?Afghanistan
database released in July 2010).

57 Centaur Logs Forensic Report, Bates 00046567-76, at l.

16

20124

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

2010.? The entirety ofthe CIDNE?Afghanistan database so downloaded was located during the
forensic examination of PFC Manning's SD card. 59

While there was no digital forensic evidence from PFC Manning?s personal computer directly
indicating that the CIDNE-Afghanistan database was uploaded to WikiLeaks, the forensic
examination did ?nd evidence in Unallocated Clusters of multiple references to the WikiLeaks
upload webpage, including a webpage containing a link to
upload documents to WikiLeaks, and also references indicating a possible upload of the Farah
records see discussion of Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLeaks
website. 0 Moreover, PFC Manning?s chats with a person using the
user name, aliased as Nathaniel Frank from 22 February 2010 to
25 March 2010, and as Julian Assange (editor of WikiLeaks) from 17 May 2010 to 24 May 2010
discussed uploading material to WikiLeaks.6' These facts, taken together, provide circumstantial
evidence that PFC Manning uploaded the CIDNE-Afghanistan database to WikiLeaks.

PFC Manning?s comments in the ?read me? document quoted above indicate that he converted
the database another in that he wanted to make this infonnation
public and thus deprive its owner, the United States, of its use or bene?t. While PFC Manning in
his duties as an intelligence analyst deployed to Iraq had reason to use the database
every day, he had no need to access the CIDNE-Afghanistan database,62 and he had no
authorization to take this database from its owner and thus his taking it constituted stealing it.

While there was no direct evidence provided of the value of the CIDNE-Afghanistan database,
there was evidence provided that the valuation of the Net-Centric Diplomacy database was over
$4 million.? This circumstantial evidence supports a conclusion that the value of the CIDNE-
Iraq database was over $1,000.

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 641 exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in stealing the
database and converting WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order
and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 6 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Specification 7 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 793(e)):

Law

5' PFC Manning?s SD Card Forensic Report, Bates 00125319-C31, at 9-10.

Centaur Logs Forensic Report, Bates 00046567-76, at 7.

5? PFC Mam1ing?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 65-67, 77-78.
5? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

62 Testimony of CPT Lim.

63 NCD Valuation Documents, Bates 00410556-60.

I7



20125

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 31
December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010, the accused had unauthorized possession of
information relating to the national defense, to wit: more than twenty classi?ed records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he possessed could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Facts

The evidence showed that an SD Card recovered ?om the residence of PFC Manning?s aunt
contained an archive ?le named 80\yada.tar.bz2.nc.? When
using the ??TWink1492! password mentioned above, this ?le contained the complete
CIDNE databases for Afghanistan (91,911 reports) and Iraq (391,883. reports). It also contained
a ?le describing the contents and stating, ?It?s already been sanitized of any source
identifying information. You might need to sit on this information, perhaps 90-180 days, to
?gure out how best to release such a large amount of data, and to protect source. This is possibly
one of the more signi?cant documents of our time, removing the fog of war, and revealing the
true nature of 21st century asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.?

The evidence showed that PFC Manning was at his aunt?s residence on or about 26 January 10.65
The evidttasrgce also showed that WikiLeaks released 74,778 reports from the CIDNE-Afghanistan
database.

The evidence showed that between 1 January 2010 and 7 January 2010, there were 372
connections from the server containing the CIDNE-Afghanistan database and PFC Manning?s
secondary SIPRNET computer, resulting in the transfer of 256.76 MB of data to PFC Manning?s
secondary SIPRNET computer.? The evidence showed that the ?last modi?ed? date for the
CIDNE-Afghanistan ?le contained in the yata.tar.bz2.nc ?le mentioned above was 8 January

6? PFC Manning's SD Card Forensic Report, Bates 00125319-31, at 1-2, 9.

PFC Marming?s so Card Forensic Report, Bates 00125319-31, at 7.

66 CIDNE Files Forensic Report, Bates 00054312-17, at 5; Testimony of SA Bettencourt (CIDNE-Afghanistan
database released in July 2010). -

67 Centaur Logs Forensic Report, Bates 00046567-76, at 1.

18



20126

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

2010.63 The entirety of the CIDNE-Afghanistan database so downloaded was located during the
forensic examination of PFC Manning?s SD card.69

While there was no digital forensic evidence ?'om PFC Manning?s personal computer directly
indicating that the CIDNE-Afghanistan database was uploaded to WikiLeaks, the forensic
examination did ?nd evidence in Unallocated Clusters of multiple references to the WikiLeaks
upload webpage, including a webpage containing a link to
upload documents to WikiLeaks, and also references indicating a possible upload of the Farah
records (7see discussion of Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLeaks
website. 0 Moreover, PFC Manning?s chats with a person using the
user name, aliased as Nathaniel Frank from 22 February 2010 to
25 March 2010, and as Julian Assange (editor of WikiLeaks) from 17 May 2010 to 24 May 2010
discussed uploading material to WikiLeaks." These facts, taken together, provide circumstantial
evidence that PFC Manning uploaded the CIDNE-Afghanistan database to Wikibeaks.

Manning?s comments in the ?read me? document quoted above indicate that he knew the

database would be released and that the information contained in the reports, by ?removing the
fog of war? concerning actions in which U.S. military forces were involved, could be used to the
injury of the United States. His statement in that document that the recipient needed to ?sit on
the information . .. to protect source? indicates that he knew WikiLeaks was not entitled to
receive this information While PFC Manning in his duties as an intelligence analyst deployed to
Iraq. had reason to use the database every day, he had no need to access the CIDNE-
Afghanistan database.?

The evidence showed that there were more than twenty of these documents? and that they were
properly classi?ed and remain classi?ed."

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 793(e) exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in providing
the database to WikiLcaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 7 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 8 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 641):

Law

5? PFC Manning?s SD Card Forensic Report, Bates 00125319-31, at 9-10.

69 Centaur Logs Forensic Report, Bates 00046567-76, at 7.

7? PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 65-67, 77-78.
7? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

72 Testimony of CPT Lim.

"3 Bates 00377846-37791

7? Classi?cation Review, Bates 00376879-902.

20127

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on or about 8 March 2010, the
accused voluntarily, intentionally and knowingly stole, purloined, or converted a thing of value,
to wit: a United States Southern Command database containing more than 700 records belonging
to the United States government another;

(2) that the thing of value belonged to the United States and had a value in excess of One
Thousand Dollars

(3) that the accused did so with intent to deprive the owner of the use or bene?t of the thing of
value so taken;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 641 exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Facts

The evidence showed that a user of PFC Manning?s primary and secondary SIPRNET computers
searched for retention of interrogation videos, initially on 28 November 2009, and during the
month of March 2010 conducted over 700 searches using wget commands (which are used to
download ?les from a web server) pertaining to Guantanamo Bay detainees. The forensic
examiner downloaded the same documents using the same program, and veri?ed that those
documents were the same documents on the WikiLeaks website by comparing them." The
forensic examiner also found four complete TF Guantanamo Bay detainee assessments on PFC
Ma1ming?s primary SIPRNET computer under PFC Ma1ming?s user pro?le." Moreover, in his
chats with Mr. Lamo, PFC Manning admitted providing these documents to WikiLeaks in the
following statements: ?oh, the IT GTMO Assange has those too;? and, after Larno
said he read those papers and asked if Assange had ?[a]nything else interesting on his table?,
PFC Manning said, ?idk don?t know] I only know what I provide him.?7

The evidence showed there was no work related reason for PFC Manning to search for
Guantanamo or Guantanamo detainee assessments."

The evidence showed that the terms or keywords ?Guantanamo? or were searched for -
from PFC Manning?s primary and secondary SIPRNET computers a total of 17 times.? The

7? Testimony of SA Shaver.

7? Testimony of SA Shaver.

7? Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 44.

7? Testimony of Fulton; Testimony of CPT Lim.

7? lntelink Log Files Forensic Report, Bates 003751 16-129, at 9.

20



20128

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

evidence also showed that the wget command was used 793 times to download documents
pertaining to Guantanamo detainees from PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer.?

The evidence showed that on 8 March 2010, in an online chat with
aliased to Nathaniel Frank at the time but later aliased to Julian
Assange (editor of WikiLeaks),8? PFC Manning made statements including: ?anyway, im
throwing everything I got on JTF GTMO at you should take a while to get up tho . ..
summary/history/health conditions/reasons for retaining or transfer of nearly every detainee . . . I
have a that organizes the info as much as possible.?82

Additionally, the forensic examination of PFC Manning?s personal computer found evidence in
Unallocated Clusters of multiple references to the WikiLeaks upload webpage,
including a webpage containing a link to upload documents to
WikiLeaks?, and also references indicating a possible upload of the Farah records (see discussion
of Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLea.ks website.? These facts, taken
together, support the conclusion that PFC Manning uploaded the Southern Command database to

WikiLeaks.

The evidence showed that between 24 April 2011 and 21 June 2011 WikiLeaks released 765
detainee assessment briefs, documents pertaining to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.?

PFC Ma1ming?s comments in his chats with Mr. Lamo about why he released documents to
WikiLeaks indicate that that he converted this database another in
that he wanted to make this information public and thus deprive its owner, the United States, of
its use or bene?t? PFC Manning had no need to access Guantanamo detainee assessments for
his job,? and he had no authorization to take this database ?om its owner and thus his taking it
constituted stealing it.

While there was no direct evidence provided of the value of the Southern Command database,
there was evidence provided that the valuation of the Net-Centric Diplomacy database was over
$4 million." There was also evidence provided that the value of the information Wikibeaks
possessed was 12 million pounds, or between $15-20 million.? This circumstantial evidence
supports a conclusion that the value of the Southern Command database was over $1,000.

??1nte1in1t Log Files Forensic Report, Bates 003751 16-129, at 12.

The evidence showed that a person using the user name was aliased as Nathaniel
Frank from 22 February 2010 to 25 March 2010, and as Julian Assange (editor of Wikibeaks) from 17 May 2010 to
24 May 2010. PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

?2 PFC Manning?sPersonal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 23.

33 PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 65-67, 77-78.

8? Testimony of SA Bettencourt.

*5 For example, PFC Manning stated, in reference to the State Depart1'nent Cables, that ?it was forwarded to WI.
and god knows what happens now hopefully worldwide discussion, debats, and reforms I want people to see
the truth. .. regardless of who they because without inf ormat-ion, you cannot make informed decisions as a
p?ublic.? 10 Ex. l9(D), at 33.

Testimony of CPT Lim.
NCD Valuation Documents, Bates 0O410556-60.
3' Testimony of SA Bettencourt.



20129

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 641 exists and that PFC Manning's conduct in stealing the
database and converting WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order
and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 8 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 9 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 793(e)):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 8 March
2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, the accused had unauthorized possession of information
relating to the national defense, to wit: more than three classi?ed records from a United States

Southern Command database;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he possessed could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Facts

The evidence showed that a user of PFC Manning?s primary and secondary SIPRNET computers
searched for retention of interrogation videos, and during the month of November conducted
over 700 searches using wget commands (which are used to download ?les ?'om a web server)
pertaining to Guantanamo Bay detainee suspects. The forensic examiner downloaded the same
documents using the same program, and veri?ed that those documents were the same documents
on the WikiLeaks website by comparing them. 89 The forensic examiner also found four
complete JTF Guantanamo Bay detainee assessments on PFC Manning?s primary
computer under PFC Manning?s user pro?le.9? Moreover, in his chats with Mr. Lamo, PFC
Manning admitted providing these documents to WikiLea.ks in the following statements: ?oh, the
HF GTMO Assange has those too;? and, after Lamo said he read those papers and
asked if Assange had ?[a]nything else interesting on his table?, PFC Manning said, ?idk don?t
know] I only know what I provide him.?9'

Testimony of SA Shaver.
9? Testimony of SA Shaver.
Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 44.



20130

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, US. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

The evidence showed there was no work related reason for PFC Manning to search for
Guantanamo or Guantanamo detainee assessments.?

The evidence showed that the terms or keywords ?Guantanamo? or were searched for
from PFC Manning?s primary and secondary SIPRNET computers a total of 17 times.? The
evidence also showed that the wget command was used 793 times to download documents
pertaining to Guantanamo detainees from PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer.?

The evidence showed that on 8 March 2010, in an online chat with
aliased to Nathaniel Frank at the time but later aliased to Julian
Assange (editor of WikiLeaks), 5 PFC Manning made statements including: ?anyway, im
throwing everything I got on JTF GTMO at you now. .. should take a while to get up tho

summary/history/health conditions/reasons for retainingxor transfer of nearly every detainee I
have a that organizes the info as much as possible.?

Additionally, the forensic examination of PFC Manning?s personal computer found evidence in
Unallocated Clusters of multiple references to the WikiLeaks upload webpagc,
including a webpage containing a link to upload documents to
WikiLeaks, and also references indicating a possible upload of the Farah records (see discussion
of Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 10, below) to the WikiLeaks website.? These facts, taken
together, support the conclusion that PFC Manning uploaded the Southern Command database to
WikiLeaks.

The evidence showed that between 24 April 2011 and 21 June 2011 WikiLeaks released 765
detainee assessment briefs, documents pertaining to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.?

PFC Manning?s comments in his chats with the person using the pressassociation screen name,
later aliased as Julian Assange, indicate that he had reason to believe the information he provided
concerning JTF GTMO detention memos could be used to the injury of the United States. In
those chats, PFC Manning asked: ?how valuable are JTF GTMO detention memos containing
summaries, background info, capture info, etc.? and received the response, ?quite valuable to the
lawyers of these guys who are trying to get them out, where those memos suggest their
innocence/bad proceedure?? PFC Marming had no need to access Guantanamo detainee
assessments for his and he had no authorization to provide these records to WikiLeaks,
who was not authorized to receive it.

92 Testimony of CPT Fulton; testimony of CPT Lim.

93 lntelink Log Files Forensic Report, Bates 003751 l6?l29, at 9.

lntelink Log Files Forensic Report, Bates 003751 16-I29, at I2.

95 The evidence showed that a person using user name was aliased as Nathaniel
Frank ?om 22 February 2010 to 25 March 201 as ran Assange tor ofwikibealts) from 17 May 2010 to
24 May 2010. PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 20-32, 76.

9? PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00l24283-362, at 23.

'7 PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates oor242s3-352, at 65-67, 77-73.

9' Testimony of SA Bettencourt.

PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 22.

Testimony of CPT Lim.

23

20131

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning
The evidence showed that there were more than three of these and that they were
properly classi?ed and remain classi?ed. '02

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 793(e) exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in providing
these records to WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 9 of Additional Charge 11.

Additional Charge 11, Speci?cation 10 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 793(e)):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 11 April

2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, the accused had unauthorized possession of information
relating to the national defense, to wit: more than ?ve classi?ed records relating to a military

operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan occurring on or about 4 May 2009;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he possessed could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered; or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and wasof a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces

Facts

The evidence showed that a user of PFC Manning?s user account on his primary SIPRNET
computer downloaded 135 ?les from a centcom.smil.mil server on 10 April 2010; shortly
thereafter, after these ?les were viewed, the farah.zip ?le was viewed on 10 April 2010 on PFC
Manning?s primary SIPRNET

The evidence showed that a CD created on 11 April 2010 at 9:18 am containing a ?le named
?fa.rah.zip? was accessed on PFC Manning?s personal

Bates 00378123440.

Classi?cation Review, Bates 00378646-49.

PFC Mauning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021l037?l 10, at 51-52.
PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 49.

24



20132

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

The evidence from Unallocated Clusters on PFC Manning?s personal computer indicated that
seven ?les with names like ?farah.partl .rar? had existed in a arah? folder on the desktop of that
computer. The evidence also showed that at least four of these ?les had been uploaded to
WikiLeaks after having been using the program, as they had the .nc ?le
extension added an indicator of the use of that program.??5
Additionally, the examination of Unallocated Clusters on PFC Manning?s personal computer
revealed that classi?ed documents relating to the operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan, on or
about 4 May 2009 that were found on the centcom.smil.mil server and also on PFC Manning?s
primary SIPRNET computer existed on his personal computer.?

The evidence showed that in a chat with Mr. Lamo, PFC Manning stated, in response to Lamo?s
question ?what do you consider the highlights? immediately following PFC Ma1ming?s statement
that he only knew what he provided to Mr. Assange, ?The Gharani airstrike videos and full
report, Iraq war event log, the ?Gitmo Papers,? and State Department cable In the
context of his discussion earlier in those chats concerning the State Department cables where he .
said, ?it was forwarded to WL and god knows what happens now hopefully worldwide
discussion, debates, and PFC Manning had reason to believe that the information in
these documents could be used to the injury of the United States. PFC Manning had no need to
access information concerning Afghanistan for his and he had no authorization to provide
these documents to WikiLeaks, which was not authorized to receive it.

The evidence showed that there were more than ?ve of these records' 1? and that they were
properly classi?ed and remain classi?ed.?

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 793(e) exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in providing
.these records to WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 10 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge 11, Speci?cation 11 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 793(e)):
law
In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1
November 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010, the accused had unauthorized possession of

ms PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates at 65-68.

PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 54-58.

Lamo Chat, 10 Exhibit 19(0), at 4445.

Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 33.

Testimony of CPT Lim (stating PFC Manning had no need to access the CIDNE-Afghanistan database fa? his
job).

Bates oo377425.49s.

Classi?cation Review, Bates 00376879-902.

25

20133

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

information relating to the national defense, to wit: a ?le named PAX.zip? containing a
video named PAX.wmv?;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he possessed could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces

Facts

On 8 January 2010, WikiLeaks tweeted that they had a video of the Gharani airstrike video that
was and asked for supercomputer time (presumably to In his chats
with Mr. Lamo, PFC Manning acknowledged that Assange had this video in an
format ?they also caught wind that he [Assange] had a of the Gharani airstrike in
Afghanistan, which he has, but hasn?t yet .. . the production team was actually
working on the Baghdad strike though, which was never really . .. he?s got the whole
15-6 for that incident . .. so it wont just be video with no context .. . but its not nearly as
it was an awful incident, but nothing like the baghdad one . .. the investigating
officers left the material unprotected, sitting in a director on a centcom.smil.n1il . .. server .. . but
they did zip up the ?les, aes-256, with an excellent password. . . so afaik [as far as I know] it
hasn?t been broken

Additionally, as mentioned above, PFC Manning stated that the ?highli hts? of what he provided
to Mr. Assange included ?the Gharani airstrike videos and full report.?' 4

The evidence also showed that a computer owned by a Mr. Jason Katz, a fonner employee of the
Department of Energy, contained a ?le named BE.zip, and within that ?le was an
password-protected ?le named BE 22 PAX.wmv. The password the forensic examiners obtained
from CENTCOM to open the ?le by the same name on the centcom.smiI.mil server also opened
the ?le on Mr. Kat:z?s computer, and the ?les appeared to be the same. The ?le was placed on
Mr. Katz?s computer on 15 December 2009 and Mr. Katz had installed a password cracking
program and was trying to the ?le.?5

This evidence, particularly PFC Manning?s statements as to where the ?le was located and his
knowledge that the ?les had been zipped ?with an excellent password,? together with the
evidence indicating that PFC Manning had uploaded the farah.zip ?les, circumstantially

Testimony of SA Bettenoourt; Bates
"3 Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 10-11.

Lamo Chat, 10 Exhibit at 44-45.

"5 Testimony of SA Shaver.

20134

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

indicates that PFC Manning provided the BE 22 PAX.wmv ?le to WikiLeaks and that ?le was
the one that was placed on Mr. Katz's computer.

The evidence showed that in the context of his chats with Mr. Lamo concerning the State
Department cables where he said, ?it was forwarded to WL and god knows what happens now
hopefully worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms,? ?6 PFC Manning had reason to
believe that the information in this video could be used to the injury of the United States. PFC
Manning had no need to access information concerning Afghanistan for his job,? and he had no
authorization to provide these documents to WikiLeal-cs, which was not authorized to receive it.

.The evidence showed that this video was properly classi?ed and remains classi?ed. 13

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 793(e) exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in providing
these records to WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation I 1 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 12 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 641):

Law
In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following five elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 28 March
2010 and on or about 4 May 2010, the accused voluntarily, intentionally and knowingly stole,
purloined, or converted a thing of value, to wit: the Department of State Net-Centric Diplomacy
database containing more than 250,000 records belonging to the United States government another;

(2) that the thing of value belonged to the United States and had a value in excess of One
Thousand Dollars

(3) that the accused did so with intent to deprive the owner of the use or bene?t of the thing of
value so taken;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 641 exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Iamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 33.
"7 Testimony of CPT Lim (stating PFC Manning had no need to access the CIDNE-Afghanistan database for his

job)
Classi?cation Review, Bates 00376879-902.

27

20135

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, US. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

acts

The evidence showed that PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer contained, under his
user pro?le, a ?le named ??les.zip? in the ?bloop? folder that had over 10,000 Department of
State cables in .html web page format, and that over 4,000 of these cables were classi?ed.? '9 A
CD accessed on PFC Manning?s personal computer containing ?les.zip was burned on 4 May
The evidence showed that another document in the ?bloop? folder, ?backup.xlsx,? was a
spreadsheet with cables published in March, April, and May 2010.12? The tab in this spreadsheet
including cables published in March and April 2010 started with a cable with number 251,288.

The evidence showed that PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer had a version of wget
(software used to download ?les from a server) that was the same version found in the
Department of State log ?les, the Intelink log ?les, and that was downloaded on a NIPRN ET
computer by the bradley.manning user pro?le. 122 A user of PFC Manning?s user pro?le on that
NIPRNET computer did Google searches for WikiLeaks and wget.exe on 3 May 2010 and
downloaded wget to that pro?le. A user of PFC Manning?s user pro?le then transferred wget
from the NIPRNET to SIPRNET on 4 May 2010, under PFC Manning?s user pro?lem

The evidence showed that on 20 August 2011, Wilcables in unredacted form and made them available on the Internetm While the evidence was
that WikiLeaks did not release the cables in folder,?5 the forensic examination found
thousands of State Department cables in unallocated space on PFC Manning?s primary SIPRN ET
computer, ran in classi?cation from unclassi?ed to secret; many were complete, but many
others were not? 5 Additionally, the forensic examination of PFC Mam1ing?s primary SIPRNET
computer revealed that a deleted and partially overwritten ?le named ?c:\Lost
Fi1e\backup\farah.zip? was originally created on 10 April 2010 and contained 582 Department of
State Cables, over 250 of which were classi?ed. '27 The evidence showed the Department of
State cables were in .csv format, a way of moving ?les from one database to another, and were
Base64 encoded. Analysis of PFC Manning?s secondary SIPRN ET computer and his personal
computer also showed many Department of State cables that had been converted to Base64 and
stored in .csv formatm Speci?cally, approximately 113,000 complete Department of State
cables converted to Base64 were found in a deleted .csv ?le in Unallocated Clusters on PFC

"9 Testimony of SA Shaver; PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021 1037-110,
at 3] .

Testimony of SA Shaver.

PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 002110374 10, at 31; spreadsheet, at
Bates 00296982; Testimony of SA Shaver.

'22 PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021 1037-1 10, at 37.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

Testimony of SA Bettencourt; Testimony of SA Shaver.
Testimony of SA Shaver. SA Shaver also testi?ed there was a problem with ?les.zip when it was created, and if
a person using WinZip tried to open it, it would not open because it was a corrupted ?le, and one would need special
tools to open the ?les in ?les.zip. Based on that testimony, it appears that \VikiLealcs did not release the cables in
?les.zip because they could not open them.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

"7 PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021 1037- 11 0, at 34-36.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021 1037-1 10, at 36.

28



20136

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Manning's secondary SIPRNET computer,'3? and evidence of Department of State cables
published before March 2010 were found in Unallocated Clusters on PFC Manning?s personal
computer, including data appearing to have a .csv ?le structure listing Department of State cables
with numbers preceding 251,287 in a format similar to the cables found on PFC Manning?s
primary SIPRNET Computer. '3 1 Additionally, examination of Department of State cable
message record numbers released by Wil-tiLeaks identi?ed 251,298 individual message record
numbers; examination of PFC Manning?s personal computer and his primary and secondary
SIPRNET computers showed that they contained 83% of all the message record numbers
released to WikiLeaks 132

This evidence, taken together, leads to a conclusion that the 251,287 ?les released by WikiLeaks
were provided to WikiLeaks by PFC Manning.

The evidence showed that in his chats with Mr. Lamo concerning the State Department cables,
PFC Manning said, ?it was forwarded to WL and god knows what happens now hopefully
worldwide discussion, debates, and refomis I want people to see the truth.. . regardless of who
they because without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a which
indicates that that he converted this database another in that he
wanted to make this information public and thus deprive its owner, the United States, of its use
or bene?t. While there was evidence that PFC Manning had the authority to access diplomatic
cables for his job,'34 he had no authorization to take this database ?'om its owner and thus his
taking it constituted stealing it.

The evitlisesnce showed that the valuation of the Net-Centric Diplomacy database was over $4
million.

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 641 exists and that PFC Mann.ing?s conduct in stealing the
database and converting WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order
and discipline and was service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 12 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 13 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. l030(a)(1)):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the govemrnent must establish the following six elements:

PFC Ma1ming?s Secondary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199494-507, at 1, 12-14.
'31 PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 51-54.

'32 Files Forensic Report, Bates 00054320-34, at 14.

Lame Chat, 10 Ex. at 33.

Testimony of CPT Lim (stating-he gave the link through email to access diplomatic cables).
NCD Valuation Documents, Bates 00410556-60.

29



20137

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 28 March
2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, the accused knowingly exceeded authorized access on a
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer,

(2) that the accused obtained information that has been determined by the United States
government by Executive Order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure
for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, to wit: more than seventy-?ve classi?ed
United States Department of State cables;

(3) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(4) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(5) that 18 U.S.C. section 1030(a)(1) exists; and

(6) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.?

Facts

The evidence showed that PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer contained, under his
user pro?le, a ?le named ??les.zip? in the ?bloop? folder that had over 10,000 Department of
State cables in .html web page format, and that over 4,000 of these cables were A
CD accessed on PFC Marming?s personal computer containing ?les.zip was burned on 4 May
10.138 The evidence showed that another document in the ?bloop? folder, ?backup.xlsx,? was a
spreadsheet with cables published in March, April, and May 2010'? The tab in this spreadsheet
including cables published in March and April 2010 started with a cable with number 251,288.
The evidence showed that PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer had a version of wget
(software used to download ?les from a server) that was the same version found in the
Department of State log ?les, the Intelink log ?les, and that was downloaded on a NIPRNET
computer by a user of PFC Manning?s user pro?le.?? A user of PFC Manning?s user pro?le on
that NIPRNET computer did Google searches for WikiLeaks and wget.exe on 3 May 10 and
downloaded wget to that pro?le. A user of PFC Ma1ming?s user pro?le then transferred wget
from the NIPRNET to SIPRNET on 4 May 2010, under PFC Manning?s user pro?1e.??

These elements are a tailored version of Eighth Circuit Model Jury instruction 6. 18.1030A.
Testimony of SA Shaver, PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates oo211o37?11o,
at 31.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00211037-110, at 31; spreadsheet, at
Bates 00296982; Testimony of SA Shaver.

14? PFC Marming?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021 1037-1 10, at 37.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

30

20138

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

The evidence showed that on 20 August 201 1, WikiLeaks released 251,287 Department of State
cables in unredacted form and made them available on the Intemetm While the evidence was
that WikiLeaks did not release the cables in the ?les.zip folder,?3 the forensic examination found
thousands of State Department cables in unallocated space on PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET
computer, rangin in classi?cation from unclassi?ed to secret; many were complete, but many
others were not.? Additionally, the forensic examination of PFC Marming?s primary SIPRNET
computer revealed that a deleted and partially overwritten ?le named ?c:\Lost
File\backup\farah.zip? was originally created on 10 April 2010 and contained 582 Department of
State Cables, over 250 of which were c1assi?ed.?5 The evidence showed the Department of
State cables were in .csv format, a way of moving ?les from one database to another, and were
Base64 encoded. '46 Analysis of PFC Manning?s secondary SIPRNET computer and his personal
computer also showed many Department of State cables that had been converted to Base64 and
stored in .csv format.?7 Speci?cally, approximately 113,000 complete Department of State
cables converted to Base64 were found in a deleted .csv ?le in Unallocated Clusters on PFC
Marming?s secondary SIPRN ET computer,? and evidence of Department of State cables
published before March 2010 were found in Unallocated Clusters on PFC Manning?s personal
computer, including data appearing to have a .csv ?le structure listing Department of State cables
with numbers preceding 251,287 in a fomtat similar to the cables found on PFC Manning?s
primary SIPRN ET Computer.?9 Additionally, examination of Department of State cable
message record numbers released by Wikibeaks identi?ed 251,298 individual message record
numbers; examination of PFC Manning?s personal computer and his primary and secondary
SIPRNET computers showed that they contained 83% of all the message record numbers
released to WikiLeaks.??

This evidence, taken together, leads to a conclusion that the 251,287 ?les released by Wikibeaks
were provided to WilciLealcs by PFC Manning.

The evidence showed that in his chats with Mr. Lamo concerning the State Department cables,
PFC Manning said, ?it was forwarded to WL and god knows what happens now . . . hope?rlly
worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms I want people to see the regardless of who
they are. .. because without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a public,?15?
which indicates that that he had reason to believe that the information he obtained could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

?2 Testimony of SA Bettencourt; Testimony of SA Shaver.

?3 Testimony of SA Shaver. SA Shaver also testified there was a problem with ?les.zip when it was created, and if
a person using WinZip tried to open it, it would not open because it was a corrupted ?le, and one would need special
tools to open the ?les in ?les.zip. Based on that testimony, it appears that WikiLeaks did not release the cables in
?les.zip because they could not open them.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

?5 PFC Manning's Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report Bates 0021 1037-110, at 34-36.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 0021 1037-1 10, at 36.

PFC Manning?s Secondary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00l99494?507, at 1, 12-14.

"9 PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 51-54.

nos Files Forensic Report, Bates 00054320-34, at 14.

Lame Chat, 10 Ex. 19(0), at 33.

31

20139

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, US. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

While there was evidence that PFC Manning had the authority to access diplomatic cables for his
job,'52 the context of that evidence was that access was authorized for the to do their job.
The evidence also showed that before logging on to his primary and secondary SIPRNET
computers, PFC Manning had to click on a warning banner, the ?rst sentence of which
read, ?You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for
USG-authorized use Accordingly, accessing diplomatic cables in order to provide them
to a person not entitled to receive it exceeded authorized access. PFC Manning had no
authorization to transfer this information to Wil-:iLeal-cs, which was not entitled to receive it.

The evidence showed that these cables were properly classi?ed and remain classi?ed. '54

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(l) exists and that PFC Manning's conduct in
providing these classi?ed cables to WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and
was service discrediting

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 14 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. l030(a)(1)):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following six elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 15
February 2010 and on or about 18 February 2010, the accused knowingly exceeded authorized
access on a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer;

(2) that the accused obtained information that has been determined by the United States
government by Executive Order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure
for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, to wit: a classi?ed United States Department
of State cable titled ?Reykjavik?l

(3) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(4) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(5) that 18 U.S.C. section l030(a)(1) exists; and

(6) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

1? Testimony of CPT Lim (stating he gave the link through email to access diplomatic cables).
'53 Testimony of SA Shaver; [0 Ex. 1 at 1 (Bates oomsse).
Classi?cation Review, Bates 00376903-53.

32

20140

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Facts

The evidence showed that the keyword ?Iceland? was searched for a total of fourteen times from
both of PFC Manning?s primary and secondary SIPRN ET computers.'55 The first search for
Iceland was on 9 January 2010 and came from PFC Manning's The evidence also
showed that PFC Manning accessed a CD created on 15 February 2010 at 6:21 am containing the
?le, ?l0Reykjavikl 3.txt? on his personal computenm The evidence also showed that
WikiLeaks released Reykjavik-13 on 18 February 2010.158 Additionally, the evidence showed
that when Mr. Lamo asked for ?bona ?des? during their chats, during the discussion of the State
Cables, PFC Manning stated, ?this one was a test: Classi?ed cable from US Embassy Reykjavik
on Icesave dated 13 Jan 2010 .. the result of that one was that the icelandic ambassador to the US
was recalled, and ?red that?s just one This evidence, taken together, leads to a
conclusion that the Reykjavik~13 cable was provided to WikiLeaks by PFC Manning.

The evidence showed that in his chats with Mr. Lamo concerning the State Department cables,
PFC Manning said, ?Hilary Clinton, and several thousand diplomats around the world are going
to have a heart attack when they wake up one morning, and ?nds an entire repository of
classi?ed foreign policy is available, in searchable format to the public . .. theres so much. . . it
affects everybody on everywhere there?s a US there's a diplomatic scandal that
will be Iceland, the Vatican, Spain, Brazil, Madagascar, if its a country, and its
recognized by the US as a country, its got dirt on it .. . its open diplomacy. . . worldwide anarchy
in CSV format. . and ?it was forwarded to WL and god knows what happens now
hope?illy worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms .. . I want people to see the
regardless of who they because without information, you cannot make informed decisions
as a which indicates that that he had reason to believe that the information he obtained
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.

While there was evidence that PFC Manning had the authority to access diplomatic cables for his
the context of that evidence was that access was authorized for the to do their job.
The evidence also showed that before logging on to his primary and secondary SIPRNET
computers, PFC Manning had to click on a warning banner, the ?rst sentence of which
read, ?You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for
USG-authorized use Accordingly, accessing diplomatic cables in order to provide them
to a person not entitled to receive it exceeded authorized access. PFC Manning had no
authorization to transfer this information to WikiLeaks, which was not entitled to receive it.

lntelink Logs Forensic Report, Bates 003751 1c129, at s.

Testimony of SA Shaver.

'57 PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 49.

Testimony of SA Bettencourt; PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at
Attachment

"9 Lamo Chat, I0 Ex. at 9.

Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 3.

1? Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 33.

Testimony of CPT Lim (stating he gave the link through email to access diplomatic cables).

Testimony of SA Shaver; 10 Ex. 11(9), at 1 (Bates 00376856).

33

20141

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, US. v. PFC Bradley F. Manning

The evidence showed that this cable was properly classi?ed and remains classi?ecL'??

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. lO30(a)(1) exists a.nd that PFC Manning?s conduct in
providing this classi?ed cable to WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and was
service discrediting.

Additional Charge 11, Specification 15 (Art. 134, l8 u.s.c. 793(e)):

law
In order to prove this offense, the govermnent must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 15
February 2010 and on or about 15 March 2010, the accused had tmauthorized possession of
information relating to the national defense, to wit: a classi?ed record produced by a United
Stats rmy intelligence organization, dated 18 March 2008;

(2) that the accused had reason to believe that the information he possessed could be used to the
injmy of the United Stats or to the advantage of any foreign nation;

(3) that the accused willfully communicated, delivered, or transmitted the said information to a
person not entitled to receive it;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 793(e) exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and ws of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forcs.

Facts

The evidence showed that ?between [the document at issue] was
accessed only 12 times; 4 ofthe12 accesses during that period were attributedto IP addresses
assigned to PFC Manning's SIPRNET

The evidence showed that the classi?ed record produced by a United Stats Army intelligence
organization copied from the SIPRNET contained the same content as the document that was
posted to WikiLeaks on 15 March 2010'? The evidence showed that in a chat with

(aliased at the time to Nathaniel Frank but later to Julian
Assange), the accused discussed this report, stating: article has LTC Packnett allegedly

Classi?cation Review, Bats 00376903-53.
Army Intelligence Forensic Report, Bats 0046452-66, at 1.
Army Intelligence Forensic Report, Bates 0046452-66, at 5-7 (the date of the document at issue is contained in

that Report); Tstimony of SA Bettencourt.
34

20142

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

con?rming the authenticity of the 2008 report posted on The Early Bird the same dag!
of that chat, 18 March 2010, had an article from the New York Times discussing that report.?

The contents of the document at issue indicate that PFC Manning had reason to believe that the
information in this document could be used to the injury of the United States. PFC Manning had
no need to access information concerning WikiLeaks for his job,? and he had no authorization
to provide this document to WikiLeaks, which was not authorized to receive it.

The evidence showed that this document was properly classi?ed and remains c1assi?ed.??

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 793(e) exists and that PFC Manning?s conduct in providing
this document to WikiLeaks was prejudicial to good order and discipline and was service
discrediting.

Ithus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 15 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge II, Speci?cation 16 (Art. 134, 18 U.S.C. 641):

Law
In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following ?ve elements:

(1) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1 1 May
2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, the accused voluntarily, intentionally and knowingly stole,
purloined, or converted a thing of value, to wit: the United States Forces Iraq Microsoft
Outlook/Sharepoint Exchange Server global address list belonging to the United States
government another,

(2) that the thing of value belonged to the United States and had a value in excess of One
Thousand Dollars -

(3) that the accused did so with intent to deprive the owner of the use or bene?t of the thing of
value so taken;

(4) that 18 U.S.C. section 641 exists; and

(5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to? the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed "forces.

Facts

167 PFC Manning Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 124283-362, at Amy Intelligence Forensic
Report, Bates 0046452-66, at 10-1 l.

IO Ex. p. 20-21.

"59 Testimony of CPT Lim.

Classi?cation Review, Bates 004l0623?34.



20143

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

The evidence showed that on 7 May 2010, WikiLeaks tweeted a request seeking as many .mil
addresses as possible.?' The evidence showed that the Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer to
which PFC Manning had access contained a large text ?le named ?blah.txt? appearing to be an
extract of an Exchange global address list in the peter.bigelow' user account, and that based on
the analysis of PFC Mannl'ng?s personal" computer and primary SIPRNET computer, ?blah?
appeared to be a ?le name that PFC Malming commonly usedm The evidence showed that the
?le creation dates for the ?les related to the global address list on the Supply Almex NIPRNET
computer were 13 May and 22 May The evidence also showed that the temporary intemet
?les of SSG Peter Bigelow?s user account contained searches for how to obtain a global address
list from Microsoft Outlook.?4

The evidence showed that the Supply Annex NIPRNET computer did not require CAC logon, so
the forensic analysis was unable to determine whether SSG Bigelow created the global access list
?les or if PFC Manning used his account.?5 However, the recycle bin for SSG Bigelow?s
account contained documents related to PFC Manning, such as a copy of his Article 15,
counseling statements, and other documents,?? and the temporary intemet ?les on SSG

Bi gelow?s account included an amazoncom checkout page indicating that the item purchased
would be sent to PFC Manning at an address in Potomac, Maryland, and included evidence of
Google searches for WikiLeaks and Julian Assange,m and the Google search page login user
was PFC Marming?s G-mail account,m all of which indicates that PFC Manning was using sso
Bigelow?s account. -

The evidence showed that PFC Manning?s personal computer contained, in unallocated clusters,
a text fragment showing intent to ?acquire and ex?ltrate Global Address List ?'om United States
Forces - Iraq (U SF-I) Microsoft Outlook I Sharepoint Exchange Server,? and also contained an
extracted portion of an Exchange global address list, which led the examiner to conclude "it
seems likely PFC MANNING completed the ?task? identi?ed

The global address list would be helpful for the enemy to possess in that it would enable the
enemy to engage in ?Spear?shing,? a targeted attempt to gain information from an unsuspecting
source by masquerading as someone the source trusts; speci?c information such as knowledge of

full names and emails facilitates spear?shingobecause it is more likely to make the targeted

source believe the spear?sher is legitimate.?

PFC Manning's searching for the global address list and how to ex?ltrate it shortly after
WikiLeaks tweeted asking for as many mil address as possible indicates that that he converted
the global address list another in that he wanted to make this

Bates 00410594-95.

"1 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 11.

"3 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 13.

Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00l99556?90, at 29-32.

Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00i99556?90, at 12.

"6 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 17.

"7 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 21-22, 27-29.
"8 Testimony of SA Williamson.

"9 PFC Manning's Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283?362, at 54-55.

Testimony of SA Bettencourt.

36

20144

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

information public by giving it to WikiLeaks and thus deprive its owner, the United States, of its
use or bene?t. PFC Manning had no authorization to take the global address list from its
owner and thus his taking it constituted stealing it.

While there was no direct evidence provided of the value of the global address list, there was
evidence rovided that the valuation of the Net-Centric Diplomacy database was over $4
million.? There was also evidence provided that the value of the information WikiLeaks
possessed was 12 million pounds, or between $15-20 nn11ion.??3 This circumstantial evidence
supports a conclusion that the value of the global address list was over $1,000.

The evidence showed that 18 U.S.C. 641 exists and that PFC Marming?s conduct in stealing the
global address list and converting Wikibeaks was prejudicial to
good order and discipline and service discrediting.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the oifense
alleged in Speci?cation 16 of Additional Charge II.

Additional Charge Speci?cation I (Art. 92, UCMJ):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following three elements:

(1) that there was in existence a certain lawful general regulation in the following terms:
paragraph Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, which provides: ?the
following activities are speci?cally prohibited by any authorized user on a Government provided
IS or connection: . .. Attempts to strain, test, circumvent, or bypass network or IS security
mechanisms, or to perform network or keystroke monitoring. RCERTS, Red Team, or other
official activities, operating in their official capacities only, may be exempted from this
requirement?;

(2) that the accused had a duty to obey such regulation; and
(3) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 1

November 2009 and on or about 8 March 2010, the accused violated this law?il general
regulation by attempting to bypass network or information system security mechanisms.

Facts

For example, PFC Marming stated, in reference to the State Department Cables, that ?it was forwarded to WL
and god knows what happens now hopefully worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms I want people to see
the regardless of who they because without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a
public.? 10 Ex. l9(D), at 33.
*2 NCD Valuation Documents, Bates 0041 ossaoo.
?3 Testimony of SA Bettencourt.



20145

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Examination of PFC Manning's secondary SIPRNET computer revealed a text string that he had
provided to (aliased at the time to Nathaniel Frank but later to
Julian Assange) in a deleted chat session found on his personal computer - in that chat which
occurred on 8 March 2010, PFC Manning asked, ?any good at lm has cracking,? provided the
text string, and said ?i had to hexadump a SAM ?le, since i don't have the system ?le.?m

The evidence also showed that PFC Marming attempted to obtain the password of the TPUSER
account on his secondary SIPRNET com uter, which could have been used to attempt to hide his
true identity while using that computer.? Given the extent of his conduct described in this
report, it is reasonable to conclude tint PFC Manning attempted to ?nd a way to hide his activity
while engaging in that conduct.

The evidence showed the regulation at issue existed and PFC Manning had a duty to obey it.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 1 of Additional Charge

Additional Charge Speci?cation 2 (Art. 92, UCMJ):
law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following three elements:

(1) that there was in existence a certain lawful general regulation in the following terms:
paragraph Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, which provides: ?the
following activities are speci?cally prohibited by any authorized mer on a Government provided
IS or connection: Modi?cation of the IS or software, use of it in any manner other than its
intended purpose, or adding user-con?gurable or unauthorized software such as, but not limited
to, commercial instant messaging, commercial Internet chat, collaborative environments, or peer-
to-peer client applications. These applications create exploitable vulnerabilities and circumvent
normal means of securing and monitoring network activity and provide a vector for the
introduction of malicious code, remote access, network intrusions or the ex?ltration of protected
data?;

(2) that the accused had a duty to obey such regulation; and

(3) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 11
February 2010 and on or about 3 April 2010, the accused violated this lawful general regulation

by adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network Computer.
Facts

PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283-362, at 25 (the forensic examiner noted
that ?the terminology hash cracking? and ?hexadumping a SAM ?le? are techniques used gaining
unauthorized access to a Windows-based computer by breaking the login password?); PFC Manning's Secondary
SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199494-507, at 9.

PFC Manning's Secondary SIPRNET computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199494-507, at 9-10.

38

20146

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley F. Manning

The evidence showed that the wget command was used to download documents pertaining to
Guantanamo Bay detainees from PFC Manning?s primary SIPRNET computer." 86 In order for
wget to have been used, it must have been installed.

The evidence showed that wget was not authorized so?ware. '87

The evidence showed the regulation at issue existed and PFC Manning had a duty to obey it.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 2 of Additional Charge

Additional Charge Speci?cation 3 (Art. 92, UCMJ):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following three elements:

(1) that there was in existence a certain lawful general regulation in the following terms:
paragraph Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, which provides: ?the
following activities are speci?cally prohibited by any authorized user on a Government provided
IS or connection: Modi?cation of the IS or software, use of it in any manner other than its
intended purpose, or adding user-con?gurable or unauthorized software such as, but not limited
to commercial instant messaging, commercial Internet chat, collaborative environments, or
peer-to-peer client applications. These applications create exploitable vulnerabilities and
circumvent normal means of securing and monitoring network activity and provide a vector for
the introduction of malicious code, remote access, network intrusions or the ex?ltration of
protected data?;

(2) that the accused had a duty to obey such regulation; and

(3) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on or about 4 May 2010, the
accused violated this law?il general regulation by adding unauthorized software to a Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network Computer.

Facts

The evidence showed that PFC Manning?s primary SIPRN ET computer had a version of wget
(software used to download ?les ?'om a server) that was the same version found in the
Department of State log ?les, the Intelink log ?les, and that was downloaded by the
bradleymanning user pro?le on a NIPRNET computenm A user of PFC Manning?s user pro?le
on that NIPRN ET computer did Google searches for WikiLeaks and wgetexe on 3 May 10 and

"6 Intelink Logs Forensic Report, Bates 00375116-129, at 12 (this document includes examples of dates of such
use of wget).

"7 Testimony of CPT Cherepko.

PFC Manning?s Primary SIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00211037-110, at 37.

39

20147

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

downloaded wget to that pro?le. A user of PFC Marming?s user pro?le then transferred wget
?om the NIPRNET to SIPRNET on 4 May 2010, under PFC Manning?s user

The evidence showed that wget was not authorized so?warem
The evidence showed the regulation at issue existed and PFC Manning had a duty to obey it.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 3 of Additional Charge

Additional Charge Speci?cation 4 (Art. 92, UCMJ):

Law

In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following three elements:

(1) that there was in existence a certain lawful general regulation in the following terms:
paragraph Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, which provides: ?the
following activities are speci?cally prohibited by any authorized user on a Government provided
IS or connection: Modi?cation of the IS or so?ware, use of it in any manner other than its
intended purpose, or adding user?con?gurable or unauthorized software such as, but not limited
to commercial instant messaging, commercial Internet chat, collaborative environments, or
peer?to-peer client applications. These applications create exploitable vulnerabilities and
circumvent normal means of securing and monitoring network activity and provide a vector for
the introduction of malicious code, remote access, network intrusions or the ex?ltration of
protected data?;

(2) that the accused had a duty to obey such regulation; and

(3) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about 11 May
2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, the accused violated this lawful general regulation by using
an information system in a manner other than its intended purpose.

Facts

The evidence showed that on 7 May 2010, WikiLeaks tweeted a request seeking as many .mil
addresses as possible. The evidence showed that the Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer to
which PFC Manning had access contained a large text file named ?blah.txt? appearing to be an
extract of an Exchange global address list in the peter.bigelow user account, and that based on
the analysis of PFC Manning?s personal computer and primary SIPRNET computer, ?blah?
appeared to be a ?le name that PFC Manning commonly used.'92 The evidence showed that the
?le creation dates for the ?les related to the global address list on the Supply Annex NIPRNET

Testimony of SA Shaver.

Testimony of CPT Cherepko.

Bates 00410594-95.

"2 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00l99556?90, at 1.

40



20148

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, US. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

computer were '93 The evidence also showed that the temporary
intemet ?les of SSG Bigelow?s user account contained searches for how to obtain a global
address list from Microsoft Outlook.'94

The evidence showed that the Supply Annex NIPRNET computer did not require CAC logon, so
the forensic analysis was unable to determine whether SSG Bigelow created the global access list
?les or if PFC Manning used his account. [95 However, the recycle bin for SSG Bigelow?s
account contained documents related to PFC Manning, such as a copy of his Article 15,
counseling statements, and other documents,? and the temporary intemet ?les on SSG
Bigelow?s account included an amazon.com checkout page indicating that the item purchased
would be sent to PFC Manning at an address in Potomac, Maryland, and included evidence of
Google searches for WikiLeaks and Julian Assange,m and the Google search page login user
was PFC Manning?s G-mail account,m all of which indicates that PFC Manning was using SSG
Bigelow?s account.

The evidence showed that PFC Manning?s personal computer contained, in unallocated clusters,
a text ?agment showing intent to ?acquire and ex?ltrate Global Address List from United States
Forces Iraq (USF-I) Microsoft Outlook Sharepoint Exchange Server,? and also contained an
extracted portion of an Exchange global address list, which led the examiner to conclude ?it
seems likely 1>1=c MANNING completed the ?task? identi?ed above.?m

PFC Manning?s searching for the global address list and how to ex?ltrate it shortly after
WikiLeaks tweeted asking for as many .mil address as possible indicates that that he used the

Supply Annex NIPRNET computer for a other than its intended purpose by obtaining the global
access list.

The evidence showed the regulation at issue existed and PFC Manning had a duty to obey it.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 4 of Additional Charge

Additional Charge Speci?cation 5 (Art. 92, UCMJ):
Law
In order to prove this offense, the government must establish the following three elements:

(1) that there was in existence a certain lawful general regulation in the following terms:
paragraph 7-4, Army Regulation 380-5, dated 29 September 2000, which provides, in relevant

"3 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 13.

Supply Annex NIPRN ET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 29-32.

'95 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 12.

Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 17.

'97 Supply Annex NIPRNET Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00199556-90, at 21-22, 27-29.
Testimony of SA Williamson.

1? PFC Manning?s Personal Computer Forensic Report, Bates 00124283?362, at 64-65.

41



20149

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

part: ?Classi?ed information that is not under the personal control and observation of an
authorized person, is to be guarded or stored in a locked security container, vault, room, or area,
pursuant to the level of classi?cation and this regulation by one or more of the following
methods: -SECRET information will be stored in the samemanner as prescribed for TOP
SECRET [in a GSA-approved security container with one of the listed supplemental controls or
in a vault or security room] in a GSA-approved security container without supplemental
controls CONFIDENTIAL information will be stored in the same manner as prescribed for
TOP SECRET and SECRET information except that supplemental controls are not required?;

(2) that the accused had a duty to obey such regulation; and

(3) that at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on divers occasions between on
or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, the accused violated this law?il

general regulation by wrongfully storing classi?ed information.

Facts

As outlined in this report, the evidence showed that throughout, PFC Manning brought CDs with
classi?ed information on them and accessed them on his personal computer, and showed that his
personal computer contained classi?ed inf onnation. There was no evidence that the personal

computer containing classi?ed information was stored in an approved manner as required by the

regulationzoo
The evidence showed the regulation at issue existed and PFC Manning had a duty to obey it.

I thus conclude that reasonable grounds exist to believe that PFC Manning committed the offense
alleged in Speci?cation 5 of Additional Charge

II. Analysis of Matters Raised by the Accused
Overeharging by the Government

The defense argued that Additional Charge I and its Speci?cation, Speci?cation of Additional
Charge II, and all ?ve Specifications of Additional Charge should be dismissed. The defense
also argued that the remaining Speci?cations of Additional Charge II should be consolidated into
one Speci?cation alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. section 641, one Speci?cation alleging
violations of 18 U.S.C. section 793(e), and one Speci?cation alleging violations of 18 U.S.C.
section l030(a)(1). I the charged o??enses were either dismissed or consolidated as sought by
the defense, PFC Manning would face a maximum penalty of 30 years.

As outlined above, there are reasonable grounds to believe that PFC Manning committed the
offenses alleged in Additional Charge I and its Speci?cation and in Additional Charge II,
Speci?cation 1. These are serious charges, but so too is the offense conduct they allege.

Note that I do not believe that PFC Manning?s storage of the CD marked 12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE
30 GC, with a sticker attached, in his quarters constitutes a violation of this regulation as there was no
evidence that the video contained on that CD was in fact classi?ed.

42



20150

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Anned Forces rwently found that an Article 134 offense
alleging wrongfully providing information about the U.S. military to persons the accused thought
were members of Al-Qaida was not multiplicious with attempted violations of Article 104,
including attempting to give intelligence to the enemy. U. S. v. Anderson, 68 M.J. 378, 384-85
(C.A.A.F. 2010). Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to recommend that these charges be
dismissed.

With respect to the remaining Speci?cations of Additional Charge II, charged under Article 134
as 5 violations of 18 U.S.C. section 641, 8 violations of 18 U.S.C. 793(e), and 2 violations of 18
U.S.C. 103 (all also including charging the relevant conduct as prejudicial to good order
and discipline and service discrediting), each speci?cation charges a separate and distinct
criminal act occurring at different times or involving different information. As Anderson stated,
for multiplicity analysis ?the applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes
a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not.? Anderson, 68 M.J. at 385 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 US. 299, 304

(1932)).

A review of the elements of the speci?cations in Additional Charge II alleging violations of 18
U.S.C. sections 793(e), 641, and 1030(a)(1) indicates that each of these statutes requires ?proof
of a fact which the others do not.? For example, the section 793(e) offenses require proof that
the accused had unauthorized possession of information relating to the national defense, while
the section 103 offenses require proof that the accused exceeded authorized access on a
SIPRNET computer and also obtained inf omiation that has been determined by the United States
government to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense
or foreign relations. Accordingly, even though these offenses have two elements in common
(having reason to believe that the information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, and will?illy communicating the information to a person
not entitled to receive it), the offenses are not multiplicious. Similarly, the section 641 o?enses
are not multiplicious with the section 793 and section 103 offenses because the section
641 elements require proof of different facts than do the elements of the other offenses.

As to whether any of the Speci?cations 2-16 of Additional Charge II constitute an unreasonable
multiplication of charges, the Speci?cations allege separate criminal transactions involving
different time periods and different information. For example, one of the two Speci?cations
alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. section 1030(a)(1) (Speci?cation 13) alleges conduct between
on or about 28 Mar 10 and on or about 27 May 10 involving more than 75 classi?ed Department
of State cables, while the other (Speci?cation 14) alleges conduct between on or about involving one particular Department of State cable. An analysis of the other
Speci?cations of Additional Charge II charging violations of the same statute leads to the same
conclusion.2?'

Note that in those cases where the dates of the Speci?cations in Additional Charge ll overlap (18 USC 793
violations: Speci?cations 2 and 3; Speci?cations 5 and 7; Speci?cations 2, 3, and 9; Speci?cations 9 and 10;
Speci?cations 2, 9 and 15; and 18 USC 641 violations: Speci?cations 4 and 6), the information that is the subject of
the charged offense is separate and distinct, indicating that the criminal act charged in each speci?cation is separate
and distinct.

43

20151

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

Anderson cites the ?ve part test used to determine whether there is unreasonable multiplication
of charges omitting the ?rst factor, which simply asks whether the accused objected at trial, the
test asks, ?Is each charge and speci?cation aimed at separate criminal acts? . . . Does
the number of charges and speci?cations misrepresent or exaggerate the .. . [accused?s]
criminality? Does the number of charges and speci?cations unfairly increase the
[accused?s] punitive exposure? [and] Is there any evidence of prosecutorial overreaching or
abuse in the drafting of the charges?? Anderson, 68 M.J. at 386 (emphasis in original; quoting
US. v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 338 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). As outlined above, here each charge and
speci?cation is aimed at a separate criminal act, and thus I do not believe the number
of charges and speci?cations misrepresents or exaggerates PFC Manning?s criminality.

As to whether the number of charges and speci?cations unfairly increases his punitive exposure,
the Anderson court?s reasoning is instructive: ?[Anderson?s] punitive exposure was not
increased, because a conviction on any one of the Articles 80, UCMJ, offenses had a maximum
punishment of life con?nement; and the Government could easily have broken up the
speci?cations as dra?ed into multiple different speci?cations based on speci?c contacts, e-mails,
Internet postings, etc.? Id Given the maximum penalty under Additional Charge I and its
Speci?cation, PFC Manning?s punitive exposure is similarly not unfairly increased here.

Finally, there was no evidence of prosecutorial abuse or overreach in the drafting of the charges.
As a result, I do not believe the charges and speci?cations constitute an unreasonable
multiplication of charges.

As to the Speci?cations of Additional Charge the evidence showed that it was common for
soldiers to lay music and games and to watch movies on computers in the SCIF at FOB
Hammer.? There was also evidence that it was not uncommon to add software to those
computers, such as Chat.?2?3 However, the evidence also showed that there was a
mission-related reason for the addition of MIRC Chat, as used it to chat with the
aviation community concerning their work,2?4 and even for listenin to music, as it helped reduce
stress and helped the perform their duties more e?ectively. 05 In contrast, there was no
evidence showing there was a mission-related reason to add the software wget to these
computers, nor was there evidence showing there was a mission-related reason for PFC
Manning?s other conduct alleged in these Speci?cations. Moreover, whether or not other
software such as MIRC Chat was added to the computers, or whether or not games, music, or
movies was played on the computers, the basis for these charges is not that PFC Manning added
such other software or played games, music, or movies on these computers. Quite the contrary

Testimony of CPT Fulton (saw soldiers listen to music in the SCIF, it was common for them to transfer music
from the SIPRNET to another network, no one ever told her that music on the SIPRNET was a violation of

-information assurance security procedures, and soldiers would watch movies and play games on their workstations);

Testimony of SGT Padgett (they were told music was authorized in the SCIF and there was music and also games
on the shared drive on the SIPRNET terminals; movies were allowed, but only on the unclassi?ed computers)

Testimony of SGT Madaras (MIRC chat was added to the computers once they got to Iraq); Testimony of Mr.
Milliman (sometimes he would see so?ware programs installed on the computers without his knowledge, but that
was not common).

Testimony of CPT Cherepko; Testimony of SA Shaver; Testimony of Milliman (MIRC Chat was authorized
to be installed soldiers were not supposed to install it themselves but they could have done it if they wanted to).
Testimony of CPT Keay (music tolerated so Soldiers could be more productive).

44



20152

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

the basis for these charges is that PFC Manning attempted to bypass computer security
mechanisms, added unauthorized software, misused an information system, and wrongfully
stored classi?ed material as part of his efforts to provide information to WikiLeaks. Thus, the

evidence of other potential regulatory violations in the SCIF at FOB Hammer much of which

appears to have been authorized, condoned, or at least had a mission-related purpose does not
rise to the level of a potential defense against these Speci?cations.

Rather, this evidence may serve as extenuating or mitigating evidence; in that case, however, the
severity of the offense conduct is such that it would not indicate that disposition of the
Speci?cations by anything other than referral to a general court-martial is appropriate. This is
because this evidence does not indicate that, should PFC Marming be convicted of these
Speci?cations, a sentence at or below the jurisdictional limits of a lesser level of court-martial
would be appropriate, nor does it indicate that another disposition of these Speci?cations would
be appropriate.

Death Penalty Unwarranted

With respect to Additional Charge I, the defense noted that the government has stated that they
will not seek the death penalty in this case. Should there be any question on this issue, I
recommend against seeking the death penalty in this case as that penalty appears unwarranted
given the facts and circumstances of the charged offenses.

The Command?s Failures Made It Possible for PFC Manning?s Conduct to Occur

There were numerous failures on the part of the command that could have prevented PFC
Manning ?om committing the charged offenses involving classi?ed information and information
available on SIPRN ET. Most egregiously, the command took no action whatsoever to review
whether PFC Manning?s access to classi?ed information should be suspended or revoked after
he made statements, before the deployment even occurred, to the effect that the American flag
was meaningless to him and he had no loyalty to this country.? But there were other examples
such as physical outbursts where PFC Manning's behavior was such that it should have
prompted review of his access to classi?ed information.2?7 There was evidence that had the
command been aware of these issues, PFC Manning would have been removed from the
While PFC Manning received regular behavioral health services, it does not appear any mental
health provider made a de?nitive recommendation that his access to classi?ed information be
rescinded until 28 May 10.209 Admittedly, the evidence surrounding the global address list
showed that PFC Manning continued to obtain information in order to provide it to WikiLeaks
even after losing his access to classi?ed information, which indicates that removing PFC
Manning?s access to classi?ed information earlier would not have entirely prevented his offense
conduct. Nevertheless, the evidence also showed that, had the command taken steps earlier to
review PFC Manning?s suitability for continued access to classi?ed information, the command

Testimony of SPC Showman in defense-requested closed session.

2" See, fa example, IO Ex. 2l(D), at Ex. C, at Bates 00013362-67 (MFRs dated 21 Dec 09, 26 Apr 09 [appears
mis-dated], and 8 May 10 by then-MSG Adkins describing PFC Manning?s enatic behavior).

Testimony of CPT Lim.

"910 Ex. 2l(D), at Ex. (PFC Manning?s mental health records), at Bates 0001414748.

45

20153

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

could have limited PFC Manning?s opportunity to obtain classi?ed information and information
available on SIPRNET.

The command?s failures in this regard, however, do not negate PFC Manning?s intent or
knowledge in engaging in the charged conduct. Whether or not the command?s failures could be
considered extenuating or mitigating for purposes of determining an appropriate sentence should
this case be referred to trial and should PFC Manning be convicted of any offenses, the severity
of the charged conduct is such that this information does not bear on whether PFC Manning
should face trial by general court-martial, trial by a lesser level of court-martial, or whether other
disposition of the charges is appropriate. Simply put, this information does not indicate that the
disposition of these charges should be less than by referral to general court-martial. This is
because this evidence does not indicate that, if PFC Manning were convicted of the offenses, a
sentence at or below the jurisdictional limits of a lesser level of court-martial would be
appropriate should he be convicted, nor does it indicate that other disposition of the charges is

appropriate.
PFC Manning?s Behavioral Health Issues/Gender ?Identity Disorder Should Be Considered

The record is replete with information concerning PFC Manning?s behavioral health treatment,
including for his gender identity disordenm The evidence also showed that PFC Manning told
then-MSG Adkins about his gender identity issues by email,2" that PFC Manning had repeatedly
searched for information on the Internet concerning gender identity disorder and had information
concerning separation from the military for such disorder and concerning transgender persons in
the mili that he used an online identity named breanna.e.manning to communicate on the
Inteznlnetzl and that he cross-dressed as a female when he was on leave in late Jan-early Feb

10.

There was, however, no evidence that PFC Manning?s behavioral health issues, including his
gender identity disorder, prevented him from forming the requisite knowledge and intent for any
of the charged offenses. Moreover, behavioral health evaluations prepared on 22 and 28 May 10
stated that PFC Manning ?had the mental capacity to understand and participate in the
proceedings? and ?was mentally

As to whether evidence of PFC Manning?s behavioral health issues, although not rising to the
level of a defense, could be considered extenuating and mitigating evidence, the severity of the
charged offenses is such that this evidence would not indicate that disposition of these charges
other than by referral to general court-martial is appropriate. This is because this evidence does
not indicate that, if PFC Manning were convicted of the offenses, a sentence at or below the
jurisdictional limits of a lesser level of court-martial would be appropriate, nor does it indicate
that other disposition of the charges is appropriate.

"?Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. at 40-41Bates 00014133-39,

46

20154

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

PFC Manning Faced a Hostile Work Environment

The evidence indicated that PFC Manning perceived that the SCIF at FOB Hammer had a hostile
work environment against gays.?

As to whether this evidence could be considered extenuating and mitigating evidence, the
severity of the charged offenses is such that this evidence would not indicate that disposition of
these charges other than by referral to general court-martial is appropriate. This is because this
evidence does not indicate that, if PFC Manning were convicted of the offenses, a sentence at or
below the jurisdictional limits of a lesser level of court-martial would be appropriate, nor does it
indicate that other disposition of the charges is appropriate.

Comparatively Little Harm Was Caused by the Leaks

The defense argued that the charged information is ?out and open? in the public and ?the sky has
not fallen? as a result, and thus questioned whether the determinations in the classi?cation
review documents as to the harm likely to be caused by the release of the charged information

are valid.

The evidence showed, however, that the information PFC Manning provided to WikiLeaks has
been found in the possession of the enemy?? The evidence thus does not support a conclusion
that little harm was caused by the leaks.

PFC Manning Had an Idealistic Motive for His Actions

The defense argued that PFC Manning was young, idealistic, and had a strong moral compass,
indicating that he had an idealistic motive for his offenses.

The evidence showed that PFC Manning may have believed that his conduct was motivated, at
least in part, by idealism. For example, in his chats with Mr. Lamo, a?er explaining how
wwknesses in protecting the information at issue helped make his actions possible (?it was a
massive data facilitated by numerous both physically, technically, and
perfect example of how not to do INF OSEC listened and lip-synced to Lady
Gaga?s Telephone while ex?ltrating possibly the largest data spillage in american history .. .
pretty simple, and unglamorous weak servers, weak logging, weak physical security, weak
counter?intelligence, inattentive signal a perfect storm?), PFC Manning gave a
window into his motivation: ?its sad i mean, what if i were someone more malicious i

""10 Ex. Ex. J.

2? As outlined above, the evidence showed that enemies of the United States possessed the information provided to
WikiLeaks by PFC Manning. For example, the video named ?12 Jul 07 C2 ENGAGEMENT ZONE 20 GC
Anyone.avi? is contained in the recruiting video. produced by Al-Qaida?s media arm (Bates 00408202-236) and is
described as ?footage published by the WikiLeaks website,? which clearly indicates that the enemy obtained this
video from WikiLeaks That video also speci?cally references the leak of a State Department cable, which indicates
they obtained the cable from Wikil_.eaks, and also references WikiLeaks documents describing communications by
leaders in Islamic countries with the United States, which also indicates they are referring to State Department
cables they obtained from WikiLeaks.

47

20155

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

could have sold to russia or china, and made bank?? and in response to Mr. Lamo?s question as
to why he didn?t sell this information, PFC Manning stated, ?because it?s public data it
belongs in the public domain information should be free because another state would just
take advantage of the try and get some edge . .. if its out in the it should be
a public good.?m

However, assuming that PFC Manning had an idealistic motive for his actions, such motive
would not negate the requisite knowledge and intent for the charged oifenses. Moreover, even if
the nature of his motive could be considered extenuating and mitigating evidence should this
case be referred to trial and should he be convicted of any offenses, I do not believe this evidence
would indicate that any disposition at this stage of the proceedings less than referral to trial by
general court-martial would be appropriate.

Defense Objections During the Hearing

1. At the outset of the hearing, the defense objected to my acting as the Investigating Officer in
this case and asked that I recuse myself.? I consulted with my legal advisor who advised me as
to the standard of R.C.M. 902(a) that recusal is required if my impartiality may rwsonably be
questioned. My legal advisor also said that the test is ?any conduct that would lead a reasonable

man knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that [my] impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.? I do not believe a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would be led

to the conclusion that my impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and thus denied the
defense?s recusal request, making the following essential ?ndings of fact:

a. As a civilian, I am employed by the Department of Justice as a Deputy Chief in the
Criminal Division?s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, My section does not handle cases
involving conduct of which PFC Manning is accused.

b. I was not aware of the speci?cs of investigation into the WikiLeaks matter
before reviewing materials in my role of as investigating oi?cer.

c. I sent emails to counsel concerning this matter from my usdoj.gov email account.

d. I stated the reasons for my denial of the defense request to produce the DOJ ?le in this
case in my written determinations as to defense requested evidence.

e. While I am employed as a civilian by the Department of Justice that is investigating
this matter, no aspect of my work in the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section is
involved with or otherwise relates to the allegations against PFC Manning.

f. I made written determinations as to defense-requested witnesses in writing based on
my determinations as to whether the expected testimony was necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to the truth of the charges, the form of the charges, and the disposition of the

2" Lamo Chat, 10 Ex. 19(0), at 33.
1" 10 Ex.



20156

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, U.S. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

charges, and also determined whether witnesses were reasonably available. I also considered
whether the expected testimony was cumulative to the testimony of other witnesses.

g. In addition, alter my legal advisor called me on 15 December 2011 to discuss R.C.M.
405(f)(l l) and 405(a)(l to ensure that I was properly considering them, I reconsidered my
earlier determination as to three defense requested witnesses. My legal advisor made no
recommendations as to my determinations on defense requested witnesses.

h. My determination as to the defense?s closure request was made after consulting my
legal advisor and providing his advice to the parties. That determination was consistent with the
legal advice I received. I provided the reasons for that determination in writing, applying R.C.M.
806(b)(2). (Subsequently, I granted the def ense?s closure request in partm) .

i. My determination as to my ability to consider statements under penalty of perjury
under 28 U.S.C. 1746 was made after consulting with my legal advisor and after providing his
advice and cases and legislative history he provided me to the parties, and my determination was
consistent with my legal advisor?s advice. I provided that determination in writing to counsel via
a 141418 December email. I did limited research into the matter before seeking my legal
advisor?s advice.

j. I conclude that a reasonable person knowing all the above facts would not conclude
that my impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

2. During the testimony of SA Graham, the defense objected to my admonishing the government
that, with respect to evidence that the defense objected to based on lack of authentication, I
would only consider authenticated evidence and I then asked the government if there were any
documents they wanted me to consider that they would need SA Graham to authenticate before
letting her off the phone. The defense objected that by making these comments I went beyond
my role as 10 and was telling the government how to perfect their case. In making these
comments, I simply was trying to make the proceeding more efficient by ensuring I wouldn?t
have to call this witness again. She is in Hawaii and we had a hard time getting her on the
phone.

3. During the testimony of SA Mander, the defense objected to my denial of their request that
the investigative ?les of the FBI and the State Department be produced. I referred the defense to
my written determinations as to defense-requested evidence and noted that the defense can raise
this issue at the appropriate time should this case be referred to trial.

4. During the testimony of CPT Lim, the defense objected to the witness stating that the
accused?s conduct was service-discrediting and prejudicial to good order and discipline.

5. Before the taking of classi?ed testimony, the defense objected to the govemment?s providing
late notice of their intent to introduce classi?ed evidence and testimony and objected to the
ta.king of classi?ed testimony and my consideration of classi?ed evidence based on this late

22? See 10 Ex. 49.
~49

20157

Continuation Sheet, DD Form 457, US. v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

notice. The defense requested that I append reasons for denying their request to the report of
investigation. The main reason I denied the defense?s request is that the convening authority's
special instructions requiring 14 days? notice of the intent to disclose classi?ed information
applies only to the defense, not to the government I also noted that there was no evidence the
government was trying to engage in trial by ambush, and that the defense had been in possession
of the underlying information since 8 November 2011.

6. During SPC Baker?s testimony, the defense objected to my allowing the government to ask
the witness about the accused?s statements about his feelings about the military. I overruled the
objection.

7. During. Mr. Johnson?s testimony, the defense objected to the government putting up a
screenshot of a chat allegedly between the accused and Mr. Lamo showing the accused?s name
rather than the online identity ?bradass87.? I sustained that objection.

8. During Mr. Lamo?s testimony, the defense objected to consideration of the alleged chats
between the accused and Mr. Lamo on the grounds that they are privileged under M.R.E. 503.
The parties submitted written briefs on this issuem I overruled the defense objection and my
written determination of this issue is attachedm

9. On the morning of 21 December, the defense objected to continuing the hearing until
Thursday morning, 22 December, for arguments because the defense was ready to argue at 1500
on 21 December. I denied the ?objection because at a conference on 20 December, the parties
agreed to. break early on 21 December and to present argument Thursday morning, 22 December,
and the government relied on that agreement in planning its preparation.

10. Additionally, the defense made various objections throughout the testimony to the
government?s questions. Those objections are contained in the transcript of the hearing.

1? 10 Exs20158

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC,U.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army C^arrtson,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure2
8March2012

20159

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY MltJTARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319-5013
REPLYTO
ATTENTION OF

ANJA-CL

4^

2 December 201

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC Paul Almanza, 150th Judge Advocate General Detachment*
Support Organization, MG Albert C. Lieber USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria,
VA 22310

SUBJECT: Requested Witness List for Article 32 Investigation - United States v. PFC Bradlev
Manning
1. The United States requests the following witnesses be called during the Article 32 proceeding
in the above-referenced case:
a. SFC Paul D. Adkins, HHC, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY, (b) (6)
b. SPC Eric S. Baker, 62d MP Detachment, Fort Drum, NY, (b) (6)
c. WOl Kyle J. Balonek, HHB, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY, (b) (6)
d. Special Agent Troy Bettencourt, Department of Treasury, Washington, DC,(b) (6)
(b)
(6)

e. SSG Peter J. Bigelow, AFSOUTH BN Naples, Naples, Italy, (b) (6)
f. CPT Thomas M. Cherepko, NATO Force Command Madrid, Madrid, Spain, (b) (6)
(b)
(6)

g. Special Agent .\ntonio Edwards, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC,
Quantico, VA, (b) (6)
h. CPX Casey M. Fulton, 2d BDE, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY,(b) (6)
i.

Special Agent Toni Graham, 102nd MP Det (CID), Schofield Barracks, HI, (b) (6) -

j.

Mr. Mark Johnson, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC, Quantico, VA,

(b)
(6)
(b) (6)

k. Mr. Adrian Lamo, Carmichael, CA, (b) (6)
1. CPT Steven J. Lim, HQ, 1 st Army Division-East, Fort Meade, MD, (b) (6)

-

20160

ANJACL
SUBJECT: Requested Witness List for Article 32 Investigation United Statesv.PFC Bradlev
Manning
m SGTChadM.Madaras,BCo,2dBDESTB,10thMountainDivision,FortDrum,NY,
(b) (6)

n SFC(R)Brian^.Madrid,Buckeyc,A^,(b) (6)
o. Special Agent Mark Mander, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC
Quantico,VA,(b) (6)
p. Mr.Ja^nA^ Milliman, Palmyra,VA, (b) (6)
q. Special Agent Calder Robertson, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, ^e^^m^y,DSN
(b) (6)

r. Special Agent David Shaver, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC, Quantico,
VA,(b) (6)
s.

Ms^JihrleahW^Showman,Syracuse,NY(b) (6)

L Special AgentAlfred Williamson, Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, USACIDC,
Quantico,VA,(b) (6)
2. If neccssary,the prosecution may request additional witnesses whose testimony is relevant,
and not cumulative, to the investigation.

ASHDEN
CPT,JA
Trial Counsel

^



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 3
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 8 March 2012
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

20162

UNITED STATES
DEFENSE REQUEST FOR
ARTICLE 32 WITNESSES

us. Amy.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. U.S.
Amiy Garrison. Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer. VA 2221



I

I



MANNING. Bradley E., PFC I

I

I

I DATED: 2 December 201
I

On behalfof PFC Bradley E. Manning. his civilian counsel, David E. Coombs requests
the attendance of each of the below listed witnesses for the following reasons:

a) In order to inquire into the truth of the matter alleged in the charges, consider the
fonn of the charges. and assist the Investigating Officer in making recommendations as to
disposition of the charges. See Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 405(a);

b) In order to serve as a means of discovery for the defense. The defense has been
unable to speak with several of the listed witnessed due to their lack of cooperation with
requests to be interviewed prior to the Article 32 hearing. See R.C.M. 405(a) Discussion
(stating the "investigation also serves as a means of discovery? for the defense);

c) ln order to present matters in mitigation ofthe charged offenses. R.C.M. 405(f)
(stating an accused has the right to present evidence in defense. mitigation, and
extenuation); Article 32(b). Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused
may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf. either in defense or mitigation.
and the investigation officer shall examine available witnesses requested. . United
States Garcia. 59 M.J. 447. 451 (C.A.A.F. that an accused has the right to
present anything he may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in defense or
mitigation);

d) In order to inquire into the issues of unlawful command in?uence and unlawful
pretrial punishment in violation of Articles I3 and 37 of the UCMJ. See R.C.M. 405(e)
Discussion (stating that inquiry in to other issues such as legality of searches or the
admissibility of evidence is proper by an Article 32 Investigating Officer).

1) SA Toni M. Graham, 102"? MP Detachment, l3l4 Lyman Road, Scho?eld Barracks,
Hawaii. 96857. SA Graham is one ofthe
law enforcement agents that conducted work on this case. SA Graham was the
primary agent involved in the initial investigation of the case beginning on 25 May
2010. SA Graham will testify about the investigative steps taken from the time of the



20163

Lfnited States v. .\/Ianning; Article 32 Witness List

3)

4)

5)

6)

initial involvement until the matter was transferred to the Computer Crime
Investigation Unit (CCII I) on 23 June 2010.

SA Mark A. Mander. GSI3. I Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island. Illinois 61299-
5000. SA Mander is one ofthe law
enforcement agents that conducted work on this case for the CCIU. He is the drafter
ofmost ofthe CID Reports oflnvestigation. He is part ofajoint investigation by CID
and the Department of State (DOS) Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). Under the
cooperative investigation agreement. CID is the lead investigative agency with
primary responsibility for coordinating all leads affecting the US Amiy, and DSS has
responsibility for leads involving the DOS. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) later_ioined as ajoint partner in the investigation with responsibility for
providing counterespionage expertise. investigative support. and as the lead agency
for all civilian related leads.

SA Calder L. Robertson GSI3. Computer Crime Investigation Unit (CCIU).
Manheim. Germany 1. He
extracted the hard drives from the two SIPR and one NIPR computers collected from
the SC IF. the personal laptop of SSG Bigelow, and the personal external hard drive of
PFC Manning. SA Robertson will testify about his involvement in the investigation
and the steps he took from the initial reporting of the alleged incident on 25 May 2010
until present regarding the forensic imaging and evidence collection of electronic
media seized in Iraq.

SA David S. Shaver. GS13. Computer Crimes Investigative Unit. 27130 Telegraph
Road. Quantiw Virginia - SA
Shaver is a forensic examiner who conducted an examination ofthe computers used
by Manning within the T-SC IF. 44 loose hard drives seized from 2" BC T,
digital media collected from PFC Manning?s Aunt's residence, various log ?les from
CIDNE Iraq and CIDNE Afghanistan. log files from the Army Counterintelligence
Center (ACIC and his personal computer equipment. SAC Shaver completed I9
classi?ed CCIU reports and will testify about the nature of his forensic examination
and the results ofhis examination.

SA Charles T. Ames Jr.. GSI3. 9805 I.owen Road, Fort Belvoir. Virginia 22060,

.. SA Ames is one of
the law enforcement agents that conducted work on this case. He interviewed
numerous witnesses during the CCIU investigation from 2d He also detailed
the collection of classified information for the Information Review Task Force?s
damage assessment.

SA Alfred L. Williamson. Digital Forensics and Research Branch. Computer Crimes
Investigative Unit. 27130 Telegraph Road. Quantico. Virginia 22134.

A forensic examiner who examined the U.S.
Supply Annex computer (Unclassified). utilized by PFC

1



20164

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

7)

8)

9)

Bradley Marming. He will testify about the nature of his forensic examination and the
results ofhjs examination. He will also testify about his forensic analysis and
evidence collection from PFC Manning?s cellular telephone. the computer assigned IP
address l44.l07. I 7.19 and the forensic imaging of the Wikileaks website.

SA 'l'ro_v M. Bettencourt. Computer Crimes lnvestigative Unit, 27130 Telegraph
Road. Quamico. Virginia 22|3
SA Bettencourt is one of the agents that worked extensively on this case for to
include interviewing multiple witnesses in the case and conducting ?eld investigation
for the CC IU . SA Bettencourt will testify about his involvement in the case and the
investigative steps that he took.

SA Ronald K. Rock. ljnited States Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service
Of?ce of Professional Responsibility.
- SA Rock is one of the law enforcement agents that conducted
work on this case. The defense requests that SA Rock be instructed to provide the
Investigating Officer and the defense with a complete copy of DSS case file number
PR-2010-00076 and any other collateral investigations by the DSS related to this case
at least two weeks prior to the start of the Article 32 hearing.

SA Patrick Wheeler. Federal Bureau of Investigation. the defense does not have
contact infomiation for SA Wheeler, but believes that he would be the best
representative from the FBI to discuss the initial involvement of the FBI and their
subsequent investigation. SA Wheeler is one of the law enforcement agents that
conducted work on this case. He was the first agent to make contact with Adrian
Lamo on 25 May 2010 in order to obtain the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and
PFC Manning. The defense requests that SA Wheeler be instructed to provide the
Investigating Officer and the defense with a complete copy of FBI case file number
242460 and any other collateral investigations by the FBI related to this case at least
two weeks prior to the start of the Article 32 hearing.

I0) Martin Leibman, Kenner Army Health Clinic. 700 24"? Street. Fort Lee, Virginia

23801. . that perfonned a
command-referred behavioral health evaluation BHE on PFC Marming 24 December
200?). CPT Leibman will testify that he determined PFC Manning appeared to be
under a considerable amount of stress at the time of his evaluation. He will also
testify that PFC Manning did not appear to have any social support system and
seemed hypersensitive to any criticism. He recommended that PFC Manning be
moved from the night shift to the day shift and that he be given a low intensity duty
for the immediate future. He also determined that PFC Marming was potentially
dangerous to himself and others and recommended removal of his weapon or removal
of the bolt from his weapon along with increased monitoring and supervision. lie
will testify that he used a behavioral health evaluation fonn that was not approved.
MEDC OM Form 4038. On that fonn. however, there was a block that permitted the
behavioral health provider to indicate that the Soldier being evaluated was not



20165

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

suitable for continued access to classified material. Despite having this option. PT
Leiehman did not check this box. He will testify that he does not remember why he
did not check that box. Had he done so. PFC security clearance would
have been revoked and he would not have had access to classified materials after that

date.

l) PT Michael E. Worsley. l908"? MC Detachment. 500 SW 42"d Street. Topeka.
Kansas 66609-l24l He will testify
that he treated PFC Manning on numerous between 30 December 2009 and 26 May
2010. As part ofhis treatment. CPT Worsley considered letters written by PFC
noncommissioned officer in charge, then MSG Adkins. He will testify
that now SFC Adkins expressed concern about PFC Manning?s mental and emotional
stability in the three letters noting that PFC Manning appeared to be suffering greatly
and also having difficulty sharing his problem. PT Worsley will testify that he
contacted SFC Adkins after each evaluation was completed in order to give him a
summary of the infonnation from his review and to allow SFC Adkins to share his
thoughts and concerns. Despite the behavior of PFC Manning, CPT Worsely will
admit that he never made a recommendation to the command concerning whether to
suspend PFC Manning's security clearance. He did, however, speak with MAJ
Clifford lausen and Eric Usbeck about his reviews and PFC Manning?s need
for ongoing long term to explore and understand his issues.

12) CPT Edan A. Critchfield. Department of Behavioral Medicine, 1050 Mt. Belvedere
Blvd. Fort Drum, New York 13602.
He is a that performed a behavioral health evaluation on PFC Manning on
22 May and 28 May 2010. He will testify that SFC Adkins had expressed concern to
him about PFC Manning around 10 April 2010. and had given him a memorandum
where he documented his concerns. Since PFC Manning's primary clinician. PT
Worsley, was on leave at the time. he completed the command directed mental health
evaluation. Based on his interview of PFC Manning and review of his records, CPT
Critchfield will testify that he determined PFC Manning was at risk to himself and
others and recommended that he not have an operable weapon. le will testify that he
considered making a recommendation as to PFC Manning?s access to classified
information in his 22 May 20l0 evaluation but did not do so because he had been
infomted that PFC Manning was no longer allowed in the T-SCIF. Instead, he deleted
the block referencing access to classified information on the MEDCOM Form 4038 in
order to have more space to write notes on the form. PT ritch?eld will testify that
he did receive training on the subject of Soldier suitability for access to classified
information. The training that he received was informal ?on-the-job? training during
his residency. He will testify that the factors suggested to look for in making
suitability determinations were (1) reliability, (2) stability, and (3) judgment. On his
28 May 20lO mental health evaluation. CPT Critchfield will testify that he made a
recommendation that PFC Manning was not ?suitable for continued access to classified
material and that his security clearance should be rescinded.





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United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness l.ist

13) CO1. David M. Miller. Brigade Modemization Command, Fort Bliss. Texas 799l6.
Former 2nd BCT Commander, He will
testify that the brigade did not want to take the wrong personnel forward, nor did the
brigade want to leave a large rear behind for a small staff to manage and lead. He
expected the leaders in the Brigade to identify those soldiers who should not deploy.
He will testify that his S-2. the officer in charge of PFC Manning, MAJ Clifford
lausen. was not up to the standard of performance that he expected out of someone
in that position. Based upon his discussions with then LTC Paul Walter and LTC
Brian Kems, COL Miller decided it was best to remove MAJ Clausen from his
position as the S2 and place CPT l.im into thatjob. He will testify that from his
perspective. the issues surrounding PFC Manning should have been something that
the S2 personnel would have been more involved in than the company. However,
there were several issues that may have impacted the response to PFC Manning?s
issues. First. during that time period the former company commander, MAJ Elijah
Drcher was relieved over property accountability and due to the fact he was not
making good decisions. Second. MSG Adkins, the NCOIC in the S2 Section, was
"marginal, but not bad enough to either relieve or replace. He will testify that then
MSG Adkins was technically competent but that he lacked leader skills expected ofa
MSG. He will also testify that commanders (in conjunction with their unit security
manager) are allotted 30 days to submit an initial DA 5248-R following the discovery
of credible derogatory information on a Soldier. After the initial DEROG is
submitted and processed by the unit has 90 days to submit a follow-up
5248-R if there is a pending investigation or adverse action taken summary
court-martial). Once the investigatiorvproceedings are completed and the Soldier has
been cleared/charged of offense, the unit must submit a final DEROG. In this case.
he will testify that then MSG Adkins failed to keep the chain of command informed
A of PFC Manning emotional and mental condition. He will testify that this failure

resulted in the command not submitting a DEROG in a timely manner.

14) LTC Brian Kems. Old Dominion University, Brigade Cadet Command, Rollins
Hall. Room 119. Norfolk, Virginia 23529,

(Former Executive Officer for 2nd BCT), l-le will testify
that he was MAJ Clausen?s direct supervisor. He believed that MAJ Clausen could
not provide CO1. Miller with accurate or timely estimates or intelligence, and could
not talk to CO1. Miller in a way that served the ommander's needs. The brigade
commander ?nally lost confidence in MAJ Clausen and made the decision a?er
approximately 6 months to move him. He will testify that the unit did not conduct a
fomial relief for cause. but moved him to a transition team. According to Kems.
MAJ lausen?s performance was weak, but not so weak as to warrant a relief for
cause. LTC Kems did not believe MAJ Clausen was not a strong leader. He tried to
decentralize operations but didn?t have enough oversight to control. He empowered
junior members who were too inexperience to do the job and did not step in to correct
when they made mistakes. He will testify that MAJ lausen was unable to mentor or
develop younger officers and didn?t have much direct control over the shop. He will
also testify that MAJ Clausen was handicapped by weak NCO leadership in his shop.

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United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

Speci?cally. his NCOIC. then MSG Adkins was not an effective leader. In his
opinion. both MAJ Clauscn and MSG Adkins were weak leaders. He will testify that
he was unaware of any leadership guidance provided in the S2 sections regarding
enlisted personnel management. He will testify that it did not surprise him that MAJ
lausen put out information that Warrant Officers and Noncommissioned Officers
were to defer all management responsibilities to MSG Adkins. He will testify that
perhaps the command was too generous with MAJ Clausen and that removing him
from his position earlier would have been advantageous. He will testify that he
believes PFC Manning?s mental and emotional issues were more than enough to put
others at risk and should have resulted in an immediate DEROG. He will testify that
he did not know anything about PFC Manning?s conduct until a recommendation for
separation was made by the chain of command. He will testify that none of the
mental or emotional health concems, prior to May of20lO, made it to his level. LT
Kems will testify that the failure to properly DEROG PFC .Vlanning?s was the unit?s
biggest failure. He believes that the unit should have pulled PFC Manning's access to
classified information much earlier. He will testify that the unit should have
recognized him as needing help and that his condition made him unfit for service as
an intelligence analyst. He will also testify that the assistant S6 for the brigade. CPT
Cherepko came to him with concerns about unauthorized personal media on
machines. According to PT herepko, personnel were putting unauthorized media
on computers such as programs. games. videos. and music. LTC Kems will testify
that it was fairly common when the unit arrived to see games, music and movies on
the He believed that it was fairly common across lraq. He will testify that
he tried to get the staff to do the right thing, but media on the continued to
be the standard. He will testify that at no point was UCMJ punishment applied to
those who were placing unauthorized information on He will acknowledge
that with respect to the media on the he believed that the Army had become
too comfortable working on while deployed. it is his opinion that this may
have bred some complacency because of the ease of access. He believes that most
Soldiers did not realize that that placing music and other media on
computers was wrong because of how prevalent those items were across Iraq. He will
also testify that after Manning was arrested. COL Miller ordered him to take a
complete look at INFOSEC across the brigade. He formed a working group
consisting of the SGM, S2, S6 and lO personnel to look at how the brigade was
operating. Based upon this review, the S6 removed universal ability to write to disks;
there was additional compartmentalizing of information within the BCT based on a
need to know: the S6 instructed staff on how to lock out directories and the brigade
established an SOP on the implementation for reviewing infractions for potential
DEROG actions.

15) MAJ Elijah A. Dreher. (Former HHC.
ZBCT Commander). He will testify that he had very little interaction with the S2
shop. He will also testify about the guidance he gave regarding whether soldiers
would deploy. He will testify that he was not made aware of any effort to keep PFC
Manning from deploying. He will testify that his understanding was that PFC

(1



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United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

Manning?s issues came about after deploying. He was not aware that SFC Adkins
recommended to PFC Manning that he self-refer to Mental Health or that PFC
Manning even went to Mental Health prior to the deployment. He will also testify
that he was not adequately informed ofPF Manning?s mental health issues by MAJ
Clausen or Adkins. His TDS cozmsel is Suchomski at Fort Gordon

-

I6) MAJ Clifford D. lausen. National Radio Frequency COMECT Center.

He was the 2/10 BCT S-2 until being
replaced by CPT Lim. He will testify that SFC Adkins did tell him about an outburst
by PFC Manning before the deployment. but that he does not remember SFC Adkins
having a conversation with him about leaving PFC Manning on rear detachment. He
will also testify that he did not recall talking to the company commander about
Manning?s behavioral health issues. He will testify that it was his practice to not take
many issues outside ofthe S2 Shop, and that he believed the supervision policy of
having every issue go through SFC Adkins was fine. Finally, he will testify that
music CDs were allowed in the T-SCIF.

17) CPT Barclay Keay. HHC, 4-31 Infantry Battalion. 2nd Brigade Combat Team.
Mountain Division. Building 10210 North Riva Ridge. Fort Drum. New York 13682.
ight shift for the 'l?-SCll? for 2nd
BC T). He will testify that he believed PFC Manning was good at his job and he was
also impressed with PFC Manning?s computer skills. Despite this belief, he will
testify that PFC Manning should not have been a soldier as he seemed to act
immature. He will testify that you could not demand things from PFC Manning as he
had a soft skin and was not receptive to commands. He will testify that there was a
lack of leadership on the night shift which PFC Manning worked on. He will testify
that from his perspective PFC Manning wanted to be a good soldier. but naturally was
not good at the basic soldier skills. He will also testify that music, movies. and games
were common on machines. He will testify that he went to a lot of people to
try to determine if it was a problem to have media on because he did not
think it was proper. He will testify that he spoke with several individuals within the
about this issue. but no one could provide him with an answer. He will testify
that eventually it became the nomi to see soldiers listening to music. watching
movies, and playing games on machines.

I8) CPT Matthew W. Freeburg, 101 12. Armored Division Road. Fon Drum.
New York 13602. . Company
commander and property book holder for all the computers within HHC, 2BCT. He
will testify about providing commander?s authorization to seize and search the
computers PFC Manning was known to work on. He also provided search
authorization to search PFC Manning?s room. He will testify that he never received
any information from the S2 Section conccming any of PFC Manning?s mental or
emotional issues until after the alleged assault of SPC Showman. He will testify that
after the alleged assault. he removed PFC .\/Ianning from the T-SCIF and sent him to

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United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

work in the Supply Room. He then gave PFC Manning an Article 15 reducing him
from SPC to PFC. Along with the Article 15, CPT Freeburg will testify that he ?lled
out a DEROG form in order to suspend PFC Manning?s security clearance. CPT

reeburg will testify he then went to PT Worsley at Behavioral Health to discuss
PFC N/lanning?s condition. CPT Worsely told him that PFC Manning's troubles were
deeper than the Army could fix and that he should be separated. CPT Freeburg will
testify that he then sent PFC Manning to CPT Critch?eld for an evaluation. Based
upon the mental health recommendations, CPT Freeburg will testify that he initiated
the chapter paperwork. CPT reeburg will testify that he believed it was shocking that
something more serious had not been done to address PFC Marming?s behavioral
issues prior to him assaulting SPC Showman and receiving an Article IS. He will
also testify that he was aware that personnel had placed video games, movies, and
music on the drive.

19) CPT Steven J. Lim. First Amiy Division East, 4550 Llewelyn Drive. Fort
Meade, Maryland 20755, He will testify
that he knew about PFC Manning emotional and mental health issues before taking
over as the brigade S2. Additionally, he will testify that PFC Manning was
counseled on a few occasions due to his emotional and mental issues and that he was
informed that PFC Manning was seeing a doctor about his condition. Despite this
knowledge, PT Lim will testify that he was not aware of the full extent of PFC
Manning mental health issues. He will testify that once he leamed of the entire facts
surrounding PFC Manning, he believed that PFC Manning should not have been
deployed. He will also testify that he gave a negative counseling to SFC Adkins for
failing to inform him of the various issues PFC Manning was struggling with during
the deployment. PT Lim will testify thatsoldiers were authorized to bring music
CD5 to listen to in the T-SC IF. CPT Lim will also testify that the T-SCIF failed to
draft a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). PT Lim will testify that he passed the
link to the .S. Embassy cables to the various including PFC Manning. He
disseminated the link to the S2 shop and the BN S2's sometime in the beginning
of January 2010 in order to allow the to better understand the Iraqi political
situation. He will also testify that the comments in the press that say the release of the
CIDNE database compromised our key sources and put the lives of sources at risk are
inaccurate. Any name in the CIDNE database (Iraq and Afghanistan) werejust names
put in by a soldier who spoke to some local national and not sources for the United
States. CPT Lim believes that although a name may be in IDNE, it was likely
spelled phonetically and did not contain the full name of the individual. CPT Lim
knows that he had the ability to pull 50 different ways to spell Muhammad when he
would do a CIDNE database search. That fact there were so many different ways to
spell Muhammad is indicative of the fact the names in the database were not
accurate accounts.

20') PT Thomas M. herepko. NATO Force Command Madrid, Madrid, Spain 09649.
. lie was the assistant S-6 for the
2BCT. He will testify that the information assurance procedures were not being



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United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

followed by the brigade. He knew that Soldiers would go to the local market and buy
movies. music and games and place the infomiation on their SIPR and NIPR
computers. He tried to address the issue but could not get any support from the
leadership to enforce the standards. He raised the movie and music concern to the S6,
MAJ Morrow, and the Brigade X0, Kems. but that nothing was done. When the
mood struck him. he would scan the shared drive for music, movies and games and
will testify that he would find it every day. Every time that he found unauthorized
material on the he would delete it. Occasionally, he would find a Soldier
that would have a huge amount of unauthorized material on their computer ?in one
instance it was 500 Gigabytes of information, but nothing was done. He will testify
that as the IASO he did not know that he needed to prepare a Dol) Information
Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) packet for certi?cation
and accreditation of the brigade network. He will also testify that due to this failure,
it was later determined that the brigade did not have an Approval to Operate (ATO) or
an Interim Approval to Operate (IATO) for their network. Additionally, the brigade
did not receive a formal IA certi?cation and accreditation inspection during its tour,
contrary to the guidance in MN F-l Directives. Finally, he will testify that he knew
about personal software being loaded on the and he would remove the
software when he came across it. He is represented by PT Michelle Borgnino at
Fort Myer,

21 CPT Michael R. Johnson. Brigade, 25"? Airborne Infantry Division. Joint Base
ljlmendork-Richardson, Alaska 99505.

He will testify that SFC Adkins was in charge of
all enlisted responsibilities. He will testify that whenever he engaged the Soldiers on
issues as a leader that he was told to back off by SFC Adkins. PT Lim, and MAJ
lausen. He will testify that the S2. MAJ Clausen, did not set standards for the unit.
Based upon this lack of leadership, he will testify that a lot of conduct was ignored.
He will testify that he remembers venting to MAJ lausen and SFC Adkins about
how nothing was being done to address PFC Manning?s mental and emotional issues.
He will state that when he addressed these concerns to MAJ Clausen and SFC Adkins
that he was told that he needed to stay in his lane. After the change in leadership
within the S2 Section. he will testify that all ofthe officers sat down to discuss soldier
standards in an attempt to address substandard conduct. However, SFC Adkins
objected to any changes and would not allow anyone to address the issues
surrounding PFC Manning. As such. he will testify that nothing was done to address
PFC Manning?s mental and emotional issues.

22) 1LT Tanya Marie Gaab. HHC. 525"? Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1--
She will testify that SFC Adkins was in charge ofthe
administrative details and supervision of the soldiers within the S2 Section. She will
testify that she was made aware of many of the issues surrounding PFC Manning
when she arrived to the unit. In her opinion, PFC Marming should have been
removed from his position in the T-SCIF early on in the deployment. However, she
felt that the leadership within the S2 section was not really concerned with

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United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

disciplining Soldiers. She will testify that she asked SFC Adkins why PFC Manning
was not removed from his position in the T-SCIF earlier, and that he told her that it
was a manpower issue. She will testify that she believes that PFC Manning?s issues
were not taken seriously and no one took any steps to help him or even recognize that
he needed help. She believes the unit failed to take proper action and failed to
properly respond to the issues that PFC Manning was obviously struggling with both
before and during the deployment.

23) ILT Elizabeth A. Fields. as the
Special Security Representative (SSR) for the T-SCIF and part of the Sunni Team,
She will testify that she only received one hour oftraining at 10"? MTN to be the SSR
for the T-SCIF. Her training covered the basic rules and regulations for a at
Fort Drum. She will testify that her training did not really cover ensuring the security
ofa T-SCIF. However, she will testify that she was only the SSR at F011 Drum.
When her unit deployed to Iraq. she will testify that then MSG Adkins was the one
that worked the security of the T-SCIF and she dealt with security clearances. She
will testify that SF Adkins did not receive any training to be the SSR. However, he

- just assumed the position under the approval of the 3-2, MAJ Clausen. She will
testify that she believed SFC Adkins provided terrible supervisory leadership. She
thought he was a terrible leader because the problems within the unit were constantly
being ignored. She will testify that it was obvious to everyone that PFC Manning was
struggling with mental and emotional issues. However. she will testify that when she
tried to deal with the issue and get PFC Manning help. she was told that it was an
NCO problem and to stay out of it by SFC Adkins. She will also testify that she did
not believe that MAJ Clausen had any type of management over the section. She also
did not believe that the Company cared about the S2 section because they were
not co-located. She will testify that she was aware of multiple issues with PFC
Manning, but stated that PFC Manning stayed in the T-SCIF because SFC Adkins
said that we needed personnel. She will testify that she believed that there was a lack
of leadership across the board. She will testify that as leaders they should have
pushed harder from the NC Os to the Officers. She will testify that she was puzzled
why PFC Manning was not removed from the T-SCIF after previous behavior
incidents that occurred between him and SPC Padgett in December of 2009. She will
testify that it was simply accepted that people brought in Ds and DVDs into the T-
SCIF. She believed that there was no unit training at 2/10 that focused on T-SCIF
operations during the deployment.




24) Joshua D. Ehresmam. 1o?' Mm Hq. Fort Drum._NY 13602,
He is ted by

He




Curtis A. Devlin. Fort Lee TDS.
will testify that he was told by SFC Adkins and MAJ Clausen that he was not
responsible for any personnel who worked in the S2 section. He will testify that on
several occasions he returned to SFC Adkins and MAJ Clausen to clarify their
expectations about his responsibilities regarding enlisted Soldiers and Officers and his
non-role in soldier leadership was reinforced on each occasion. CW2 Ehresman was

l0



20172

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness l.ist

aware of multiple emotional outbursts by PFC Manning. He will testify that prior to
the deployment he recommended that PFC Manning should not deploy and expressed
this directly to MAJ Clausen. CPT Martin and SFC Adkins. He will testify that he
was told that PFC Manning would deploy due to manpower issues. He will testify
that he witnessed an incident in December of 2009 by PFC Manning that required him
to physically involve himself in the situation in order to ensure PFC Manning did not
try to harm himself or others. After this emotional outburst, he will testify that he
spoke to SF Adkins and recommended that he take the bolt from PFC Manning's
weapon, send him to mental health and then get him out of the Army. He also spoke
with CPT Lim, CPT Martin and ISG liric Lisbeek about his concerns after the
outburst by PFC lvlanning. He will testify that even after expressing these concerns,
nothing was done.

25) MSG Eric H. Usbeck. Fort Bliss. Texas,

(fonner ISG 2nd BCT). He will testify that prior to the deployment. he
received occasional comments from SFC Adkins regarding PFC Manning?s attitude
and personal problems. However, he was never aware of any suggestion not to
deploy PFC Manning. He will testify that he was made aware of one incident during
the deployment involving PFC Manning by another soldier. MSG Usbeck then
sought out SFC Adkins to clarify what this soldier had told him. After learning what
happened. MSG Usbeck along with SPC Showman decided to counsel PFC Manning
for about 45-60 minutes and referred him to Mental Health for evaluation. He will
testify that could not recall if the referral was command directed or if Manning
volunteered. He will testify that he later learned that PFC Manning had not gone to
mental health as required. However. due to his transition, he will testify that he
informed his replacement of the issue instead of attempting to address the issue
himself.

26) MSG Mark S. Woodworth. Task Force 3. OPS GRP, JRTC, l2l2 Port Arthur

Terrace. Leesvillc. Louisiana 7l446
became the ISG of the company in March of

2010. He will testify that he was briefed on Manning having an issue with another
soldier. He believed that PFC Manning had gone to Combat Stress and seen a
provider. The next thing he heard about PFC Manning was the assault of SPC
Showman. After the assault of SPC Showman. PFC Manning was moved to the
Supply room. He will testify that SFC Adkins did not talk to him about removing the
bolt from PFC Manning?s weapon. He also does not recall any discussions about
sending PFC Manning back to the States or chaptering him out of the Anny. He will
also testify about CID coming to the unit and searching PFC Manning's living
quarters and work space.

27) src? Paul David Adkins. HHC, BCT. Fort Drum. New York 13602,?
He is represented by TDS Cuurmel. SFC
Adkins will testify that he was PFC Manning?s NCOIC. Once a MSG, SFC Adkins
was administratively reduced by a board due to being derelict in his duties. The board

ll



20173

United States Manning; Article 12 Witness list

concluded that Adkins failed to take proper steps in addressing PFC Manning?s
issues. SFC Adkins will testify that he was aware ofthe problems Manning.
Over the course months. he will testify that he drafted three memorandums
detailing various behavioral health concerns of Manning. Despite this
knowledge. SFC Adkins will testify that he tailed to notify anyone of these concerns
that could have taken steps to take care of Manning and ensure that he was
getting the help that he needed. Instead. he will testify that he simply allowed PFC
Manning to continue to work in the as an intelligence analyst. SFC Adkins
will testify that he assessed that PFC Manning was salvageahle if he received and
aetixely participated in extensive therapy (I-2 times a week on an
indefinite basis) coupled with responsive evaluations. medication and
follow-up adjustments on dosages.

Pd







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United States v, Manning: Article 32 Witness List



30) sor Daniel w. Padgett. Company. BSTB. 10?? Mountain Division. Fort
Drum. New York t36o2. former
supervisor of PFC Manning. He will testify that Manning was a very good
analyst. who was good with computers but timid and not good at public speaking. He
will testify that he was assigned as the night shift NCOIC with then SPC Manning and
He was assigned this position even though he had not yet been to any
leadership schools. lle will testify that there really was not any one supervising the
night shift. He will also testify that when he needed to counsel PFC Manning he went
to SSG Balonek and asked him if he could counsel him. He will testify that he was
given permission to handle disciplinary actions for Manning by SFC Adkins and
SSG Balonek. He will testify that he believed that he was in essence taking care of
other NCOs soldiers and that Manning should have been counseled by SSG
Balonek. He will testify that during one counseling session in December of 2009.
PFC Manning grabbed the table and flipped it. He will testify that Manning did
not approach him- but he was concerned when PFC Manning stepped towards the
weapons rack. He will testify that when PFC Manning stepped towards the weapons
rack. CW2 Ehresman grabbed PFC Manning from behind and held him until he
calmed down. He will testify thatalthough PFC .\/lanning later apologized to him.
that he believes Manning should have been removed from the T-SCIF after the
incident. Finally. he will testify that personnel in the were told that they
could listen to music CDs and watch movies in the T-SCIF.

31 SGT David A. Sadtler. 709 Ml Battalion. US. Army Garrison. Wiesbaden,

. lle is a 35N signal intelligence
analyst. He will testify that he first met PFC Manning at a rotation at JRTC. He will
testify that he believes that PFC Manning used to be a very happy and very hyper
individual. but his leadership wore him down. He will state that-PFC Manning was
upset that no one cared about the mission. He also believed that the unit made it very
difficult on PFC .\1anning as it seemed to outcast him as though they were trying to
get him out ofthe Army. He will testify that a lot of people had support from other
people. but that he didn?t believe PFC .\/lanning had any support from his chain of
command. He will testify that he recalls an incident when PFC Manning found a
repoit that apparently upset him. PFC Manning had found in the report that some
Iraqis or possibly some Nioroceans were being arrested at a printing press facility.
SGT Sadtler will testify that attached to this report was some evidence which had
been collected; however. this information was in Arabic. He will testify that PFC
Manning had taken the time to have the document translated and tried to show the
translation to his superiors. He will testify that PFC Manning was very upset about

13

20175

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

the issue. He will testify that ifthere was a moment in which PFC Manning may have
snapped. this would have been it. SGT Sadtler will testify that everyone stonewallcd
PFC Manning on the issue as no one thought it was a big deal. He will testify that the
translation indicated that the individuals being arrested had printed documents that
were questioning whether the lraqi govemment was embezzling public funds.

32) sor Lorena Cooley. line Fort Drum. New York, 13602,
Cooley will testify that she believes that PFC
Manning was picked on by other because they assumed that he was gay. She will
testify that Adkins minimized a lot ofthings with PFC Manning and tried to
keep things within the shop. SGT Cooley will testify that PFC Manning should have
probably gotten help before they deployed. Finally, she will testify that Soldiers
brought in CD5 for music and movies and that this information was placed on the
computers.

33) SGT Sheri M- W?a1sh- -
SGT Walsh will testify that PFC Manning had
conversations with her about relationship issues and the fact he was having gender
identify issues. She will testify that PFC Manning spoke to her often about wanting
to get an Honorable Discharge so that he could keep his Top Secret Clearance after
his release from the Anny. She will testify that she noticed that very few people
would talk to PFC Manning. She will testify that every time that she saw PFC
Manning. he was by himself. She will testify that others would make fun of PFC
.\4anning?s size and the fact that they believed he was gay. One time SGT Walsh saw
PFC Manning coming out of his room; two soldiers pushed the door back into PFC
Manning's face. She will testify that Manning was obviously upset and
embarrassed about having the door pushed back into his face. She will testify that
instead ofcomplaining about the conduct, PFC Manning simply said that he walked
into the door by accident. SGT Walsh will testify that she believes PFC Manning was
at a very confusing time in his life. She does not believe that the Army was a good fit
for him based upon where he was at in his life.

34) SPC Jihrleah w. Showman. Fort Drum. New York

. SPC Showman will testify about being aware of
PFC Manning's emotional issues. She will testify that she went to SFC Adkins and
recommended that PFC Manning not deploy due to his emotional issues. She will
testify that she believes that she was the first in the IF to see the "Apache video"
which she found of her own accord in a network folder. She will testify that she
called CW2 SSG Balonek, and another soldier over to see the video. SPC
Showman will testify that over the next few days. several of the T-SCIF personnel
debated about whether the video showed a camera or a rocket propelled Grenade
(RPG) launcher and whether the actions of the Apache crew were appropriate under
the circumstances. SPC Showman will testify about her time as PFC Manning direct
supervisor and her multiple observations of PFC Manning both before and during the

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United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

deployment that indicated to her PFC Manning was struggling both emotionally and
mentally.




35) Adrian l.amo,
. Mr. Lamo will testify about the chat conversations that he had
with an individual alleged to have been PFC Manning between 21 May 2010 and 25
May 2010. He will also testify about the nature of the conversations and his
subsequent actions.

36) President Barack Obama, The White House, 1600 Avenue NW.
Washington. 20500.-. The defense requests the presence of
President Obama in order to discuss the issue of Unlawful Command Influence (UCI).
Under Rule for Courts-Martial the defense is entitled to explore the issue of
UCI. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). a superior officer in the
chain ofcommand is prohibited from saying or doing anything that could in?uence
any decision by a subordinate in how to handle a military justice matter. As the
Commander in Chief. President Obama made improper comments on 21 April 20l I,
when he decided to comment on PFC Manning and his case. On that date, he
responded to questions regarding PFC Manning?s alleged actions by concluding that
?We?re a nation of laws. We don't let individuals make their own decisions about
how the laws operate. He Manning] broke the law." The comments by
President Obama are UCI. The defense intends to question President Obama on the
nature of his discussions with members ofthe military regarding this case and
whether he has made any other statements that would either influence the prosecution
ofthis ease or PFC Manning?s right to obtain a fair trial. In additional to the UCI
issue, President Obama will testify about his views on the Afghanistan SIGACTS
released by WikiI.eaks. He will testify that the leak did not reveal any issues that had
not already informed our public debate on Afghanistan. He will also testify that the
Afghanistan point to the same challenges that led him to conduct an
extensive review of the Afghanistan policy. President Obama will also testify about
the problem of over-classification within the govemment. Specifically, that he
supported and signed into law the Reducing Over-Classification Act on 7 October
2010. Additionally. he will testify that on his first full day in office. 21 January 2009,
he issued two memoranda for the head of Executive Departments and Agencies that
were related to transparency in govemment. The first memorandum focused on the
administration of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). and the second focused on
transparency and open govemment. President Obama will testify that the
transparency memorandum he wrote committed the administration to ?an
unprecedented level of openness" and to the establishment of ?a system of
transparency. public participation. and collaboration." President Obama will testify
that on 8 December 2009 his administration released a third memorandum - an Open
Govemment Directive (OGD). The OGD included detailed instructions for
departments and agencies on how they are to ?implement the principles of
transparency. participation. and collaboration.? Finally, on 29 December 2009,
President Obama will testify that he issued Executive Order 13526 in an attempt to

IS

20177

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

improve the system for classifying. safeguarding, and declassifying national security
information. including the establishment ofthe National Declassi?cation Center.

37) Former Secretary Robert Gates, Chancellor. College of William and Mary. PO. Box
8795. Williamsburg. VA Former Secretary Gates will testify
that the Afghanistan and Iraq SIGACT releases did not reveal any sensitive

intelligence sources or methods. He will also testify that the Department of Defense
could not point to anyone in Afghanistan or Iraq harmed due to the documents
released by ikileaks. He will testify that the Afghanistan and Iraq SIGACTS are
simply ground-level ?eld reports that document dated activities which do not disclose
sensitive information or our sources and methods. Fonner Secretary Gates will also
testify that the initial public descriptions of the harm to foreign policy due to the
publication of diplomatic cables were ?fairly signi?cantly overwrought.? He will also
testify that although the disclosures were embarrassing and awkward. they did not
represent signi?cant consequences to foreign policy. Finally. Former Secretary Gates
will testify that on 29 July 2010, he directed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to
lead a comprehensive review of the documents allegedly given to WikiLeaks and to
coordinate under the Information Review Task Force (IRTF, formerly TF 725) to
conduct a complete damage review. He will testify that the damage review confirmed
that the alleged leaks represented a low to at best moderate risk to national security.
Speci?cally?. that all of the information allegedly leaked was either dated, represented
low-level opinions. or was already commonly understood and know due to previous
public disclosures.

38) Secretary Hillary R. Clinton, U.S. Department of State. 2201 Street NW,
Washington. DC. 20520. Secretary Clinton will testify that she has
raised the issue of the disclosure of diplomatic cables with foreign leaders "in order to
assure our colleagues that it will not in any way interfere with American diplomacy or
our commitment to continuing important work that is ongoing." Secretary Clinton
will also testify that she has not had any concerns expressed to her about whether any
nation would not continue to work with the United States or would not continue to
discuss important matters going forward due to the alleged leaks. As such, Secretary
Clinton will testify that although the leaks were embarrassing for the administration.
that she concurs with Former Secretary Gates? opinion that they did not represent
signi?cant consequences to foreign policy.

39) CPT James Kollty, 15? Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. Texas, Brigade S-2,
He will testify about his classi?cation review of

the three Apache gun videos that were sent to his Division by ORSCOM.
Speci?cally. he will testify that the videos were not classi?ed at the time of their
alleged release. However. he will testify that he believes that videos should have been
classi?ed. He will testify regarding his classi?cation determination.



20178

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

40) RADM Kevin M. Donegan. Director of Operations for United States Central
Command. 71 15 South Boundary Boulevard. MacDill Air Force Base. Florida
33621. RADM Donegan conducted
classi?cation reviews on two PowerPoint slide presentations of of?cial reports
originated by The PowerPoint presentations are the subject of
Speci?cation 10 of Charge ll. Donegan will testify regarding his
classi?cation determination and his belief of the impact on national security due to
the release ofthe information.

41) Robert E. Betz, Chief Classi?cation Advisory Of?cer, the
govemment has not provided the defense with contact information for Mr. Betz. Mr.
Betz will testify about his classi?cation determination concerning the alleged chat
logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Bradley Manning. Speci?cally. he will testify about
his classi?cation assessment of infonnation discussed in the alleged chat logs. Mr.
Betz believes the limited discussion caused ?serious damage? to national security.

42) LtGen Robert E. Schmidle. Jr.. Deputy Commander Cyber Command.
. LtGen Schmidle, as the Original Clas cation

Authority over the information discussed by Mr. I.tGen Schmidle will
testify that he concurs with the classi?cation detennination and impact statements
made by Mr. Betz. The defense would like to question him regarding his declaration
and the basis for his belief.

43) VADM Robert S. llarward. USCENTCOM. Deputy Commander, MacDill Air
Force Base. Florida 33621. VADM
llarward will testify concerning his classi?cation review and classi?cation
determination concerning the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, Iraq Events, other
brie?ngs and the B1322 PAX.wmv video. Speci?cally, VADM Harward will testify
concerning his classi?cation detennination and his beliefof the impact on national
security from having this information released to the public.

44) Patrick F. Kennedy. Under Secretary of State for Management, the defense does not
have contact infomiation for Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy will testify coneeming his
review of the disclosure of Department of State Diplomatic ables stored within the
Net-Centric Diplomacy server and part of SlPl)lS. Mr. Kennedy will testify
concerning his classi?cation determination and the impact ofthe release ofthe
information on national security.

45) RADM David B. Woods. Commander. Joint Task Force Guantanamo
GTMO). RADM Woods will testify
concerning his review of the disclosure of?x-?e documents, totaling twenty-two pages.
RADM Woods will testify concerning his classi?cation determination and the impact
of the release of the infonnation on national security.

20179

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

46) CAPT Kevin D. Moore, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center,
He will testify that during a meeting in early
January of 201 l, the Security Battalion Commander in charge of the Quantico Brig.
Col. Robert Oltman. clearly stated to the Brig Staff that will not have anything
happen to Manning on my So. nothing is going to He won?t be
able to hurt himself and he won't be able to get away, and our way of making sure of
that is that is he will remain on Maximum Custody and indefinitely." He will
testify that one of the other Brig Capt. William Hocter then said ?You
know Sir, I am concerned because if you are going to do that, maybe you want to call
it something else because it is not based upon anything from behavioral health.? In
response. Capt. Moore will testify that Col. Oltman said ?We will do whatever we
want to do. You make a recommendation and then I have to make a decision based
upon everything else." Capt. Moore will testify that Capt. Hocter then said, ?Well
then don?t say it is based upon mental health. You can say it is Maximum Custody,
andjust don?t put that we [behavioral health] are somehow involved in this." Col.
Oltman replied. ?Well, that is what we are going to do.? Capt. Moore will testify that
he spoke with others at the Brig to see if they knew why the Brig was so heavy
handed on PFC Manning. He will testify that others at the Brig told him that they
have never seen anything like this before. Capt. Moore will testify that others told
him that they were afraid to speak out about the situation given the concern of what
would happen as a result of any complaint about PFC Manning?s treatment.

47) CAPT William J. Hocter, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center,
He will testify that neither the Quantico Brig

ommander, CW4 James Averhart, nor the Security Battalion Commander, Col.
Robert Oltman, gave him any reasons for maintaining the Prevention of Injury
precautions other than stating it was for PFC Manning's safety. He will testify that
Col. Oltman intimated that he was receiving instruction form a higher authority on the
matter but did not say who was providing this direction. Capt. Hocter will testify that
he knew that the higher base authorities had frequent (sometimes weekly) meetings to
discuss PFC Manning. Capt. Hocter will testify that he gave weekly status reports
stating that he felt the POI precautions were unnecessary. Capt. Hocter will testify
that he recalls a meeting with Col. Oltman where he stated that PFC Manning would
remain in his current status Maximum Custody and POI unless and until he received
instructions from higher authority to the contrary. Capt. Hocter cannot recall Col.
O|tman?s exact words, but he does recall that Col. Oltman made it clear that nothing
would change with PFC Manning regardless of his behavior or the recommendations
of behavioral health.

48) lmnatc Christopher Whit?eld, Joint Regional Correction Facility (JRCF), Fort
Leavenworth. Kansas. Inmate Whit?eld will testify that he was taken to the pretrial
section at the JRCF and met with PFC Manning. He will testify that he explained the
purpose of his visit and asked PFC Manning who PFC Manning allegedly responded with. sold information to Wikileaks.?

20180

United States v. Manning: Article 32 Witness List

Shortly after this alleged statement, the guards realized that Inmate Whit?eld should

not have been in the pretrial area.
I
1/

DAVID E. COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel



20181

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
v^
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCU.SArmy,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Enclosure4
^March2012

20182

UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ ENCLOSURES)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U S. ARMY MIUTARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319-5013
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ANJA-CL

2 December 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC Paul Almanza, 150th Judge Advocate General Detachment, Ixgal
Support Organization, MG Albert C. Lieber USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria,
VA 22310
SUBJECT: Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Investigation - United States v. PFC Bradlev
Manning
I . The United States requests you consider the following evidence during the Article 32
proceeding in the above-referenced case:
a. Charged Documents.
(1) Batch #1 (00376954 - 00377572). See Enclosure 1.
(2) Batch #2 (00377626 - 00377675). See Enclosure I .
(3) Batch #3 (00377845-00378140). 5ee Enclosure 1.
b. Classification Reviews.
(1) Classification Review (CENTCOM) (00376871 - 00376873).
(2) Classification Review (DISA) (00376890 - 00376890).
(3) Classification Review (CYBERCOM) (00376875 - 00376878).
(4) Classification Review (CENTCOM) (00376879 - 00376902).
(5) Classification Review (DoS) (00376903 - 00376953).
(6) Classification Review (Other) (00378148 - 00378175).
(7) Classification Review (SOUTHCOM) (00378646 - 00378649).
c. Accused's Personnel Records.
(1)
(2)
(3)

PFC Bradley E. Manning's OMPF (00000116 - 00000164).
PFC Bradley E. Manning's ERB (00000006).
Security Clearance Documents.
(a) Batch #1 (00015617-00015619).
(b) Batch #2 (00022898-00022913).
(c) Batch #3 (00022947 - 00022949).
(d) Batch #4 (00036801 - 00036802).

d. Accused's Training.
(1) Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Training.

UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ENCLOSURES)

20183

UNCLASSIFlEDBBLES(SECRETBBORCONBNOFORNwBENCLOSURES)
ANJACL
SUBJECT: Requested Evidence Listfor Article 32 Investigation United Statesv.PFC Bradlev
Manning
(a) Batch #1(00001052-00011344).
(b) Batch #2 (00011649 - 00012569).
(2)

The Accused's AIT Corrective Training Slideshow (00125314 - 00125316).

(3)

The Accused's Information Assurance Training.
(a) l A Exam (00375768-00375771).
(b) l A Training Requirement (00375772).
(c) l A Virtual Training (00375773).
(d) l A Virtual Training #2 (00375774).
(e) Test Results (00022348).
e. Law Enforcement Investigations.
(1)

CIDCaseFile.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
0)

(2)

Batch #1 (00000179 - 00000376).
Batch #2 (00000402 - 00000411).
Batch #3 (00021364-00025526).
Batch #4 (00026079 - 00026082).
Batch #5 (00026356 - 00036786).
Batch #6 (00045302 - 00046073).
Batch #7 (00375183-00375724).
Batch #8 (00378219-00378623).
Batch #9 (00378626 - 00378645).
Batch #10 (00407991 -00408088).

CID Forensic Reports.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(1)
(m)
(n)
(o)

10th Mountain Shares (00046074 - 00046451).
Army Intelligence Report (00046452 - 00046566).
CENTAUR Logs (00046567 - 00052616).
CENTCOM Server (00052617 - 00054311).
CIDNE Files (00054312 - 00054319).
Department of State Files (00054320-00119042).
SOUTHCOM Comparison (00375008 - 00375115).
Intelink Logs (00119043 - 00375129).
Lamo Chats (00124107-00124282).
Manning's Personal Computer (00124283 - 00125269).
Manning's External Hard Drive (00125270 - 00125318).
Manning's SD Card (00125319 - 00199473).
Computers 148.17.172.115 and 22.225.28.54 (00199474 - 00199485).
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.29.185 (00199486 - 00199493).
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.40 (00199494 - 00199510).

2
UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ENCLOSURES)

20184

UNCLASSIFIEDBBLES(SECRETB^ORCONBNOFORNwBENCLOSURES)
ANJACL
SUBJECT: RcoucstedEvidence List for Article 32 Investigation United Statesv.PFC Bradlev
Manning
(p)
(q)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)

Manning'sCD(00199511 00199523)
NlPRNETcomputer 144.1^7.17.139(00199524 00199555)
NlPRNETcomputer 144.1D7.19(00199556 00211019)
NlPRNETcomputer 147.198.178.143(00211020 00211027)
SIPRNETcomputer22.225.28.216(00211028 00211036)
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.22(00211037 00243945)^(00243882

00374370)
(v) OGADocuments(00374371 00375007).
f. Militarv Intelligence Investigations.
(1)

Investigation #1.
(a) Batch#l (00044865 00045301)
(b) Batch#2(00375173 00375182)
(c) Batch#3(00377582 00377625)
(d) Batch#4(00377748 00377844)
(e) Batch#5 (00378203 00378218)
(2) Investigation #2.
(a) Batch#l (00375130 00375172)
(b) Batch#2(00377573 00377581)
(c) Batch#3(00377736 00377747).
(d) Batch#4(00378177 00378202)
(3) Investigation#3(00377676 00377735)
g Administrative Investigations.
(1)
(2)
(3)

AR38tl 5Investigatton (00000663 00000771)
USF-IAR15-6Investigation (00012721 00012903)
SecArmyAR 15-6 Investigation.
(a) Batch#l (00013162 00020152)
(b) Batch#2(00036787 00036788)

h. Enemy Possession ofWikiLeaks MateriaL

i

(1)
(2)
(3)

AI-Qa'idaRecruitingVideo(00408202 00408236)
Al-Qa'ida in theArabianPeninsulaMagazine(000f2570 00012711)
Enemy NumberlPossession Report.
Enclosure 2.

(4)

Enemy Number2Possession Report. .^^^ Enclosure 2.

Miscellaneot^ Documents.
(1)
(2)

DCGS-ALogonBanner(00376856 00376856)
C3Document(00378141 00378147)

3
UNCLASSIFIEDB^LES(SECRETBBORCONBNOFORNwBENCLOSURES)

20185

UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ ENCLOSURES)
ANJA-CL
SUBJECT: Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Investigation - United States v. PFC Bradley
Manning
j . Common References.
(1) United States Code.
(a) 18 use 793(e).
(b) 18 use 641.
(c) 18 use 1030(a)(1).
(2) Executive Orders.
(a) Executive Order 12958.
(b) Executive Order 13292.
(c) Executive Order 13526.
(3) Regulations.
(a) AR 380-5 (00001408-00001718).
(c) AR 25-2 (00038974 - 00039076).
(c) CENTCOM Regulation 25-206 (00016128 - 00016229).
(4) Public Law 107-40, The Authorization for Use of Military Force, 18 Sep 01.
2. If necessary, the prosecution may request you consider additional evidence which is relevant,
and not cumulative, to the investigauon.

2 Ends
1. Charged Documents
2. Additional Classified Evidence

ASHDENFEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

4
UNCLASSIFIED//LES (SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN w/ENCLOSURES)

20186

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Enclosure5
^March2012

20187

UNCLASSIFIED//LES
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319-5013
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ANJA-CL

7 December 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC Paul Almanza, 150th Judge Advocate General Detachment, Legal
Support Organization, MG Albert C. Lieber USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria,
VA 22310
SUBJECT: Additional Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Invesfigafion - United States v.
PFC Bradley Maiming

1. In addition to the Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Invesfigation, dated 2 December
2011, the United States requests you consider the following evidence during the Article 32
proceeding in the above-referenced case:
a. Classification Reviews.
Classification Review (OGA) (00410623 - 00410634).
b. Accused's Personnel Records.
Security Clearance Documents. Batch #5 (00000430 - 00000450).
c. Accused's Training.
(1)

The Accused's Information Assurance Training.
(a) DoD l A Awareness-October 2008-v7_0 Training Disk (00409673).
(b) DoD l A Awareness-October 2009-v8_0 Training Disk (00409674).
(c) Phishing Awareness-April 2008-vl_0 Training Disk (00409675).
(d) PH October 2007-vl_0 Training Disk (00409676).

(2)

The Accused Pre-Deployment Training.
(a) Iraq Overview PowerPoint (00409722 - 00409740).
(b) Afghanistan Overview PowerPoint (00409741 - 00409780).

(3) Classified Information Systems. CIDNE Export Screenshots (00410665 00410667).
d. Law Enforcement Investigations.
CID Case File.
(1) Batch #11 (00409673 - 00409678).
(2) Batch #12 (00409781 - 00410553).

UNCLASSIFIED//LES

20188

UNCLASSIFIEDB^ES
ANJACL
SUBJECT: Additional Requested Evidence List for Article 32 Investigation UnitedStatesv
PFCBradleyManning
(3)

Batch#13(00410635

00410649)

e Enemy Possession ofWikiLeaks Material.
Enemy NumberlPossession Evidence.
(1) IIR60890563 11 (Redacted)(00410660 00410664)
(2) MetadataDisplay (00410658 00410659)
(3) Forensically RecoveredMatertal (00410654 00410657).
f. Miscellaneous Documents.
(1)

The Accused'sMilitary Intelligence Work Product.
(a) IEDStoryboard(00410603 00410606)
(b) RangeStoryboard (00410607 00410609)
(c) IIR6068 4579 10(00410610 00410612)
(d) SIPRNETEmail,dated 100112(00410613 00410614)
(e) SIPRNETEmail,dated 100224(00410615)
(fl SIPRNETEmail,dated 100308(00410616)
(g) SIPRNETEmail,dated 100419(00410617)
(h) SIPRNETEmail,datedl00425(00410618)
(i) SIPRNETEmail,dated091130(00410600 00410602)

(2)

WikiLeaks Background.
(a) WikiLeaks Most WantedLeaksof2009,dated 090830(00410561

00410571)
(b) WiktLeaksMostWantedLeaksof2009,dated091105(00410572
00410583)
(c) WikiLeaksMostWantedLeaksof2009,dated 100522 (00410584
00410593)
(d)
(e)
(fl
(g)
(3)

Afghanistan
Tweet,dated
Tweet,dated
Tweet,dated

War LogsPosted by WikiLeaks(00410668 00410670)
100507 (00410594 00410595)
100108(00410596 00410597)
100216(00410598 00410599)

The Accused'sOther Documents.
(a) WikiLeaks ContactInformationFile(00409721)
(b) CIDNETypesFile(00409719)
(c) Written Note Related to GAL Extraction (00409720)
(d) ScreenshotofGoogleSearchforGALExtractionMacro(00409679).
(c)EarlyBirdArticle,dated20100318(00409686 00409718)
(f^ MacQuickstartBarScreenshot(00409680)
(g) MacPasswordI^eychainScreenshot(00409683)
(h) Email(Encrypted),dated 100520(00409681)
(i) Email(Decrypted),dated 100520(00409682)

2
UNCLASSIFIEDBBLES

20189

UNCLASSIFIED^BLES
ANJACL
SUBJECT: Additional Requested Evidence ListforArticlc 32 Investigation UnitedStatesv.
PFCBradleyManning
(^) Email,dated 100408(00409684)
(k) Email,dated 100410(00409685)
(I) IIR5 332 0069 10(00410619 00410622)
(4)

Defense InformationSystemsAgency Documents.
(a) DISA Trickier Report(00410653)
(b) DISATricklerReportEncll(00410650)
(c) DISA Trickier ReportEncl3(00410651)

(5)

Other.
(a) CIDNE Data on the Internet(00410554)
(b) GALExtracttonInstructionsScreenshot(00410555)
(c) CENTCOMSharepointArchitecture(00410635)
(d) NCDValuationDocuments (00410556 00410560)

2. If necessary,the prosecution may request you consider additional evidence which is relevant,
and not cumulative, to the investigation.

ASHDENFEIN
CPT,JA
Trial Counsel
CF:
DefenseCounsel

3
UNCLASSIFIEDB^ES


20190

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


v. Prosecution Response to Defense

Motion to Compel Depositions

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 6

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,

Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 8 March 2012


Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

20191


UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7! 15 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101



22 February 201 1

MEMORANDUM For Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
SUBJECT: PFC Manning (Wikileaks) Classi?cation Review Request

1. In accordance with the request from the Staff Judge Advocate for the US Army District of
Washington dated 20 November 2010, USCENTCOM CCJ3 conducted a classi?cation
review of two PowerPoint presentations to determine: whether the information was
appropriately classified at the time of production; the current classi?cation level of the
documents; and whether or not disclosure of the documents would cause harm to the national
security of the US.

2. RADM Kevin Donegan signed an affidavit attesting to the correct classi?cation of the
documents both at the time of production as well as at the present time and the damage caused
by their unauthorized release.

3. The J3 POC for this memorandum is the undersigned, CCJ3-O-CAS,

.. /7
.SF W. ELLISON
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Central Asian States Action Officer





ManningB_00376871

20192

DECLARATION

I, Rear Admiral Kevin M. Donegan, declare and state:

I am a Naval Flag Officer, and I have served in various United
States Navy and joint service assignments for over 30 years. I am the
Director of Operations for United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and
I am responsible for planning, organizing, directing and controlling
joint and combined military operations at the direction of the Commander
United States Central Command. I advise the Commander on all matters
pertaining to the strategic and operational employment of assigned
forces, the conduct of joint and combined operations and other necessary
functions of the command required to accomplish our assigned tasks and
missions. As Director of Operations, I have been delegated Original
Classification Authority by the Secretary of Defense at the Secret level.
I have held my current position for seven months.

PURPOSE OF DECLARATION

I submit this declaration, in the matter of United States v.
Private First Class Bradley Manning, to demonstrate to the best of my
knowledge and belief that disclosure of the information identified below
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security of the United States. In making the following statement
regarding the classification information in this case, I rely on my
personal knowledge and experience, upon information made available to me
in my official capacity, upon advice and conclusions reached and
determinations made in accordance therewith.

I deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified form
to facilitate its handling and use during any judicial proceeding.

DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION

Information which requires protection in the interest of national
security of the United States is designated CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION per Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security
Information, signed by President Obama on December 29, 2009. The prior
Executive Order concerning classification was Executive Order 12958
signed by President Clinton on April 20, l995 as amended by President
George W. Bush on March 25, 2003. As specified at Section 1.2 of E0
13526, information is classified in levels commensurate with the
assessment that unauthorized disclosure could cause the following
expected damage to national security:

a. Top Secret information exceptionally grave damage

b. Secret information serious damage
c. Confidential information - damage

ManningB_00376872

20193

Unclassified information does not require a security clearance for
access, but nonetheless may be of a sensitive nature.

CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION

I reviewed the material related to this case which was provided by
the Staff Judge Advocate for Military District of Washington. The
documents in question are two PowerPoint slide presentations of official
reports originated by USCENTCOM. The documents are currently classified
at the SECRET level. The documents were appropriately classified at the
SECRET level at the time they were generated. They remain currently and
properly classified SECRET under sections l.4(a) and 1.4(c) of
Executive Order 13526. Both PowerPoint slide presentations describe the
After Action Review of the Farah CIVCAS Investigation to General David
Petraeus. The file names of these two presentations have the dates 25 May
2009 and 8 June 2009 respectively.

IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IF INFORMATION RELEASED

Unauthorized disclosure of the classified material specified above
would reveal intelligence sources and methods, CJSOTF-A techniques and
procedures, as well as sensitive information that could affect relations
between the US and its allies in the regionL

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ?l746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the
information provided herein is true and correct to the best of my

knowledge.

.1

KEVIN M. DONEGAN
RADM, USN
Director of Operations

Executed this 15th day of February 2011.



20194

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCUS.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Enclosure7
8March2012

20195

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) DECLARATION
(U) 1, ROBERT C. BEI'Z. declare and state:
(U) BACKGROUND
(U) I am a Classillcatioii .Advisory OfTlccr wit!i 6 years of experience. My current po.sition is USCYBERCOM Chic I'
Classification .Advisory Officer, which is responsible for supporting and advising Commander and Deputy
Commander, USCYBIiRCOM as the command's senior classification expert. I report to the USCYBERCOM Chief
of Staff. I have held my current position for 2 years, and have over 6 years of experience in evaluating and applying
national security information classification regulations.
(U) PURPOSE OK DECLARATION
(U) I submit this declaration, in the matter of United States v. Private First ('lass Bradley Mannini:. lo demonstrate
to the best of my knowledge and belief that disclosure ofthe information identified below reasonably could be
ex|Tccted to cause SERIOUS i)Afv':A(ii! to the national security of the United States. In making the following
statement regarding the classified information in this case, I rely on my personal knowledge and experience.
Executive Order LISZA Chi.s.sifieJ Nuliimil Sccuriiy iiyormaiioii, Department ofDefense instruction 0-3600.U2
Infornialion Operaliom (/(.)) Sc'ciirily Cla.s.sificaliInfonnalion Seciirily Program, and additional information available to me in my official capacity.

(U) I deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified fonn to facilitate its handling and use during any
judicial proceeding.
(U) DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
(U) Information which requires protection in the interest of national security ofthe United States is designated
CLASSIFIED NATION AI. SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive Order 13526, Cla.wjk'ci National Seairily
Infonnalion, signed by President Obama on December 29, 2009 [prior to June 27, 2010, refer to Executive Order
1295S signed by President Clinton on April 20, 1995 as amended by President George W. Bush on March 25, 2003].
Information is classified in levels commensurate with the assessment lhat unauthorized disclosure could cause the
following expected damage to national security:
a. (U) Top Secret infomiation

exceptionally grave damage
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 1 of 4

ManningB_00376875

20196

UNCLASSIFIED

b. (U) Secret information

serious damage

c. (U) Confidential information damage
(U) Ihiclassifled infonnation docs not require a security clearance for access, but nonetheless may be of a sensitive
nature.
(U) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION
(U) Within the Department of Defense, classilied information is handled and protected in accordance with
Department of Defense Regulation 5200.1 -R InformalUm Securily Program. Classified infomiation should be
handled and examined only under such conditions as are adequate to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining
access. Classilied material may not be removed from designated work areas or moved from information systems,
e.g. classified databases, computer networks, servers, or computers, except in the performance of official duties and
under special conditions which provide protection for the classified material.
(U) CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION
(U) I reviewed the material related to this case, which was provided by the Prosecution in a memorandum dated IX
March 2011. The item in question is the text log of a computer chat session, fhe log has no classification markings
but contains national security information properly classified at the SECRET level per Department of Defense
Instruction 0-36(K).()2 liiloniiulion Operalum.s (lU) Security Claxsijlcalion Guidance dated 28 November 2(X)5, and
Strategic Command Instruction (SI) 720-1 GlobalInioiniaiioii (Jrid(GIG) NKTOPSSecurity Classification Guide
dated 15 July 2(l(W The information in the log was classified SECRET at the time it was generated, and at no time
has it been dcclassilled. It is currently and properly classified SECRET. It contains the followini.' national securiiv
information.


(U) U.S. Government knowledge that a specific offensive cyber capability is operational in cyberspace and
under the control ofa specific adversary



(U) U.S. Cjovernment detailed knowledge of specific cyber activity being conducted against the U.S. by a
specific adversary



(U) U.S. Governmeni attribution of specific cyber activity conducted against the U.S. lo a specific
adversaiy

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 2 of 4

ManningB_00376876

20197

UNCLASSIFIED

^

(U^The association of'a^^fainilygroup''ofUNCI.ASSIFIED cover feims^ie code woids^wilh the
classified information they are intended to protect.

^

(U^The association ofaspeciflc UNCLASSIFIED cover leim^i.e. code word) with the classified
informafion it is intended to protect

^

(U)The level and lypcof success of specific cyber operations byaspeciflc adversary against f I S
information systems

^

(U)ThelevclofeffortlheUS Government expends dealing with specific cyber activity ofaspecillc
adversary.

^

(f^)TheUS.Governments assessment of the offensive cyber culpability and capacity ofaspecifie
adversary
lU^IMPACTONNATIONAESECURITY IF INFORMATION RELEASED

(U) Unauthorised disclosui^ ofthe classified material specified above would
^

fU)RevealUS capability to defect so^phisticaled cyber activity conducted against theUS

^

(U) Reveal U.S capability lo attribute cyber activity to sophisticated adversaries

^

(U) Reveal the levelUS Government ofknowledge and understanding ofaspeeiflc cyber threat

^

(U)Cause theU.S.Government to ex^^ndpersoinnel and financial reso^urces to apply newprolectionslo
Ihedisclosed classilied information and undisclosedbulrelated information

^

(U)Createanegative impact on U.S.Govemment intemational relationships based on fhe assessment that
specific cyber activity againsi the U.S. is being conducted byaspecified adversary

^

(U) Reduce U.S.allies'eonfidcnce in IheU.S.Government'sabilily to protect classified information
affecting their own nafional .security.

(U) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.^17^6,Ideclare under penalty ofpetjury that the information provided herein is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge.

^
^

^

^

^

RobertEBet^
ChiefClassificalion AdvisoryOfficer, U.S.CyberCommand

Ex^ci^t^dthi^

l^anttingO 00378877

^^^^^^

^ ^
day of ^^^^^^^
^

2011.
UNCLASSIFIED
Page^of4

20198

UNCLASSIFIED

(LI) Asan Original Cla.ssillcation Authority with control over the national security inlormalion discuss
respoiisibility for its protection.lconcur with the with theclassiflcationdetemiination and impactslalemenls made
herein.Ifurtherendorse this declaration as theoffleialslatemenf ofUnited StalesCyberCommand in regard lo the
mailer ofUnited Slalcsv.Private First Class Br^^dlcvManniu^.

RoberlE Schmidle,Jr,
Lieutenant Generaf United Slates Marine Corps
Deputy CommanderU.SCyberCommand

Executed this

day of T«-^kr

2011.

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 4 of 4

ManningB_00376878

20199

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Enclosure 8
8 March 2012

20200

UNCLASSIFIED
(U) DECLARATION
(U) 1, VICE ADMIRAL ROBERT S. HARWARD, declare and stait:
(U) BACKGROUND
((.:) { am a Vice Admits! in the United States Navy with 32 years of active service. {currency serve as Deputy
Commander, U.S, Ceniral Comroa^d (USCENTCOM) at MacDill Air Force Base. I have held thiu position since 11
July 2011. My resposKibilities include exercising TOP SECRET and below Original Classification authority, which
inchides rendering a dete- fnirsatiots of USCENTCOM generated iriformatiooforclassincation purposes pmuant !:o a
wriEten delegation ftosri -he Deputy Secfe-aty of Detense. (See Meoiorandum fmni the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Subject: Delegation of Top Secret Classification .Authoritj', dated 5. May 2011 (Enclosure 1)).
(U) PURPOSE OF DECL.4 RATION
(U) { submit this declantdon, in the matter of United States v. Private First Class BnKijgv Maaam^ to demonstrate
to the best of my knowledge and beliefthat disclosure ofthe infomrtation identified below i-easonabiy could be
expected so cause SERIOUS PAMAQE to the national security of the United States. la making the following
staietnent regarding the cbssiHgd ififbtmation i« thk case. I rely on my personal knowledge and expertetice,
^executive Order \j52^Ciassifsad National Security inforrrsation or (i)r materials classic d prior to June 27.2010,
on Executive Order 1.3292, and Ceatiai Comraiind Regulation 330-14 Security'CiasslfKoiiim Guide {siiniQt& 0501,
0109. and 0130), and addititxial information available to me in my official capaciry.
(U) I deliberately structured this declaration it: an unclassified form to facilitate its kmdling and use during any
judicial proceeding,
(U) DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
(IJj Iflfofmatioo which requires protection in Ate mterest of oalional security of tbe United States is. designated
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION p«r Executive Order 13526, CW#e^Afo,^oW AcK^fy
Information, signed by President Barack Obama on December 29.2009 [prior to June 27,2010, refer to Executive
Order !295SsiE:t)edbyPresidesl Qi!«os on April !'?, 1995 as atnended by President George W Bush on March 25,
2003], iRtbriT-ation b cisjiified m levels coiTiji-ensutatc witi) the assessmes! that unauthorized discloiore could
cause the following expec-ed damage to national security;
a. (LO Top Secret iofoimation - exceptionally grave damage

b (U) Secret information •• serious damage
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 1 of 3

ManningB_00376879

20201

UNCLASSIFIED
c. (U) Coniidential information - damage

(U) Unclassified information does not require a security clearance for access, but nonetheless may W of a sensitive
nature.
(U) PROTECTIOh' OF INFORMATION
(IJ) Widiin the USCENTCOM, classified infonnasion is handled and protected in accordatice with Executive Orders
13526 atid 12958, asatnended atxiCetUral Cosnmand Regulation 380-M .Secitrisy Chsssiftcaiiffn Gmde. Ihe
USCENTCOM Special Security Office (SSO) issues this guide :md ^Wdresses inquiries concerning its. content and
interpretation. The national defense requites that certain inforniiaiion be maintained in confidence in order to protect
our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interaction w;ih fottign nations. Classified
infoimation should be handled and examined only under such conditions as are adequate to prevent unauthorised
personsftotngaining access. Classified material may not be removed fiom desipated work feasor moved frtwtJ
infortnation systems, e.g. classified databases, computer networks, servers, or computer;;, except in she perfotrtjaijce
of ofsktal duties aad under special conditions which provide protection for the classified material.
(U) CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION
(0) I reviewed the nnaterial forwarded to USCENTCOM by govetnmen! prosecutors in the matter ofUnited States
V. Private First Class Bradkv %Umim., which was provided by LTC Chris F, Callen, USAR, at the USCENTCOM
Staff Judge Advocate Office. Thi: material was staffed Uuowgh thefollowingUSCENTCOM Direciorases:
Intelligence (12% Operations (13), and the Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J.5). Tlje results of tltis staffing were
provided to me and consolidated into this affidavit. The results of the review of these documents arc located in
Enclosure 2 - CIDNE Afghanisian Events, Enclosure 3- CIDNE Iraq Events, Enclosure 4 - Other Briefings, and
Enclosure 5 - Video. As identified in Enclosures 2 through .•>, items contain national security information properly
classified at the SECRET level per Executive Order 13292, or Executive Order 13526, and CCR 3S0-14. The
intbrmation contained xyitbin the listed items was properiy classified SECRET at the time it was generated, and at no
time has it beet! declassified. It is curreotly and properly classi Red SECRET. .4s outlined st! Enclosures 2 thro-jgh .1,
the documents contain the following types of national security information:


(U) U.S. Govemment intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or
crypiology

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 2 of3

ManningB_00376880

20202

UNCtASSlFlED


(U) U.S. Oovemment military plans, weapons systems, or operations

«

(U) U.S. Govemment operational code words identified with mission operations



(U) Participating unik, mcluding (ypes, vulneraWlides. locaiioos, quantities, readme^ suKui, deployments,
redeployrtjetits, and details of tnovenient of US aietidly forces



(U) Significatit actions related to fact of and general type (vehicle-borne, etc) of improvised explosive
aitacks



(U) Stipiflcsnt action event summaries



(U) Limitations and vulnersabilities of US forces in combat area

»

(U) Foteign govertsKsent Information
(U) IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IF INFORMATION RELEASED

(U) Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified stove would:


(U) Cause the U.S. Government to expend personnel and financial resources to apply new jrotections to
the disclosed classified information and undisclosed but related infbrmation

»

(U) Reduce LIS, allies" confidence in the U.S. Govemmeitt's ability to proiect ciassitied information
affecting their own national security



(U) Pose a threat to the security of US and coalition forces in the Iraq Combined/Joint Operations .Area
(CjOA)



(U) Pose a threat to Ac securily of US and CMlitiors forces in the Afghanistan Combined/joint C^serations
AreafOOA)



(U) Hinder on-going military operations, intelligence activities and soutxres and nsethods, and negatively
affect foreign government ifitelligejiice and relatiotjs.

(U) Pursuant to 2S U.S.C. §1746,1 declare under penalty of periuxy that the information provided herein is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge.
/
^'^'(^
Robes t S. Harward
Vice .Adtniral, U.S. Navy
Executed this ^ J _ day of

^

2011.

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 3 of3

ManningB 00376881

20203

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSe PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 2O30I 1010

NAY G 5 28i;
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
(%NERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR. OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
ENSPECrOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR. ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT: Dgk#*lm of Top Store* OHgmal ClasaiGoidoQ Aythonty
The (ocumbmb ofthe posjtioas uknixjBkd m A* aNmched Hsdng #rc bwiby mibsnxsd to
ALCKiae Top Secwt ongim* tUumgcadoa mmhonty m mx&t^im&s w & Executive Ohkf
"CWmEad Natkwwd S«cuBty ki&mmdon.** T&:s mmamadwm saptmitdest pttyiam delegsdons.

A*t&chaiAs stated

Enclosure 5

ManningB_00376882

ORXCmAL TOP SECRET CLASSmCAnON AUTHORTMES

SecnAuy of Defease
Oqwdy SeoftAzy of Deifesse
Special Assistaat as the Secretary md Dqjuty Seactaiy ofDefense

Und» SAKtWy of DefmeferPolicy
Pnacipal Depafy Ussda* Secietwy of Defease fat Policy
DqMy Under Sea«tary ofDeAnae for Policy lategrjOioa & Chief of Staff
Dimarw, Defase Seewmty Coopemjoii Agency
0«psiSy Duector. Defease Secudty CoopeMTkm Agency
Dcpu^ Under Secnrtsry of DefeaseforStrategy, Plans and Forces
Assisto Smstasy of Defease {Special OpendwoK and Low Wcnaky Conflkt)
Pfiiscipal Deputy Asslstest SecKtwry ofDe&mae (SpecW Opemdooa and Low
IntBoaity CotiSist)
Alston SecPRmy ofDtfkoae (OloW SWIegic AfGm*)
AaauW* SeoKtmy of Deferae (Ailaa and PadSc Security AfBun)
PiiBclpsI Deputy ASD (Asian and Pseife SecuAy Affairs)
Prissdpai Depuxy ASD (Homeland Defkoam)
Asssstesi Secietgry cf Defease (Inkmadonal Security Policy)
Pfiodp*! Deputy ASD (lokmadoogl Seemly Policy)
Under S»mtajpy

DeAmw (AeqmWikm, TechaaWgy & L@|^We*>

Undkr Seovbwy *f DeAma* (XmWHgema^
Under Swetory #

(Panwwamel and Rmadkeaa)

ofpmw
Assistot Seaxtmy ofDefense (Health Affaio)
Asslstaat Sees&my of Defeoae (Legislative Affairs)
AmstsM to &e Secretly of Defessse (Ibtelligeoce Oversight)
Assisism Seexetaxy of De&nae for Networks and InAnnation Integradon/DoD CIO
Cemerd Cennae! idT #* Oenarf««Bt of Defknaa
0 « O T I Cownael

Nocq)** Depaly Gtoeml Counsel '

*

Enclosure 1

ManningB_00376883

20204

OMGCWAL TOP SECRET GLASSmCATION AUTHORITIES
OepaSy Geoeml Counsd, blemadonal AfSks
kmmaeL IntelliaeDce
Imspfcfof Gweral #f A * Daparbneo* #f Dakmse

DAraelor, AdaahdmirmtWn mod Mmmggmemt; Waahhgton He#di;nmrXMnxtor, OpermUamnl Tea* amd Evahmdom (OT&E)
Mreelor, Coa* Aawsamen* m*d Pmgmm EvmWmtkm (CAPE)

Chairmm, J€S {C3CS)
Vice C&aiiman, JCS (VCJCS)
AamatW to &@ CWnnam, JCS (ACJCS)
Director, Jokt S*afr(DJS)
Vice Diirctm, Joint StafTfVDJS)
Director fm Umpsymss: and PerKwoel (Dli)
Diredof of lotdligcoce (DI2)»PoahWm mmhilaWed by DIA
Vice Dimaof of MeUigeoce (VDJ2) - PmMom nwdmiakedfeyDIA
DiMKtof fat Opcnadoms (DB)
Vice Diredof Opemtiona (VDJ3)
Depoy DipK&xr Special 0]p«xa%ioaa (DDSO)
Director 6%f LogWc: (Dj4)
DuWor for Strategy PIssss and Policy (DJ5)
Vice Dbector &r Strategy Man* and Polky (VDJ5)
Chief of Stafi» IXnxAxWe for Strategic Plana and PoJky
Director &r Cwmnand, ContMd, Commmiationa, & Computer (C4) Systems (DJ6)
Vice Director ^ C4 Syatona (VDJQ
Director fbr Opentiooal Plan* and Joint Force Developmeat (DJ7)
Vic« Director for Op«radonaI Plans and ioast Fasces Devekpment (VDJ7)
Diitctor for Force Simsw, Resources, md Asaeasment (DJ8)
Vice DioKtor for Force Structure, Resouieea, and RequiremeiAa (VDJS)
DA&me Advanced Reswrch Prejee** Agency (DARPA)

Director (DR)
Deputy DuWor(DD)
ChiefofStalT(CS)
CfeieC Fmamcial Executive (FE)
DepuQf Directw f « bteHigeace (J2)
Depi^ Dimctof, Analysis (DI)
Deputy Dinx3or for Humm Melligoace (DH)

Enelosurel

ManningB_00376884

20205

OHIdNAL TO? SECRET CLASSIFICAT OM AUTHOR TIES
Deputy DipKtor for MASINT and Techmcal CoUecdon (DT)
The Defense AttacWs (DAO) (TotaX of 137)
Director, NalioaiJ, Media Exploitation Center (NMEC)
Chief, Natkma! MASINT Management 0@ce(NM)
D^feissgjgf^raste

A^fpcy ll>ISA||

DsKSitofs DISA
Vice Dkector, DBA
Pdndpnl Director &gGK)Operatioos (GO)
De&gff T^r&K* Radmcden Aaemer fPTRA^
Direclnr.DTRA
BIsfsctoiv

M L@p3itle$ A§@%&y (DLA)

Dkae(af, MWk DeAasa Agency (MDA)
Diraetof^ M*d@n»* CeaapadaMmtelBgenee Agrnqr (NGA)

Director, NSAChief, Ceotxal Security Service
Dxgmty Director, NSA
Dwstor's Clnef of Staff
DimA^DqwOfONcfofStaE
SK3INT Director
SIGINT CWef of SWf
SKnNTDurec^mdeDcputyCbiefArSIGIN?
SIGINT DiRctorate Associate Deputy Chief for SIGINT Policy and Corporate Isaues
Deputy DireGtwfe?An^ysia and ProdtKtioa
Deputy Director for Data Acquiaititm
CMe£ InAxmadon Shanog Swfiees
Chief, Oyptanalyai* and Exploitation Services
Director, National Sesoitj- Operalioas Caxter (NSOC)
Director NSA/CSS Tbrca* Operadooa Center (NTOC)
Infonnalion Assurance Diwctor
Im&wrmation AssuMoce Technical Direck*
AsaocWe Director for Cmmmity Ihtegxatiox:, Policy and Records
Deputy Associate DimSOT for Policy md Recoids
Asaociaie Director for Security and Coiz%en«teHigence
Director &r Foreign AfBiirm
Associate DLrectw for IffisSaiWom and Logiatics

Enclosure' 1

ManningB_00376865

20206

ORIGINAL TOP SECRET CLASSEMCATION AUTHORmES
National Rec^mmWance Omea (NROi

Director
Piincipd Dqxxty Dtrccwr
Deputy Director
Director, Imagery latelligeace Systems Aoquiaidoa Directorate
Director, Signals kWIigeoce Systems Acqdsltioa Directorate
Dimctor, Commumcatioss Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate

Directw, Advajsced Systems md Technology
Director, MissiooOp«ati«»Di*eAmAe
Direcb*. Special Communications OERce
Director, Ground Et^oprise Directorate
Director, OfRce of Security and CouataialcUigence
Director, OSIce of Space Launch
Director, Mismon Support Directorate
AwWemt, NatknaX Defemw Ualv«rslty (NDU)
UnKed S M w AMca Command fUSAFRICOM)
Comffiaader
Deputy to the Commander for Military OpoKtsons
Deputy to the CosOTaader for Civil Military Activities
CMefofSisff

VWW

WIN

VM)

Cortita&sdcr
Dcpwiy Cotamaoder aod CMef of StaB'
U * W Statesl^gf#11 f,#mMMf f U # V f O M l
Orosnartd*
Deputy ComtssKJikier
OxiefofStaa^
Un) W SWw JWW forwa Command mSJFCQjW
CoiDZBsodor
Dcpy^ Cocnmander
Chief of Staff
Commander, NORAD and UaWed States NorAarn Command (USNORTHCOM)

Enclosure 1

ManningB 00376886

20207

ORICDIAL TOP SECRET aLASSn^ICATIW* AUTRORmES

a
Commander
Dqwty Commander

Foreign Policy Advisor (Gnmted by Department of Slate)
CommaDde, US Forces ^apan
CogssMndstj US Fotco
Unltad StmW Swda! Oneratkna Command mSSOCOM^

Commamkr
Deputy Commander
Co*%m&od^« Joist Speci&l Operations Ccwinsxid

Ccmmander

Military Deputy Commander
Chief of Staf
United S(mW gW#s^ Command fUSSTRATCO&n
Commander (JOCQ

Commander (i
Ogpat^f Commander (TCDC)

mxi^ad,

C#er Command rUSCYBIECOMI

Commander
Deputy Comoumder

Enclosure 1

ManningB_00376887

20208

20209

FndiMwr* ClOm AFGHANISTAN SVf.mS

Tab

A

identified Ootwment

ittiformatioti Classified
iper C£R
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Ciassifttatieir!

2A5CAlX.3579^r)Ae^Kn
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6/30/2003
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Section 1.4 (a)

'participating -jn'it.s,
including types,
vtilner abilities,
locations, quantities,
readiness static,
desioymer'-ts.
str ategic Intel brief, ID .Way
redeploy fr.:ents. and
2003 TarahiNS Probacy
details of movement oi
elibcratley ^nxtigated"
txS friendly forces;
intelligence activities
(•nclijding covert
action}, inteStgerice
source.*! or methods, or
cryptology

riNAL- iO'S REPORT i.OS
20002 i m 09)
(.SiSl^if.'0){minim?.edj (.3)

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Classification

ICCR 380-14 (OilC), Page A124, Hern 12; EO 13526
i Section 1.4(a)

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i weapon; systems, o-r
[operations

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Section 1,4 (a)

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|24, Item 12;£0 33526
1 Section 1.4 {aj

iMsitary plans,
TA8 A Appendix 10 (USPOR- ;
weapons systersis, or
A FR AGO 08-003 - CIVCAS
operators
PROCEDURES) .Sep OS

EO 12558 as amended.
Section 1.4(3)

jCCS 380-14 (0110), Page A.
|24,ltem 12; EO 13526
1 Section 1.4 (a)

iOp^rati'orsai coTAUO Appends 6(821.? Of^f I wordSs) when
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24;EO 12953*5an^nded, bs.ltem 13; £01,3526
Section 1,4 (a)
; Section 1.4 (a)

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Enclosure 4: Other 3rienng%Page2

Tab

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Identf jied Document

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per CCa 380-14, £0
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CCA 380-14 (0109), Papa A
2 3 , I t e m l l ; EO 13526
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CCR 380-14, fOl 10), Page A- |
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33, Items 2,3, and 8; Page A-1
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|
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|

Enclosure S. Video

Identifted Oocumesit

iiiWmatio!) CtassiSet!
per COS 38014, EO
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Oassification
^ arW/or EO 13516

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Operational code
VIDEO >M 22 PAX), Way \
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SasisforCvrr^t
| Classification

CCR 380 14 (0109). Page A-1 CCR 380-14 (0110) Page A24; EO 12958 as amended, 1 23, item 11; EO 13525
Section 1.4 is]
\
Section 1.4 (a)

I

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hail
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Enclosure 9
8 March 2012

20225

DECLARATION
I, Patrick F. Kennedy, declare and state:

BACKGROUND
I am a Career Minister in the Foreign Service with 38 years of experience with the United
States Govemment specializing in national security and foreign affairs. My current position is
Under Secretary ofState for Management, which is responsible for the activities of ten bureaus
and offices that are responsible for management improvement initiatives; diplomatic security and
foreign missions; infonnation resources management; support services for domestic and overseas
operations; consular affairs; human resources; the Foreign Service Institute; overseas buildings;
medical services andfinancialresources management. I report to Hillary Rodham Clinton, the
Secretary of State. I have held my current position for four years, and have over 18 years of
experience in classification management of national security information, security, and
intelligence, including serving as the State Department Senior Agency Official for Classification
in addition to the Deputy Director ofNational Intelligence for Management for two years and
heading the Transition Team that set up the newly created Office of the Director ofNational
Intelligence.
PURPOSE OF DECLARATION
I submit this declaration, in the matter ofUnited States v. Private First Class Bradlev
Manning, to demonstrate, to the best of my knowledge and belief that disclosure of the
information identified below as classified reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security of the United States. In making the following statement regarding the classified
information in this case, I rely on my personal knowledge and experience, E.O. 13526 on
Classified National Security Information and the Department ofState Classification Guide; and
additional information available to me in my official capacity as the State Department's
designated Senior Agency Official responsible for directing and administering the Department's
program for classifying national security information.
I deliberately stmctured this declaration in an unclassified form to facilitate its handling
and use during any judicial proceeding.
DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
Information which requires protection in the interest of national security of the United
States is designated CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive
Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, signed by President Obama on December
29, 2009 [prior to June 27,2010, refer to Executive Order 12958 signed by President Clinton on
April 20, 1995 as amended by President George W. Bush on March 25, 2003]. Information is

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classified in levels commensurate with the assessment that unauthorized disclosure could cause
the following expected damage to national security:
a. Top Secret information exceptionally grave damage
b. Secret information serious damage
c. Confidential information damage
The Mission ofthe Department ofState encompasses the conduct of foreign relations of
the United States which dictates that the Department relies particularly upon two classification
categories when protecting national securityinformation. These are described in Section 1.^ of
E.O. 13526 which states in pertinent part:
Infbrmation shallnotbe considered for classification unless it
concerns:...^b^fbreign govemment infbrmation; ...^d^ fbreign
relations or fbreign activities ofthe United States, including
confidential sources...
Forei^ government infbrmation. defined in part as infoEmation provided to the United
States Govemment byafbreign government or governments or an intemational organization of
governments is contained in many ofthe documents described in this declaration and is classified
under Section l.^^b^ofE.O.13526. An essential understanding that governs all diplomatic
intercourse, and that constitutes an essential element in all successfiil diplomatic exchanges, is
that confidentialitywill be observed. Mutual trustin this realm is vital fbrthedevelopmentof
cordial and productive diplomatic relations. Unwillingness orinabilityto maintain
confidentialityin diplomatic exchanges would inevitably chill ourrelations with other countries
and lead to diminished access to sourcesofinfbrmation important to the successful formulation
andimplementationofU.S.foreignpolicy,andtherebywoulddamagethenationalsecurity.
The abilityto obtain infbrmationfi^mfbreign governments is essential to the formulation
and successful implementation ofU.S.fbreign policy. Disclosureoffbreign govemment
infbrmation provided in confidence would cause fbreign officials to believe thatU.S.officials
arc not abl^c^r willing to ob^erv^th^ confidentiality expected in ^u^h interchanges.

Governments would become less willing in the future to furnish infoimation important to the
conductofU.S. fbreign relations, and in general less disposed to cooperate with the United
States in theachievement of fbreign policy objectives of common interest. Disclosureofthis
infbrmation ^treasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security''^Section
l.l^a^^^^,EO. 13526^.
Infbrmationin almost all of thedocumentsdescribed in this declarationhave been
classified under Sectionl.^^d^ofE.0.13526, which protects infbrmation concemingforei^
relations or fbrei^ activities ofthe United States, including confidential sources. Documents
described belowrecount details ofthe relationship between the United States andanumber of
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fbreign countries. The documents covernotonlythetraditional diplomatic, political and
economic relations, but also include important areas such as human rights protection and security
cooperation. Manyofthedocumentsare intended to inform policymakers in Washington ofthe
true situation on the ground and therefore containfi^ankcomments and criticisms, as well as
analyses that, ifreleased, reasonably could damageU.S. relations with the countries concemed.
Otherdocumentscontain infomiation derived fi^omsourceswhoprovided theinfbrmation with
the expectation that theiridentities will be protected. Release ofthis infbrmation reasonably
couldrisk the life or safety ofthe confidential sources. Failure to preserve the expected
confidentiality could risk future access not onlyto these sources, but also to others who might
providesensitiveinfbrmationto U.S. officials. Thisclassificationcategory has also been applied
to fbreign govemment infbrmation in addition to thel.^^b^category,as release ofinformation
fi^om fbreign governments could damage U.S. fbreign relations.
Documents described in this declaration have also been protected under classification
categories l.^^a^ ^militaryplans, weapons systems or operations^, l.^^e^^scientific,
technological or economic matters^andl.^^g^, vulnerabilities and capabilities of systems and
installations,^ The reason fbr application ofthese categories is included with the document
descriptions.
PROTECTION OFINFORMATION
within the Department ofState, classifiedinfbrmationis handled and protected in
accordancewith:!.^ E.O. 13526^and predecessor orders^on Classified National Security
Infbrmation, 2.^ Infbrmation Security Oversight Office ^ISOO^Implem^ting Directive,
ClassifiedNational Security hifbrmation, 32 CFRParts 2001 and 2003, and 3.^thel2^^volume
ofthe Foreign Affairs Manual ^FAM^, section 500, titled Infbrmation Security. Classified
infbrmation should be handled and examined only under such conditions as are adequate to
prevent unauthorized personsfi^omgaining access. Classified material maynotberemovedfi^m
designated work areas ormovedfi^om infbrmation systems, e.g. classified databases, computer
networks, servers, or computers, except in the performance ofofficial duties and under special
conditionswhich^rovide^rotection fbrthe classifiedmaterial.
CLASSIFICATIONDETERMINATION
Ireviewed the material related to this case, which was provided bythe prosecution team
at the Department ofthe Army.
L

NCD Server Logs
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

NCDServerLogs^Voucher078^10,Item^:l^consistofNet^entricDiplomacy^NCD^
server access, audit, and application activity logging from January,2009 through June, 2010.
These logs reside onanational security system accredited to operate at the Secret level. They
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contain application activity logging, user session and search activity infbrmation, and extemal
browse-downdata. NCD logging isacontinuous,on-goingprocess based on system and user
activity. As such, no action to explicitly classifythe NCD server logs occurs while additional
activity logging is being appended and no original determination ofclassification was made
when the events that generated the log activitytook place. Asubsequentreview ofthe logs by
subject matter experts determined thatthe proper classification ofthe log activity data is
SECRETunderSectionsl.^^d^^g^ofE.O, 13526. Theaudit logs contain associations between
classified servernamesandTransmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol ^TCP/IP^ addresses.
Application logs include entries that reveal intemal system application attributes. Access logs
contain associations between TCP/IP addresses, usernames^iflogged on through Passports, data
on telegrams being searched, and actual search terms.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would expose
capabilities and identitiesofclassifiednational security systems rendering them vulnerable to
hostile actions. The compilation ofusernames, telegram data, and actual search terms contains
associations that could damage fbreign relations ofthe U.S.and reveal confidential sources.
2.

NCDFirewallLogs
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

Firewall Logs ^Voucher 151-10, Item ^ : 1 ^ consist ofFirewall activity logging fi^om
November,2009throughMay,2010
Theselogsresideonanationalsecuritysystemaccredited
to operate at the Secret level. Theycontaininfbrmationregardinginbound and outbound access
sessionsthrough the State Department'sperimetersecurity systems. Firewall logging isa
continuous, on-going process based on system and user activity. As such, no action to explicitly
classifythe Firewall server logs occurs while additional activity logging is being appended and
no original determination of classification was made when the events that generated the log
activitytook place. Asubsequentreview ofthe logs by subject matter experts detemiined that
the proper classification of the log activity data is SECRETunder Sectionl.^^g^ofE.O. 13526.
The Firewall logscontain associations between classified hostnamesandTransmissionContEol
Protocol/Internet Protocol ^TCP/IP^ addresses. Firewall logs also contain infbrmation by site
name listing both inbound and outbound classified access activities and application usage along
with data that reveals intemal content-filtering policies.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would expose
capabilities and identities ofclassified national security systems rendering them vulnerable to
hostile actions. The compilation ofcontent-filtering transactions contains associations that
reveal protection servicesrelatedto the national security.
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3

10REYKJAVIK13
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION

10REYKJAV1^13 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassyReyk)avik,datedJanuary13,
2010to the DepartmentofState. Threepages, The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL at the time itwas generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^d^,
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems an intemational dispute stemmingfi^omthe collapse ofan
Icelandic bank that had offered high interest savings accounts^named^^Icesave"accounts^to
depositors intheUnitedKingdom andthe Netherlands. It reports on three conversations with
the U.S. Embassy'sCharged'Affaires^CDA^ the person in chargeoftheEmbassyin the
absenceofthe Ambassador. In one meeting, the CDA spoke with two senior Icelandic officials.
In another, he spoke withasenior Icelandic diplomat. In the third, he spoke withaBritish
diplomat. The sources are named in the telegram. They offered theirviews in confidence to the
U.S.govemment. The telegram reporis theirpersonal views on this ongoing dispute and the
optionstheirgovemments were considering. Publicreleaseoftheoptionsunder consideration
could undermine the negotiating positions ofthe governments involved. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with Iceland
and the United Kingdom and diminish the willingnessof fbreign officials to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
^.

xl2^ Charging Documents
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION

99ISLAMABAD^95 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Islamabad, dated January 25,
1999 to the DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionl.^^d^ and thoseportions were
reclassified on August 9, 2011by an Original ClassificationAuthority^OCA^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram analyses public attitudes towards the messages ofmoderate and radical
Islam and increasingly antiAmerican and anti-^estemattitudes in Pakistan. It describes the
sometimes unsatisfactoryresultsofprevious public diplomacy efforts and makes proposals fbr
future public diplomacypolicy actions. In doing so it expresses views ofvarious potential
audiences and likely receptivityto various proposals. Unauthorized disclosure ofthis material
could be drawn upon, in or out of context, and used by our adversaries against us not only in

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Pakistan but in the wider Islamic world. Thus, it would be directly counterproductive to the
policypurpose ofthe document.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
05ALGIERS1836 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Algiers, datedAugust 29,2005 to
the DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.0.12958 at the time itwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSections l.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions describe some ofthe responses ofthe U.S.Ambassador's
interlocutors during his confidential conversationswith Govemmentof Algeriaofficials
fbllowingthe visit to the region ofSenatorLugar, who had conducted sensitive negotiations on
the releaseofPolisario prisoners long held by Morocco. The clear expectation ofthe Algerian
officials in the Ambassador'smeetings was that theirremarks, which included expressions of
private regret,were not fbrpublic dissemination. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of Algeria and
diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials
and visiting legislative branch persons.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06ALGIERS1961 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Algiers, dated November 12,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Six pages, Thetelegram was properlyclassified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O.13526 underSection l.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions identifyanon-official source who was speaking to U.S.officials
on intemal political and economic matters in the expectation of complete confidentiality. That
person'sabilityto function in thatsociety,andpossiblytheability ofhis associates to function,
would be harmed byrevelation ofhis identity.Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the individual concemed and diminish his
and others'willingness to conduct confidential business with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06 BAGHDAD26^6isan official telegramfi^omEmbassyBaghdad, datedJuly2^, 2006
to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.O. 12958atthetimeitwasgenerated,ThetelegramremainsSECRET under E.O. 13526
underSection l.^^d^.
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The report discussesasensitive intemal matter, the revelation ofwhich would to this day
create anger and instability amongasignificantsegmentofthepopulation in Iraq, In addition, it
is based on privilegedinfbrmationobtainedinstrictconfidencefi^om sources who expected longterm protection. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish its officials' -and other
privateparties' willingness to confide in U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06BAGHDAD^205 is an official telegramfiomEmbassyBaghdad, dated November 10,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated.The telegram remains
CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 13526 underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document describesaconversation between two very seniorU.S.officials and the
leadersofaleading Iraqi politicalgroup. Discussion centered on intemal politics and the Iraqi
participants clearly had the expectation that they were speaking in complete confidentiality.
Unauthorized disclosureoftheclassified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the important organization the interlocutorsrepresented and diminish its leaders' and
other Iraqi oppositionists'-willingness to communicatefi^anklywithU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06BEIRUT3603 is an official telegramficimEmbassy Beimt, dated Novemberll,2006
to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.O. 12958 atthe timeitwasgenerated.Thetelegramremains SECRET under E.O. 13526
underSections l.^^b^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thereportdescribesthe U.S.Ambassador'sconversationswith visiting intemational
organization officials onanumber of sensitive issues inaregion then in confiict. The officials
spoke with candorin the clear expectation thatthe Ambassadorwould hold their comments in
strict confidence. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to U.S,relations with the concemed agency and otherintemational organizations,
and diminish their officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06BEIRUT360^ is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Beirut, dated November 12, 2006
to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated.ThetelegramremainsSECRET under E.O. 13526
under Sectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocumentreportsaconversation between the U.S.Ambassador andasenior and
still-active Lebanese politician, who spoke in the expectation of complete confidentiality.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause serious harm to
the United States by diminishingthewillingnessofthe individual and, by extension, other
Lebanese leaderstoconductconfidentialexchanges in candorwithU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06BEIRUT3703 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassyBeirut, dated November 27,2006
to the Department ofState. Fourpages. Portions ofthe telegram were properly classified
SECRET under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
SECRET under E.O. 13526 underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions describe the U.S. Ambassador'sconfidential conversation witha
prominent Lebanese person who is still alive. The conversation centers on sensitive issues and
personalities on the Lebanese political scene, and was conducted in the expectation of complete
confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause
serious ham^ to relations with the followers ofthe individual and diminish U.S. officials'ability
to communicate with the various Lebanese factions. In the extreme, it could also endanger his
life in the volatile political/sectarian climate prevalent in that nation.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06BELGRADE1681 is an official telegramficimEmbassy Belgrade, dated Octoberl7,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526underSectionsL^^b^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram severely criticizes the response of senior Se^ian officials toaset of
proposals that the United States had made to the Serbian govemment designed to capture an
alleged war criminal wanted bythe Intemational CriminalTribunal fbr the fbrmer Yugoslavia.
The telegram also reports infbrmation provided bynamed fbreign officials to the U.S.
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govemment in the expectation that it would be kept confidential. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would harm relations with the Govemment ofSeibia and
especiallywiththeinfiuential persons who are directly criticized. Itsrelease would also
diminish the willingnessof officials from Serbia, the Intemational CriminalTribunal fbrthe
fbrmerYugoslavia, and elsewhere to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06COLOMBO1889 is an official telegram from Embassy Colombo, dated November 10,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Four pages. Thetelegram wasproperly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remain CONFIDENTIAL under E.0 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reportsadiscussion between the Ambassador and senior Sri Lankan
officials about the scope and intensity of recentGovemment ofSriLankamilitary action against
the rebel Tamil Tigers towards the end ofthe long fbught insurgency in thatcountry.
Descriptions ofthe actions and possible upcoming actions need no longer be classified in view of
the termination ofhostilities and the passage oftime. Material that remains classified reveals the
identities ofthe officials and infbrmation about military and capabilities/vulnerabilities. It also
expressestheAmbassador'sjudgmentoftheviewsexpressedbytheofficialsthemselvesandin
comparison to previouslyreported infbrmation. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified
material could be used to politically damage the officials involved and thereby cause damage to
relations with the GovemmentofSri Lanka.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5^20 is an official telegram from Embassy Kabul, dated November 10, 2006
to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALin partunder E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegram remain CONFIDENTIAL under ^.0.13^2^ underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the Ambassador'smeeting with President Karzai and senior security
officials about steps being taken to refbrm the Afghan National Police. Someportions that
remain CONFIDENTIAL report Karzai'semphasis on specific factors, including ethnic
representation and othersensitivematters. It also reports the Ambassador'simplioit evaluation
ofthosecomments.Otherportions reveal advice being given by specific participants including
one Euro^an allied official. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthis material would reveal the identities

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ofindividuals who were giving their views to the President and thereby would undeimine the
confidenceofPresidentKarzai, and of otherpersons present, in fiiture such exchanges.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5^21 is an official telegram from Embassy Kabul, dated November 10, 2006
to the Department ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in partunder E.O. 12958 atthetime itwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reports on the actionsofarecently arrived GovemorofUruzgan Province
in creatingamilitiaand describes its use in several intervening events. ItfiiEtherdiscusses the
possible integrationofthis and othermilitias into an auxiliarypolice. The portions that remain
classified describe confiictingversionsofthe events and allegations conceming motivations of
various parties. They also reveal the Embassy'sassessment ofthe events as they refiect on the
official who remains in high office. One portion also reveals related infbrmation given in
confidence by allied personnel in Afghanistan. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material
withheld would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of Afghanistan and diminish the
willingness ofour allies to exchange confidences with us.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5^35 is an official telegram fi^om Embassy Kabul, dated November 12, 2006
to the DepartmentofState. Six pages. Thetelegram wasproperly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated.Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderEOI3526underSectionsL^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reports on actions taken byanew Acting Commander ofthe Afghan
Border Police inKhostProvinceafterawalkout by about one fifth ofthe force underthe
previous commander and discusses prospects fbrthe future including likelypersonnel
movements, sometimes inapolitical context. Someportions report remarks by some fbreign
official and non-official sources about the nature ofthe previous problems and the actions and
motivations ofindividuals andgroups. The cable also gives the Embassy'sassessmentofthe
situation. Someoftheinfbrmationneedno longer be classified. Unauthorized disclosure of
otherreported events, allegations and ofthe sources could be damaging to individuals identified
and the Embassy'srelations with them, and inhibit the Embassy'sabilitytoelicitsimilarly
confidential infbrmation fromfiitureinterlocutors.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KATHMANDU3023 is an official telegram fi^om Embassy Kathmandu, dated
NovemberlO, 2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsof
thetelegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram describes the U.S.Ambassador'sdiscussions with the UN representative in
Nepal concemingaproposed UN role in the implementation of an impending agreement
between the GovemmentofNepalandMaoist insurgents to end their long confiict, including the
needfbraUN Security Council Resolution. Portions being withheld report the representative's
thinking about how he will proceed and what he envisions the UN role to be. It further expresses
the ambassador'sviews which are at odds with some ofthat thinking. Representatives of the UN
and its constituent bodies expect that their discussions with us ofthis nature will be kept in
confidence. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specifiedabovecould be used
against us and thoseofficialsbypersons or governments of countries withastake in matters
being discussed. Thus it would adversely affect our diplomats'abilityto conduct similar
discussions with all UN representatives worldwide, thereby damaging U.S. fbreign relations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06KATHMANDU302^is an official telegram from Embassy Kathmandu, dated
NovemberlO, 2006 to the DepartmentofState. Sevenpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTL^LunderE.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram describes the U.S. Ambassador'sconfidential conversations with the
NepalesePrimeMinister and his fbreign policyadvisoraboutthe prospects fbr an agreement
with the Nepalese Maoists af^eralong civil war and about the nature of the intemational
involvement. The portions thatremain CONFIDENTIAL reveal the Prime Minister'sand the
Advisor'sexpressed personal views as well as GovemmentofNepal thinking about: l^the
nature ofthe intemational involvement in reaching and implementing an agreement; 2^ attitudes
of certain otherparties; 3^ intemal political and legal aspects and ^^the likely attitude ofthe
insurgent elements. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterialspecified above could still
be used adversely by elementswithinNepalnot sympathetic with the govemmentand would
betray confidentialitiesexpected bythe Nepaleseofficials.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KU^A1T^30 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kuwait, dated NovemberlO,
2006 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. Thetelegram wasproperly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunder E.O. 12958atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIALunder E.0.13526 underSections l.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The stillexemptedportionsdescribe the Embassy'sassessm^t ofrumorsofthe
dissolution ofparliamentand new elections. It draws on conversations with various Kuwaiti
officials and politicians, who spoke to U.S.diplomats in the expectation ofconfidentiality.
Unauthorized disclosure of the classified material would cause harm to the Embassy'srelations
with both the Govemment ofKuwait and Kuwaiti politicians, and diminish theirwillingness to
conduct confidential exchanges with U.S. officials in the future.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KU^A1T^38 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kuwait, dated November 12,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunder E.O. 12958atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSection l.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions are part ofadiscussion betweenaU.S. andaKuwaiti official on
economic matters, especiallyastill-sensitive question conceming otherparties in the region.
The conversation was conducted in the expectation ofconfidentiality on both sides.
Unauthorizeddisclosureoftheexemptedmaterial would cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofKuwaitand diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06MADRID2955 is an official telegram from Embassy Madrid, dated November 27,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the Deputy Chief ofMission'sprivateconversation withasenior
Spanish official aboutaterritorialdispute in another country. Thetelegram also reportsaremark
on the same topic that an evenmore senior Spanish official made toavisiting American
diplomat inaconfidential setting. The dispute in questionhas implications fbrthe territorial
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integrityofSpain, making itaparticularlysensitiveissue in Spanish politics. Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations with the
GovemmentofSpain and diminish the willingnessofSpanish and otherofficials to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06MADRID2956 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Madrid, dated November 27,
2006 to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^b^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reportsaprivate conversation between the Deputy Chief ofMissionanda
senior Spanish official about the prospects fbr admitting another countryto the European Union
^EU^. The Spanish official comments on the attitudes ofother EU members on the issue.
Unauthorizeddisclosureoftheclassifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofSpain and diminish the willingnessofSpanish and otherofficials to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06PRISTINA9^7isanofficialtelegramfiomU,S.OfficePristina,datedNovemberll,
2006 to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in partunder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems plans fbrthe departure ofthe United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
Classified portions report confidential criticismsfi^omnamed sources about the perfbrmanceof
an intemational organization andagovernment ministry and itschief. Unauthorized disclosure
ofthe classified material specified above would diminish the willingnessof officials fi^om
fbreign governments and intemational organizationsto speak fi^anklywith U.S.representafives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06PRISTINA9^8isano^cialtelegramfi^omU.S.OfficePristina,datedNovemberll,
2006 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remain CONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526 underSectionsl.^^^^d^,

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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems plans fbr refugee movements afteradecisiononKosovo'sfinal
status. Classifiedportions contain critical commentsabout the performance ofintemational
agencies, some of them offered in the expectation of confidentiality byanamedfbreign official
andsomemadeby U.S. Office Pristinaitself. Unauthorized disclosure oftheclassifiedmaterial
specified above would cause harm to relations with intemational organizations and diminish the
willingness ofofficialsfi:^omintemational organizations and fbreigngovernments to share their
views with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06RfYADH8811isanofficialtelegramfi^omEmbassy Riyadh, datedNovemberll,2006
to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRET under E.O. 13526
underSections l.^^a^,^^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document reports highly sensitive conversations between U.S. Embassy officials and
visitingU.S. military officials on the oneside, and senior Saudi officials on theother. The
discussions, which involved very delicate political and material matters, wereconducted in the
expectation oftotal secrecy. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe contentswouldcauseseriousharm
to relations with the Govemment ofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand seriously diminish its
officials'willingness to conduct sensitive diplomatic and security business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06SEOUL3882 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Seoul, dated November 10, 2006 to
the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 atthe time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain SECRET under E.O.
13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseclassified portions describe the U.S.Charged'Affairs'diplomatic exchanges with
asenior fbreignministry official ofthe Govemment ofthe Republic ofKorea conceming the
Proliferation Security Initiative ^PSI^,aglobal anti-proliferation effbrt aimed at stopping the
trafficking of weaponsofmass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. This
effbrt is particularlyimportant as it relates to North Korea. The PSI is highly controversial in the
Republic ofKoreaand unauthorized disclosure of the classified material could be seized upon by
opposition elements to undermine supporters ofthe effbrt. In addition, compromise ofthis
diplomaticexchange would cause harm toU.S.relationswith the Govemment ofthe Republic of

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Korea and discourage its officialsfi^omconducting highly sensitive diplomatic business with
U.S. officials in the future.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06SEOUL3885 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassySeoul,dated November 12,2006 to
the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSections^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The classified portions describeadiscussionbetweenasenior South Korean political
figure andU.S, diplomatic officials coveringabroadrangeofhighly sensitive topics including
the U.S,-Republic ofKoreaAlliance,NorthKoreaand the SixParty Talks and domestic
political developments. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would
cause embarrassment and harm to this highlyprominent politician and diminish the willingness
ofother Korean officials to discuss confidential sensitive subjects with U.S. officials in the
future. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would also cause harm
torelationswith the Govemment ofthe Republic ofKoreaand diminish its officials'willingness
to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06SUVA^89 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Suva, dated November 12,2006 to the
DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in part
underE.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl^^b^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The classified portions describe the embassy'sassessmentofacivil-military crisis in
whichFiji'sMilitary Forces Commanderis pitted againstthecountry'sPrime Minister.
Detailed commentsfi^omprominent local sources on the growing confi^ontation are also reported.
Unauthorized disclosure oftheclassifiedmaterial would cause harm to U.S. relations with the
local authorities and injure the reputation of embassy sources resulting in an unwillingnessof
these and othersources to meetwith U.S. officials in the future.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06TAIPEI3830isatelegramfi^om the American Institute Taiwan ^AIT^, Taipei, dated
November 12,2006 to the Department ofState. Two pages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified SECRET under E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainSECRET under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^^d^.
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describes an AITofficer'sconfidential discussion with an export control
authorityinTaiwan conceming UN Security Council Resolution 1718,which imposed economic
and commercial sanctions on NorthKorea in the afiermath ofthat nation'sclaimednucleartest
ofOctober9,2006. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material would cause harm to U.S.
relations with the authorities in Taiwan and diminishTaiwan officers'willingness to conduct
confidential business with the American Institute in Taiwan in the future.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06TRIPOLI6^5 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Tripoli, dated November 10, 2006
to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in partunder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions describeaconversation between an Embassy officer anda
representative ofthe Libyan Ministry ofForeign Affairs called at the behest ofthat Ministry.
The purpose was to convey Libya'sviews onaregional issue, and the GovemmentofLibyahad
every expectation to believe that the United States Govemment would treat the subject and the
details ofthe discussion as confidential. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classifiedmaterial
specified above would cause harm to relations with theGovemmentofLibya present or future
-and diminish its officials'willingness to conductconfidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials. It would also be seen by otherstates,particularlythose in the region, ofalapse in U.S.
abilityto maintain confidentialityin its diplomatic exchanges.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06TRlPOLI6^8isanofficialtelegramfiomEmbassyTripoli, datedNovember 10,2006
to the Depar^ent ofState. Fourpages, The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated.Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSection l.^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThosepoitionscontaintheEmbassy'scandidanalysisoftheLibyancentralbank's
attempts to enlist our help in settingupatrainingprogram.Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe
exempted material would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofLibya present or
future-and diminishitsofficials'willingness to conductdiscussmatters in private with U.S.
officials.

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^ ^ ^ ^ ^- 1^^ ^^^^. , , —

20241

DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07ADDISABABA2197 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Addis Ababa, dated July
13,2007 to the Department ofState. Sevenpages. Thetelegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthe time it was generated. Portions remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSection l.^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
It reportsaconversation with an NGO source who was speaking in confidence with U.S.
officials aboutsensitive matters inazone of ongoing insurgency. He may have been speaking
withoutthe consent ofhisorganization.Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classifiedmaterial
specified above would cause serious harm to the individual and inhibithisand his organization's
ability to functionin countries throughoutthe entire region. This in tum could have negative
impact on the abilityofU.S. officials to communicate with non-government individuals.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07ANKARA23isanofficialtelegramfiomEmbassyAnkara,datedJanuary8,2007to
the Department ofState. Threepages. Thetelegram was classified CONFIDENTIALunder
E.O. 12958 atthetime itwasgenerated.Aportion ofthe telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526 underSection l.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concemsTui^ish impatience with American efforts to counterthe Kurdish
^o^ers'Party ^PKK^, which is engaged in amiedstmggle with the GovemmentofTuri^ey. The
classified portion contains the Embassy'sspeculation aboutintemal pressures within theTurkish
govemment. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specifiedabove would cause
harm to relations with the Govemiment ofTurkey.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
^^^^;

07AN^^ARA2^68 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Ankara, dated October ^,2007 to
the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram assesses the prospects fbrpolitical refbrm inTurkey. Classifiedportions
contain assessments ofpolitical refbrm that official, non^fficial, and diplomatic sources, some
named and others identifiable, provided in confidence to Embassy staffs One portion contains
the Embassy'sown assessment ofthe situation. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would subject some Embassy sources to retribution and would, in
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^.

general, diminish the willingness ofsources to share their views with U.S. officials.
Unauthorized disclosure of the Embassy'sviews on the sensitive domestic issue of political
refbrm would damage relations withTui^ey.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07ASHGABAT1359 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Ashgabat, dated December
1^,2007 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. Thetelegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSections l.^^^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE

^^^^

The telegramreports the account given to the U.S,Ambassador bythe Russian
AmbassadorinTui^kmenistanaboutarecent high level Russian-Turkmen visit which resulted in
agas export agreementandotherpublicly announced topics. The portions remaining
CONFIDENTIAL are the Russian Ambassador'sexplanations about the detailsofthe Russian
Turkmen arrangements, his rather extraordinaryinterpretationofU.S.policyin the region and of
TuriEmenistan'srelations with the Chinese and other governments in the region. They also relay
the Embassy'sfi^ank comments abouttheRussian'sexpressedviews.Unauthorized disclosure of
the classified material specified above would cause hami to relations with the Russian and the
Turkmen governments and diminish their officials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD35 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January 5, 2007
to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.O. 13526
underSection l.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document transmits the Embassy'sanalysis ofastill-delicate intemal political
situation in the country. It contains candidassessments ofthe motives and perfbm^ance ofsenior
Iraqi officials, some still in power. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified
above would cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish its
officials'willingness to discuss delicate political matters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD36 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, datedJanuary5,2007
to the Depa^ent ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under

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E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRET under E.O. 13526
underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram contains the Embassy'sreportofaconversation between the Ambassador
andahighlyplaced Iraqi govemment o^cial on sensitive intemal and bilateralmatters. The
conversation was conducted in the expectation ofstrict confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure
ofthe contents would cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish
itsofficials'willingness to discussdelicate political and securitymatters with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
^

07BAGHDAD37 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January5,2007
to theDepartment ofState. Sevenpages. Thetelegram wasproperly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.O. 13526

^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document contains the Embassy'sreport ofameetingbetweenaveryseniorvisiting
U.S. officials and senior Iraqi political and govemment persons on sensitive intemal and bilateral
matters. Several ofthe Iraqi participants are still in theirrespective positions. The conversation
was conducted in the expectation of strict confidentiality on the Iraqi side. Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause serious harm to relations with
both theGovemment oflraq and Iraqi politicalfigures,and diminish theirwillingness to discuss
delicate political and securitymatters with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
.^A^^..^^;
^^^^^^^

07BAGHDAD^2 isan official telegramfiomEmbassyBaghdad, datedJanuary 7,2007
to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram wasproperly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains SECRET under E.O. 13526
underSections l.^^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE

^.IB

The telegram contains the Embassy'sreport and analysis of an intemal security situation
andtheGovemmentoflraq'seffbrtstodealwithit. It refers to conversations with Iraqi
officials, some ofwhom senior and stillserving, conducted in candor and the expectation of
strict confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would
cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish itsofficials'
willingnesstodiscussdelicatepolitical and securitymatters with U.S.officials.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD53 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, datedJanuary7,2007
to the Department ofState.Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 13526 underSectionslB^^^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocument contains the Embassy'sreport ofacandid conversation on intemal
political and securitymatters withasenior Iraqi official, who is still serving, conducted in the
expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above
would cause harm to relations with the individual and the Govemment oflraq, and diminish its
officials'willingness to discuss political and securitymatters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD56 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January7,2007
to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526underSection l.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Exempted portions contain the Embassy'ssometimes critical assessment ofthe political
and security situation inaprovince in Iraq. It includes quotes fiom local political leaders who
were speaking in confidence toU.S. officials.Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause hami to relations with the Govemment oflraq and with political
leaders. Revelation would diminish thosepersons'willingness to discuss political and security
matters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
^ ^B^^B

^

07BAGHDAD63 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, datedJanuary7,2007
to the DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated.ThetelegramremainsSECRET under E.O. 13526
under Sectionsl.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document contains the Embassy'sreport ofasensitiveconversation on intemal
political and regional and securitymatters between the Ambassador andasenior Iraqi official,
who also representsaminority faction. It was held in the expectation ofconfidentiality.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause serious harm to
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relations with Iraqi leaders and officials and diminish theirwillingness to discuss political and
securitymatterswith U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD6^ is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January7,2007
to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Depaimient ofState equities are no longersensitive; butrelease would require
Department ofTreasury concurrence.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD70 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January 8, 2007
to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O, 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526underSections l.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document contains the Embassy'sreportofaconversation on intemal political and
securitymatterswithaveryseniorh^aqiofficial,whoisstillserving,conductedinthe
expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above
would cause haim to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish its officials'willingness
to discuss political and securitymatters with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
OTBANGKOKIIlis an official telegram fiom the Embassyin Bangkok, datedJanuary 8,
2007 to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describes the U.S.Ambassador'sconfidential conversations with senior
Thai govemment officials conceming serious Thai domestic difficulties. Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would result in serious embarrassment to the
senior Thai officials mentioned and would be seized on by some local critics as heavy-handed
U.S. interference in Thai intemal affairs. Sucharevelation would cause overall harm to U.S.
relations with the Govemment ofThailand and would lessen U.S. effectiveness in our effbrt to
ameliorate future problems.
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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
07BASRAH3 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Office Basrah, dated January 5, 2007
to the Department of State. Three pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part
under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions remain SECRET under E.O. 13526
under Sections 1.4 (b) and (d).
IMPACT OF RELEASE
The document is a report of a kidnapping of an American citizen in Basrah and the
exempted passages include candid commentary on the background of the case, as well as
infbrmation provided in confidence by Iraqi security officials. Unauthorized disclosure of the
classified material specified above would cause serious hami to relations with the Govemment of
Iraq and hinder future willingness oflraqi authorities to share information with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
07BEUING152 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Beijing, dated January 8, 2007 to
the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 under Sections 1.4 (bXd).
IMPACT OF RELEASE
-

This telegram describes the U.S. Charge d' Affairs' conversation with a Chinese
Assistant Foreign Minister held with an expectation of confidentiality conceming matters related
to the Taiwanese and their alleged "separatist activities." Unauthorized disclosure of the
classified material would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of China and diminish its
officials' confidence in being able to discuss complex dq>lomatic business with U.S. officials
without their views being publicized.
.;

^

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION

'''''

07BEIRUT1958 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Beirut, dated December 14, 2007
to the Department of State. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. It remains CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526
under Section 1.4(d).
IMPACT OF RELEASE
:
The telegram reports the Embassy's conversations with political leaders on sensitive
intemal issues conceming their movement. The leaders, many of whom are still active in
Lebanon's tempestuous politics, would expect their confidences to be strictly protected by U.S.
officials. Unauthorized disclosure of the classified material specified above would cause hami to
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relations with the opposition politicalfiguresin Lebanon and diminish its leaders'willingness to
discuss policymatters with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BOGOTA101 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Bogota, datedJanuary 5, 2007 to
the Department ofState, Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O, 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionl4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This cable sets outfbravisiting seniorU.S. military commanderthe political and security
situation in Colombia and describes the views ofsenior Colombian officials on the country's
strainedrelations with several third countries. Thewithheldmaterial speculates on new
directionsin fbreign policy fbllowingpolitical change. Itdiscussesthe country'srelations with
two othercountrieswhich have become particularly sensitive. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe
classified material specified above would cause hami to relations with the Govemment of
Colombiaand with third countries and would diminish the willingness of Colombian officials to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials, to the detriment ofour interests in
the country,
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BOGOTA5118 is an officialtelegram fiom Embassy Bogota, datedJuly 13, 2007 to
theDepartment ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526underSectionsl4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe ongoingnegotiationsbetweenthe Govemment of Colombiaand
aterroristgroup andthe Govemment'spriority objectives in those negotiations. The infomiation
was provided to us by officials in confidence, and theiridentity deserves protection. The
infbrmation includes strategies and tactics that the Govemmentmight still employ in
negotiations with dissidents and our own evaluation oftheirpossible effectiveness.
Unauthorizeddisclosure oftheclassifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations
with the Govemment ofColombia and diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S.officials orto provide information, to the detriment of our interests
in the country.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BRATISLAVA665 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Bratislava, dated December
14, 2007 to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 atthetime itwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALin partunder E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE

:^.^^

Classified portionsreport onaprivatemeetingbetween the DeputyChiefofMission and
theDeputyForeignMinisterofSlovakiainwhichtheydiscussedKosovo and Iran.
Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofSlovakia and diminish the willingness ofSlovak and other officials to
Bconduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. representatives,
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BRIDGETO^^23 is an official telegram fi-om Embassy Bridgetown, datedJanuary 5,
2007 to the DepartmentofState, Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALin part under E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe the impactin Grenada of recent elections inaneighboring
Caribbean country,theeflbrts of Grenadian political groups to use the outcome fbrtheir own
purposes, andtheprivate comments ofleadingGrenadian political figures to U.S.Govemment
officials. The infbrmation was given with an expectation ofconfidentiality. The infbrmation
includesafi-ank analysis of weaknesses of various elements ofthe local political scene and the
media. It speculates on tactics to be used byvarious political groups. Unauthorizeddisclosure
oftheclassifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations with various Grenadian
political factions and leaders as well as Govemmentolficials and would discourage their
willingness to engage in candid and confidential diplomatic exchanges with U.S. officials, to the
detrimentofU.S. interests in the country.
B ^ -

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BUENOSAIRES1341 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Buenos Aires, dated July
13,2007 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated.Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSections14(b)(d).

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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes the U.S.Ambassador'sconversations with Govemmentof
Argentinaofficials conceming differences within the Argentine Govemment onrelations with
the U.S.Govemment. Theytookplace inaconfidential environment that permitted each official
to speakfi^ankly.The message makesrecommendationsonimprovingstrainedbilateral and
regional ties. It proposesfiirtherhigb-level discussions with Department ofState principals.
Sensitive regional issues are raised in the conversations, withafi-ank exchange of views. Past
bilateralproblemsare discussed. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified
above would cause harm torelationswith the Govemment of Argentina, diminish itsofficials'
willingness to conductconfidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials, and inhibit future
negotiations.
^

DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

07CARACAS2346 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Caracas, dated December 14,
2007 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionl.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes developments inakeyVenezuelan economic sector, drawing on
the assessments ofmultiple industrial sector and official sources. It speculates on possible
malfeasance andreportsevidenceofmultiplefinancialdifficulties relating toabulwark ofthe
country'seconomy. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would
seriously damage commercial and official interests ofthe various sources, diminish their
willingness to engage in candid exchangeswith U.S. officials, and open them toofficial
harassmentand commercial retaliation. Itwouldreducetheabilityof ourofficialsto protect
U.S, economic interests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07CARACAS35 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Caracas, datedJanuary 5, 2007 to
the Department ofState, Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O, 13526 underSectionl.4(d),
^B^^^,^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThoseportionsdescribeaVenezuelanGovemment'sinitiativeto fbrmasingle
"revolutionary" political party,theEmbassy'sfi^ank assessment ofthe purposeofthe new
organization, and the reaction ofdiverse supporters ofPresident Chavez to being subject to
increased political discipline and stricter ideology. It speculates on tactics to be used by the
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Govemment.Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm torelationswith the Govemment ofVcnezuela and diminish the willingness ofVenezuelan
political leaders and other sources to conduct confid^tial and candid discussions with U.S.
officials and to provide infbrmation.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07DHAKA24 is an official telegram from Embassy Dhaka, datedJanuary7,2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526underSectionsl4(b)(d)
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the Ambassador'sconversation,togetherwithathird country
national, infbrmingthe head ofamajor Bangladeshi political party ofhighly sensitive political
in^rmation that had come from confidential sources, ^^ilethefactofthe Ambassador's
meetingwithapolitical leaderisnotsensitive, the unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above could be explosive in the Bangladeshi domestic political scene and
cause harm torelationswith the party leader and otherinfiuential persons in Bangladesh, and
therebyimpairtheEmbassy'sabilitytoeffectivelyrepresentU.S.national securityinterests in
thatcountry.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07KABUL68 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kabul, datedJanuary7,2007, Four
pages. The telegram was properly classifiedSECRET under E.O. 12958 at the time it was
generated. The telegram remains SECRET under E.O. 13526 under Sectionsl.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram describesameeting between Embassy Kabul andanumber of Afghan
officials discussingindetailmattersconcemingAfghan detainees held bythe U.S. Portions
withheld describe various possible arrangements b^twe^th^ U.S. and Afghanistan for the
possible movementand/orreleaseofparticularindividuals.Itreveals infbrmation about and
constraints perceived on this highly sensitive subjectwhich isamatter of concem not onlyto the
detaineesand their families but also toawidespectrumofthe Afghan populace. Itsrelease
would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofAfghanistan and diminish its officials'
willingness toconductconfidential diplomatic business with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07KINGSTON25isanofficialtelegramfiomEmbassyKingston,datedJanuary5,2007
to the Depariment ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
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in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportionsdescribe sensitive commentsbyaleadingintemationalhealth official on
the efficacy ofthe Govemment ofJamaica'sresponsetoamalaria outbreak and the country's
fiindingpriorities fbrpublic health. He speculates on the effect the outbreak might have ona
future intemational sporting eventto be hosted by Jamaica. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemmentof
Jamaica, diminish the willingness ofintemational officials toconductconfidential businesswith
U.S. officials, and create strainsin relations between an intemational entity and the Govemment
ofJamaica.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07KUALALUMPUR40 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Kuala Lumpur, dated
January 8, 2007 to the Department ofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsl4(b)(d).
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r .

IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describesaU.S.Embassy officer'sconfidential conversations withasenior
Malaysian Foreign Affairs official concemingacontroversial matterto be considered bythe UN
SecurityCouncil.Unauthorizeddisclosureofthis classified material would cause harm to
relations with the Govemment ofMalaysia and diminish its officials'confidence in discussing
sensitive intemational issues with the U.S., without fear oftheirviews being publicized.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07LAGOS719is an official telegram fiom Embassy Lagos, dated November 1,2007 to
the DepartmentofState, Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
partunderE.0.12958atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofitremain CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526 underSectionl.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
It is an Embassyreportonanew,highlypublicized gubernatorial appointment. Portions
ofit draw on the sensitivecommentsofprivate sources who believed they were speaking in
confidence and whose identities need to be protected. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would cause harm to the Embassy'srelations with political leaders and
diminish theirwillingness to engage in candid discussions with U.S. officials in the future.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07LAPA^1949isanofficialtelegramfiomEmbassyLaPaz, datedJuly 13, 2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSectionsl.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe the commentsofleadingBolivian politicalfiguresabout an
attack on an indigenous leader and the Embassy'sfiank assessment ofthe political consequences
ofthe incident. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause
harm to relations with theGovemment ofBolivia and diminish thewillingnessofleading
Bolivianpoliticians to conduct confidential diplomatic businesswith U.S. officials, to the
detrimentofourinterests in the country.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07LIMA^400 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Lima, dated July 13,2007 to the
National SecurityCouncil and to the DepartmentofState.Fourpages. The telegram was
properlyclassified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthe time it was generated.
Portionsofthetelegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under Section 1.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describeU.S,officials'confidential conversations with Govemment of
Pern officials and civic leaders duringaperiod ofincreased labor unrest and street
demonstrations. It includes the Embassy'sfiankassessment of the likely political consequences
ofthe unrest. Several sources are identified whose opinions and infbrmation areofimportance
to the Embassyin protecting U.S. interests in the country. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofPeru
and diminishwillingnessofitsofficialsandof civic leaders to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials and to provide infomiation.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07MINSK1024 is an official telegram from Embassy Minsk, dated December 14, 2007 to
the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionl4(d).
^

IMPACTOFRELEASE

^^^^

The telegram reports onavisit bythe Ambassador andarepresentative of the European
Union toahospitalized youth leaderwho had been beaten bypolice. Classified portions contain
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the views ofthe hospitalized activist andarelative as well as infbrmationfiomanothernamed
source abouthis condition. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above
would endanger Embassy contacts in Belarus and diminish the willingness of sources
everywhere to speak fi^kly with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07MOSCO^5824 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Moscow,dated December 14,
2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated.Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThetelegramreportswhataseniorRussiandiplomattoldanembassyofficerin
confidence onavarietyof current issues. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified materia
specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofRussia and diminish the
willingnessofRussian and otherofficials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07MOSCO^5825 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Moscow,datedDecember14,
2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated.Thetelegramr^ains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSection14(d).
^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram discusses Russian politics, presenting the viewsofnumerous identified
sources who talked with Embassy officers in the expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would endangersomeofthe sources cited
and, in general, diminish the willingnessofRussians and others to speakfi^anklywithU.S.
officials.
^
^
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07NE^^^ELHI80 is an official telegram fiom Embassy New Delhi, dated January 8,
2007 to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. Thetelegram wasproperly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in partunder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portions ofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526 underSection 1.4(d).

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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the passageofareligious conversion ban in one State in India.
Those portions thatremain CONFIDENTIAL include the source of an opinion given bya
memberofaminority religious community and the Embassy'scomment on the political
significance ofthe measure to the central govemment in India. Unauthorized disclosureofthe
source could adversely impact the personal welfare ofthe interlocutor. Disclosure ofthe U.S.
commentwould likely be exploited bypoliticaland/orsectarian parties, thereby infiaming antiAmerican feelings and causing harm to U.S.relations with India.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07PANAMA1197 is an official telegram fiom EmbassyPanama, dated July 13,2007 to
the Department ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O.12958 at the time it was generated.Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSections14(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe confidential conversations between U.S. officials and
Govemment ofPanama officials and oppositionleaders on infightingwithinPanama'spolitical
parties. Thesefi^ankdiscussions center on candidates fbr legislative leadership positions and fbr
the Presidency. There are also sensitive conversations onPanama'srelations with third countries
which directly affect U.S.interests. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified
above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofPanama and diminish the
willingness ofofficials and otherpolitical leaders to provide infbrmation and to conduct
^
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials, to the detrimentofourinterests in the
country.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07PANAMA1198 is an official telegramfiomEmbassyPanama, datedJuly 13, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O.12958 at the time itwas generated. Thetelegramremains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.0.13526underSections14(b)(d)
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes theU.S.Ambassador'sconversations with Govemment of
Panama officials af^erdeliveringademarche on sensitive negotiations onadifficult regional
problem. They took place inaconfidential environment that permitted each official to speak
frankly. The message includes an Embassy assessment ofthe likely Panamanian response to
U.S. proposals. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause

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harm to relations with the Govemment ofPanama, diminish itsofficials'willingness to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials, and inhibit fiiture negotiations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07PARIS4722 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Paris, dated December 14, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder E.O.
12958 atthe time itwas generated.The telegram remains SECRET under E.O. 13526 under
Sections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the views oftwo named fbreign officials about Franco-German
cooperation and Frenchofficials. ThecommentsweremadetoaU.S. Embassy officer in the
expectation of confidentiality.Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above
wouldjeopardize the career ofonesourceand, in general, diminish the willingness offbreign
officials to exchange views with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07PARIS4723 is anofficial telegram fiom Embassy Paris, dated December 14, 2007 to
the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under
E 0 13526underSectionsl.4(b)(d)(e)
IMPACTOFRELEASE

^

The telegram concems an intemational trade dispute between the United States and the
European Union. Itprovides the Embassy'sanalysis ofthe problem and its recommendations fbr
action, while also identi^ngasource ofinformation provided in confidence to the Embassy.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to the
economic interestsofthe United States and diminish the willingness of fbreign contacts to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07RANGOON22 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Rangoon, dated January 8, 2007
to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.0 13526underSectionsl.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describes sensitive infbrmation and analysis conceming the Burmese ruling
authorities and possible fiiture political developments. In addition, it includes comments fi-om
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multiple sources, includingathird country diplomat, provided with an expectation of
confidentiality conceming Burmese intemal matters. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
materialwoulddamagerelationswiththehostgovemmentandalsojeopardizetheabilityofthe
U.S.Embassyto obtain similarinfbrmation in the futurefi^omthese and other sources.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07REYKJAVIK203isan officialtelegramfi^omEmbassyReykjavik,datedJuly13, 2007
to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSections14(b)(d)
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems an Icelandic inquiryinto allegations that the CIA transported
detainees through Iceland. Classified portions reportthe Embassy'sanalysis ofthe situation and
the viewsofnamed or identifiable Icelandic officialsas provided to Embassy staffin the
expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above
would cause harm to relations with the Govemmentoflceland and diminish the willingnessof
Icelandic and other officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
representatives.
^ DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07RIYADH21 is an officialtelegramfiomEmbassyRiyadh, datedJanuary 8, 2007 to tiie
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under E.O.
12958 at the time it was generated. ItremainsSECRETunderE.O. 13526 under Sections 1.4
^^^^
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document reportsadiplomatic demarche by an Embassy Officer on an official ofthe
Saudi MinistryofForeignAffairsonaregionalmatter,includingtheresponse ofthe Saudi
official. The Saudi official spoke in the expectation that thediplomatic exchange would be
treated as confidential. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified materialspecifiedabove would
cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment ofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand
diminish its officials'willingness to speak in confidence to U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07RIYADH22 is an official telegramfiomEmbassyRiyadh, datedJanuary 8, 2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 12958atthetimeitwasgenerated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under
Sections 1.4(b)and(d).
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isareportofadiplomatic demarche by an Embassy Officer onasenior
official ofthe Saudi Ministry ofForeign Affairs conceming regional and bilateral matters. The
content ofthedemarche, as well as the response ofthe Saudi official, remain sensitive. The
Saudi official spoke in theexpectation thatthediplomaticexchange would be treatedas
confidential. Unauthorized disclosure oftheclassifiedmaterial specified above would cause
harm torelationswith theGovemmentofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand diminish its
officials'willingness to speak in confidence to U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07R1YADH23 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Riyadh, datedJanuary 8, 2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder E.O.
12958 at the time itwas generated. ItremainsSECRETunderE.O. 13526 under Sections 1.4(b)
and(d). ,
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isareportofadiplomatic demarche by an Embassy Officer on an official
ofthe Saudi Ministry ofForeign Affairs onasensitive regional matter, and includes the response
ofthe Saudi official. The Saudi official spoke in the expectation that the diplomatic exchange
would betreated as confidential. Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe exempted material would cause
serious harm to U.S. relations with the Govemment ofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand would
diminish its officials'willingness to speak in confidence to U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07SANSALVADOR1375 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy San Salvador, datedJuly
13, 2007 to the Department ofState, Threepages, The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderEO. 12958atthetimeitwasgenerated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSections1.4(a)(d)(g).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe proposedU.S.govemmental assistance programs aimed at
addressing Salvadoran vulnerabilities to intemational narcotics traffickers and t^-rorists. The
portions describespecificequipmentand training and how certain equipment can bestmeet
Salvadorian needs. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would
expose vulnerabilities ofthe Salvadoran police and militaryto the operations ofintemational
narcotics traffickers and terrorists, to the detrimentofU.S, interests.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07SANTODOMINGO28 is an official telegram fiom EmbassySanto Domingo, dated
January8,2007totiieDepartmentofState.Ninepages.Thetelegramwasproperlyclassified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526underSectionl.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe the U.S. Embassy'sassessment ofthe level of corruption in the
Dominican Republic, public attitudes toward the problem, efforts ofthe Dominican Govemment
to confionti4 and the likelihood ofsuccess. The material includes reportsofpolitical
motivations fbrprosecutionofcorruption. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with theGovemment ofthe Dominican Republic
and diminish the willingness ofitsofficials and other sources to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials and to provide information, to the detrimentofU.S. interests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07SUVA18is an official telegram from Embassy Suva, datedJanuary7,2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.0.12958 at thetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSectionsl.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The remaining classified portions ofthis telegram describe the fbrmation ofan interim
govemmentin Fiji fbllowingacoup carried out by Fiji'smilitary commander. Commodore
Bainimarama. Many ofthe sources as well as the individuals mentioned continue to be
important active senior politicalfiguresin Fiji.Unauthorized disclosure of the classified
material would cause harm to U.S.relations with the GovemmentofFiji and diminish the trust
oflocal sources to share infbrmation with theU.S. Embassy.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07TUNIS47isanofficialtelegramfiomEmbassyTunis,datedJanuary5,2007tothe
DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part under
E.O. 12958 at thetimeit was generated. Portions remain SECRET under E.O. 13526 under
Sections 1.4(b)and(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isabriefingpaper^r the upcoming visit toTunisiaofaU.S.official. The
exempted portionsrefertoanincidentthe details of which were obtained by sensitive means. It
also reportsasensitiveactionbytheGovemmentofTunisia conceming intemal security.
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Unauthorized disclosure ofthe exempted material would cause serious harm to sensitive sources,
and harm relations with the Govemment ofTunisia, including thepresentinterim one, with the
result beingthatthatTunisianindividuals and officials wouldhave less trust in theirfiiture
exchangeswith U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07USUNNE^ORK573 isan official telegram fiom tiie UnitedStates UNMission,
datedJuly 13,2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsof
tiie telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportionsdescribe senior State Departmentand^hiteHouseofficials'confidential
conversationswith the Secretary General ofthe United Nations on sensitive intemational
negotiations conceming difficult regional problems. The fi^k discussion took place with an
expectation ofconfidentiality. The give and takepermitied each side to promote its objectives.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to sensitive
intemational negotiations and diminish thewillingnessofUnited Nation officials to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07USUNNE^ORK575 is an official telegramfi^omtiieU.S.Missionto tiie United
Nations, dated July 13,2007 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classifiedCONFlDENTIALunder E.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsoftiie
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems United Nations efforts to establishaspecial tribunal to investigate
theassassinationofapolitical leader and other attacks in Lebanon. Itreportsameeting in which
anamed UN official briefed representatives ofthe U.S. mission in the expectation of
confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the United Nations and diminish the willingnessofUN and other officials
to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07USUNNE^ORK578isanofficialtelegramfi-omtiieU.S.Missionto die United
Nations, dated July 13,2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsof
tiietelegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports onaprivate meeting of diplomatsfi^omseven countries to negotiate
aSecurityCouncilresolution on Kosovo. The classified portions are statements of national
positions, includingverbatim quotationsfi-omfbreign Ambassadors, not always in accordance
withtheirinstructions. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specifiedabove would
diminish the willingness of fbreign officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with
U.S. representatives and consequentlydamagerelationswith several fbreign governments.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07VIENTIANE12 is an official telegram fiom the AmericanEmbassy Vientiane, dated
January 8, 2007 to the DepartmentofState. Ninepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderE.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The classified portionsofthis telegram describeadiscussionbetweenaU.S.
Congressman andaVice President ofthe Lao National Assembly, who is alsoaPolitburo
member. The embassy'sreporting contains sensitive candid comments concemingthis senior
politicalfigurein Laos. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material would cause harm to
U.S. relations with the Govemment ofLaos and would be likely to diminish Lao cooperation
with the American Embassy on issues importantto the U.S.
^
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07VILNIUS13 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Vilnius, datedJanuary 8, 2007 to
the Departinent ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d),
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems Lithuanian effbrts to satisfy the requirements fbrmembership in
the "Schengen" group ofEuropean countries witii open intemal borders. Classifiedportions
contain the Embassy'sanalysis and report the viewsofnamed Lithuanian officials that were
offeredtoEmbassystafi^intiieexpectationofconfidentialityandweresometimescriticaloftiie
Lithuanian govemment. Unauthorizeddisclosureoftheclassifiedmaterial specified above
would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofLithuaniaand diminish the willingness of
Lithuanian and other officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08AMMAN535 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Amman, dated February 20, 2008
to the Department ofState. Ten pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated, Portionsofthe telegramremain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)and(d).
^^^^^^^^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocumentcontains the Embassy'sreport ofthe actions of opposition politicians and
groups in the lead up to changes in political organization and parliamentary elections. Itreports
confidential contacts with senior Jordanian govemment officials on the elections, as well as
delicate Embassy analysis ofthe situation. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with officials ofthe Govemment ofthe Kingdom
ofJordan, and wouldhampertheEmbassy'sfuture abilityto communicate in confidence with
non-govemmental political players.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08CAIRO569 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Cairo, dated March 23, 2008 to the
DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
^
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSectionl.4(d).
^^^^^^^^
IMPACTOFRELEASE

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The document isareportofaconversation between an Embassy officer and anArab
League official whose name, and occasionally the infbrmation he provided, must be protected
because he was at times speaking in confidence. The infbrmation concemed third countries, and
the source'sopinions that he clearlyshared in expectation of confidentiality. Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Embassyin its relations with the Arab League andimpairthe abilityofU.S. officials to conduct
diplomatic exchanges withmembersofthat organization.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
08DARESSALAAM206 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassy Dares Salaam, dated
April 1,2008 to the Department ofState. Six pages.Thetelegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portionsremain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526underSections1.4(b)and(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocument reportsaconversation between our Ambassador and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, including discussion of^imbabwe and otherregional issues. Some topics
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covered were sensitive and the Minister spoke in the expectation ofconfidentiality.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the Govemment ofthe Tanzania and would hinder future interchanges between U.S.
officialsandtheTanzanian govemment.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
08KHARTOUM246 is an official telegram fi-om Embassy Khartoum, dated February 20,
2008 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsofitremain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526underSectionsl.4(b)and(d).
^^^^^^^B^^^^^^^^^^^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThetelegramreportsaconversationbetweentheU.S. Charged'Affaires andthe
Commanding General ofthe U.N. peacekeeping force in Darfiir. The general shares his views
on the situation and briefstheChargeonhis plans. Someofhis comments are sensitive and
wereofferedin the expectation ofconfidentiality. The documentalsooffersits own views on
theg^eral'sremarks, some ofwhich are not intended fbrthe public. Unauthorized disclosure of
theclassified material specifiedabovewouldcause harm to relations with the United Nations
andhindertheabilityofU.S,officials in the fiiture to exchange views in full candor, especially
in peacekeeping situations where the UnitedNations is participating. Revelation of someofthe
U.S. analysis of the general'scomments, which wasmeant fbr intemal consumption, would also
be harmful toU.S.relationswith the UnitedNations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08KHARTOUM428isan official telegramfiomEmbassyKhartoum,datedMarch23,
2008 to the Department ofState, Ninepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderE.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)and(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
It reportsadiscussion between theU.S. Charged'Affaires in the course of whichas^ior
official ofthe Sudanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs presented Sudan'sfbrmal response to an
earlierU.S.paper on bilateralrelations. Someofthe exchangedealt with bilateral issues that
shouldnotbediscussed in public because oftheir sensitivity and because the expectation was
that theywouldbe held in confidence. Otherpassages containfi^ankEmbassy analysis ofthe
stateofplaythatwerenot intended to be revealed. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified
material specified above would cause harm torelationswith the Govemment ofSudan and
hinderthe abilityofU.S.officials in the fiitureto exchange views in fiill candor. Revelation of
U.S. analysis ofSudanesemotivations would be harmful to relations with that country'sofficials.
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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09ADDISABABA1063 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Addis Ababa, dated May7,
2009 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 attiietime itwas generated. Portionsofitremain
CONFIDENTIALunder E.0.13526 underSections1.4(b)and(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram transmitsabriefing paper ^rthe upcoming visit oftheU.S.Ambassadorto
the United Nations. It discusses bilateral and regional issues. Some portions ofit reveal
infbrmationpassed in confidence bythe Ethiopian government, and some contain candid
Embassy analysisofEthiopian actions and policynot intended ^rpublic revelation.
^
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofEthiopia and hinderthe abilityofU.S.officials to conduct daily business
with the leaders ofthat country.
^

^.^^

^^^^^^

DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09BAGHDAD2390 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated September 5,
2009to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 attiietimeitwas generated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526underSections 1.4(b) and(d),
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document reports an Embassy Officer'sconversationwithastaffmemberofasenior
Iraqi official on intemal Iraqi politics and on its relations withathird country. The Iraqi official
spoke in the expectation that the exchange would be treated as confidential. Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofthe Iraq and would impair ourrelations with the source, as well as the sertior
official fbrwhom he works.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09BAMAKO85 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Bamako, dated February 12,2009
to the Department ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsoftiie
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)and(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thisdocument contains the Embassy'sassessment in early 2009 ofthe military status of
the Tuareg rebellion in northem Mali, as well as effbrts bythe Govemment ofMali to finda
negotiated solution. The majorityofthe cable consistsof: theEmbassy'sanalysisofthe
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military capabilityofgovemment andrebelfbrces; the impact on regional security; the relation
ofthe Tuaregrebellion to Al^aeda activities inNorthAfi-ica; and potential actions bytwo
neighboring states. Some ofthe infbrmation in the document was obtained fiom confidential
sources and its revelation couldrisk exposingthem. Otherportions involving Embassy
assessmentswouldriskoffending area governments. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would significantly damage relations with the Govemment ofMali and
with at least two neighboring states. Disclosure would greatly lessen theability of officials at
Embassy Bamako to acquire sensitive infbrmationfi-omGovemment ofMali civilian and
military officials. It would also potentially disclose analytical procedures to organizations and
states which are attemptingto overthrow,or supporting the overthrow,offi-iendly governments
in the region.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09BOGOTA2873 is anofficialtelegramfi^omEmbassy Bogota,datedSeptember4,2009
to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.0.12958 at the time itwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)(d).
^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe conversations betweenaU.S. official andasenior official of an
Afi-o-Colombian organization on the arrest oftwo members ofthe Colombian Congress(who are
also membersofthe Afio-Colombian organization) because of alleged paramilitaryties.
Includedis the Embassy'sassessment ofthe impact ofthe arrests on the future infiuence ofthe
Afi^o-Colombian organization. Thefi-ankdiscussion took place with the expectation of
confidentiality. The message also discusses pastU.S. assistance to the organization.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specifiedabove would diminish the
willingness ofprominent Colombian politicians and leaders to conductconfidential diplomatic
business withU.S. officials, to thedetrimentof our interests.
^
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09BRAS1LIA1112 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Brasilia, dated September 4,
2009 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
It describesaU.S. official'sconfidential conversations with GovemmentofBrazil
officials on sensitive negotiations on possible Brazilian involvement inasensitive area ofthe
world. They took place inaconfidential environment that permitted each official to speak
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fi-ankly and to seek agreement on actions mutually beneficial to the interests ofthe two countries.
This opporturtityprovidedafbrum fbr an exchange ofinformation each side was seeking. Italso
facilitated the scheduling offiirthermeetings with experts conceming the area in question.
Unauthorizeddisclosure oftheclassifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofBrazil, diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. officials, and inhibit fiiture negotiations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
09BRASIL^A1113isanofficialtelegramfi-omEmbassyBrasilia,datedSeptember4,-^
2009totiieDepartinentofState Eightpages Thetelegramwasproperlyclassified
^
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegram remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe theU.S. National Security Advisor'svisit to Brazil and his
conversations with GovemmentofBrazil officials includingsensitiveissuesrelated to Brazil's
relations with third countries. Thesefi-ankdiscussionstookplacewithan expectationof
confidentiality. They centered on problems around theregionofLatinAmericain which both
countries have considerable interest in finding solutions. They also touched on trade relations,
non-proliferation, and trouble spots outside Latin America. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specifiedabovewould cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofBrazil
and diminish its officials'willingness to exchange infbrmation and to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
^ ^
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09CARACAS1168 is an official telegram fiom EmbassyCaracas, dated September 4,
2009 to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526 underSection 1.4(d).
^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describeaGovemmentofVenezuelainitiative to criminalize public
protests and the Embassy'sassessmentofthe impact this initiative will have on opposition
leaders andgroups. The message also explores future implications ofthis new initiative and its
possible effect on specific opposition leaders.Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofVenezuela, result in the
harassment ofopposition leaders, and impede our abilityto obtain infbrmation in the future fi-om
these and similar sources.
B^^^^
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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09LIMA1309 is an official telegram from Embassy Lima, dated September 4, 2009 to the
DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL under
E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under E.O.
13526 underSections1,4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Themessagedescribesasensitive hostage rescue effbrt, assessespossiblepolitical
ramifications, and discusses Peruvian vuhierabilities when undertaking such actions. The
message speculates on possible next StepsagainsttheSenderoLuminosoguerrillas and analyses
thegovemment'stactics. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above
would cause harm torelationswith the GovemmentofPeru and reveal police andmilitary
vulnerabilities when confrontingterroristorganizations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09ME^CO2658 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassyMexico City, dated September4,
2009 to the DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O, 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d). ^
^^^^^^^^^^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describeaU.S.official'sconversationswithaGovemmentofMexico
official on Mexico'sposition onasensitive United Nationsrelated issue. Theytookplaceina
confidential environment that permitied each official to speakfi-ankly.The issue relates to the
scheduling oflimited time fbrspeakers atameetingof an intemational organization.
Unauthorized disclosure of the classifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations
with the Govemment ofMexico and diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. officials, to thedetriment of ourinterests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION

09NE^ELHI00267isan official telegramfi-omEmbassyNew Delhi, datedFebruary
12, 2009 to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALin part under E.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsoftiie
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThetelegramreportsadiscussionbetweentheAmbassadorandahigh level Indian
official, primarily about the U.S.-Indiannuclear cooperation program,at the beginrungofthe
thennewU.S. administration. Portions that remain CONFIDENTIAL reveal differences of
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views between the two governments on various implementation issues related to that program,
including discussionofallegedlyinequitable treatment. The telegram also briefiydiscusses
Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the statusoflndia-Pakistan discussions on terrorist attacks,
Disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemmentsoflndia, Pakistan, and toalesser extent Afghanistan, and diminish those
governments'officials'confidence in their abilityto conduct confidential diplomatic business
with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09PARIS217is an officialtelegramfi^omEmbassyParis, datedFebruary 12, 2009to tiie
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O, 12958 atthe time it was generated. Portions of the telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL
under E,0. 13526 underSections1,4(b)(d),
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the views of anamed French diplomat conceming intemational
strategytoward the recognition ofKosovo. The French diplomat spoke with the expectation that
his remarks would be protected. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classifiedmaterial specified
above would cause harm torelationswith the Govemment ofFrance and diminish the
willingness ofFrench and other officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09PRAGUE88 is an officialtelegramfiomEmbassy Prague, dated Febmary 12, 2009to
the Department ofState. Threepages, The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O, 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 underSections1,4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reportsaprivate discussion betweenanamedCzechofficial and an
Embassyofficeraboutaproposal advanced byathird country. The Czech Republic at the time
held the Presidency ofthe European Uruon(EU), and the discussion involved both Czech and
EU policy. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm
to relations with the Govemment of the Czech Republic and dimirtish the willingnessofCzech
and other officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09PRISTINA58isanofficialtelegramfi^omEmbassyPristinadatedFebruary12,2009to
the DepartmentofState, Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
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part under E.O. 12958 at thetimeit was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA), which is charged with
resolvingreal property claims resulting fiom the armed confiict in Kosovo. Classifiedportions
report the viewsofnamed fbreign officials who participated inaprivate meeting of stakeholders
in the KPAas well as thefiankpersonal viewsofanamed fbrmer intemational official.
Classified portions also contain Embassy comments, sometimes critical offbreign governments
and institutions. Unauthorized disclosureoftheclassified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the GovemmentsofKosovo and Serbia and diminish the willingnessof
officialsfiomfbreign governments and intemational organizations toconductconfidential
diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09R1YADH1156 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Riyadh, dated September 5, 2009
^
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages.The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526 under Sections 1.4(b)and(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocument containsareportofaconversation between an Embassy Officer anda
sertior official ofthe Saudi MinistryofForeign Affairs on bilateral and sensitive regional
matters. The Saudi official spoke in the expectation that thediplomatic exchange would be
treatedas confidential.Unauthorizeddisclosureoftheclassifiedmaterial specifiedabove would
cause harm to relations with theGovemment ofthe KingdomofSaudiArabiaandinhibitthe
abilityofU.S. officials to conductconfidential businesswith that govemment.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANTIAGO831 is an official telegram from ^mbas^y Santiago, dat^S^tember 4,

2009to the Department ofState.Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated.Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSections l,4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes the U.S. Ambassador'sconfidential conversation withaleading
Chilean politician who oflers candid views on otherChileanpoliticiansand on relations with
third countries. Thefiankdiscussion took place with an expectationof confidentiality. The
subjects included sensitive regional issues and the local political scene. Unauthorizeddisclosure
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ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of
Chile and dimirtish the wiltingnessofChilean political leaders to offer infbrmation and to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANT1AGO833 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Santiago, dated September 4,
2009 to the Departinent ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALin partunder E.0.12958attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsoftiie
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL underE.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe the U.S.Ambassador'sconversationwithaGovemment ofChile
official on Chilean relations with third countries and Chilean views on sensitive regional
developments. It tookplace inaconfidential environment that permitted each official to speak
fi-ankly. Most ofthe message deals with Chile'sparticipation in UNASUR, the Union ofSouth
American Nations, and the country'srelationship with othermember states. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofChile and dimirtish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S.officials, to the detriment of ourinterests,
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANTIAGO835 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Santiago, dated September 4,
2009to the Depar^ent ofState. Fivepages. Thetelegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSection 1.4(b).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe the U.S. Ambassador'sconfidential conversation witha
prominent Chilean politician on the capabilities ofanother Chilean leader. The comments are
sensitive and were given with the expectation of complete confidentiality. Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofChile and dimirtish the wiltingnessofChilean leaders to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANTODOMINGO1017is an official telegram fiom Embassy Santo Domingo, dated
September 4, 2009 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 12958attiietimeitwasgenerated.Thetelegram
remainsCONFIDENTIALunderE.O, 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d),
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes the U.S.Charge'sconversationwithaGovemment ofthe
DomirticanRepublicofficial on Domirticanjudicial independence and refbrm and on sensitive
corruption and extradition cases. It took place inaconfidential environment that permitted each
official to speak frankly. Included are sensitive comments conceming the workingsofthe
judiciary and the Embassy'sassessment. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with theGovemmentofthe Dominican Republic
and diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials, to the detriment of ourinterests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92632 is an official telegramfi-omthe Department, dated September 4,2009 to
the Embassy in Moscow. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part
under E,0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain SECRETunder
E.O. 13526 underSectionl4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram instructs the Embassy on behalfofthe Department ofDefense (DOD) to
presentadrafi text to the Russian Govemment pursuant toaportion ofarecently concluded
U.S.-Russianagreementon goods transitingRussiaenroute to Afghanistan, Portions remaining
SECRETrevealcertainbasesfbrtheU.S.positionas stated inthedrafi text. (Releaseof
portions ofpreviously classified portions wouldrequire DOD concurrence.)Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would adverselyimpact the U.S. abilityto
securefi^omthe Russians important national security objectives in Afghartistan as well as our
diplomats'conduct of future discussions/negotiations with the Russians.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92641 is an official telegram fiom the Department, dated September 4, 2009 to
Embassy Colombo andanumber of otherposts. Six pages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in partunder E.0.12958 atthe time it was generated. Portionsof
tiietelegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSection 1.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram instmcts Embassy Colombo to makeademarche to the GovemmentofSri
Lanka, with otherposts making supporting demarches toanumberof other governments,
concemingthe situation ofpersonsdisplaced in Sri Lanka during the final days ofthe recently
concluded confiict with Tamil Tigerrebels. The portions which remain CONFIDENTIAL
discuss the natureoftheDepartment'sconcem and detail the specific diplomatic points to be
made to theGovemment ofSri Lanka and to otherrelevant governments of whom we request
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particular actions. Unauthorized disclosureofthis classified material would damage relations
not onlywith the GovemmentofSri Lanka but also potentially between other governments and
Sri Lanka.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92655 is an official telegramfi^omthe Department ofState, dated September 4,
2009toEmbassyTegucigalpa.Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALin part under E.O. 12958attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsoftiie
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4(b)(d).
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
^
Those portions describe the U.S. Secretary ofState'sconfidential conversation with the
PresidentofHonduras on sensitivenegotiations on the peaceful restoration of democratic order
in Honduras and on the views ofthird countries on developments in Honduras. It took place ina
confidential environment thatpermitted each to speakfi^ankly.Commitments were made on
each side. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm
to relations with the GovemmentofHonduras and diminish its officials'willingness to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
^
,
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92657 is an official telegramfi-omthe Department ofState, dated September 4,
2009 to the Embassies inMoscow,Kyiv,andAstana.Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O, 12958 at thetimeit was generated. Portionsof
tiietelegramremain CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSectionsl.4(a)(b)(d)(e).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram instmcts the recipients to deliveraconfidentialmessageto parties to the
Sti-ategicArms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired onDecember5,2009.Those
portions convey intemal communications ofthe Joint Compliance and Inspection Comntission
(JCIC) created by ST/^T. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above
would harm relations with the othermembers ofthe JCIC and would assist fbreign governments
that are not parties to START to obtain infbrmation aboutU.S.strategic missiles.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
09TEGUCIGALPA891 is an official telegramfi^omEmbassyTegucigalpa, dated
September 4, 2009 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. Thetelegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderE.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsoftiie
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4(b)(d).
^

^

^

^.^B^B.^^.,..^

:^^^,:^^i^^^;^^

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^^^H^-

IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe sensitive materials provided in confidence bymembersofthede
facto Govemment ofHondurastoU.S.officials and infbrmation about thede facto
Govemment'sinvestigation of officialsofthe fbrmer govemment. It includes Embassy
speculation conceming charges made. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofHonduras and diminish
the willingnessofpolitical contacts to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials and to provide infbrmation.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION

^

09TEGUCIGALPA892 is an official telegram from EmbassyTegucigalpa, dated
September4,2009 to the Department ofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderE.O. 12958 attiietimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 13526 underSection1.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE

^^B^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Themessage describes possiblearrangements fbraprominent European leaderto visit
Honduras and the Embassy'srecommendations regarding the appropriateness of suchavisit.
The visit wasplanned bybackersofthe coup which toppled the legitimate Honduran
Govemment in 2009. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would
cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofHonduras and diminish the willingness of
prominent Honduran leaders to provide infbrmation and to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10BRUSSELS382 is an official telegramfi^omtheU.S.Mission to the European Union in
Brussels, dated March 30, 2010to the Department ofState. Fourpages. Thetelegram was
properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in partunder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated.
PortionsoftiietelegramremainCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections1.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Classified portions report the views ofnamedEuropean Union (EU) officials about the
situation inYemen and plans fbr additional EU assistance. The EU officials'critical
assessments o f Y ^ e n were intended to be held in confidence by theU.S.govemment.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified materialspecifiedabove would cause harm to relations
with the European Union and dimirtish the willingnessofEuropean Union and other fbreign
officials to conductconfidential diplomatic business with U.S. representatives. ^ ^ ^ ^

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20273

DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10GENEVA347is an official telegram fiom theU.S.Mission in Geneva, dated March
30,2010to the Defense IntelligenceAgency(DIA) and otheraddressees.Thirteen pages. The
telegram was properly classified SECRET in part under E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated.
PortionsoftiietelegramremainSECRET under E.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4(b)(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegramreports onameeting between U.S. and Russianrepresentatives negotiating
an agreement to limit strategic arms. The negotiations were conducted in the expectation of
confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm torelationswith the GovemmentofRussiaand diminish the willingnessofRussian and
otherofficialstoconductconfidentialdiplomaticbusinesswith U.S.representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10LIMA333 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Lima, dated March 29, 2010 to the
DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in part
underE.O.12958 at thetimeit was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 13526 underSection1.4(d),
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions provide an overview,in preparation fbravisit bytheU.S. Assistant
Secretary ofState fbr^estem Hemisphere Affairs, ofthe sensitive political, security and
economic challenges facing Peru and U.S.-Peruvian relations. Itincludes an assessmentof
counter-narcoticprograms and the strength ofpublicinstitutions, Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofPeru
and diminish the willingnessofsourcesto continue to provide such infbrmation orto conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10PRETORIA636isan official telegramfiomEmbassyPretoria, datedMarch 30, 2010
totheDepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTI/^
under E.O. 12958 attiietimeitwasgenerated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526
underSection 1.4(d).
IMPACTOFRELEASE

^^^^^;^^^B

The cable reports onasensitive internal matterinvolving issues within the rulingparty,
and includes unusually candid Embassy analysis ofthose matters. Unauthorized disclosure of
the mat^al would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofSouth/^caand hinderthe
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ability of U.S. officials to conduct daily business with members of the host government, as well
as the leaders of the party.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
10RABAT294 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Rabat, dated March 30,2010 to the
Department ofState. Twelve pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part
under E.O. 12958 at thetimeit was generated. Portions of the telegram remain SECRET under
E.O. 13526 under Section 1.4(d).
:
V:; /

•• , •

IMPACT OF RELEASE

The document describes the Embassy's approach to cooperation on counterterrorism with
the Govemment ofMorocco. Still-sensitive portions draw on intelligence and other delicate
information to describe the terrorist threat in Morocco. Also contained are some sensitive
measures the U.S. and Morocco are taking to cooperate in anti-terrorism activities. Unauthorized
disclosure of the classified material specified above would cause serious harm to relations with
the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and hinder our efforts to obtain further
cooperation in the area of anti-toTorism.
.; ;
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION i

*

10TOKYO627 is an official telegramfi-omEmbassy Tokyo, dated March 29, 2010 to the
Department ofState. Four pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions of the telegram remain
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under Sections 1.4 (bXd).
IMPACT OF RELEASE
This telegram describes confidential discussions between a U.S. Assistant Secretary of
Defense and a senior Japanese Defense official conceming difficult bilateral defense
arrangements related to U.S. forces in Okinawa. The Govemment of Japan (GOJ) observes a 30
year rule for declassification of sensitive substantive diplomatic conversations and the
unauthorized disclosure of this classified material would cause harm to U.S. relations with the
GOJ and lessen Japanese officials' tmst and confidence in conducting confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746,1 declare under penalty of perjurytiiattiieinformation
provided herein is tme and correct to the best of my knowledge.

^

Executed this^2_ day of ^ j " ^ 201L

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20276

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCU.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Enclosure 10
8March2012

20277

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY

DECLARATION
1, Rear Admiral David ^oods, declare and state:

BACKGROUND
lamaRear Admiral in the United States Navy with 30 years of active service.
My current position is Commander, JointTaskForce-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. My responsibilities include the review ofJTF-GTMO
information fbr classification purposes pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13526
(^Classified National Security Information^^). Ihave held this position since 24 August
2011and report to General Douglas Fraser, Commander, US Southem Command.
PURPOSEOFDECLARATION
Isubmitthis declaration in the matterofUnitedStatesv.Private First Class
Bradley Manning, to demonstrate to the best ofmy knowledge and belief that disclosure
ofthe infbrmation identified below reasonably could be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security ofthe United States. In making the fbllowing statement
regarding the classification ofinformation in this case,lrely on mypersonal knowledge
and experience, upon the infbrmation made available to me in my official capacity,upon
tiie advice and conclusions reached, and determinations made in accordance therewith.
DESIGNATIONOFINFORMATION
Infbrmation that requires protection in the interest of national security ofthe
UnitedStatesisdesignatedCLASSIFlEDNATlONALSECURITYINFORMATlON
under Executive Order 13526, ClassifiedNational Security Infbrmation, signed by
President Obama on December 29,2009.1nfbrmation is classified in levels

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commensurate with the assessment that unauthorized disclosure could cause the
fbllowing expected damages to national security:
a.

TopSecretinformation^—exceptionally grave damage

b.

Secret infbrmation—serious damage

c.

Confidential infbrmation—damage

Unclassified infbrmation does not requireasecurity clearance fbraccess, but
nonetheless may be ofasensitive nature.
The current basis fbr classification ofnational security infbrmation is found in
E0 13526. Sectionl.3 ofEO 13526 authorizes an Original ClassificationAuthority
(OCA) to classify infbrmation owned, produced, or controlled by the United States
govemment i f i t falls within certain classification categories. One such category,fbund
at Section l,4(c)ofE0 13526, concerns infbrmation that pertains to an intelligence
activity (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology.
Five documents, totaling twenty-two pages, have been provided to JTF-GTMO
fbraclassification review. These documents were originated by JTF-GTMO and are
identified as the enclosures to the prosecution requests, datedl8March2011and4
August2011. All five documents bear ^^SECRET^^ markings.
CLASSIFICATIONDETERMINATION
The five documents are classified pursuant to Section 1.4(c)ofEO 13526, because
they contain infbrmation conceming intelligence sources and methods, and infbrmation
that, ifreleased, could cause serious damage to national security. This infbrmationis
classifiedattheSECRETlevel.

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The documents contain intelligence data compiled about detainees or summaries
ofsuch data. Intelligence data included in this category of withholdings typically
describes the detainee^s biographical infbrmation, the circumstances ofhis capture and
what he had in his possession when he was captured, the circumstances and date ofhis
transfer to Guantanamo, his travel, his affiliations v^th individuals and organizations of
intelligence interest, and his activities in support ofthose organizations. The intelligence
data in this category also includes infbrmation about other personsandorgartizations.
Ihave determined that the intelligence data contained in the documents reveal
details about intelligence we have gleaned regarding individuals and organizations of
intelligence interest. Additionally, this infbrmation reveals the sources of our
intelligence, as well as methods and approaches fbr collecting intelligence. At the time of
their creation, the documents and the intelligence data contained in them was classified at
tire SECRET leveltiiroughtheactionoftheCommander,JTF-GTMO.
IMPACT ONNATIONALSECURITYIFINFORMATIONRELEASED
Ihave detemtined that the documents and infbrmation remain properly classified,
and that their release reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security because it would reveal in^rmation conceming intelligence sources, the
specific infbrmation obtained from such sources, or both. Accordingly, this infbrmation
was and is properly classified at the SECRET level, pursuant to Section 1.4(c)ofEO
13526

In accordance with 28U.S.C.§1746,ldeclare under penalty of perjury that the fbregoing
is true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge.

FOROFFICI/^ USEONLY
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Dated: } i _ November 2011
JAVID WOODS
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

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Appellate Exhibit 15
Enclosure 11
41 pages
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed for Reason 2
and Reason 3
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record of Trial

20282

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

8 March 2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


v. Prosecution Response to Defense

Motion to Compel Depositions

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 12






20283

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
u.s. ARMY MIUTARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, oc 20319-5013
i i nepu T0
ATTENTION OF
7 December 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC Paul Almanza, l50th Judge Advocate General Detachment, Legal
Support Organization, MG Albert C. Lieber, USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria,
VA 22310

SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses United States v. PFC
Bradlcv Mannino



1. PURPOSE. The prosecution responds to the Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses as
follows and, where applicable, requests you ?nd the witnesses not reasonably available or the
defense?s proffered testimony cumulative or not relevant to the Article 32. investigation.

2. LAW. ?[A]ny witness whose testimony would be relevant to the investigation and not
cumulative, shall be produced if reasonably available.? Manual for Courts?Martial, Rule for
Courts-Martial (RCM) 405(g)( see also RCM 405(3) discussion (the primary objective of the

investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the
form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be

made of the case?).
3. RESPONSES.

21. SA Toni Graham. The United States does not object to this witness.

b. SA Mark Mander. The United States does not object to this witness.

c. SA Calder Robertson. The United States does not object to this witness.

cl. SA David Shaver. The United States does not object to this witness.

e. SA Charles Ames. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses, namely
SA Toni Graham, SA Mark Mander, SA Calder Robertson, SA David Shaver, SA Alfred
Williamson, and SA Troy Bettencourt.

f. SA Alfred Williamson. The United States does not object to this witness.

g. SA Troy Bettencourt. The United States does not object to this witness.

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ANJ
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses United States v. PFC

Bradley Manning

h. SA Ronald Rock. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness. The
defense?s proffered testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses, namely SA
Toni Graham, SA Mark Mander, SA Calder Robertson, SA David Shaver, SA Alfred I
Williamson, and SA Troy Bettencourt. This case is a joint investigation and the above CID
agents can testify about this matter.

i. SA Patrick Wheeler. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses, namely
SA Toni Graham, SA Mark Mander, SA Calder Robertson, SA David Shaver, SA Alfred
Williamson, and SA Troy Bettencourt. This case is a joint investigation and the above CID
agents can testify about this matter.

j. CPT Martin Leibman. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s mental status and MEDCOM Form
4038 is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the
relevant issues. In addition, on 22 April 2011, an RCM 706 board concluded that Manning
did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that
resulted in him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his
conduct.? See RCM 40S(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire
into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to
secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?). The
alleged testimony of CPT Leibman is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if
found relevant, the proffered testimony is cumulative with testimony from witnesses who
worked with PFC Manning, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, WOI Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT
Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

k. CPT Michael Worsley. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s mental status and his
alleged communications with SFC Adkins, MAJ Clausen, and MSG Usbeck is not relevant to the
Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. In addition, on
22 April 201 I, an RCM 706 board concluded that Manning did not have a severe mental
disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM 405(a) discussion
(the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the of the matters set forth in
the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure infonnation on which to determine
what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of CPT Worsley is outside
the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is
cumulative with testimony from witnesses who worked with PFC Manning, namely CPT Lim,
CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

1. CPT Edan Critch?eld. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s mental status, his alleged
recommendation, his alleged training on Soldier suitability for access to classified information,

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ANJA-CL
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses United States v. PFC

Bradley Manning

and the alleged MEDCOM Form 4038 is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will
only serve to distract from the relevant issues. In addition, on 22 April 2011, an RCM 706 board
concluded that Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the
alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the
investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the
form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be
made of the case?). The alleged testimony of CPT Critch?eld is outside the scope of the Article
32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is cumulative with testimony
from witnesses who worked with PFC Manning, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, WO1 Balonek,
SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

m. COL David Miller. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding the command?s decision to deploy PFC Manning
and his opinion of Clausen, MAJ Dreher, and MSG Adkins is not relevant to the Article 32
investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion
(the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in
the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine
what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of COL Miller is outside
the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is
cumulative with other witnesses in the chain of command, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01
Balonek, SFC Adkins, and Ms. Showman.

n. LTC Brian Kems. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding his opinion of MAJ Clausen and MSG Adkins and
the alleged operations of the working group is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and
will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary
objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges,
[to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on which to detennine what
disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of LTC Kems is outside the
scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is
cumulative with other witnesses in the chain of command, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01
Balonek, SFC Adkins, and Ms. Showman.

o. MAJ Elijah Dreher. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding his alleged ignorance of issues relating to PFC
Manning is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the
relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to
inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges,
and to secure infonnation on which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?).
The alleged testimony of Dreher is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even
if found relevant, the proffered testimony is cumulative with other witnesses in the chain of
command, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, and Ms. Showman.

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SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses United States v. PFC

Bradlev Manning

p. MAJ Clifford Clausen. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding his alleged ignorance of information relating to PFC
Manning is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the
relevant issues. See RCM 4-05(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to
inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges,
and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?).
The alleged testimony of Clausen is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even
if found relevant, the proffered testimony relating to operations in the S-2 office is cumulative
with other witnesses who worked in the S-2 office, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton,
Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

q. CPT Barclay Keay. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding his alleged opinion that media devices should not
be allowed in the S-2 office is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to
distract from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the
investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the
form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be
made of the case?). The alleged testimony of CPT Keay is outside the scope of the Article 32
investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony relating to PFC Manning?s work
performance and operations in the S-2 office is cumulative with other witnesses who worked in
the S-2 of?ce, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and

Ms. Showman.

r. CPT Matthew Freeburg. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s alleged behavioral issues
and any actions taken by the chain of command in response is not relevant to the Article 32
investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion
(the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in
the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on which to detennine.
what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of CPT Freeburg is
outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony
is cumulative with other unit witnesses, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC
Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

s. CPT Steven Lim. The United States does not object to this witness.
t. CPT Thomas Cherepko. The United States does not object to this witness.

u. CPT Michael Johnson. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s mental status and his opinion and
interactions with SFC Adkins, CPT Lim, and MAJ Clausen is not relevant to the Article 32
investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. In addition, on 22 April
20] 1, an RCM 706 board concluded that Manning did not have a severe mental disease or

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SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses United States v. PFC

Bradley Manning

defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to appreciate
the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary

_objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges,

[to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what
disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of CPT Johnson is outside the
scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is
cumulative with other expected witnesses, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC
Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

v. 1LT Tanya Gaab. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness. The
defense?s proffered testimony regarding her alleged opinion(s) of PFC Manning and of the
leadership, the command decision to deploy PFC Manning, and PFC Manning?s mental status is
not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant
issues. In addition, on 22 April 201 1, an RCM 706 board concluded that Manning did not
have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in
him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct." See RCM
405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the
matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on
which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of
Gaab is outside the scope of the Article .32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the
proffered testimony is cumulative with other expected witnesses, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton,
W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

w. Elizabeth Fields. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding her alleged training as the SSR and her opinion of
the leadership is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from
the relevant issues. See RCM discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to
inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges,
and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?).
The alleged testimony of Fields is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if
found relevant, the proffered testimony relating to conduct in the S-2 office is cumulative with
other witnesses who worked in the S-2 of?ce, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek,
SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

x. CW2 Joshua Ehresman. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s alleged mental status and
the decision to deploy PFC Manning is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only
serve to distract from the relevant issues. In addition, on 22 April 201 1, an RCM 706 board
concluded that Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the
alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the
investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the
form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be

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SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses United States v. PFC

Bradlev Manning

made of the case?). The alleged testimony of CW2 Ehresman is outside the scope of the Article
32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony relating to conduct in the S-2
office is cumulative with other witnesses who worked in the S-2 office, namely CPT Lim, CPT
Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

y. MSG Eric Usbeck. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.

The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s alleged mental status and attitude is
not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant
issues. In addition, on 22 April 2011, an RCM 706 board concluded that Manning did not
have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in
him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM
405(3) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the
matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on
which to detennine what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of
MSG Usbeck is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the
proffered testimony relating to PFC Manning?s alleged conduct is cumulative with other
witnesses in the chain of command, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, Balonek, SFC Adkins,
and Ms. Showman.

z. MSG Mark Woodworth. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s mental status is not
relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. In
addition, on 22 April 201 1, an RCM 706 board concluded that Manning did not have a
severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him
being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM
405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the
matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on
which to determine what disposition should be made of the case"). The alleged testimony of
MSG Woodworth is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the
proffered testimony is cumulative with other witnesses in the chain of command, namely CPT
Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, and Ms. Showman, and law enforcement
witnesses, namely SA Toni Graham, SA Mark Mander, SA Calder Robertson, SA David Shaver,
SA Alfred Williamson, and SA Troy Bettencourt.

aa. SFC Paul Adkins. The United States does not object to this witness.

bb. SSG Lawrence Mitchell. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony regarding any alleged photos observed on PFC
Manning?s iPod, his mental status, and any attempt to chapter PFC Manning out of the military is
not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant
issues. In addition, on 22 April 2011, an RCM 706 board concluded that Manning did not
have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in
him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM

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Bradley Manning

4-O5(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the
matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on
which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of
SSG Mitchell is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the
proffered testimony relating to PFC Manning?s alleged conduct is cumulative with witnesses
who worked in the S-2 office, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT
Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

cc. SGT Rebecca Schwab. The United States objects to the defense request for this

witness. The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning alleged sexual orientation
and her opinion of PFC Manning is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only
serve to distract from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of
the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the
form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be
made of the case?). The alleged testimony of SGT Schwab is outside the scope of the Article 32
investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is cumulative with other witnesses
who worked with the accused, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT
Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

dd. SGT Daniel Padgett. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding his opinion of the chain of command is not relevant
to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. See RCM
405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the
matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the fonn of the charges, and to secure infonnation on
which to detennine what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of
SGT Padgett is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the
proffered testimony relating to PFC Manning?s conduct and operations in the S-2 office is
cumulative With other witnesses who worked in the S-2 office, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton,
W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

ee. SGT David Sadtler. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding an incident that upset PFC Manning and his opinion
of PFC Manning and the chain of command is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and
will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. See discussion (the primary
objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges,
[to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what
disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of SGT Sadtler is outside the
scope of the Article 32 investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is
cumulative with other witnesses who worked in the S-2 shop, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton,
W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

ff. SGT Lorena Cooley. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s treatment by the unit and her

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Bradlcv Manning

opinion of the chain of command is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only
serve to distract from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of
the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the
fonn of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be
made of the case?). The alleged testimony of SGT Cooley is outside the scope of the Article 32
investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is cumulative with other witnesses
who worked in the S-2 of?ce, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, W01 Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT
Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

gg. SGT Sheri Walsh. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.

The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning?s treatment by the unit and PFC
Manning alleged mental issues is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve
to distract from the relevant issues. In addition, on 22 April 201 1, an RCM 706 board concluded
that Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged
criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
wrongfulness of his conduct.? See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the
investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set" forth in the charges, [to verify] the
form of the charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be
made of the case?). The alleged testimony of SGT Walsh is outside the scope of the Article 32
investigation. Even if found relevant, the proffered testimony is cumulative with other witnesses
who worked in the S-2 office, namely CPT Lim, CPT Fulton, WOI Balonek, SFC Adkins, SGT
Madaras, and Ms. Showman.

hh. Ms. Jihrleah Showman. The United States does not object to this witness.
ii. Mr. Adrian Lamo. The United States does not object to this witness.

j. President Barack Obama. The United States objects to the defense?s request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation
because it involves matters outside the scope of the investigation and will only serve to distract
from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation
is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the
charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the
case?).

kk. Dr. Robert Gates. The United States objects to the defense?s request for this witness.

The defense?s proffered testimony is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation because it
involves matters outside the scope of the investigation and will only serve to distract from the
relevant issues. See RCM 4-O5(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to
inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges,
and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?).

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ll. Honorable Hillary Clinton. The United States objects to the defense?s request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation
because it involves matters outside the scope of the investigation and will only serve to distract
from the relevant issues. See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation
is ?to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the
charges, and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the

case?).

mm. CPT James Kolky. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony is not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only
serve to distract from the relevant issues. The Apache video is not classi?ed, and the United

States does not allege otherwise.

nn. RADM Kevin Donegan. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The United States requests you find RADM Donegan not reasonably available for the
Article 32 given his position as Director of Operations, CENTCOM. See RCM 405(g)(l)(B) (a
witness is not reasonably available if the ?dif?culty, expense, delay, and effect on military
operations? of obtaining the testimony outweighs its signi?cance).

oo. Mr. Robert Betz. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The United States requests you ?nd Mr. Betz not reasonably available for the Article 32 given
his position as Chief Classification Advisory Of?cer, CYBERCOM. See RCM 405(g)(l (a
witness is not reasonably available if the ?difficulty, expense, delay, and effect on military
operations? of obtaining the testimony outweighs its significance).

pp. LtGen Robert Schmidle. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The United States requests you find LtGen Schmidle not reasonably available for the
Article 32 given his position as Deputy Commander, CYBERCOM. See RCM 405(g)(l (a
witness is not reasonably available if the ?difficulty, expense, delay, and effect on military
operations? of obtaining the testimony outweighs its signi?cance).

qq. VADM Robert Harward. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The United States requests you ?nd VADM Harward not reasonably available for the
Article 32 given his position as Deputy Commander, CENTCOM. See RCM 405(g)(l)(B) (a
witness is not reasonably available if the ?dif?culty, expense, delay, and effect on military
operations? of obtaining the testimony outweighs its signi?cance).

rr. Honorable Patrick Kennedy. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The United States requests you find Honorable Kennedy not reasonably available for
the Article 32 given his position as Under Secretary of State for Management. See RCM
405(g)(l (a witness is not reasonably available if the ?difficulty, expense, delay, and effect
on military operations? of obtaining the testimony outweighs its signi?cance).

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Bradley Manning

ss. RADM David Woods. The United States objects to the defense request for this

witness, according to testimony anticipated by defense. The United States requests you ?nd
RADM Woods not reasonably available for the Article 32 given his position as Commander,
Joint Task Force - Guantanamo. See RCM (a witness is not reasonably available if
the ?difficulty. expense, delay, and effect on military operations? of obtaining the testimony
outweighs its significance).

tt. CAPT Kevin Moore. The United States objects to the defense request for this witness.
The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning's alleged POI status is not relevant to
the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues. See RCM
405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the truth of the
matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure information on
which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged testimony of
CAPT Moore is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation.

uu. CAPT William Hoctor. The United States objects to the defense request for this

witness. The defense?s proffered testimony regarding PFC Manning's alleged POI status is not
relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues.
See RCM 405(a) discussion (the primary objective of the investigation is ?to inquire into the
truth of the matters set forth in the charges, [to verify] the form of the charges, and to secure
information on which to determine what disposition should be made of the case?). The alleged
testimony of CAPT Hoctor is outside the scope of the Article 32 investigation.

vv. Inmate Christopher Whitfield. The United States objects to the defense request for this
witness. The defense?s proffered testimony is cumulative with law enforcement agents, namely
SA Toni Graham. SA Mark Mander, SA Calder Robertson, SA David Shaver, SA Alfred
Williamson, and SA Troy Bettencoun.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at?.

FEIN
JA
Trial Counsel

CF:
Defense Counsel

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20293

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC,U.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
^omt Base Myer-Henderson Hall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Enclosure 13
8March2012

20294

^l^ecember^Oll
MEMORANDUMl^ORArticle321nvestigatingOfficer,LTCPaulAlman^a,150thJudge
Advocate General Detachment, Legal Support Organization. MG Albert C. Lieber USAR
Center, 6901TelegraphRo^d,Alexandria,Virginia^2310
SUBJECT: WitnessJustification United StatesvPFC BradlevEManning
1. On2Deccmber 2011,the defense in the above case servcdacopy ofits witness request on
the govemment. Below, the defense sets forth the relevancy ofeach witness that the
govemment opposes and notes that under Article 32(b)Unifbrm Code ofMilitary Justice, PFC
Manning has therightto cross-examine witnesses against him. and present anything he may
desire either in defense or mitigation.
a. SACharles Ames SARonaldRock and SA Patricia Wheeler. As noted in the defense's
witness request, the defense believes eachofthe requested agents is relevant and will provide
needed testimony at the Article 32. The delense would like to note that over 22 CID agents
participated in the investigation ofthis case. The fact that the defense-requested agents mirror
those ofthe govemment(with the exception ofSAAmes)should speak to the reasonableness
of the defense'srequest. The defense h^s requested the atiendanceofSA Rock and SA
Wheeler in orderto provide the Investigating Officer with testimony conceming the joint
investigations being conducted by both the Department ofState and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Notably.SA Rock w^s on the original govemment'switness list filed on7July
2010. According to the govemment'smen^o^ated7December 2011,the other agents "SA
Graham, SAM Mander, SA Robertson. SA Shaver, SAWilliamson and SA Bettencourt can
provide the needed testimony" Their testimony,however,will in large part be hearsay
evidence about what other agents have done on the case and what witnesses have told these
other case agents. Such testimony will do little to aid the Investigating Officer in conductinga
^^thoroughandimpartialinvestigationofallmatters"asrequiredby Article 32(^) UCMJ
Furthers the defense hasalegitimate interest in using the Article 32 hearing asadiscovery tool
(see discussion to R.C.M.405(a)). ifthe defense does not have the opportunityto question the
c^^^g^^t^^bout^vid^i^^^th^yd^v^lo^^d.witn^^^^5th^yint^rvi^w^d,l^adsth^y pursued,

leads they elected not to pursue, and other relevant matters, the defense will also be denied an
important function that the Article 32 investigation is designed to accomplish, giventhe status
ofcurrent and ongoing operations and the fact that case agents are likely spread throughout the
United States and overseas, the Article 32 investigation is the only realistic mechanism
available to the defense to personally question the ca^e agents involved in the investigation.
b. l^ey Leaders of2nd Brigade CombatTeam: In the defense'sv^tncss request, the
defense requested th^t selected key leaders of the 2nd Brigade CombatTeam be made available.
1) The relevancy ofthese witr^esses should be obvious. Each ofthese witnesses can
provide different insight into the events that transpired betweenlNovember 2009 and 27 May
^(^1(^. becauseeach witness viewed the events lrot^8diflerer^t perspective, theirit^dividu^l

20295

SUBJECT: Witness Justification - United States v. PFC Bradlev E. Manning

testimony is independently relevant. The defense notes for example, that all of the requested
witnesses provided swom statements as part of the Secretary of the Army's 15-6 Investigation.
This includes COL Miller, LTC Kems, MAJ Dreher, CPT Freeburg, MSG Usbeck, and MSG
Woodworth. The statements from these witnesses provide different and important details about
the events.
(a) COL Miller's statement about the perception of the leadership qualities ofMAJ
Dreher, MAJ Clausen, and MSG Adkins is relevant to their response or lack of a response in
this case. Additionally, the fact that COL Miller ultimately decided to remove MAJ Dreher and
MAJ Clausen from their respective positions and considered MSG Adkins "marginal, but not
bad enough to either relieve or replace" is also relevant and provides mitigation evidence that
the Investigating Officer should consider.
(b) LTC Kems will testify not only to MAJ Clausen's weak performance and the
fact that he was not a strong leader, but he will also testif>' that MAJ Clausen did not take
appropriate action to correct mistakes made by junior members in his unit and did not have
control over the S-2 shop. LTC Kems will also testify that MAJ Clausen was handicapped by
weak NCO leadership and that MSG Adkins was not an effective leader. LTC Kems also
~
provides key testimony regarding the S-2 section's failure to initiate a suspension of PFC
Manning's security clearance when it became obvious that such action was required.
(c) MAJ Dreher will testify to the fact he was not kept aware of the problems being
suffered by PFC Marming. He will testify the MAJ Clausen and MSG Adkins failed to inform
him of PFC Manning's mental health issues. Differences in details and differing perspectives
such as these cannot be resolved by merely looking at the swom statements or considering the
hearsay testimony of the witnesses the govemment wishes to bring.
(d) CPT Freeburg, MSG Usbeck, and MSG Woodworth will testify about the
command's lack of relevant information from MAJ Clausen and MSG Adkins conceming PFC
Manning. The failure to provide this information impacted not only the decision regarding
whether to deploy PFC Manning, but also the timeliness of the suspension of PFC Manning's
security clearance.
2) In its response to the defense witness request, the govemment states that the
defense's proffered testimony regarding the total breakdown in command and control within the
S-2 Section and the multiple failures by the unit to take basic steps in response to clear mental
health issues being suffered by PFC Manning is somehow "not relevant to the Article 32
investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." The govemment cites to
R.C.M. 405(a). Inexplicably, the govemment ignores R.C.M. 405(f) and controlling case law
which clearly states an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and
extenuation at the Article 32. See R.C.M. 405(f) (stating an accused has the right to present
evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation); Article.32(b), Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf,
either in defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine available witnesses

20296

SUBJECT: Witness Justification UnitedStatesv PFC Bradlev E Manning
requested ");^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (^^^^^^^^^, 59M J 447, 451 (C.A.A F^
accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalfat an Article 32 in
defense or mitigation). Each ofthe above requested witnesses will have relevant and
independent information ofthe events that transpired.and all ofthese witnesses should be
produced in order to accomplish the purposes ofthe investigation. Simply reading the swom
statements of some of these witnesses and hearing fromafewothers will not allow either party
or the Investigating Officer to e:^plore the relevant information. The listed witnesses need to be
questioned personally and individually about what they saw,heard, and experienced if there is
to beathorough and impartial investigation.^
c. Key Members of2nd Brigade CombatTeam^s S-2 Section: In the defense'switness
request, the defense requested that selected key members ofthe intelligence section ofthe 2nd
Brigade CombatTeam be made available.
1) The relevancy ofthese witnesses should also be obvious. Each ofthese witnesses
can provide different insight into the events that transpired betweenlNovember 2009 and27
May2010. Because each witness viewed the events fromadiflerent perspective, their
individual testimony is independently relevant. The defense notes for example, that all ofthe
requested witnesses provided swom statements as part of the Secretar^of the Army'sl5-6
Investigation. This includes MAJ Clausen, CPT Keay.CPTJohnson.lLTGaab, ILTFields,
CW2 Ehresman, SSG Mitchell, SGT Schwab, SGTPa^gett,SGTSadtler,SGTCooley,and
SGTWalsh. The statements from these witnesses provide different and important details about
the events, l^ach ofthese witnesses can provide unique information regarding not only the
dysfunctional leadershipscheme by MAJ ClausenandMSG Adkins, butalsothenumerous
recommendations to get PFC Manning help both prior to the deployment and during the
deployment. Each witnesswill provide relevant mitigation and extenuation evidence regarding
howtheS-2section failed to notify the company commander of the issues PFC Manning was
struggling with or the multiple acts ofbehavior that should have resulted in an imn^ediate
suspension ofPFCManning'ssecurity clearance
2) In its response to the delense witness request fbr relevant S-2section witnesses, the
govemment states that the testimony ofthese witnesses is somehow "not relevant to the Article
32 investigation and will only ser^^e to distract from the relevant issues." The govemment also
opines that the breakdo^^^ in command and control, the decision to deploy PFC Manning, and
the decision to not suspend his security clearance earlier "is not relevant to the Article 32
Investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." The govemment cites to
R.C.M. 405(a). Again, the goverrunent ignores R.C.M. 405(1^ and controlling case law which
' It is troubling that in the government's response dated 7 December 2011, it objects tdefense that is not also on the government's list. The govemment does not seem to be interested at all in providing
an thorough and impartial investigation. The govemment indicates that it is going to go to the expense and trouble
of bringing two civilian witnesses and other military witnessesfrommultiple duty locations in the United States
and overseas, and yet the govemment claims that it is too costly and troublesome to bring any of the defense
requested witnesses. Such a position defies logic and common sense.

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SUBJECT: Witness Justification - United States v. PFC Bradley E. Manning

clearly states an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and
extenuation at the Article 32. See R.C.M. 405(f) (stating an accused has the right to present
evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation); Article 32(b), Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may "present anything he may desire in his own behalf,
either in defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine available witnesses
requested..."); United States v. Garcia, 59 M.J. 447, 451 (C.A.A.F. 2004)(ruling that an
accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in
defense or mitigation). Each of the above requested witnesses will have relevant and
independent information ofthe events that transpired, and all ofthese witnesses should be
produced in order to accomplish the purposes of the investigation.
d. Mental Health Providers: In the defense's witness request, it requested CPT Leibman,
CPT Worsley, and CPT Critchfield be made available.
1) The relevancy ofthese witnesses should also be obvious. Each ofthese witnesses
provided mental health treatment to PFC Manning or conducted a behavioral health
examination for the command. Because each witness was involved at differenttimesand in
different aspects, their individual testimony is independently relevant.
• - ' 2) The govemment states the testimony of these mental health providers "is not
relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues."
Additionally, the govemment points to the fact that a R.C.M. 706 board concluded that "PFC
Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the allged criminal
conduct that resulted in him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness
ofhis conduct" as a basis to ignore any mental health testimony. Such a position is
indefensible. The fact PFC Manning did not have a "severe mental disease or defect" only
indicates that he does not have a basis to claim an insanity defense. Such a conclusion does not
speak to any diminished capacity or mitigating and extenuating circumstances. See R.C.M.
405(f) (stating an accused has the right to present evidence in defense, mitigation, and
extenuation); .Article 32(b), Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice (UCMJ) (stating an accused may
"present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the
investigation officer shall examine available witnesses requested..."); UnitedStates v. Garcia,
59 M.J. 447,451 (C.A.A.F. 2004)(ruling that an accused has the right to present anything he
may desire in his own behalf at an Article 32 in defense or mitigation). Each of the above
requested witnesses will have relevant and independent information, and all of these witnesses
should be produced in order to accomplish the purposes ofthe investigation.
e. Original Classification Authorities (OCA): In the defense's witness request, the defense
requested each of the individuals that provided OCA reviews be made available.
1) The relevancy ofthese witnesses should also be obvious. Each of these witnesses
provided a unswom affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

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SUBJECT: WitnessJustification United StatesvPFC BradleyEManning

2) Thegovemment objected to the defense request fbr any ofthese witnesses. The govemment.without any justification, requested that you find the requested v^tness were not
reasonably available given the importance oftheir respective postion. The govemment seems
to argue that in matters ofjustice, if you have too important ofaposition, you should not be
bothered. Militaryjustice should not be controlled by the importance ofyour duty position.
Each individual took the time to provide an unswon^ affidavit. The defense should be provided
with the opportunity to examine these witnesses at the Article 32 hearing.
3) In the event these witnesses are not produced, the defense objects to the Investigating
Officer considering their unswom statements. R.C.M.405(g)(4)(B). Unswom statements
under 2^U.S.C.^ 1746 cannot be considered by the Investgating Officer. The Manual fbr
Courts-Martial requires that testimony given at an Article 32 be under oath. R.C.M.
405(h)(1)(A). Ifawitness is deemed not reasonably available, the Investigating Officer can
consider swom statements. R.C.M.405(g)(5)(B)(i). Aunswom statement provided under 28
U S C ^ 1746isnotaswomstatement lnorderforanunswomstatementprovidedunder28
U.S.C.^1746 to be admissible, it must be subscribed and signed "inajudicial proceeding or
courseofjustice"in order to subject the declarant to the penalty of perjury at the Article 32
Article 131c(3)(noting that "Sectionl746 does not change the requirement thata
hearing,
depositionbegivenunderoathoralterthcsituationwhereanoathisrequiredto betaken before
aspecificperson");^^^^^^^28USC^ 1746(notingthattheunswomdeclarationisnot
effective in "depositions or an oath ofoffice, or an oath required to be taken befbreaspecified
official.")
f. Current andFormer Members of the U.S. Government: Inthe defense'switness request,
the defense requested President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and fbrmer Secretary Gates be made
available.
1) The relevancy ofthesewitnessesshouldbeobvious Each ofthesewitnesses has
provided statements that contradict those given by the OCA witnesses regarding the alleged
damage caused by the unauthorised disclostrres. Additionally.eachofthese witnesses is
relevant in order to inquire into the issues oft^lawful command influence and unlawfirl pretrial
punishment in violation of Articles 13and37 of the UCMJ. ^^^R.C.M.405(e)Discussion
(stating that inquiry into other issues such as legality ofsearches orthe admissibility of
evidence is proper by an Article 32 Investigating Officer).
.
2) The government apparently has no diftict^lty obtaining the presence ofcivilian
witnesses when it deems it necessary. The defense requests that the Investigating Oflicer
contact each civilian witness and invite each witness to attend pursuant to R.C.M. 405(g)(2)(B).
3) The defense objects to the witnesses not being produced at the Article 32 based soley
on the determinatiot^ by the govemment that they are too important to be made available.
Assuming the witnesses are not produced, the defense will requestadeposition of these
witnesses if charges are referred, pursuant to R.C.M 702 and the holding in ^^^^^^^^^^^^.^v.
C^^^^^^^^^5MJ.143(CMA1978)

20299

SUBJECT: Witness Justification-United Statesv.PFC Bradlev E.Manning

g. Mental Health Prov^d^r^ at th^^^antic^Conf^n^m^ntFa^i^ity: Inthe defense'switness
request, the defense requested CAPT Moore and CAPT Hocter be made available.
1) The relevancy ofthese witnesses should is obvious. Each ofthese witnesses has
provided statements that would supportthe fact PFC Manning was subjected to unlawful
pretrial punishment under Article 13ofthe Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice. ^^^^ R.C.M
405(e)Discussion(stating that inquiry into other issues such as legality of searches orthe
admissibility ofevidence is proper by anArticle 32 Investigating Officer).
2) The govemment objects to the defense request, stating that the alleged unlawtui
pretrial punishment is notrelevar^t at the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract
from the relevant issues. Whether PFC Manning was unlav^^ully punished prior to trial isa
relevant matter fbr you to consider. The facts ofhis unla^vful pretrial punishment is appropriate
inf^^rmation for you to consider in fbrming your recommendations to the convening authority.
The issue is also important for the integrity ofthe militaryjustice system and the appearance of
faimess in the process.
h. Inmate Christoper Whitfield: In the defense'switness request, it requested Inmate
Whitfield be made available. The relevancy ofthis witness should be obvious. Any agent
testifying to the matters allegedly heard by IruTtate Whitfield would only be testifying to
hearsay. Given the potential impact ofhis testimony,lt^nate Whitfield must be produced in
ordertoprovideforathoroughandimpartialinvestigation
2. PFC Manning is charged with offenses that carry the maximum punishment oflife without
the possibility of parole. His charges are among the most serious charges thatasoldier can
face. The govemment must be prepared to accept the costs incurred by the seriousnessofthe
charges that they have preferred against PFC Manning. An^^hing but the personal appearances
ofall witnesses requested by the defense and government would deny PFC Mamtit^g his right to
athorough and impartial investigation and tum this intoahollow exercise.
3. The govemment'sclaim that the cost ai^d burden is too great to require the production and
personal appearance of relevant and necessar^ witnesses is not justified. It was the
govemment'sdecision to conduct this Article 32 investigation at Fort Meade. The defense's
position has been consister^t; it does not object to this location provided it has the personal
appearance of all relevant and necessarv witnesses. The govemment should not be allowed to
use its own decision to conduct the investigation atFort Meade asaway to avoid making
relevant witnesses available.

DAVID EDWARDCOOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

20300

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
^omt Base Myer-Henderson Hall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Enclosure 14
^March2012

20301

From:
To:
Cc:

Fein, Ashden CPT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA
coombs(aarmvcourtrnartialdefense,com: Almanza. Paul
Morrow I I I . JoDean. CPT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA; Overgaard. Angel M. CPT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA:
Whvte. Jeffrey H, CPT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA: Wavtmoht. Daniel W. SGT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SIA:
Matthew kemkes; Paul Bouchard; Tooman. Joshua J CPT MIL US USA TRADOC; Holzer, Mark LTC MIL USA

OTJAG; Melissa Santiago
Subject:
Date:

RE: Defense Request to Compel Production of Witnesses
Thursday, December 08, 2011 4:00:35 PM

Sir,
In short, the United States maintains its objections.
1. We acknowledge the rights of the accused under RCM 405(f). However, we
would like to highlight that there is no documented precedence that empowers
the defense to use the Article 32 investigation to explore all possible
theories of mitigation and extenuation for matters that would only be
potentially relevant during the sentencing phase of the trial, if any. As you
will see in Garcia, the Court, in dicta, quotes Article 32 stating the
"accused has the right to present anything he may desire in his own behalf[,]"
but actually rules on the validity of an Article 32 waiver. The defense's
proffered testimony is not relevant to the charged misconduct or any
mitigation or extenuation evidence towards the alleged acts of the accused
(lAW the Charge sheet). The defense is simply trying to use the Article 32 as
a vehicle to openly explore alleged failures of the chain of command which are
not relevant to charges, thus outside the scope of RCM 405 and your charter.
In fact, the defense uses the statement "each of these witnesses can provide
different insight into the events that transpired between 1 November 2009 and
27 May 2010[;]" however based on the defense's proffer, the "events" are not
related to alleged criminal acts of the accused, but the actions of others who
interacted with the accused.
2. RCM 405(g)(1)(A) purposely limits witness production for witnesses that
are both relevant and not cumulative. Each witness the United States objects
to based on cumulative testimony, is in fact cumulative with others on the
witness list. The purpose of the Article 32 is to conduct a "thorough and
impartial investigation of all matters" and that can still be accomplished by
receiving testimony by multiple other witnesses with similar access to
information, proximity to the accused, or part of the same joint
investigation.
3. As for any witnesses testifying about alleged mental health issues, it
does not appear from the defense's proffered testimony that the defense
intends to present testimony as to the accused's having partial mental
responsibility for the alleged crimes; therefore these witnesses are not
relevant to the charges, including mitigation or extenuation on the merits.
The United States responses are based solely on defense's proffered testimony.
The United States does not argue with the defense that a diminished capacity
amounting to a partial mental responsibility defense could be relevant as
mitigation and extenuation.
4. The defense's witnesses who they proffer will testify about alleged
Articles 13 and 37 violations are not relevant. Our analysis under #1 above
applies as well. Additionally, defense's proffered Articles 13 and 37
violations are matters reserved for the convening authority prior to referral
and ultimately a military judge at a court-martial, if this case is referred.
The substance of these matters and the fact they allegedly occurred after the
commission of the alleged offenses make these witnesses not relevant to the
accused's alleged misconduct, thus outside the scope of your investigation.

20302

5. The defense misrepresents the government's position in l ^ t n o t e l . The
United States did not state in its response that it would not entertain travel
for defense witnesses based on their production being "too costly and
troublesome." The United States will entertain the defense's requestfor
witnesses that are not relevant or cumulative and based on your determination
of availability and method of production, will produce the witnesses.
Additionally,the United States intends to request some of its witnesses be
calledtelephonically,ratherthan in person, but cannot make that request
until you makeadetermination on which witnesses you will call as the
InvestigatingOfficer. Asoftoday and absentthegovernment'srequestto
have the senior ranking government officials declared not reasonably
available, the United States has not objected to the personal appearance of
any witnesses, both the government's or defense's. The United States has
objected to you considering certain witnesses based on relevance and^or
cumulative production. However,the United States does intend to make future
requests to have some witnesses testify telephonically to minimise costs,
depending on which witnesses you ultimately order to be produced and are
reasonablyavailable.
^. The United States objects to your consideration of Article 131, Peijury,
asareference in determining whetherastatement is properly sworn. Article
131 isapunitive article intended to criminalize sworn statements by
Servicemembersduringajudieial proceeding. The original classification
authority (OCA) reviews are simply sworn statements made "under penalty of
peoury"IAW2^U.S.C.174^. Rather than Article 131, the United States
recommends you consider Article 134, liaise Swearing, and specifically the
portion under the explanation which states,"l^ijt does not include such
statements madeinajudicial proceeding orcourseofjustice,asthese are
under Article 131, peijury...."See MCM, part I^,paragraph7^c(l).Underthe
defense's proposed analysis, the only sworn statements that you could consider
during this investigation, are previously sworn statements given under oath at
an Article 32 investigation or court-martial.
Additionally,ladded CPT Hunter Whyte to our emails. He is another
government counsel.
Thank you.
^^r

CPTI^ein

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 222]]

20303

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 15

8 March 2012

20304




From: sm

To: Almanza..2aul;

Cc: Manneiuemkes; ll;

01.- 11::

Subject: RE: Telephonic 802

Date: Sunday, December 11, 2011 11:17:24 PM

LTC Almanza,

1500 will work with the me. I would like to discuss the outstanding issues regarding which witnesses
will be produced, the production of evidence motion, and the defense's closure motion.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs

11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free: 1-800-588-4156

Local: (508) 689-4616

Fax: (508) 689-9282



*?*Confidentiality Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain con?dential attorney-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copla. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: Re: Telephonic 802

From: "Almanza, Paul"
Date: Sun, December 11, pm

#2


Cc:




Counsel -

I'm available any time tomorrow, but given the government's availability, we should plan for 1500.

Thanks, and talk to you then.

LTC Almanza

Original Message

From: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA

To: Almanza,
Paul

Cc: Matthew kemkes
orrow JoDean, CPT USA SJA




20305

Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA SJA
Meussa sanuago



Sent: Sun Dec 11 18:14:42 2011
Subject: RE: Telephonic 802

Sir,

The government has no issue, but requests the call after 1500. We will be
moving our office in the morning in order to prepare for the Article 32.

Thank you.

v/r
CPT Fein


From:

Sent: Sunday, December 11, 2011 6:14 PM

To: Almanza, Paul

Cc: Matthew kemkes; Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA Fein, Ashden
CPT USA Melissa Santiago

Subject: Telephonic 802

LTC Almanza,

I was wondering if we could have a quid 802 on Monday to discuss some of the
remaining issues? I am open just about anytime after 1030.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs

11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free: 1-800-588-4156

Local: (508) 689-4616

Fax: (508) 689-9282



Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-dient information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this infonnation may be unlawful and is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20306

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 16

8 March 2012

20307

From

To Almanna?aul;





Subject. RE: Telephonic 802

Date: Monday, December 12, 2011 5:44:27 PM

LTC Almanza,

28 U.S.C. 1746 Statements

In response to your request for us to look at 2010 WL 2265833 and 2002 WL 243445, the defense's
position is that both cases are inapplicable to the situation at hand. In Faison, the 10 found that TRD
was unavailable and that her videotaped statement was sworn. Such a determination was appropriate
given the fact TRD responded to questions indicating that she knew the difference between the buth
and a lie and promised to tell the truth. As the 10 and the AFCCA correctiy concluded, this colloquy
more than adequately satisfied the oath/a?irmation requirement so as to make TRD's videotaped
statement a sworn statement under R.C.M. In the instant case, unswom statements
under 28 U.S.C. 1746 do not share any of the same hallmarks of a sworn statement. The statements
are not made in front of anyone and the statements are not similar, in that they are not made in front
of a person authorized to administer oaths.

Likewise, Elsevier dealt with a videotaped interview that was done without a formal swearing or oat:h.
However, it quali?ed as a sworn statement in accordance with R.C.M. since on a later
date the unavailable witness did swear to the truth of the statements contained therein. The 10
correddy found this to be a sworn adop?on of the videotaped interviews that, pursuant to United States
v. Wood, 36 M.J. 651 (A.C.M.R. 1992), rendered it admissible. None of the individuals who provided the
unswom statements under 28 U.S. C. 1746 have subsequendy provided a sworn adoption of their
unswom statement in accordance with R.C.M.

An unswom statement provided under 28 U.S.C. 1746 does not qualify as a sworn statement. In
order for an unswom statement provided under 28 U.S.C. 1746 to be admissible, it must be
subscribed and signed "in a judicial proceeding or course of justice" at the Article 32 hearing. A plain
reading of 28 U.S.C Section 1746 and R.C.M. 405(h)(1)(A) undercuts any argument to the contrary.

Closure

While the Defense acknowledges the general right of the public to attend criminal proceedings, such
right is not unfettered and must be balanced by the right of the accused to a fair trial. Sped?cally, die
Defense maintains that the publlc's interest in ?ve discrete pieces of evidence, which may or may not
be admissible if the case proceeds to trial, is not suf?cientiy overwhelming to override the accused's
right to a fair trial. It is important to note that all of the ca? in this area involve the government
attempting to dose the Article 32 hearing while the accused was attempting to assert the right to a
public hearing. Here, it is the accused who is asserting his right to close parts of the hearing in order to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process and to ensure his right to a fair trial." The Government can
point to no harm to its case based upon the defense's request. Instead, the discussion seems to be
centered on subsequent steps that a military judge can take to cure any error at the Article 32. This
analysis is misguided given the relative ease of avoiding the harm and the limited nature of the
defense's request. Certainly, to the extent that we are going to err, we should err on the side of
caution. In this instance, that would mean closing the hearing during those limited times requested by
the defense.

Training
The defense has attached the referenced email regarding the IT training.

Best,
David

20308

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs

11 South Angell Street, #317

Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free: 1-800-588-4156

Local: (508) 689-4616

Fax: (508) 689-9282





Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain con?dential attorney-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20309

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 17

8 Mareh 2012

20310



Subjed:
Date:

Monday, December 12, PM

Sir,

me United States maintains its previously stated position on both the validity of the sworn statements
and keeping the hearing open to the public in order to reduce public scrutiny and ensure Uansparency
of the military justice process.

Our systems were down tonight, and we will send a copy of the email the defense referenced

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20311

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 18

8 March 2012

20312





To: -

cc:

Subject: US v. PFC BM - Witness Ust (UNCIASSIFIED)
Date: Monday, December 12, 2011 8:59:46 PM

Attachments:

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Counsel -

Attached per my conversation with CPT Fein and Mr. Coombs this afternoon is a copy of my witness list
for the hearing.

I will circulate a signed version of this document as soon as possible.
Thank you.
LTC Almanza

Classi?cation: UNCIJXSSIFIED

.. ..

20313

Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 8 March 2012

Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


v. Prosecution Response to Defense

Motion to Compel Depositions

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 19

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,





20314

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
15OTH JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACHMENT (LSO)
MG ALBERT C. LIEBER USAR CENTER
5901 TELEGRAPH ROAD

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22310-3320
REPLY TO
ATTENTDN OF

ARRC-CAR-LSQ 12 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

SUBJECT: Witness List

I. As indicated in my original noti?cation memorandum of 23 November 201 l, as delayed by
my e-mail noti?cation to you of 7 December 20] l, below is a list of the witnesses I intend on
calling during the investigation of this case and my initial determination as to whether witnesses
are reasonably available. Government counsel, please advise both me and defense counsel if you
believe any of the witnesses designated below as reasonably available are not reasonably
available; for any witness designated as not reasonably available or that you believe is not
reasonably available, please indicate whether he or she will be available by telephone during the
investigation or whether you believe another alternative to testimony is appropriate.

SF Paul Adkins (reasonably available)

SPC Eric S. Baker (reasonably available)

W01 Kyle J. Balonek (not reasonably available)
SA Troy Bettencourt (reasonably available)

SSG Peter Bigelow (not reasonably available)
CPT Thomas Cherepko (not reasonably available)
SA Antonio Edwards (reasonably available)

CPT Casey Fulton (reasonably available)

SA Toni Graham (not reasonably available)

Mr. Mark Johnson (reasonably available)

Mr. Adrian Lamo (not reasonably available)
CPT Steven Lim (reasonably available)

. SGT Chad Madaras (not reasonably available)

SF Brian Madrid (not reasonably available)
SA Mark Mander (reasonably available)

Mr. Jason Milliman (not reasonably available)
SA Calder Robertson (not reasonably available)
SA David Shaver (reasonably available)

Ms. ihrleah Showman (not reasonably available)
SA Alfred Williamson (reasonably available)
CPT Barclay Keay (reasonably available)

SGT Daniel Padgett (reasonably available)
lnmate Christopher Whit?eld (not reasonably available)
RADM Kevin Donegan (not reasonably available)
Mr. Robert Betz (not reasonably available)



20315

ARRC-CAR-LSQ
SUBJECT: Witness List

2. LtGen Robert Schmidle (not reasonably available)

a. VADM Robert Harward (not reasonably available)

bb. Mr. Patrick Kennedy (not reasonably available)

cc. RADM David Woods (not reasonably available)

dd. Person subscribing Bates numbers 00378148-00378 75 and 00410623-004l0634 (not

reasonably available)

2. Please address all questions or concerns to the undersigned

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

Original signed
PAUL R. ALMANZA
LTC, JA, USAR
lnvestigating Officer

CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemkes
Paul Bouchard
CPT Ashden Fein (a

Mr. David Coombs (at
CPT JoDean Morrow
CPT Angel Overgaard (at
CPT Jeffrey Whyte (at









r

20316

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Enclosure 20
8 March 2012

20317

From:
To:
Cc:

Subject:
Date:

Almanza. Paul
Fein. Ashden CPT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA: coombs(aarmvcourtmartialdefense.com
Matthew kemkes; (b) (6)
; Morrow I I I . JoDean. CPT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA;
Overoaard. Anoel M. CPT USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA: m(b) (6)
; Whvte. Jeffrey H. CPT
USA JFHO-NCR/MDW SJA
Re: Telephonic 802
Monday, December 12, 2011 9:15:05 PM

All I just sent the witness list I mentioned in my conversation with Mr. Coombs and CPT Fein from my ako
account ((b) (6)
. As I haven't yet received it on my DOJ email to which I sent it
as a cc, just wanted to let you know it's on its way.
Also, counsel, I intend to ask my legal advisor for advice on whether a statement under penalty of
perjury should be considered a "sworn statement" that can be considered by the 10 over defense
objection if the witness is not reasonably available.
Thank you.
LTC Almanza

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Gan'ison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20318

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 21

8 March 2012



20319

From:

To: Almanza._Eau1,
-

mm

Subject: RE: Telephonlc 802

Date: Monday, December 12, 2011 9:42:09 PM

LTC Almanza,

The defense received your list of intended witnesses. It is the defense's understanding that the listed
witnesses are those that you would want to hear from during the hearing. If a speci?c witness is listed
as reasonably available by you, then this witness is to be produced as a live witnesses. The defense is
unsure of your intent regarding a witness that is on your list but is listed as "not reasonably available.?
It appears that you are deferring to the government regarding whether these witnesses will be
produced and in what manner. The defense believes that this determination must be made by you and
not the government.

If the defense's reading of your memorandum is correct, it appears that only 12 witnesses will be called
at the Article 32 (one of which will invoke his 5th Amendment Right). The remaining witnesses, under
me above understanding, will testify if at all, at the government's discretion.

With regards to t:he witnesses not listed by you, the defense requests a ruling regarding whether these
witnesses have been deemed as either not relevant, cumulative or not reasonably available. Under
R.C.M. the defense objects to the determination that its listed witnesses are either not
relevant, cumulative or not reasonably available.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs

11 South Angell Street, #317

Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free: 1-800-588-4156

Local: (508) 689-4616

Fax: (508) 689-9282





Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain con?dential attorney-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disdosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 22

8 March 2012

20320

20321



subject: RE: Telephonic
Date: Monday, December 12, 2011 10:51:03 PM
Attachments:

Sir,

As for those witnesses you determined to be reasonably available, the United States agrees with the
defense's interpretation.

Based on the attached memorandum, SFC Adkins is invoking his Arbcle 31 rights. The United States will
produce him if you determine his presence is required to invoke his rights. Otherwise, all the
government's offered witnesses are available and the United States will deck on the status of CPT Keay
and SGT Padgett (defense offered witnesses) tomorrow morning. DTS should not be an issue, if they
are available.

As for any witness designated as not reasonably available, the government requests to call them as
telephonic wimesses, if you are not considering their sworn statements.

The United States joins the defense in the request for you to annotate for the record which witnesses
you deemed not relevant or relevant but cumulative.

Finally, as we discussed earlier today during our conference call, the United States stands ready to
coordinate the travel for those witnesses that are reasonably available or alternative testimony of each
witness that you deem relevant and not cumulative, from both the government?s and defense's witness
lists.

Thank you.

v/r
Fein



20322

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



v. Prosecution Response to Defense

Motion to Compel Depositions

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 23

U.S. Army Garrison,

Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 8 March 2012


Fort Myer, Virginia 22211





20323

cc:

Subject: Re: Telephonlc 802

Date: Tuesday, December 13, AM
Counsel -

Ya, I intend that witnesses I listed as "reasonably available? be produced as live witnesses at the
hearing, and witnesses I listed as ?not reasonably available" be heard from through an alternative to
testimony.

My making initial determinations as to availability of witnesses does not constitute my deferring to the
government on whether witnesses will be produced or not. Rather, I simply made an initial

determination as to whether witnesses were reasonably available or not per RCM and (B).

I then asked the government if they believed any witnas was not reasonably available to see if there
are any issues with immediate commanders of military witnesses determining that they are not
reasonably available or dvilian witnesses not being reasonably available.

I then asked the government whether witnesses I initially determined are not reasonably available will
be available for telephonic testimony or whether they believe another alternative to testimony is
appropriate in order to determine whether there would be any issue with telephonic testimony of the
witnms I have initially determined are not reasonably available.

As counsel know, there is still an outstanding issue as to whether statements under penalty of perjury
of certain witnesses on my list dsignatued as not reasonably available can be considered over defense
objection. For other witnesses on my list that I initially determined are not reasonably available, I
intend to take their testimony telephonically.

I will of course note the defense objection and prepare a written determination to whether I deemed
witnesses not listed as not relevant, cumulative, or not reasonably available.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

LTC Almanza

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20324

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 24

8 March 2012

20325



Classi?ca?on:
Counsel -

Attached is my closure determination. I?ve also attached another copy of my witness list - I
inadvertentiy had the wrong of?ce symbol on what I provided yesterday.

Once I get these documents printed, I will provide signed copies.

LTC Almanza
Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

\h

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20326

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 25

8 March 2012





20327

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
15011-I JIDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACI-HENT (LSO)
I6 ALBERT C. UEZR USAR CENTER
8901 TELEGRAPH ROAD
ALEXANDRIA. VIRGNIA 22310-3320

AFRC-MJVA 13 December 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

SUBJECT: Witness List

I. As indicated in my original noti?cation memorandum of 23 November 201 l, as delayed by
my e-mail noti?cation to you of 7 December 201 1, below is a list of the witnesses I intend on
calling during the investigation of this case and my initial determination as to whether witnesses
are reasonably available. Government counsel, please advise both me and defense counsel if you
believe any of the witnesses designated below as reasonably available are not reasonably
available; for any witness designated as not reasonably available or that you believe is not
reasonably available, please indicate whether he or she will be available by telephone during the
investigation or whether you believe another alternative to testimony is appropriate.

SFC Paul Adkins (reasonably available)

SPC Eric S. Baker (reasonably available)

W01 Kyle J. Balonek (not reasonably available)
SA Troy Bettencouxt (reasonably available)
SSG Peter Bigelow (not reasonably available)
CPT Thomas Cherepko (not reasonably available)
SA Antonio Edwards (reasonably available)
CPT Casey Fulton (reasonably available)

SA Toni Graham (not reasonably available)

Mr. Mark Johnson (reasonably available)

Mr. Adrian Lamo (not reasonably available)
CPT Steven Lim (reasonably available)

. SGT Chad Madaras (not available)
Brian Madrid (not reasonably available)
SA Mark Mander (reasonably available)

Mr. Jason Milliman (not reasonably available)
SA Calder Robertson (not reasonably available)
SA David Shaver (reasonably available)

Ms. Jihrleah Showman (not reasonably available)
SA Alfred Williamson (reasonably available)
CPT Barclay Keay (reasonably available)

SGT Daniel Padgett (reasonably available)

. Inmate Christopher Whit?eld (not reasonably available)
RADM Kevin Donegan (not reasonably available)
Mr. Robert Betz (not reasonably available)



20328

AFRC-MN A
SUBJECT: Witness List

z. LtGen Robert Schmidle (not reasonably available)

a. VADM Robert Harward (not reasonably available)

bb. Mr. Patrick Kennedy (not reasonably available)

cc. RADM David Woods (not reasonably available)

dd. Person subscribing Bates numbers O0378l48-00378175 and 00410623-00410634 (not

reasonably available)

2. Please address all questions or concerns to the undersigned at

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

PAUL R. ALMANZA








LTC, A, USAR
Investigating Officer
CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemkes (a
Paul Bouchard (a
CPT Ashden Fein -

Mr. David Coombs (at
CPT JoDean Monow (a
CPT Angel Overgaard (at
CPT Jef?cy Whyte(
LTC Mark Holzer (at



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, US. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 2221]



20329

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 26
8 March 2012

20330



noun
1'01

cc

Su?: RE: Tdephonli: 802

nun: weanesauy, oaaunbe 14, 2011 10:37:05 AM
Athdlinollu:
lnqiottnu: I-lim

Good rooming. The govemment was without email from at least 1937 last night until 1030 this
nioming. Thisema? servesas an updatetoyourwitnessrequstand
1937 lad night. Email is sporadic but we should be able to continue communicating through email.

Witnessust.

available? except the below witnesses.

1. Wedo notknowwhetherlhedmerent orig?nal classi?cation authorities (OCAs) will be availablefor


2.


documents.

3.
telephone.


4. Theunlted States Adrian Lamdsbedeemed reasonably available. Mr. lama is
diagnosed with asperger wndrome. This lsa high functioning form of autism. Based on his medical


Ratherthm


S.
"Awitnesswhols
unavailable under Mil. R. Evld. is not ?reasonably available." RCM MRE
80-l(aX1) incorporates in the dalm of privilege against self-incriminatlon.

6.

is not ?reasonably available." RCM MRE 804(a)(1) incorporates in the
dalm of piivilege against self-inaimination.

7.




v/r
CPT Fein

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, US. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 2221 1

666666666

20331

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 27

8 March 2012

20332



CI:
subject: RE: Teiepnonic 802
Dan: Wahesday, Deounbet 14, 2011 12:34:36 PM

lnvubuncuilgh

LTC Almanza,

?l1'iedefense'sabilityto

Tnedefenseintendsto

ASSUCI1,
notensueathomugh and impartial Article 32 hearing.


Padgett, SFCAd|dns, W01 Balonek, and Inmate Whit?eld. The govemmenthashad morethan enough

aitema?ve plans given our?meiy requestforihe witness.

Best.
David

David E. Goombs, Esq.

Law Of?oe of David E. Coombs

11 South Angeil Street, #317

Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free: 1-800-588-4156

LDIZI: (508) 689-4616

Fax: (508) 6899282





"**Con?dentiailty Notice: This transmission, inciudlng auadxments, may contain con?dential aunrney-
dentinfotmauon and isintendedforthe person(s) oroompanynamed. Ifyou are notthe intended
recipient, copies. Unauthorizedc?sdosute, mpyingoruseofthis
infotma?on may be unlawful and is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

- Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

I-IHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

barn/bI6?66?

20333

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Deposition;

Enclosure 28
8 March 2012

20334



Subjucb RE:
Duh: wadnadav, Dewnber 14, 2011 2:37:41 PM

Slr, .
Belowarethegovemmenfsresponses


Exdudingthe-Prs. Tnepressispaltofthepublic,

Aslhe


DenverPost.

0CAWitnesses. andthe
11\erefore,
Thisishypothe?cal



o?ioer. Telephonlc testimony, If available, should suffice fortheddense, prosecution, and investigating

Ifan




bothsoldlers will Ilhelybedeemed notreasonably available. We are working thispmoedureand will
any documentation, ifmisdoaoocur.

Government's Time. Theunihed Statesis working



Theu?tadstatesdosnotuuspedivdy

travel and avaiabilityonoe theinvesligating of?oer makesadetamlnauon, and mereane no






formatoftheheating. Weofferthatfortaldng
re?drect, re?cross, and I0 qusuons Addtionalry thatthereshouldbedosing argument. Theunited

Thedefense


v/r
CPT Fein

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

IIHC, U.S. Anny Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20335

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Colnpel Depositions

Enclosure 29

8 March 2012

20336



Fl?ll

Tb:

CI:

8&1 Determltaoons and Evident: Ust (LIK1A5FIED)
Kb: warhesday, Dewnber 14, 20114:11:45 PM




Classi?cation: UNCLASSIHED
Counsel -

Three Issues, listed below. And in addition no the documents referenced in 1., below, I am
also atladilng my determinations regarding defense objections to government evidence and my
evidence list.

1.

Theadvloewaslhat


LTCHolzeralsoadvisedthatthe
131 (see para. transa-iptofAnide32




pteparedforuseinthiscase.


Basedonhlsadvloeand
Kevin Donegan, Mr. RobeltBetz,LtGen
VADMRobertl-latward, Mr. RADM David woods,andthepersonsimaiblng Bates
numbets 00378148-00378175 and 00410623-00410634.

LTC I-lolzer provided four dowments, atradwed, supporting his advice:
a. The legislative of 28 U.S.C. Sa:lion 1746.

b. us v. Gundennan, 67 M.J. 683 (A.C.C.A. 2009)

c. Nissho-Iwal v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300 (561 Or. 1988)

d. Hart v. 343 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2003).

2. I



trlal.
lnsuflldent.
madelmpnoperoomrnents concerning probableguiltand appropriate Mr.
Coombs?s 131621Deoember2011 email,IfInd?1atu1orough volr dire and and
instructions by the military judge will adequately addra the risk of unlawful command in?uence. I


uredehennina?on.

thoserequestsaredenied.

20337

3.

notreasonablyavallable.

invokingtheirtights.




?thank you.

LTC Almanza

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HIIC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20338

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Deposition:

Enclosure 30

8 March 2012

20339

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACFNENT (L80)
HG ALBERT C. LEER USAR CENTER
8901 TELEGRAPH ROAD
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGIIA 22310-3320



AF RC-MJVA 14 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

SUBJECT: Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence

1. On 12 December 2011, Mr. Coombs, CPT Fein, and I engaged in a telephone conference
where we discussed the govemment?s 2 December and 7 December requested evidence lists.
During that conversation, the defense either stated they did not object to certain listed items of
evidence or raised an objection. The government then responded to objections. This document
provides my determinations regarding the defense?s objections.

a. Charged Documents:
1. Batch #1 (00376954-00377572))
2. Batch #2 (00377626-00377675)
3. Batch #3 (00377845-00378140).

There was no defense objection to these documents.

b. Classification Reviews:

CENTCOM (0037687l-00376873)
DISA (00376890-00376890)
CYBERCOM (00376875-00376878)
CENTCOM (00376879-003 76902)
(00376903-00376953)

Other (00378l48-00378175)
SOUTHCOM (00378646-00378649)
OGA (004l0623-00410634).



The defense objected that unswom statements cannot be considered over defense objection under
R.C.M. The Government responded that statements made under penalty of perjury
can be considered. Per the legal advisor?s advice, these statements can be considered.

c. Accused?s Personnel Records:

1. PFC Marming?s OMPF (00000l

2. PFC Manning?s ERB

3. Security Clearance Documents
a. Batch #1 (000l56l7-00015619)
b. Batch #2
c. Batch #3 (00022947-00022949)

20340

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence

d. Batch #4 (0003680l-00036802)
e. Batch #5 (00000430-00000450)).

There was no defense objection to these documents.

d. Accused?s Training:
1. AIT Training
a. Batch #1 (0000l052-000113.44)
b. Batch #2 (0001 1649-00012569)

The defense objected under R.C.M. 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that they are not sure this
represents the exact AIT training the accused received, but they have a witness who can describe
the training he received. I will not consider these documents.

2. AIT Corrective Training Slideshow (00I253l4-00125316)
3. Information Assurance Training

IA Exam (00375768-00375771)

Training Requirement (00375772)

Virtual Training (00375773)

IA Virtual Training #2 (00375774)

Test Results (00022348)

9.9-9.7?

The defense objected under R.C.M. 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that these documents can be
authenticated by agents. Subject to authentication, I will consider these documents.

IA Awareness-October2008-v7_0 Training Disk (00409673)
IA Awareness-October2009-v8_0 Training Disk (00409674)
Phishing Awareness-April2008-v l_0 Training Disk (00409675)
PII-October 2007-vI_0 Training Disk (00409676)

:-p-qa :-ta

There was no defense objection to these documents.

4. Pre-Deployment Training
a. Iraq Overview PowerPoint (00409722-00409740)
b. Afghanistan Overview PowerPoint (0040974l-00409780)
5. Classi?ed lnforrnation Systems. CIDNE Export Screenshots (004l0665-
00410667).

There was no defense objection to these documents.

Law Enforcement Investigations:
1. CID Case File
a. Batch #1



AFRC-MJVA

20341

SUBJECT: Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence



In

Batch #2 (00000402-0000041 1)
Batch #3 (0002l364-00025526)
Batch #4 (00026079?00026082)
Batch #5 (00026356-00036786)
Batch #6 (0004s302-00040073)
Batch #7 (0037s1s3-00375724)
Batch #8 (003732 1 9-00378623)
Batch (00378626-00378645)
Batch #10 (00407991 -00408088)
Batch #1 1 (00409673-00409678)
Batch #12 (004o97s1.00410553)
Batch #13 (004l0635-00410649)

The defense objected that these documents contained hearsay within hearsay, ar1d that AIRS and
sworn statements cannot be considered over defense objection. The government responded that
multiple agents can testify as to the contents of these documents. I will consider these
documents, but will not consider sworn statements, A?ls, or canvass interview worksheets.

2. CID Forensic Reports



V0

10th Mountain Shares (00046074-00046451)

A1-my Intelligence Report (00046452-00046566)
CENTAUR Logs (00046S67-00052616)

CENTCOM Server(000526l7-00054311)

CIDNE Files (000543 I2-000543 19)

Department of State Files (00054320-00119042)
SOUTHCOM Comparison (0037S008-003751 15)

Intelink Logs (001 19043-00375129)

Lamo Chats (00124 107-00124282)

PFC Marming?s Personal Computer (00l24283-00125269)
PFC Manning's External Hard Drive (00l25270-00125318)
PFC Manning?s SD Card (001253 19-00199473)

. Computers l48.l7.l72.l 15 and 22.225.28.54 (OOI99474-00199485)

SIPRNET Computer 22.225.29.185 (001994se00199493)
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.40 (00199494-00199510)
1>1=c Manning's

NIPRNET Computer 144.107.17.139 (00199524.0o1995ss)
NIPRNET Computer 144,107.19 (00l99556-0021 1019)
NIPRNET Computer 147.193.173.143 (0021 1020-00211027)
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.28.216 (0021 1028-0021 1036)
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.22 (0021 1037-00243945 and
00243332-003 74370)

004 Documents (00374371-00375007)

There was no defense objection to these documents.



20342

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Goverrunent Evidence

f. Military Intelligence Investigations:

1. Investigation #1
a. Batch #1 (00044865-00045301)
b. Batch #2 (00375l73-00375182)
c. Batch #3 (00377582-00377625)
d. Batch #4 (00377748-00377844)
e. Batch #5 (00378203-00378218)

2. Investigation #2
a. Batch #1 (00375l30-00375172)
b. Batch #2 (00377573-00377581)
c. Batch #3 (00377736?00377747)
d. Batch #4 (0O378177-00378202)

3. Investigation #3 (00377676-00377735)

The defense objected under R.C.M 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that they will not have a military
intelligence witness to authenticate these documents, and that they are incorporated in the CID
investigative documents. I will not consider these documents.

g. Administrative Investigations:

1. AR 380?5 Investigation (00000663-00000771)

2. USF-I AR 15-6 Investigation (00012721-00012903)

3. SecAnny AR 15-6 Investigation
a. Batch #1 (00013l62-00020152)
b. Batch #2 (00036787-00036788)

There was no defense objection to these documents. I will consider these documents, but will
not consider sworn statements, interview MFRs, MR5, and canvass intenriew worksheets.

h. -Enemy Possession of Wikileaks Material:
1. A1-Qa?ida Recruiting Video (00408202-00408236)
2. A1-Qa?ida in the Arabian Peninsula Magazine (00012570-0001271 I)
3. Enemy Number 1 Possession Report (classi?ed evidence)
4. Enemy Number 2 Possession Report (classi?ed evidence)
5. Enemy Number 1 Possession Evidence
a. 6 089 0563 ll (Redacted) (004l0660-00410664)
b. Metadata display (00410658-00410659)
c. Forensically Recovered Material (00410654-00410657)

The defense objected under R.C.M 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The govermnent responded that these documents can be
authenticated by agents. Subject to authentication, I will consider these documents.

i. Miscellaneous Documents:
1. DCGS-A Logon Banner (00376856-00376856)



VA

20343

SUBJECT: Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence

2. C3 Document (00378l4l-00378147)
3. PFC Manning?s Military Intelligence Work Product



Storyboard (0041 0603-00410606)

Range Storyboard (0041 0607-004 10609)

6 068 4579 10 (00410610-00410612)

SIPRNET Email, dated 1001 12 (004 I 0613?00410614)
SIPRNET Email, dated 100224 (00410615)

SIPRNET Email, dated 100308 (00410616)

SIPRNET Email, dated 100419 (004l06l7)
SIPRNET Email, dated 100425 (00410618)

SIPRNET Email, dated 091 I30 (00410600-00410602)

The defense objected under R.C.M 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that these documents can be
authenticated by agents. Subject to authentication, 1 will consider these documents.

4. WikiLeaks Background

a.

b.



g.

WikiLeaks Most Wanted Leaks of 2009, dated 090830 (00410561-
00410571)

WikiLeaks Most Wanted Leaks of 2009, dated 091 105 (00410572-
00410583)

WikiLeaks Most Wanted Leaks of 2009, dated 100522 (00410584-
00410593)

Afghanistan War Logs Posted by WikiLeaks (004 I 0668-00410670)
Tweet, dated 100507 (00410594-00410595)

Tweet, dated 100108 (00410596-00410597)

Tweet, dated 100216 (004 I 0598-00410599)

The defense objected under R.C.M 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that these documents can be
authenticated by agents. Subject to authentication, 1 will consider these documents.

5. PFC Manning?s Other Documents

-no 99.0??

WikiLeaks Contact Information File (00409721)

CIDNE Types File (00409719)

Written Note Related to GAL Extraction (00409720)
Screenshot of Google Search for GAL Extraction Macro (00409679)
Early Bird Article, dated 20100318 (00409686-00409718)
Mac Quickstart Bar Screenshot (00409680)

Mac Password Keychain Screenshot (00409683)

Email dated 100520 (00409681)

Email dated 100520 (00409682)

Email, dated 100408 (00409684)

Email, dated 100410 (00409685)

11R 5 332 0069 10 (00410619-00410622)

20344

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence

The defense objected under R.C.M 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that these documents can be
authenticated by agents. Subject to authentication, will consider these documents.

6. Defense lnfonnation Systems Agency Documents
a. DISA Trickler Report
b. DISA Trickler Report Encl (004lO650)
c. DISA Trickler Report Encl 3 (004lO65l)

The defense objected under R.C.M 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that these documents can be
authenticated by agents. Subject to authentication, I will consider these documents.

7. Other

CIDNE Data on the lntemet

GAL Extraction Instructions Screenshot
CENTCOM Sharepoint Architecture
NC Valuation Documents (004 05 56-004 I 0560).

9-99??

The defense objected under R.C.M 405(g)(5)(A) that these documents cannot be considered
because they are not authenticated. The government responded that these documents can be
authenticated by agents. Subject to authentication, I will consider these documents.

j. Common References:
I. United States Code
a. I8 U.S.C. 793(e)
b. l8 U.S.C. 64l
c. I8 l030(a)(l)
2. Executive Orders
a. EO l2958
b. EO l3292
c. EO 13526
3. Regulations
a. AR 380-5 (000Ol408-00001 7| 8)
b. AR 25-2
c. CENTCOM Regulation 25-206 (OO0l6l28-000l6229)
4. Public Law I07-40, Authorization for Use of Military Force, 18 September
200].

There was no defense objection to these documents.

3. Please address all questions or concerns to the undersigned at
and 3?

20345

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations Regarding Defense Objections to Government Evidence

4. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

PAUL R. ALMANZA
LTC, JA, USAR
Investigating Officer

CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemkes
Paul Bouchard (a
CPT Ashden Fein (at
Mr. David Coombs (at
CPT JoDean Morrow
CPT Angel Overgaard
CPT Jeffrey Whyte
LTC Mark Holzer (at










UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20346

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 31

8 March 2012



20347

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
15OTH JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACHMENT (LSO)
MG ALBERT C. LIEBER USAR CENTER
6901 TELEGRAPH ROAD

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22310-3320
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFRC-MJ VA 14 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

SUBJECT: Evidence List

1. As indicated in my original noti?cation memorandum of 23 November 201 1, as delayed by
my e-mail noti?cation to you of7 December 201 1, below is a list of the evidence I intend to
consider at the investigation:

a. Charged Documents:
1. Batch #1 (00376954-00377572))
2. Batch #2 (00377626-003 77675)
3. Batch #3 (00377845-003 78140).

b. Classification Reviews:

CENTCOM (0037687 1 -003 76873)
DISA (00376890-00376890)
CYBERCOM (00376875-00376878)
CENTCOM (00376879-00376902)
(003 76903-003 76953)

Other (00378148-003781 75)
SOUTHCOM (00378646-00378649)
OGA (00410623-00410634).



c. Accused?s Personnel Records:

1. PFC Manning?s OMPF (000001 16-00000164);

2. PFC Manning?s ERB (00000006)

3. Security Clearance Documents
Batch #1 (00015617-00015619)
Batch #2 (00022898-00022913)
Batch #3 (00022947-00022949)
Batch #4 (0003 680 1 -0003 6802)
Batch #5 (00000430-00000450)).



d. Accused?s Training:
1. AIT Corrective Training Slideshow (00125314-00125316)
2. Information Assurance Training
a. 1A Exam (00375768-00375771)
b. IA Training Requirement (00375772)

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Evidence List

P-.0

1

3. Pre-Dep

3.

20348

IA Virtual Training (00375773)

IA Virtual Training #2 (00375774)

Test Results (00022348)

DOD IA Training Disk (00409673)
DOD IA Awareness-October2009-v8_0 Training Disk (O0409674)
Phishing Awareness-April2008-vl_0 Training Disk (00409675)
PII-October 2007-vl_0 Training Disk (00409676)

loyment Training
Iraq Overview PowerPoint (00409722-00409740)

b. Afghanistan Overview PowerPoint (0040974I-00409780)
4. Classi?ed lnfonnation Systems. CIDNE Export Screenshots (00410665-
00410667)

e.
1.

Law Enforcement Investigations: -
CID Case File (note: I will not consider sworn statements, agent?s

investigation reports, and canvass interview worksheets contained in the CID
case file)

3.

Batch #1 (000001 79-00000376)

b. Batch #2 (00000402-0000041 1)

3

Batch #3 (00021 364-00025526)
Batch #4 (00026079-00026082)
Batch #5 (00026356-00036786)
Batch #6 (00045302-00046073)
Batch #7 (00375 1 83?00375724)
Batch #8 (003782 I 9-00378623)
Batch #9 (003 78626-003 78645)
Batch #10 (00407991-00408088)
Batch #1 1 (00409673-00409678)
Batch #12 (00409781-00410553)
Batch #13 (0041 0635-004 I 0649)

2. CID For nsic Reports

3

10th Mountain Shares (00046074-00046451)

Anny Intelligence Report (00046452-00046566)
CENTAUR Logs (00046567-000526 I 6)

CENTCOM Server (00052617-0005431 1)

CIDNE Files (000543 12-000543 19)

Department of State Files (00054320-001 19042)
SOUTHCOM Comparison (00375008-003751 15)

Intelink Logs (001

Lamo Chats (001 24107-00124282)

PFC Manning?s Personal Computer (00124283-00125269)
PFC Manning?s External Hard Drive (00l25270-00125318)
PFC Manning?s SD Card

. Computers 148.17. I 72.1 15 and 22.225.28.54 (00l99474-00199485)

SIPRNET Computer 22.225.29. I 85

20349

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Evidence List

SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.40 (00l99494-00199510)
PFC Manning?s CD (0019951 1-0199523)

NIPRNET Computer 144.107.17.139 (00199524?00199555)
NIPRNET Computer 144.107. 19 (00199556?002l 1019)
NIPRNET Computer 147.198.178.143 (0021 1020-0021 1027)
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.28.216 (0021 1028-0021 1036)
SIPRNET Computer 22.225.41.22 (0021 1037-00243945 and
00243882-00374370)

v. OGA Documents (0037437l-00375007)



f. Administrative Investigations (note: I will not consider sworn statements, agent?s
investigation reports, interview MFRs, or canvass interview worksheets contained in
these documents):

1. AR 380-5 Investigation (00000663-00000771)
2. AR 15-6 Investigation (0001272l?00012903)
3. SecArmy AR 15-6 Investigation
a. Batch #1 (00013162-00020152)
b. Batch #2 (O0036787-00036788)

g. Enemy Possession of Wikileaks Material:
1. Al-Qa?ida Recruiting Video (00408202-00408236)

Al-Qa?ida in the Arabian Peninsula Magazine (000l2570-0001271 1)
Enemy Number 1 Possession Report (classi?ed evidence)
Enemy Number 2 Possession Report (classi?ed evidence)
Enemy Number 1 Possession Evidence

a. 6 089 0563 1 1 (Redacted) (00410660-00410664)

b. Metadata display (00410658-00410659)

c. Forensically Recovered Material (00410654-00410657)



h. Miscellaneous Documents:

1. DCGS-A Logon Banner (O0376856-00376856)

2. C3 Document (00378l4l?00378l47)

3. PFC Manning?s Military Intelligence Work Product
IED Storyboard (00410603-00410606)
Range Storyboard (00410607-00410609)
11R 6 068 4579 I0 (004106l0-00410612)
SIPRNET Email, dated 1001l2(00410613-00410614)
SIPRNET Email, dated 100224 (004l0615)
SIPRNET Email, dated 100308 (00410616)
SIPRNET Email, dated 100419 (004l06l7)
SIPRNET Email, dated 100425 (004l06l8)

i. SIPRNET Email, dated 091 130 (004l0600-00410602)
4. WikiLeaks Background
a. WikiLeaks Most Wanted Leaks of 2009, dated 090830 (00410561-
00410571)



AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Evidence List

.0

5. PFC la



I.
6. Defense
a.
b.
c.


7. Othe




I.

a.

b.

C.

20350

WikiLeaks Most Wanted Leaks of 2009, dated 091 105 (00410572?
00410583)

WikiLeaks Most Wanted Leaks of 2009, dated 100522 (00410584-
00410593)

Afghanistan War Logs Posted by WikiLeaks (00410668-00410670)
Tweet, dated 100507 (0041 0594-0041 0595)

Tweet, dated 1 00108 (00410596-00410597)

Tweet, dated 100216 (00410598-00410599)

nning?s Other Documents

WikiLeaks Contact Information File (00409721)

CIDNE Types File (00409719)

Written Note Related to GAL Extraction (00409720)

Screenshot of Google Search for GAL Extraction Macro (00409679)
Early Bird Article, dated 20100318 (00409686-00409718)

Mac Quickstart Bar Screenshot (00409680)

Mac Password Keychain Screenshot (00409683)

Email dated 100520 (00409681)

Email dated 100520 (00409682)

Email, dated 100408 (00409684)

Email, dated 100410 (00409685)

5 332 0069 10 (00410619?004l0622)

Information Systems Agency Documents

DISA Trickler Report (004l0653)

DISA Trickler Report Encl 1 (0O410650)

DISA Trickler Report Encl 3 (00410651)

CIDNE Data on the Internet (00410554)

GAL Extraction Instructions Screenshot (004l055 5)
CENTCOM Sharepoint Architecture (00410635)
NCD Valuation Documents (00410556?00410560).

Common References:
United States Code

18 use. 793(e)
18 use. 641
13 1030(a)(l)

2. Executive Orders

a.
b.
c.

3. Regulati
a.
b.
e.

E0 12958

EO 13292

E0 13526

ons

AR 380-5 (00001408-00001718)

AR 25-2 (00038974-00039076)

CENTCOM Regulation 25-206 (00016128-00016229)


SUBJECT: Evidence List

4. Public Law Authorization for Use ofMi|itary Force, I8 September

2001.

2. Please address all questions or concerns to the undersigned at

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

PAUL R. ALMANZA
LTC, JA, USAR
Investigating Officer

CF:

MAJ Matthew Kemke
Paul Bouchard
CPT Ashden Fein (at a
Mr. David Coombs (at
CPT JoDean Morrow
CPT Angel Overgaard
CPT Jeffrey Whyte (at
LTC Mark Holzer (at







20351

20352

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCU.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 32
8March2012

20353

1

TC:

And

s i r , d i d you

consider, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,

the

portion

2

o f the r u l e t h a t says, "By

3

reduces the chance o f a r b i t r a r y and

4

enhances the p u b l i c confidence i n t h i s c o u r t - m a r t i a l or

5

32 process."

6

10:

I did.

7

TC:

S i r , d i d you

8

opening t r i a l s t o p u b l i c
capricious

scrutiny,

decisions

and
Article

c o n s u l t w i t h your l e g a l a d v i s o r when

making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n ?

9

10:

I did.

10

TC:

And

f i n a l l y s i r , d i d you

c o n s i d e r reasonable

11

a l t e r n a t i v e s t o c l o s u r e as r e q u i r e d i n the t e s t , i n the Rule

12

under R.C.M

13

10:

806?
I d i d , s p e c i f i c a l l y ; I considered and made f i n d i n g s

14

t o v o i r d i r e and

15

M i l i t a r y Judge.

16
17

TC:

And

a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e s and

i n s t r u c t i o n s of

the

those are w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s i n the r e c o r d t h a t w i l l

be reviewed by the M i l i t a r y Judge o r a p p e l l a t e

court

18

10:

Should t h i s case be r e f e r r e d f o r t r i a l ?

19

TC:

Yes,

20

later?
Yes.

sir.

S i r , now

I am r e f e r e n c i n g

sworn s t a t e m e n t s .

I n making

21

your d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t e s t i m o n y

22

during

23

i n Rule f o r C o u r t - M a r t i a l

24

t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , d i d you c o n s i d e r the r u l e s

10:

as

405(g)?

I did.

27

outlined

20354

1
2

TC:

And d i d you consult with your l e g a l advisor on t b i s

issue?

3

10: 1 did^

4

TC:

5
6
7
^
9

Did your l e g a l advisor provide you with l e g a l research

concerning t h i s issue?
10: Yes, he d i d , and 1 provided h i s advice i n the
documents he provided me t o counse^^^
TC:

And s i r , with t h i s legal advice, d i d you determine

that yoi:i would consider the o r i g i n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a u t h o r i t y

10

statements made under the penalty o f p e r j u r y pursuant t o 2^

11

i^.S.C. ^1746, i n l i e u o f t h e i r testimony, because they are not

12

reasonably

available^

13

10: Yes, that i s the determination that 1 made.^

14

TC:

15

And you d i d t h a t , s i r , pursuant t o the rules set f o r t h

i n Rule f o r Court-Martial 405?

16

10: Correct.

17

TC:

And f i n a l l y , s i r , d i d yoi:i make those w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s

of f a c t concerning t h a t decision?
19

10: Yes, 1 believe so. Yes.

20

TC:

21

10: There are number of emails between the counsel, so 1

22

Thank you, s i r .

believe that was contained i n an email.

23

TC:

2o i t i s documented f o r the record?

24

10: Correct.

28

20355

1

s a y i n g w e l l , t h e defense can c l e a n up t h e mess a f t e r w a r d s might

2

cause somebody t o say t h e y ^ r e not f a i r ?

3
4
5

10:

That i s a l s o a n:^tter 1 w i l l c o n s i d e r when 1

deliberate.
COC:

And l a s t l y , g i v e n the f a c t t h a t t h i s case r i s e s and

6

f a l l s on whether o r not i n f o r m a t i o n i s p r o p e r l y c l a s s i f i e d ;

^

whether o r not i t c o u l d cause harm.

8

person going, t h e lO^s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t these people are t o o

9

i m p o r t a n t t o come here.

Could you see a reasonable

The expense and t h e time and e f f o r t t o

10

b r i n g l^ieutenant Cenerals, Rear A d m i r a l s , and ^ i c e A d n ^ r a l s here

11

t o back up t h e i r unsworn d e c l a r a t i o n s might cause a reasonable

1^

person t o say you know what, t h a t t h i s whole case.

13

defense can^t cross-examine any o f t h e people who are s u p p o r t i n g

14

t h e 22 s p e c i f i c a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h i s r ^ n ^ p o i n t i n g t o t h e

15

accuseds,

16

10:

17

Ci^C:

18

10:

19

COC:

20

10:

And now t h e

^ o u l d t h a t cause somebody t o say
The t e s t
you know what
The t e s t does n o t
1 wonder i f he c o u l d be b i a s e d o r not?
The t e s t i s n o t whether somebody i s t o o i m p o r t a n t t o

21

be brought t o t e s t i f y bi:it r a t h e r whether t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f

22

t h e i r expected t e s t i m o n y outweighs, i t ^ s i n t h e r u l e

23
24

COC:

^^actly.

These people are so i m p o r t a n t , t h e r e i s no

expense, time and d e l a y t h a t would a u t h o r i s e them n o t b e i n g here

37

20356

1

today.

2

what, 1 don^t think t h i s guy can be i m p a r t i a l .

3

2o could you see how somebody then might say, ^^You know

l^astly, the government has said a ^ A r t i c l e ^ 32 i s not

4

a court-martial.

5

system.

6

here i s t o show the best face of the m i l i t a r y j u s t i c e system.

^

This i s the best we can do ^turning t o speak t o the spectator

8

gallery^

9

10:

Mr. Coombs, who are you addressing?

10

COC:

l^m addressing the public because t h i s i s a p u b l i c

11

hearing,

12

do, m i l i t a r y j u s t i c e ?

13

be a thorough and i m p a r t i a l hearing, ^ e

14

way, especially given a l l the comments by the Secretary of

15

State, by The president of the united States, by m u l t i p l e

16

mergers of the department of Oefense as t o whether or not there

1^

i s blood or^ the hands of the people who leaked t h i s information;

18

whether or not my c l i e n t should be executed.

19

commer^ts, a l l of the statements that were dor^e i n i t i a l l y should

20

beg f o r the fact that we have a thorough and i m p a r t i a l hearing

21

to a c t u a l l y get to the facts.

22

say, you know what he w i l l have h i s day i n court but the A r t i c l e

23

32 i s not going t o be i t .

24

10:

^ A r t i c l e ^ 32 i s part of the m i l i t a r y j u s t i c e

This courtroom i s b e a u t i f u l .

everything they have done

i^hat 1 am saying i s i f t h i s i s the best that we can
This i s an A r t i c l e 32 hearing.

should go out of our

A l l the p u b l i c

^ o t t o f u r t h e r hide i t .

That i s unacceptable.

Thank you both.

38

I t should

^ot to

20357

1

findings of f a c t and my conclusions of law on the record today^,

2

1 intend t o append a w r i t t e n determination t o the report o f

3

investigation.

4

^ ' i r s t , as a c i v i l i a n , 1 am employed by the department

5

o f Justice as a Oeputy Chief i n the Criminal Oivision^s Child

6

^ ^ p l o i t a t i o n and Obscenity Section.

7

cases i n v o l v i n g conduct o f which ^^C Manning i s accused.

8
9
10
11
12
13

My section does not handle

Second, 1 was not aware of the s p e c i f i c s o f OOJ^s
i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the ^ikil^eaks r a t t e r before reviewing
materials i n my r o l e of as I n v e s t i g a t i n g O f f i c e r .
Third, 1 sent emails t o counsel concerning t h i s matter
from my u^^o^.gov email account.
f o u r t h , 1 stated the reasons f o r my denial o f the

14

defense reguest t o produce the OOJ f i l e i n t h i s case i n my

15

w r i t t e n determinations as t o defense reguested evidence.

16

^ i f t h , while 1 am employed as a c i v i l i a n by the

17

department of Justice that i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h i s matter, no

18

aspect of my Oepartment of Justice work i n the Child

19

5^^ploitation and Obscenity Section i s involved w i t h or otherwise

20

relates t o the a l l e g a t i o n s against ^^C Manning..

^1

10: S i ^ t h , 1 made w r i t t e n determinatibn8 a8 t o defense-

22

reguested witnesses i n w r i t i n g based on my determinations as t o

23

whether tbe ^ ^ e c t e d testimony was necessary t o mak^ an informed

24

recomimendation

as t o the t r u t h o f the charges, the form o f the

45

20358

1

charges, and the d i s p o s i t i o n of the charges; and also

2

whether witnesses were reasonably a v a i l a b l e . 1 also ^onsider^d

3

whether the expected testimony was cumulative t o the testimony

4

o f other witnesses.

5

determined

Seventh, a f t e r my legal advisor c a l l e d me on 15

6

December 2011 t o discuss R.C.M. 4 0 5 ( f ) ( l l ) and 405(a)(1)(C) t o

^

ensure that 1 was properly considering them, 1 reconsidered my

8

e a r l i e r determination as t o three defense reguested

9

Ouring that conversation my l e g a l advisor made no

witnesses.

10

recommendations as t o my determinations on defense reguested

11

witnesses.

12

eighth, my determination as t o the defense^s closure

13

reguest was n^de a f t e r consulting my legal advisor and p r o v i d i n g

14

h i s advice t o the p a r t i e s .

15

w i t h the legal advice 1 received.

16

that determination i n w r i t i n g , applying R.C.M. 806(b)(2).

17

That deterr^nation was consistent
1 provided the reasons f o r

^ i n t h , my determination as t o my a b i l i t y t o consider

18

statements under penalty of p e r j u r y under 28

^174^ i^a^

19

made a f t e r consulting w i t h my l e g a l advisor and a f t e r p r o v i d i n g

20

h i s advice and cases and l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y he provided m^e t o

21

the p a r t i e s ; and my determination wa8 consistent w i t h rmy l ^ g a l

22

advisor^s advice.

23

counsel v i a an email on 14 December a t 141^ ^honr^^.

1 provided t h a t determination i n w r i t i n g t o

^

1 did

20359

1

l i m i t e d research i n t o the matter before seeking my l e g a l

2

advisor^s advice.

3

10: Tenth, 1 conclude that a reasonable person knowing a l l

4

the above facts would not conclude that my i n ^ a r t i a l i t y might

5

reasonably be guestioned.

6

Counsel, a t t h i s point i s there anything f u r t h e r t o

7

address?

^

TC:

9

S i r , the united States would l i k e t o j u s t r e f l e c t f o r

the record that also during the recess that the t r i a l

counsel

10

contacted the Special Court-Martial Convening Authority and

11

advised him o f the defensors reguest f o r a verbatim t r a n s c r i p t

1^

and the I n v e s t i g a t i n g Officer^s concurrence and the t r i a l

13

counsel^s concurrence,

14

created but only f o r the sole purposes of the f i l i n g t h i s w r i t ;

15

and i t w i l l only include the portions of t h i s hearing up t o t h i s

16

session.

17

^e ordered the verbatim t r a n s c r i p t t o be

I t w i l l be produced tonight.

10: Thank you, t r i a l counsel.

18

Oefense?

19

COC: nothing f u r t h e r from the defense.

20

10: Okay. At t h i s point, we are i n recess.

^1

^The A r t i c l e 32 hearing recessed a t 1514, 16 December 2011.^

22

^The A r t i c l e 32 hearing was called t o order a t 1528, 16 December

23

2011.^

47

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20360

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 33

8 March 2012

20361

From:
To:

Subject:
Date:
Attachments:



Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Counsel -

Attached are my determinations as to defense requested witnesses, and below is a list of the reasonably
available witnesses I intend to have appear personally, and for those witnesses who are not reasonably
available, whether I intend to take their testimony by phone or to consider another alternative to
testimony:

SFC Paul Adkins (reasonably available - in person)

SPC Eric S. Baker (reasonably available in person)

W01 Kyle J. Balonek (not reasonably available by telephone)

SA Troy Bettencourt (reasonably available in person)

SSG Peter Bigelow (not reasonably available by telephone)

CPT Thomas Cherepko (not reasonably available - by telephone)

SA Antonio Edwards (reasonably available in person)

CPT Casey Fulton (reasonably available in person)
SA Toni Graham (not reasonably available by telephone)

Mr. Mark Johnson (reasonably available - in person)

Mr. Adrian Lamo (reasonably available - in person)
CPT Steven Lim (reasonably available in person)

SGT Chad Madaras (not reasonably available by telephone)

Brian Madrid (not reasonably available by telephone)

SA Mark Mander (reasonably available - in person)

Mr. Jason Milliman (not reasonably available by telephone)

SA Calder Robertson (not reasonably available - by telephone)

SA David Shaver (reasonably available in person)

Ms. Jihrleah Showman (not reasonably available - by telephone)

SA Alfred Williamson (reasonably available in person)

CPT Barclay Keay (not reasonably available - by telephone)

SGT Daniel Padgett (reasonably available - in person)

Inmate Christopher Whit?eld (not reasonably available by telephone)

RADM Kevin Donegan (not reasonably available - statement under penalty of perjury)
Mr. Robert Betz (not reasonably available statement under penalty of perjury)
LtGen Robert Schmidle (not reasonably available statement under penalty of perjury)
VADM Robert Harward (not reasonably available - statement under penalty of perjury)

Mr. Patrick Kennedy (not reasonably available - statement under penalty of perjury)
RADM David Woods (not reasonably available statement under penalty of perjury)

Person subscribing Bates numbers 00378148-00378175 and 00410623-00410634 (not reasonably
available statement under penalty of perjury)



Thank you.
LTC Almanza

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20362

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 34

8 March 2012



AFRC-MJVA

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

20363

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
150TH JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACHMENT (LSO)
MG ALBERT c. LIEBER USAR CENTER
6901 TELEGRAPH ROAD
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22310-3320

14 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

I. This document provides my determinations as to defense requested witnesses.



SA Toni Graham she is not reasonably available because while her testimony is
relevant, she is located in Hawaii and the signi?cance of her expected testimony with
respect to the first month of the investigation and her personal appearance does not
outweigh the difficulty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

SA Mark Mander reasonably available.

SA Calder Robertson he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is located in Germany and the signi?cance of his expected testimony with
respect to obtaining the collection of digital evidence and forensic imaging does not
outweigh the dif?culty and cost of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

SA David Shaver reasonably available.

SACharles Ames his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement
witnesses involved in the investigation; to the extent his testimony would cover the
collection of classi?ed information for the Information Review Task Force?s damage
assessment, I understand from the 12 December 20] I telephone conference with CPT
Fein and Mr. Coombs that the government does not have the authority to disclose
damage assessments and thus I conclude that any testimony concerning such topics
would not be permissible.

SA Alfred Williamson reasonably available.

SA Troy Bettencourt - reasonably available.

SA Ronald Rock as the law enforcement investigation was ajoint investigation, his
expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved in
the investigation.

SA Patrick Wheeler as the law enforcement investigation was a joint investigation,
his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved
in the investigation; moreover, his testimony conceming his contacts with Mr. Adrian
Lamo is cumulative with Mr. Lamo?s testimony.

CPT Martin Liebman his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, CPT Liebman?s concerns
about PFC Manning?s mental health did not rise to the level ofcausing him to
indicate that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classi?ed
material, and thus are not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning

20364

VA
SUBJECT: Detenninations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be. (I note that with respect? to all the defense-requested witnesses concerning
PFC Manning?s mental health issues, the government has stated that on 22 April

20l I, an R.C.M. 706 board concluded that Manning did not have a severe
mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in
him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his
conduct?)

k. CPT Michael Worsley his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, CPT Worsley?s concerns
about PFC Manning?s behavior and issues did not rise to the level of causing him to
recommend to the command that they should suspend PFC Manning?s clearance and
thus is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

1. CPT Edan Critch?eld - his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, CPT Critch?eld only
recommended that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classi?ed
material and that his security clearance should -be suspended on 28 May 2010, after
the dates of all charged offenses, and despite his detennination on 22 May 2010 that
PFC Manning was at risk to himself and others, he did not make a recommendation as
to PFC Manning?s continued access to classi?ed infonnation on that date due to
having been informed that PFC Manning was no longer allowed in the T-SCIF, and
thus is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

m. COL David Miller his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an infonned
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed information
earlier, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

n. LTC Brian Kems his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed information
earlier, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Moreover, his information as to whether unauthorized media/programs were
commonly on SIPRNET computers is cumulative to the testimony of CPT Cherepko,
CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett, and his testimony as to remedial measures the
command took to improve INFOSEC measures is not relevant as it post-dates the
charged offenses.

20365

AFRC-MJ VA
SUBJ ECT: Detenninations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

o. MAJ Elijah Dreher his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s mental health issues better,
and should have left PFC Manning back instead of taking him on the deployment, and
whether or not he was aware or should have been aware of PFC Manning?s mental
health issues, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses, and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be.

p. MAJ Clifford D. Clausen his expected testimony is not relevant to the fom1 of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
infom1ed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better
is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Moreover, his
infonnation as to whether music CDs were allowed in the T-SCIF is cumulative to the
testimony of CPT Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

q. CPT Barclay Keay not reasonably available due to previously scheduled leave;
although he would have been available on 3 or 4 January 2012, the signi?cance of his
testimony does not outweigh the delay in securing his personal appearance. I
understand the government and the defense join in requesting that he be considered
not reasonably available and that he testify by telephone.

r. CPT Matthew W. Freeburg his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, the circumstances of his removing PFC Manning from the T-SCIF and
assigning him to the supply room, the Article I5 PFC Manning received, CPT
Freeburg?s interaction with CPT Worsley where he received CPT Worsley?s opinion
as to the extent of PFC Manning?s condition, his sending PFC Manning to CPT
Critch?eld for an evaluation, and his initiation of chapter paperwork, is not relevant
to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses,
especially as CPT Critch?eld did not recommend that PFC Manning?s access to
classi?ed information be rescinded. His infonnation as to whether videogames,
movies, and music was placed on the is cumulative to the testimony of CPT
Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

s. CPT Steven Lim reasonably available.

t. CPT Thomas Cherepko reasonably available.

u. CPT Michael Johnson his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
infomied recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better
is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

20366

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING AND ARRANGING RECORD OF TRIAL
USE OF FORM - Use this form and MCM, 1984,
Appendix 14, will be used by the trial counsel and
the reporter as a guide to the preparation of the
record of trial in general and special court-martial
cases in which a verbatim record is prepared. Air
Force uses this form and departmental
instructions as a guide to the preparation of the
record of trial in general and special court-martial
cases in which a summarized record is authorized.
Army and Navy use DD Form 491 for records of
trial in general and special court-martial cases in
which a summarized record is authorized.
Inapplicable words of the printed text will be
deleted.

8. Matters submitted by the accused pursuant to
Article 60 (MCM, 1984, RCM 1105).

COPIES - See MCM, 1984, RCM 1103(g). The
convening authority may direct the preparation of
additional copies.

12. Advice of staff judge advocate or legal officer,
when prepared pursuant to Article 34 or otherwise.

ARRANGEMENT - When forwarded to the
appropriate Judge Advocate General or for judge
advocate review pursuant to Article 64(a), the
record will be arranged and bound with allied
papers in the sequence indicated below. Trial
counsel is responsible for arranging the record as
indicated, except that items 6, 7, and 15e will be
inserted by the convening or reviewing authority,
as appropriate, and items 10 and 14 will be
inserted by either trial counsel or the convening or
reviewing authority, whichever has custody of
them.

13. Requests by counsel and action of the
convening authority taken thereon (e.g., requests
concerning delay, witnesses and depositions).

1. Front cover and inside front cover (chronology
sheet) of DD Form 490.
2. Judge advocate's review pursuant to Article
64(a), if any.
3. Request of accused for appellate defense
counsel, or waiver/withdrawal of appellate rights,
if applicable.
4. Briefs of counsel submitted after trial, if any
(Article 38(c)).
5. DD Form 494, "Court-Martial Data Sheet."

9. DD Form 458, "Charge Sheet" (unless included
at the point of arraignment in the record).
10. Congressional inquiries and replies, if any.
11. DD Form 457, "Investigating Officer's Report,"
pursuant to Article 32, if such investigation was
conducted, followed by any other papers which
accompanied the charges when referred for trial,
unless included in the record of trial proper.

14. Records of former trials.
15. Record of trial in the following order:
a. Errata sheet, if any.
b. Index sheet with reverse side containing
receipt of accused or defense counsel for copy of
record or certificate in lieu of receipt.
c. Record of proceedings in court, including
Article 39(a) sessions, if any.
d. Authentication sheet, followed by certificate
of correction, if any.
e. Action of convening authority and, if appropriate, action of officer exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction.
f. Exhibits admitted in evidence.

6. Court-martial orders promulgating the result of
trial as to each accused, in 10 copies when the
record is verbatim and in 4 copies when it is
summarized.

g. Exhibits not received in evidence. The page
of the record of trial where each exhibit was
offered and rejected will be noted on the front of
each exhibit.

7. When required, signed recommendation of
staff judge advocate or legal officer, in duplicate,
together with all clemency papers, including
clemency recommendations by court members.

h. Appellate exhibits, such as proposed instructions, written offers of proof or preliminary
evidence (real or documentary), and briefs of
counsel submitted at trial.

DD FORM 490, MAY 2000

Inside of Back Cover

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