Title: Volume FOIA 064

Release Date: 2014-03-20

Text: 20367

Volume 64 of 111
SJAR ROT
FOIA Version

VERBAT IM 1

RECORD OF TRIAL2

(and accompanying papers)

of
(Name: Last, First, Middie initiai) (Sociai Security Number) (Rank)
Headquarters and
Headquarters Company,
United States Army Garrison U-S- Army FCDIJC Ml/er: VA 22211
(Unit/Command Name) (Branch of Service) (Station or Snip)
By
GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
Convened by Commander

(Titie of Con vening Authority)

UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
(Unit/Command of Con vening Authority)

Tried at

Fort. Meade, MD on see below

(Piace or Piaces of Triai) (Date or Dates of Triai-9

Date or Dates of Trial:

23 February 2012, 15-16 March 2012, 24-26 April 2012, 6-8 June 2012, 25 June 2012,

16-19 July 2012, 28-30 August 2012, 2 October 2012, 12 October 2012, 17-18 October 2012,
7-8 November 2012, 27 November - 2 December 2012, 5-7 December 2012, 10-11 December 2012,
8-9 January 2013, 16 January 2013, 26 February - 1 March 2013, 8 March 2013,

10 April 2013, 7-8 May 2013, 21 May 2013, 3-5 June 2013, 10-12 June 2013, 17-18 June 2013,
25-28 June 2013, 1-2 July 2013, 8-10 July 2013, 15 July 2013, 18-19 July 2013,

25-26 July 2013, 28 July - 2 August 2013, 5-9 August 2013, 12-14 August 2013,

16 August 2013, and 19-21 August 2013.

1 insert ?verbatirri or ?surrimari'zeo? as appropriate. This form be used by the Army and Navy for verbatim records of triai

2 See inside back co ver for instructions as to preparation and arrangement.

DD FORM 490, MAY 2000 PREWOUS OBSOLETE Front Cover

20368

AFRC-MJ VA
SUBJECT: Detenninations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

V.

I LT Tanya Gaab her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an infonned
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, and why they did not remove him from the T-SCIF earlier, is not relevant to a
determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so, what the
disposition of those charges should be.

ILT Elizabeth Fields her expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health
issues better, and why they did not remove him from the T-SCIF earlier, is not
relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be. Her information as to whether CDs
and DVDs were permitted in the T-SCIF is cumulative to the testimony of at least
CPT Lim and SGT Padgett.

CW2 Joshua Ehresman his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better,
and whether the command should have taken PFC Manning on the deployment, as
well as CW2 Ehresman?s recommendation, after an incident in which he intervened,
that PFC Manning have his weapon?s bolt removed, be sent to mental health, and then
be separated from the Army, which resulted in no action being taken, is not relevant
to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if
so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

MSG Eric Usbeck his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have taken PFC Manning on the deployment, as well as
his counseling PFC Manning and referring him to mental health for evaluation, and
his not personally following up after learning that PFC Manning did not in fact go to
mental health is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be. Additionally, his information as to the counseling of PFC Manning is
cumulative with Ms. Showman?s.

MSG Mark Woodworth his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, his being briefed on PFC
Manning?s issue with another soldier or his assault on SPC Showman, and his
knowledge that PFC Manning was moved to the supply room, and his lack of
recollection about any discussion of sending PFC Manning back to the States or
chaptering him out, and his knowledge of the search of PFC Manning?s quarters and



20369

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJ ECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

CC.

dd.
ee.

8%

hh.

work space, is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

. SFC Paul Adkins reasonably available (pending invocation of rights issue).
. SSG Lawrence Mitchell his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the

charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the whether the
command could or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct
and behavior better, whether SFC Adkins did not do anything to address PFC
Manning?s issues, whether PFC Manning was gay, and whether the command should
have chaptered him out of the Army, is not relevant to a determination as to whether
PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those
charges should be.

SGT Rebecca Schwab her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
gay and whether he had emotional issues that made him dif?cult to adjust to military
life is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Daniel Padgett reasonably available.

SGT David Sadtler his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command
ostracized PFC Manning and did not support him, and disregarded his concems about
a particular report, is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Lorena Cooley her expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
picked on by other soldiers because they assumed he was gay, the nature of SFC
Adkin?s leadership, and whether PFC Manning should have gotten help for his issues
before they deployed is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Additionally, her information about CDs for music and movies being placed on
SIPRNET computers is cumulative to at least CPT Cherepko and CPT Keay.

SGT Sheri Walsh her expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning had
relationship and gender identity issues and whether other soldiers made fun of him
due to his size and their belief he was gay, his response to a particular incident, and
her opinion as to whether the Anny was a good ?t for him at this time of his life, is
not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and
if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

Ms. Jihrleah Showman she is not reasonably available because while her testimony
is relevant, she is located in Syracuse, NY and the signi?cance of her expected



20370


SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

Ji-

kk.

mm.

nn.



testimony with respect to her recommendation to SFC Adkins that PFC Manning not
deploy due to his emotional issues, the circumstances of her viewing the ?Apache
video? in the T-SCIF, and her experiences as PFC Manning?s direct supervisor do not
outweigh the dif?culty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

Mr. Adrian Lamo reasonably available.

President Barack Obama his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether any statements by
President Obama may have influenced the prosecution in this case, the extent of the
hann caused by the alleged disclosures, or the alleged problem of over?classi?cation
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. The defense may
of course voir dire the investigating of?cer to inquire as to whether any unlawful
command influence taints the Article 32 investigation.

Former Secretary Robert Gates his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of
the charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, the extent of the harm
caused by the charged offenses, the initial public descriptions of the harm caused by
the charged offenses, and the effect of the charged offenses on foreign policy is not
relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Additionally, to
the extent his testimony would cover the damage review conducted by the
Infonnation Review Task Force?s damage assessment, I understand from the 12
December 201 1 telephone conference with CPT Fein and Mr. Coombs that the
government does not have the authority to disclose damage assessments and thus I
conclude that any testimony concerning such topics would not be permissible.
Secretary Hillary Clinton her expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, her raising the issue of the
disclosed diplomatic cables with foreign leaders, the extent of the ham caused by the
charged offenses, and the effect of the alleged disclosures on foreign policy is not
relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

CPT James Kolky his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether three Apache gun
videos that were sent to his Division were not classi?ed at the time of their alleged
release and whether they should have been, recognizing that the govemment states
the video is not classi?ed and does not allege it is classi?ed, is not relevant to a
detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be.

RADM Kevin Donegan he is not reasonably available because while his testimony
is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Director of Operations; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation

20371

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

00.

PP-



SS.

UU.

determinations concerning the two PowerPoints at issue does not outweigh the
dif?culty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the
investigation.

Mr. Robert Betz he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is ChiefClassi?cation Advisory Of?cer; the signi?cance
of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation detenninations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Manning does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

LtGen Robert Schmidle, Jr. he is not reasonably available because while his
testimony is relevant, he is Deputy Commander; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation detenninations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Manning does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

VADM Robert Harward he is not reasonably available because while his testimony
is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Deputy Commander; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation
detenninations concerning the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, CIDNE Iraq Events, other
brie?ngs and the BE22 PAX.wmv video does not outweigh the dif?culty, expense,
and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

Mr. Patrick Kennedy he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Undersecretary of State for Management; the signi?cance of his
expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation detenninations concerning
diplomatic cables does not outweigh the dif?culty of obtaining his presence at the
investigation.

RADM David Woods he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Commander of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation detenninations concerning
the documents at issue does not outweigh the dif?culty, expense, and effect on
military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

CAPT Kevin Moore his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security
Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made determinations concerning
Prevention of ury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary
is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

CAPT William Hochter his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security
Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made determinations concerning
Prevention of Injury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

20372

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

vv. lnmate Christopher Whitfield he is not reasonably available because while his
testimony is relevant, he is currently con?ned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to alleged statements made by
PFC Manning does not outweigh the difficulty. expense. and effect on military
operations ofobtaining his presence at the investigation.

2. Please address all questions or eoneems to the undersigned at


3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

PAUL R.
JA, USAR
Investigating Officer

CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemke.
Paul Bouchar
CPT Ashden Fein (at
Mr. David Coombs (at
CPT 0 Dean Morrow
CPT Angel ()vergaard
Jeffrey Whyte (at
LTC Mark llolzer (at









UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 35

8 March 2012

20373

20374

From:
To: -
Almanza._Ea.ul;
- -
.
Subject: Revised defense requested witness determinations a ist persona telephone/other witnessa
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Date: Thursday, December 15, 2011 12:41:06 PM

Classi?ca?on: UNCLASSIFIED
All -

Per my email this morning, here's my revised defense request determinations and list of
personal/telephone/other witnesses.

LTC Almanza

SFC Paul Adkins (reasonably available in person)

SPC Eric S. Baker (reasonably available - in person)

W01 Kyle J. Balonek (not reasonably available - by telephone)

SA Troy Bettencourt (reasonably available in person)

SSG Peter Bigelow (not reasonably available by telephone)
CPT Thomas Cherepko (not reasonably available - by telephone)

SA Antonio Edwards (reasonably available in person)

CPT Casey Fulton (reasonably available in person)
SA Toni Graham (not reasonably available - by telephone)
Mr. Mark Johnson (reasonably available - in person)

Mr. Adrian Lamo (reasonably available in person)
CPT Steven Lim (reasonably available - in person)

SGT Chad Madaras (not reasonably available by telephone)

Brian Madrid (not reasonably available by telephone)

SA Mark Mander (reasonably available in person)

Mr. Jason Milliman (not reasonably available by telephone)

SA Calder Robertson (not reasonably available by telephone)

SA David Shaver (reasonably available - in person)

Ms. Jihrleah Showman (not reasonably available by telephone)

SA Alfred Williamson (reasonably available in person)

CPT Barclay Keay (not reasonably available by telephone)

SGT Daniel Padgett (reasonably available in person)

RADM Kevin Donegan (not reasonably available statement under penalty of perjury)
Mr. Robert Betz (not reasonably available - statement under penalty of perjury)

LtGen Robert Schmidle (not reasonably available statement under penalty of perjury)
. VADM Robert Hawvard (not reasonably available statement under penalty of perjury)
aa. Mr. Patrick Kennedy (not reasonably available statement under penalty of perjury)
bb. RADM David Woods (not reasonably available - statement under penalty of perjury)
cc. Person subscribing Bates numbers 00378148-00378175 and 00410623-00410634 (not reasonably
available statement under penalty of perjury)



Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20375

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 36

8 March 2012



AFRC-MJVA

20376

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
150TH JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACHMENT (LSO)
MG ALBERT c. LIEBER USAR CENTER
6901 TELEGRAPH ROAD
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 2231a-3320

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

15 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

SUBJECT: Detenninations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

1. This document provides my detenninations as to defense requested witnesses.

a.

SA Toni Graham she is not reasonably available because while her testimony is
relevant, she is located in Hawaii and the significance of her expected testimony with
respect to the first month of the investigation and her personal appearance does not
outweigh the difficulty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

SA Mark Mander reasonably available.

SA Calder Robertson he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is located in Gennany and the signi?cance of his expected testimony with
respect to obtaining the collection of digital evidence and forensic imaging does not
outweigh the difficulty and cost of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

SA David Shaver reasonably available.

SACharles Ames his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement
witnesses involved in the investigation; to the extent his testimony would cover the
collection of classified infonnation for the lnfonnation Review Task Force?s damage
assessment, understand from the 12 December 201 telephone conference with CPT
Fein and Mr. Coombs that the government does not have the authority to disclose
damage assessments and thus I conclude that any testimony concerning such topics
would not be pennissible.

SA Alfred Williamson reasonably available.

SA Troy Bettencourt reasonably available.

SA Ronald Rock as the law enforcement investigation was ajoint investigation, his
expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved in
the investigation.

SA Patrick Wheeler as the law enforcement investigation was a joint investigation,
his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved
in the investigation; moreover, his testimony concerning his contacts with Mr. Adrian
Lamo is cumulative with Mr. Lamo?s testimony.

CPT Martin Liebman his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; specifically, CPT Liebman?s concerns
about PFC Manning?s mental health did not rise to the level of causing him to
indicate that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classified
material, and thus are not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning

20377

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be. (I note that with respect to all the defense-requested witnesses concerning
PFC Manning?s mental health issues, the government has stated that on 22 April

20l I, an R.C.M. 706 board concluded that Manning did not have a severe
mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in
him being unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his
conduct?)

k. CPT Michael Worsley his expected testimony is not relevant to the form ofthe
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, CPT Worsley?s concerns
about PFC Manning?s behavior and issues did not rise to the level ofcausing him to
recommend to the command that they should suspend PFC Manning?s clearance and
thus is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

1. CPT Edan Critch?eld - his expected testimony is not relevant to the form ofthe
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, CPT Critch?eld only
recommended that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classi?ed
material and that his security clearance should be suspended on 28 May 2010, after
the dates of all charged offenses, and despite his determination on 22 May 2010 that
PFC Manning was at risk to himself and others, he did not make a recommendation as
to PFC Manning?s continued access to classi?ed information on that date due to
having been informed that PFC Manning was no longer allowed in the T-SCIF, and
thus is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

m. COL David Miller? his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an infomied
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed information
earlier, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

n. LTC Brian Kems his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed infonnation
earlier, is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Moreover, his information as to whether unauthorized media/programs were
commonly on SIPRNET computers is cumulative to the testimony of CPT Cherepko,
CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett, and his testimony as to remedial measures the
command took to improve IN FOSEC measures is not relevant as it post-dates the
charged offenses.



20378


SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses


a

MAJ Elijah Dreher his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s mental health issues better,
and should have left PFC Manning back instead of taking him on the deployment, and
whether or not he was aware or should have been aware of PFC Manning?s mental
health issues, is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses, and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be.

MAJ Clifford D. Clausen his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Moreover, his
infonnation as to whether music CDs were allowed in the T-SCIF is cumulative to the
testimony of CPT Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

CPT Barclay Keay not reasonably available due to previously scheduled leave;
although he would have been available on 3 or 4 January 2012, the signi?cance of his
testimony does not outweigh the delay in securing his personal appearance. I
understand the government and the defensejoin in requesting that he be considered
not reasonably available and that he testify by telephone.

CPT Matthew W. Freeburg his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, the circumstances of his removing PFC Manning from the T-SCIF and
assigning him to the supply room, the Article 15 PFC Manning received, CPT
Freeburg?s interaction with CPT Worsley where he received CPT Worsley?s opinion
as to the extent of PFC Manning?s condition, his sending PFC Manning to CPT
Critch?eld for an evaluation, and his initiation of chapter paperwork, is not relevant
to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses,
especially as CPT Critch?eld did not recommend that PFC Manning?s access to
classi?ed infonnation be rescinded. His information as to whether videogames,
movies, and music was placed on the is cumulative to the testimony of CPT
Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

CPT Steven Lim reasonably available.

CPT Thomas Cherepko reasonably available.

CPT Michael Johnson his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

20379

AFRC-MJVA.
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

V.

1 LT Tanya Gaab her expected testimony is not relevant to the fom1 of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, and why they did not remove him from the earlier, is not relevant to a
determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so, what the
disposition of those charges should be.

1LT Elizabeth Fields her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health
issues better, and why they did not remove him from the earlier, is not
relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be. Her information as to whether CDs
and DVDs were pennitted in the is cumulative to the testimony of at least
CPT Lim and SGT Padgett.

CW2 Joshua Ehresman his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better,
and whether the command should have taken PFC Manning on the deployment, as
well as CW2 Ehresman?s recommendation, after an incident in which he intervened,
that PFC Manning have his weapon?s bolt removed, be sent to mental health, and then
be separated from the Army, which resulted in no action being taken, is not relevant
to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if
so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

MSG Eric Usbeck his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have taken PFC Manning on the deployment, as well as
his counseling PFC Manning and referring him to mental health for evaluation, and
his not personally following up after learning that PFC Manning did not in fact go to
mental health is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be. Additionally, his information as to the counseling of PFC Manning is
cumulative with Ms. Showman?s.

MSG Mark Woodworth his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, his being briefed on PFC
Manning?s issue with another soldier or his assault on SPC Showman, and his
knowledge that PFC Manning was moved to the supply room, and his lack of
recollection about any discussion of sending PFC Manning back to the States or
chaptering him out, and his knowledge of the search of PFC Manning?s quarters and



20380

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

aa.
bb.

CC.

dd.
ee.

88-

.hh.

work space, is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SFC Paul Adkins reasonably available (pending invocation of rights issue).

SSG Lawrence Mitchell his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the whether the
command could or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct
and behavior better, whether SFC Adkins did not do anything to address PFC
Manning?s issues, whether PFC Manning was gay, and whether the command should
have chaptered him out of the Anny, is not relevant to a detennination as to whether
PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those
charges should be.

SGT Rebecca Schwab her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
gay and whether he had emotional issues that made him dif?cult to adjust to military
life is not relevant to a detennination as to whether he committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Daniel Padgett reasonably available.

SGT David Sadtler? his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command
ostracized PFC Manning and did not support him, and disregarded his concerns about
a particular report, is not relevant to a detennination as to whether he committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Lorena Cooley her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
picked on by other soldiers because they assumed he was gay, the nature of SFC
Adkin?s leadership, and whether PFC Manning should have gotten help for his issues
before they deployed is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Additionally, her information about CDs for music and movies being placed on
SIPRN ET computers is cumulative to at least CPT Cherepko and CPT Keay.

SGT Sheri Walsh her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning had
relationship and gender identity issues and whether other soldiers made fun of him
due to his size and their belief he was gay, his response to a particular incident, and
her opinion as to whether the Army was a good ?t for him at this time of his life, is
not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and
if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

Ms. ihrleah Showman she is not reasonably available because while her testimony
is relevant, she is located in Syracuse, NY and the signi?cance of her expected

20381

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Detenninations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

JJ -

kk.

mm.

nn.

testimony with respect to her recommendation to SFC Adkins that PFC Manning not
deploy due to his emotional issues, the circumstances of her viewing the ?Apache
video? in the and her experiences as PFC Manning?s direct supervisor do not
outweigh the dif?culty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

Mr. Adrian Lamo reasonably available.

President Barack Obama his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether any statements by
President Obama may have in?uenced the prosecution in this case, the extent of the
harm caused by the alleged disclosures, or the alleged problem of over-classi?cation
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. The defense may
of course voir dire the investigating of?cer to inquire as to whether any unlawful
command in?uence taints the Article 32 investigation.

Former Secretary Robert Gates his expected testimony is not relevant to the fom1 of
the charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, the extent of the harm
caused by the charged offenses, the initial public descriptions of the ham caused by
the charged offenses, and the effect of the charged offenses on foreign policy is not
relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Additionally, to
the extent his testimony would cover the damage review conducted by the
lnfonnation Review Task Force?s damage assessment, I understand from the 12
December 20] I telephone conference with CPT Fein and Mr. Coombs that the
government does not have the authority to disclose damage assessments and thus I
conclude that any testimony concerning such topics would not be permissible.
Secretary Hillary Clinton her expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, her raising the issue of the
disclosed diplomatic cables with foreign leaders, the extent of the hann caused by the
charged offenses, and the effect of the alleged disclosures on foreign policy is not
relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

CPT James Kolky his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infom1ation as may be necessary to make an
infom1ed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether three Apache gun
videos that were sent to his Division were not classi?ed at the time oftheir alleged
release and whether they should have been, recognizing that the government states
the video is not classi?ed and does not allege it is classi?ed, is not relevant to a
detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be.

RADM Kevin Donegan he is not reasonably available because while his testimony
is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Director of Operations; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation

20382

AFRC-MJ VA
SUBJECT: Detenninations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

00.

PP-

CN-

SS.

UU.

determinations concerning the two PowerPoints at issue does not outweigh the
dif?culty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the
investigation.

Mr. Robert Betz he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Chief Classi?cation Advisory Of?cer; the signi?cance
of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Manning does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

LtGen Robert Schmidle, Jr. he is not reasonably available because while his
testimony is relevant, he is Deputy Commander; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation detenninations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Manning does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

VADM Robert Harward he is not reasonably available because while his testimony
is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Deputy Commander; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation
determinations concerning the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, CIDNE Iraq Events, other
brie?ngs and the BE22 PAX.wmv video does not outweigh the dif?culty, expense,
and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

Mr. Patrick Kennedy he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Undersecretary of State for Management; the signi?cance of his
expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
diplomatic cables does not outweigh the dif?culty of obtaining his presence at the
investigation.

RADM David Woods - he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Commander of the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
the documents at issue does not outweigh the dif?culty, expense, and effect on
military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

CAPT Kevin Moore his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security
Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made determinations concerning
Prevention of Injury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

CAPT William Hochter his expected testimony is not relevant -to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security
Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made detenninations concerning
Prevention of Injury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

20383
AFRC-MJVA

Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses

2. Please address all questions or eoncems to the undersigned at

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

PAUL R. ALMANZA
LTC, JA, USAR
Investigating Officer

CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemke
Paul Bouchard
CPT Ashden Fein (at a
Mr. David Coombs (at
Jo[)ean M0rrow(
CPT Angel Overgaard
CPT Jeffrey Whyte (at
LTC Mark Holzer (at










UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211





20384

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 37

8 March 2012



A

20385

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACHMENT (LSO)
MG ALBERT C. UEBER USAR CENTER
6901 TELEGRAPH ROAD
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22310-3320

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

16 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised

1. This document provides my revised determinations as to defense requested witnesses. As
outlined below, I have reconsidered my earlier determinations concerning CPT Liebman, CPT
Worsely, and CPT Critch?eld.

3.

SA Toni Graham she is not reasonably available because while her testimony is
relevant, she is located in Hawaii and the signi?cance of her expected testimony with
respect to the ?rst month of the investigation and her personal appearance does not
outweigh the dif?culty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

SA Mark Mander reasonably available.

SA Calder Robertson he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is located in Germany and the signi?cance of his expected testimony with
respect to obtaining the collection of digital evidence and forensic imaging does not
outweigh the dif?culty and cost of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

SA David Shaver reasonably available.

SACharles Ames his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement
witnesses involved in the investigation; to the extent his testimony would cover the
collection of classi?ed information for the Information Review Task Force?s damage
assessment, I understand from the 12 December 2011 telephone conference with CPT
ein and Mr. Coombs that the government does not have the authority to disclose
damage assessments and thus I conclude that any testimony concerning such topics
would not be permissible.

SA Alfred Williamson reasonably available.

SA Troy Bettencourt - reasonably available.

SA Ronald Rock as the law enforcement investigation was a joint investigation, his
expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved in
the investigation.

SA Patrick Wheeler as the law enforcement investigation was a joint investigation,
his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved
in the investigation; moreover, his testimony concerning his contacts with Mr. Adrian
Lamo is cumulative with Mr. Lamo?s testimony.

CPT Martin Liebman reasonably available. I note that while CPT Liebman?s
concerns about PFC Manning?s mental health did not rise to the level of causing him
to indicate that PFC Marming was not suitable for continued access to classi?ed
information, his expected testimony is relevant concerning whether PFC Manning

EXHIBIT

INV. OFCR.

20386

AF RC-MJV A
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

had diminished capacity at the time of the alleged offenses and also will help to
explain the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offenses. (I note
that with respect to all the defense?requested witnesses concerning PFC Manning?s
mental health issues, the government has stated that on 22 April 2011, an R.C.M. 706
board concluded that Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at
the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct?)

CPT Michael Worsley he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant (while his concerns about PFC Manning?s behavior and issues did not rise to
the level of causing him to recommend to the command that they should suspend PFC
Manning?s clearance, his expected testimony is relevant concerning whether PFC
Manning had diminished capacity at the time of the alleged offenses and also will
help to explain the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged
offenses), he is located in Kansas and the signi?cance of his expected testimony with
respect to his treatment of PFC Manning and his opinion of PFC Manning?s need for
ongoing long term does not outweigh the dif?culty and cost of
obtaining his presence at the investigation.

1. CPT Edan Critch?eld - reasonably available. I note that while he only recommended
that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classi?ed material and
that his security clearance should be suspended on 28 May 2010, after the dates of all
charged offenses, and despite his determination on 22 May 2010 that PFC Manning
was at risk to himself and others, he did not make a recommendation as to PFC
Manning?s continued access to classi?ed information on that date due to having been
informed that PFC Manning was no longer allowed in the his expected
testimony is relevant concerning whether PFC Manning had diminished capacity at
the time of the alleged offenses and also will help to explain the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the alleged offenses.

m. COL David Miller his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed information
earlier, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

n. LTC Brian Kems - his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed infonnation
earlier, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Moreover, his information as to whether unauthorized media/programs were
commonly on SIPRNET computers is cumulative to the testimony of CPT Cherepko,
CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett, and his testimony as to remedial measures the

20387

AF RC-MJV A
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

command took to improve INFOSEC measures is not relevant as it post-dates the
charged offenses.

o. MAJ Elijah Dreher his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s mental health issues better,
and should have left PFC Manning back instead of taking him on the deployment, and
whether or not he was aware or should have been aware of PFC Manning?s mental
health issues, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses, and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be.

p. MAJ Clifford D. Clausen his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Moreover, his
information as to whether music CD5 were allowed in the T-SCIF is cumulative to the
testimony of CPT Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

q. CPT Barclay Keay not reasonably available due to previously scheduled leave;
although he would have been available on 3 or 4 January 2012, the signi?cance of his
testimony does not outweigh the delay in securing his personal appearance. I
understand the government and the defense join in requesting that he be considered
not reasonably available and that he testify by telephone.

r. CPT Matthew W. Freeburg his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, the circumstances of his removing PFC Manning from the T-SCIF and
assigning him to the supply room, the Article 15 PFC Manning received, CPT
Freeburg?s interaction with CPT Worsley where he received CPT Worsley?s opinion
as to the extent of PFC Manning?s condition, his sending PFC Manning to CPT
Critch?eld for an evaluation, and his initiation of chapter paperwork, is not relevant
to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses,
especially as CPT Critch?eld did not recommend that PFC Mar1ning?s access to
classi?ed information be rescinded. His information as to whether videogames,
movies, and music was placed on the is cumulative to the testimony of CPT
Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

s. CPT Steven Lim reasonably available.

t. CPT Thomas Cherepko reasonably available.

u. CPT Michael Johnson his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better

20388

AF A
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

v. 1LT Tanya Gaab her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, and why they did not remove him from the earlier, is not relevant to a
determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so, what the
disposition of those charges should be.

w. 1LT Elizabeth Fields her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health
issues better, and why they did not remove him from the earlier, is not
relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be. Her information as to whether CDs
and DVDS were permitted in the is cumulative to the testimony of at least
CPT Lim and SGT Padgett.

x. CW2 Joshua Ehresman his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning's conduct and behavior better,
and whether the command should have taken PFC Manning on the deployment, as
well as CW2 Ehresman?s recommendation, after an incident in which he intervened,
that PFC Manning have his weapon?s bolt removed, be sent to mental health, and then
be separated from the Army, which resulted in no action being taken, is not relevant
to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if
so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

y. MSG Eric his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Marming?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have taken PFC Marming on the deployment, as well as
his counseling PFC Marming and referring him to mental health for evaluation, and
his not personally following up after learning that PFC Manning did not in fact go to
mental health is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be. Additionally, his information as to the counseling of PFC Manning is
cumulative with Ms. Showman?s.

7.. MSG Mark Woodworth his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, his being briefed on PFC
Manning?s issue with another soldier or his assault on SPC Showman, and his
knowledge that PFC Manning was moved to the supply room, and his lack of

20389

AF RC-MJV A
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

CC.

dd.
CC.

ff.

38-

recollection about any discussion of sending PFC Manning back to the States or
chaptering him out, and his knowledge of the search of PFC Manning?s quarters and
work space, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

. SFC Paul Adkins reasonably available (pending invocation of rights issue).
. SSG Lawrence Mitchell his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the

charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the whether the
command could or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct
and behavior better, whether SFC Adkins did not do anything to address PFC
Manning?s issues, whether PFC Manning was gay, and whether the command should
have chaptered him out of the Army, is not relevant to a determination as to whether
PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those
charges should be.

SGT Rebecca Schwab her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
gay and whether he had emotional issues that made him difficult to adjust to military
life is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Daniel Padgett reasonably available.

SGT David Sadtler his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command
ostracized PFC Manning and did not support him, and disregarded his concerns about
a particular report, is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Lorena Cooley her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
picked on by other soldiers because they assumed he was gay, the nature of SF
Adkin?s leadership, and whether PFC Manning should have gotten help for his issues
before they deployed is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Additionally, her information about CDs for music and movies being placed on
SIPRNET computers is cumulative to at least CPT Cherepko and CPT Keay.

SGT Sheri Walsh her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning had
relationship and gender identity issues and whether other soldiers made fun of him
due to his size and their belief he was gay, his response to a particular incident, and
her opinion as to whether the Army was a good ?t for him at this time of his life, is
not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and
if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

20390

AF RC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

hh. Ms. Jihrleah Showman she is not reasonably available because while her testimony



is relevant, she is located in Syracuse, NY and the signi?cance of her expected
testimony with respect to her recommendation to SF Adkins that PFC Manning not
deploy due to his emotional issues, the circumstances of her viewing the ?Apache
video? in the T-SCIF, and her experiences as PFC Manning?s direct supervisor do not
outweigh the difficulty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

Mr. Adrian Lamo reasonably available.

President Barack Obama his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether any statements by
President Obama may have in?uenced the prosecution in this case, the extent of the
harm caused by the alleged disclosures, or the alleged problem of over-classi?cation
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. The defense may
of course voir dire the investigating of?cer to inquire as to whether any unlawful
command in?uence taints the Article 32 investigation.

kk. Former Secretary Robert Gates his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of

11.

the charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, the extent of the harm
caused by the charged offenses, the initial public descriptions of the harm caused by
the charged offenses, and the effect of the charged offenses on foreign policy is not
relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Additionally, to
the extent his testimony would cover the damage review conducted by the
Information Review Task orce?s damage assessment, I understand from the 12
December 2011 telephone conference with CPT ein and Mr. Coombs that the
government does not have the authority to disclose damage assessments and thus I
conclude that any testimony concerning such topics would not be permissible.
Secretary Hillary Clinton - her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, her raising the issue of the
disclosed diplomatic cables with foreign leaders, the extent of the harm caused by the
charged offenses, and the effect of the alleged disclosures on foreign policy is not
relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

m. CPT James Kolky his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the

charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether three Apache gun
videos that were sent to his Division were not classi?ed at the time of their alleged
release and whether they should have been, recognizing that the government states
the video is not classi?ed and does not allege it is classi?ed, is not relevant to a
determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be.

20391

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised

nn. RADM Kevin Donegan he is not reasonably available because while his testimony
is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Director of Operations; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation
determinations concerning the two PowerPoints at issue does not outweigh the
dif?culty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the
investigation.

00. Mr. Robert Betz he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Chief Classi?cation Advisory Of?eer; the signi?cance
of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Maiming does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

pp. LtGen Robert Schmidle, Jr. he is not reasonably available because while his
testimony is relevant, he is Deputy Commander; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Marming does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

qq. VADM Robert Harward he is not reasonably available because while his testimony
is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Deputy Commander; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation
determinations concerning the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, CIDNE Iraq Events, other
brie?ngs and the BE22 PAX.wmv video does not outweigh the dif?culty, expense,
and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

rr. Mr. Patrick Kennedy he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Undersecretary of State for Management; the signi?cance of his
expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
diplomatic cables does not outweigh the difficulty of obtaining his presence at the

- investigation.

ss. RADM David Woods he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Commander of the Joint Task Force - Guantanamo; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
the documents at issue does not outweigh the difficulty, expense, and effect on
military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

tt. CAPT Kevin Moore his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security
Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made determinations concerning
Prevention of Injury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

uu. CAPT William Hochter his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security
Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made determinations concerning
Prevention of Injury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary



20392

AF RC VA
Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised

is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

2. Please address all questions or concerns to the undersigned a
and p?

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.



PAUL R. ALMANZA
LTC, JA, USAR
Investigating Officer

CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemkes
Paul Bouchard
CPT Ashden Fein (at as
Mr. David Coombs (at
CPT oDean Morrow (a
CPT Angel Overgaard
CPT Jeffrey Whyte (at
Mark Ilolzer (at










UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20393

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 38

8 March 2012



AF RC-MJV A

20394

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
15DTH JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACHMENT (LSO)
MG ALBERT C. IJEBER USAR CENTER
6901 TELEGRAPH ROAD
ALEXANDRA, VIRGINIA 22310-3320

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

17 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(1)) Participants

SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised

1. This document provides my revised determinations as to defense requested witnesses. As
outlined below, I have reconsidered my earlier determinations concerning CPT Liebman, CPT
Worsely, and CPT Critch?eld. This 17 December version corrects an administrative error in the
16 December 201 1 version of this document with respect to CPT Cherepko.

3.

279?

SA Toni Graham she is not reasonably available because while her testimony is
relevant, she is located in Hawaii and the signi?cance of her expected testimony with
respect to the ?rst month of the investigation and her personal appearance does not
outweigh the difficulty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

SA Mark Mander reasonably available.

SA Calder Robertson he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is located in Germany and the signi?cance of his expected testimony with
respect to obtaining the collection of digital evidence and forensic imaging does not
outweigh the dif?culty and cost of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

SA David Shaver reasonably available.
SACharles Ames his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement
witnesses involved in the investigation; to the extent his testimony would cover the
collection of classi?ed information for the Information Review Task orce?s damage
assessment, I understand from the 12 December 2011 telephone conference with CPT
ein and Mr. Coombs that the government does not have the authority to disclose
damage assessments and thus I conclude that any testimony concerning such topics
would not be permissible.

SA Alfred Williamson reasonably available.

SA Troy Bettencourt reasonably available.

SA Ronald Rock - as the law enforcement investigation was a joint investigation, his
expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved in
the investigation.

SA Patrick Wheeler as the law enforcement investigation was a joint investigation,
his expected testimony is cumulative with other law enforcement witnesses involved
in the investigation; moreover, his testimony concerning his contacts with Mr. Adrian
Lamo is cumulative with Mr. Lamo?s testimony.

CPT Martin Liebman reasonably available. I note that while CPT Liebman?s
concerns about PFC Manning's mental health did not rise to the level of causing him
to indicate that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classi?ed

INV. arcs. EXHIBIT



20395

AF RC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised

information, his expected testimony is relevant concerning whether PFC Manning
had diminished capacity at the time of the alleged offenses and also will help to
explain the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged offenses. (I note
that with respect to all the def ense-requested witnesses concerning PFC Manning?s
mental health issues, the government has stated that on 22 April 2011, an R.C.M. 706
board concluded that Manning did not have a severe mental disease or defect at
the time of the alleged criminal conduct that resulted in him being unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct?)

k. CPT Michael Worsley he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant (while his concerns about PFC Manning?s behavior and issues did not rise to
the level of causing him to recommend to the command that they should suspend PFC
Manning?s clearance, his expected testimony is relevant concerning whether PFC
Manning had diminished capacity at the time of the alleged offenses and also will
help to explain the circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged
offenses), he is located in Kansas and the signi?cance of his expected testimony with
respect to his treatment of PFC Manning and his opinion of PFC Manning?s need for
ongoing long term does not outweigh the difficulty and cost of
obtaining his presence at the investigation.

1. CPT Edan Critch?eld reasonably available. I note that while he only recommended
that PFC Manning was not suitable for continued access to classi?ed material and
that his security clearance should be suspended on 28 May 2010, after the dates of all
charged offenses, and despite his determination on 22 May 2010 that PFC Manning
was at risk to himself and others, he did not make a recommendation as to PFC
Manning?s continued access to classi?ed information on that date due to having been
informed that PFC Manning was no longer allowed in the T-SCIF, his expected
testimony is relevant concerning whether PFC Manning had diminished capacity at
the time of the alleged offenses and also will help to explain the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the alleged offenses.

m. COL David Miller his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed information
earlier, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

n. LTC Brian Kems his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Marming?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have removed his access to classi?ed information
earlier, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Moreover, his information as to whether unauthorized media/programs were
commonly on SIPRNET computers is cumulative to the testimony of CPT Cherepko,



20396

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised


.

CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett, and his testimony as to remedial measures the
command took to improve INFOSEC measures is not relevant as it post?dates the
charged offenses.

MAJ Elijah Dreher his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s mental health issues better,
and should have left PFC Manning back instead of taking him on the deployment, and
whether or not he was aware or should have been aware of PFC Manning?s mental
health issues, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses, and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be.

MAJ Clifford D. Clausen his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Marming?s conduct and behavior better
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Marming committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Moreover, his
information as to whether music CDs were allowed in the T-SCIF is cumulative to the
testimony of CPT Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

CPT Barclay Keay not reasonably available due to previously scheduled leave;
although he would have been available on 3 or 4 January 2012, the signi?cance of his
testimony does not outweigh the delay in securing his personal appearance. I
understand the government and the defense join in requesting that he be considered
not reasonably available and that he testify by telephone.

CPT Matthew W. Freeburg his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, the circumstances of his removing PFC Manning from the T-SCIF and
assigning him to the supply room, the Article IS PFC Manning received, CPT
Freeburg?s interaction with CPT Worsley where he received CPT Worsley?s opinion
as to the extent of PFC Manning?s condition, his sending PFC Manning to CPT
Critch?eld for an evaluation, and his initiation of chapter paperwork, is not relevant
to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses,
especially as CPT Critch?eld did not recommend that PFC Marming?s access to
classi?ed information be rescinded. His information as to whether videogames,
movies, and music was placed on the is cumulative to the testimony of CPT
Cherepko, CPT Keay, and SGT Padgett.

CPT Steven Lim reasonably available.

CPT Thomas Cherepko not reasonably available.

CPT Michael Johnson his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could



20397

AFRC-MJ VA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

or should have monitored and addressed PFC Mar1ning?s conduct and behavior better
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

v. 1LT Tanya Gaab her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health issues
better, and why they did not remove him from the T-SCIF earlier, is not relevant to a
determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so, what the
disposition of those charges should be.

w. 1LT Elizabeth Fields her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and mental health
issues better, and why they did not remove him from the T-SCIF earlier, is not
relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be. Her information as to whether CDs
and DVDs were permitted in the T-SCIF is cumulative to the testimony of at least
CPT Lim and SGT Padgett.

x. CW2 Joshua Ehresman his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could
or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better,
and whether the command should have taken PFC Manning on the deployment, as
well as CW2 Ehresman?s recommendation, after an incident in which he intervened,
that PFC Manning have his weapon?s bolt removed, be sent to mental health, and then
be separated from the Army, which resulted in no action being taken, is not relevant
to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if
so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

y. MSG Eric Usbeck his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command could or should
have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct and behavior better, and
whether the command should have taken PFC Manning on the deployment, as well as
his counseling PFC Manning and referring him to mental health for evaluation, and
his not personally following up after learning that PFC Manning did not in fact go to
mental health is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be. Additionally, his information as to the counseling of PFC Manning is
cumulative with Ms. Showman?s.

z. MSG Mark Woodworth his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, his being briefed on PFC
Marming?s issue with another soldier or his assault on SPC Showman, and his

20398


SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

CC.

dd.
ee.

ff.

88-

knowledge that PFC Manning was moved to the supply room, and his lack of
recollection about any discussion of sending PFC Manning back to the States or
chaptering him out, and his knowledge of the search of PFC Manning?s quarters and
work space, is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

. SFC Paul Adkins reasonably available (pending invocation of rights issue).
. SSG Lawrence Mitchell his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the

charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the whether the
command could or should have monitored and addressed PFC Manning?s conduct
and behavior better, whether SF Adkins did not do anything to address PFC
Manning?s issues, whether PFC Manning was gay, and whether the command should
have chaptered him out of the Anny, is not relevant to a determination as to whether
PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those
charges should be.

SGT Rebecca Schwab her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
gay and whether he had emotional issues that made him dif?cult to adjust to military
life is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Daniel Padgett reasonably available.

SGT David Sadtler his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the command
ostracized PFC Manning and did not support him, and disregarded his concerns about
a particular report, is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the
charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

SGT Lorena Cooley her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning was
picked on by other soldiers because they assumed he was gay, the nature of SF
Adkin?s leadership, and whether PFC Manning should have gotten help for his issues
before they deployed is not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.
Additionally, her information about CDs for music and movies being placed on
SIPRNET computers is cumulative to at least CPT Cherepko and CPT Keay.

SGT Sheri Walsh her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the charges,
the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether PFC Manning had
relationship and gender identity issues and whether other soldiers made fun of him
due to his size and their belief he was gay, his response to a particular incident, and
her opinion as to whether the Army was a good ?t for him at this time of his life, is

20399

AF RC-MJ VA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses Revised



kk.

11.

mm.

not relevant to a determination as to whether he committed the charged offenses and
if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

. Ms. Jihrleah Showman she is not reasonably available because while her testimony

is relevant, she is located in Syracuse, NY and the signi?cance of her expected
testimony with respect to her recommendation to SF Adkins that PFC Manning not
deploy due to his emotional issues, the circumstances of her viewing the ?Apache
video? in the T-SCIF, and her experiences as PFC Manning?s direct supervisor do not
outweigh the dif?culty and cost of obtaining her presence at the investigation.

Mr. Adrian Lamo reasonably available.

President Barack Obama his expected testimony is not relevant to the fonn of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether any statements by
President Obama may have in?uenced the prosecution in this case, the extent of the
harm caused by the alleged disclosures, or the alleged problem of over?classi?cation
is not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. The defense may
of course voir dire the investigating of?cer to inquire as to whether any unlawful
command in?uence taints the Article 32 investigation.

Former Secretary Robert Gates his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of
the charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, the extent of the harm
caused by the charged offenses, the initial public descriptions of the harm caused by
the charged offenses, and the effect of the charged offenses on foreign policy is not
relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Additionally, to
the extent his testimony would cover the damage review conducted by the
Information Review Task orce?s damage assessment, I understand from the 12
December 2011 telephone conference with CPT ein and Mr. Coombs that the
government does not have the authority to disclose damage assessments and thus I
conclude that any testimony concerning such topics would not be permissible.
Secretary Hillary Clinton her expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, her raising the issue of the
disclosed diplomatic cables with foreign leaders, the extent of the ham caused by the
charged offenses, and the effect of the alleged disclosures on foreign policy is not
relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

CPT James Kolky his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the

charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether three Apache gun
videos that were sent to his Division were not classi?ed at the time of their alleged
release and whether they should have been, recognizing that the government states
the video is not classi?ed and does not allege it is classi?ed, is not relevant to a



20400

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

00.

PP-

?Iq-

SS.

1111.

determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if so,
what the disposition of those charges should be.

. RADM Kevin Donegan he is not reasonably available because while his testimony

is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Director of Operations; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation
determinations concerning the two PowerPoints at issue does not outweigh the
dif?culty, expense, and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the
investigation.

Mr. Robert Betz he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Chief Classi?cation Advisory Officer; the signi?cance
of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Manning does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

LtGen Robert Schmidle, Jr. he is not reasonably available because while his
testimony is relevant, he is Deputy Commander; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
the alleged chat logs between Mr. Lamo and PFC Manning does not outweigh the
effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

VADM Robert Harward he is not reasonably available because while his testimony
is relevant, he is located in Florida and is Deputy Commander; the
signi?cance of his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation
determinations concerning the CIDNE Afghanistan Events, CIDNE Iraq Events, other
brie?ngs and the BE22 PAX.wmv video does not outweigh the dif?culty, expense,
and effect on military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

Mr. Patrick Kennedy he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Undersecretary of State for Management; the signi?cance of his
expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation determinations concerning
diplomatic cables does not outweigh the difficulty of obtaining his presence at the
investigation.

RADM David Woods he is not reasonably available because while his testimony is
relevant, he is Commander of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo; the signi?cance of
his expected testimony with respect to his classi?cation detenninations concerning
the documents at issue does not outweigh the dif?culty, expense, and effect on
military operations of obtaining his presence at the investigation.

CAPT Kevin Moore his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or information as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security
Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made determinations concerning
Prevention of Injury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

CAPT William Hochter - his expected testimony is not relevant to the form of the
charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an
informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether the Security

20401

AFRC-MJV A
SUBJI-JCT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Witnesses - Revised

Battalion commander at the Quantico Brig made determinations concerning
Prevention of Injury precautions that behavioral health did not believe were necessary
is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

2. Please address all questions or concerns to the undersigned at

an

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

Vim/P

PAUL R. ALMANZA











LTC, JA, USAR
Investigating Officer
CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemke
Paul Bouchard
CPT Ashden Fein (at

Mr. David Coombs (at
PT JoDcan Morrow
PT Angel Ovcrgaard
CPT Jeffrey (at
LTC Mark Holzer (at

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 39

8 March 2012

20402

20403

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
150TH JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL DETACHMENT (LSO)
MG ALBERT c. LIEBER USAR CENTER
6901 TELEGRAPH ROAD

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22310-3320
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF



AFRC-MJVA l5 December 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR US v. Manning Article 32(b) Participants

SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Evidence

1. This document provides my determinations as to defense requested evidence listed in the
defense?s December 201 1 request to compel production of evidence:

a. The video of PFC Manning being ordered to surrender his clothing at the direction of
CW4 Averhart and his subsequent interrogation on 18 January 2011 this evidence is
not relevant to the fonn of the charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may
be necessary to make an infonned recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, the
circumstances surrounding PFC Manning?s placement in suicide risk are not relevant
to a determination as whether PFC Manning committed the charged offenses and if
so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

b. A copy of adverse administrative or UCMJ actions, and all supporting documentation
and rebuttal materials, based upon the AR l5-6 investigation conducted by LTG
Caslen or any other govemmental investigation this evidence is not relevant to the
form of the charges, the truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to
make an informed recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, whether or not
other individuals received adverse action as a result of their conduct described in that
investigation (and note that there is no indication that such conduct was substantially
similar to the totality of the conduct PFC Manning is alleged to have engaged in) is
not relevant to a detennination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

c. An Encase forensic image of each computer from the T-SCIF and the TOC of HHC,
2BCT, 10?? Mountain Division, FOB Hammer, Iraq this evidence is relevant as it
could help establish that it was common for soldiers in these locations to place
unauthorized software to these computers; however, this evidence is not reasonably
available because its signi?cance is lessened by the fact it is cumulative to the
testimony of at least CPT Keay and CPT Cherepko, and as the government has
indicated that it is still working to preserve this Qvidence, its limited signi?cance is
not outweighed by the delay of obtaining this evidence.

d. A damage review or assessment of the alleged disclosures in this case led by Mr.
Russell Travers, any communications concerning those disclosures by any
governmental employee to President Obama, and any communications concerning
this case by President Obama to the Departments of Defense, State, or Justice this
evidence is not relevant to the fonn of the charges, the truth of the charges, or
infonnation as may be necessary to make an informed recommendation as to



20404


SUBJECT: Deterrninations as to Defense Requested Evidence

disposition; speci?cally, the extent of the harm caused by the alleged disclosures and
whether any statements by President Obama may have influenced the prosecution in
this case are not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed
the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be.

e. Damage assessment conducted by the Infonnation Review Task Force and the Office
of Security this evidence is not relevant to the form of the charges, the truth of the
charges, or information as may be necessary to make an informed recommendation as
to disposition; speci?cally, the extent of the harm caused by the charged offenses is
not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning committed the charged
offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges should be. Additionally, I
understand from the 12 December 20] I telephone conference with CPT Fein and Mr.
Coombs that the government does not have the authority to disclose damage
assessments and thus I conclude that any evidence of damage assessments is not
reasonably available.

f. Collateral investigations by the Department of State, the FBI, DIA, the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive, and the CIA this evidence is not reasonably
available; as this was ajoint investigation, this evidence is cumulative with evidence
ofthe CID case ?le, and its limited significance is not outweighed by the delay in
obtaining this evidence.

g. The Department of Justice investigation into the alleged disclosures as referenced by
Attorney General Holder, including grand jury material, I8 U.S.C. Section 2703(d)
orders, and search warrants this evidence is not reasonably available; as this was a
joint investigation, this evidence is cumulative with evidence of the CID case ?le, and
also the government has said it has no knowledge of grand jury testimony or search
warrants from the Department of Justice, which leads to a conclusion that the limited
signi?cance ofthis evidence is not outweighed by the delay in obtaining it.

h. The Department of State damage assessment review conducted by its task force of
over I20 individuals this evidence is not relevant to the fonn of the charges, the
truth of the charges, or infonnation as may be necessary to make an informed
recommendation as to disposition; speci?cally, the extent of the harm caused by the
charged offenses is not relevant to a determination as to whether PFC Manning
committed the charged offenses and if so, what the disposition of those charges
should be. Additionally, I understand from the I2 December 20] telephone
conference with CPT Fein and Mr. Coombs that the government does not have the
authority to disclose damage assessments and thus I conclude that any evidence of
damage assessments is not reasonably available.

i. The Damage Assessment of Compromised Infonnation required to be submitted to
the SSO under 5105.2 I -M-I once an SCI security of?cial determines that a
security violation has occurred, and the ?nal security investigation violation report
submitted to the SSO under 5 105.2 I -M-I this evidence is not
reasonably available because the govemment has indicated that this regulation only
applies to violations involving the compromise of Sensitive Compartmented
Infonnation material and there is currently no evidence indicating a compromise of
such material in this case.

20405

AFRC-MJVA
SUBJECT: Determinations as to Defense Requested Evidence

2. Please address all questions or concerns to the undersigned a
and

3. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned.

PAUL R. ALMANZA
LTC, JA, USAR
Investigating Of?cer



CF:
MAJ Matthew Kemkes
Paul Bouchard
CPT Ashden Fein (at a
Mr. David Coombs (at
PT oDean Morrow
CPT Angel Overgaard
CPT Jeffrey Whyte (at
LTC Mark Holzer (at

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 222]]



20406

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Depositions

Enclosure 40

8 March 2012

20407

F7003: mm
To:


Boc I - mmum Eemz.

i FH -
Subject: Multiple Items
Date: Wednesday, February 29, 2012 9:10:00 AM
AttadlmentsDavid,

Scheduling:
1. We made most of the changes you recommended based on time phasing.

2. The reason we have Motions to Compel a second time, is that we are for a second round
from the defense, understanding that you have not intimated such, but it seems likely considering the
amount of information in this case and based on potential rulings of the military judge, if favorable to
the defense.

3. We are confused by your addition of the "Defense Request for Amended Section Disclosure" for
the next motions hearing. The Court already ruled on this issue, and instructed the defense to seek
clarification if something is confusing- is there something that you and the other counsel do not
understand on our disclosure? Please let us know so we may assist.

4. During our second 802 conference, after the defense offered to waive continued and future
searching of Government records for Brady/Giglio information, the Court instructed the parties to
essentially determine whether there can be a waiver of the accused's right for the prosecution to
discover brady/giglio material. The Court did not state that this would be the subject of a motions
hearing the next time we go on the record, as mernorialized in the military judge listing the motions we
are arguing in her post-arraignment 802 conference summary email. We have been and plan on
working with multiple entities, including GAD and our State Bars, to determine if this can occur. As we
stated during the conference, the United States does not oppose this limitation; HOWEVER we are not
clear whether this waiver can occur both from a legal and ethical standpoint, and we do not know the
effect it would have for IAC purposes on appeal. we continue to research this issue, we welcome the
defense?s assistance to provide us their authorities on the legal, ethical, and prevention of IAC issues.
Please take into account that this proposed waiver/limitation will likely include the prosecution not
discovering some mitigating evidence for sentencing purposes, if any, even though the prosecution will
intend to put on an aggravation case.

S. We do not agree that phases 4 and 5 should be combined. In a "normal" case that involves a
spattering of classi?ed information from one or two OCAs, we would agree. However because this case
involves more than ten OCAs that are inside and outside we do not think it is realistic to combine
unclassified and classified evidentiary motions. Additionally, the United States intends to offer for
admission more than 20 items of digital media and more than seventy-?ve different pieces of
documentary evidence. It is more realistic to space these two phases out and allow for adequate time
for the Court to consider pre-authentication and pre-admission of the evidence and then pre-
quali?cation of the many experts. For planning purposes, we are assuming the defense will not stipulate
to admission of the evidence or quali?cations of the experts- if we are incorrect in that assumption then
please let us know and we will adjust our calendar and the way forward.

6. We agree that the timelines will adjust if the Court orders depositions, but we have chosen to give a





20408

proposal based on the information today and not contingencies based on Court rulings. We also predict
that this schedule will shift more to the right based on additional defense mo?ons, as in most cases? but
as you know, that is not in our control.

00! Contact Infonnation:







infonnation?



ASUs:

command needs your clients to give them money and there is no way to bill him or the
HCCF. However, it appears the command has one of PFC BM's dweck in t:heir possession which CPT
Bouchard or a member of the defense could use to obtain the money.

From the command: We won't be able to take the money from HCCF. PFC BM was sent with three
checks from the JRCF, we deposited two at HCCF. We still have the third. We could have him
coordinate with either his lawyer or his family to have the dieck cashed, give us the amount needed to
purchase his uniforms and then he can instruct his family/lawyer on what to do with the remaining
amount. Otherwise the only other idea would be to draft a memo for PFC BM to sign stating that he
wants to purchase the uniforms and to have his lawyer release the funds to us.

Address of HCCF:

We are still working with PMO tn determine if the HCCF location/address should be given out. We think
this information is to protect PFC BM and the facility. If that is the answer, then we will
come up with a proposal to ensure he can still receive the mail.

Protective Order:

We are still working with and DA experts on the procedures for the protective order and
coordinating with many of the 005. Hopefully by C08 tomorrow, I will have an answer to your
question as to whether we envision a process that has the CS0 going directly with the OCAs.

V/r
Ashden

20409

Appellate E^hihitl^
^Supplements
Ipage
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed for Reason2
^ilitar^.ludge^sSeal^rder
dated20August2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record ofTrial

20410

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Prosecution Response
to Defense Motion to
Compel Discovery

8 March 2012

RELIEF SOUGHT

The United States respectfully requests the Court deny, in part, the Defense Motion to
Corripel Discovery (hereinafter "Defense Motion") for the reasons provided herein. The United
States requests oral argument.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

As the moving party, the Defense bears the burden of persuasion and must prove any
factual issues necessary to decide this motion by a preponderance of the evidence. See Manual
for Courts,.Martial, United States, R. C.M. 905(c) (2008).
FACTS

The United States stipulates to those facts cited in Defense Motion, except for any
allegations that are inconsistent with the following:
The Department of Defense Directives cited by Defense in paragraph 5(a) only apply to
the compromise of Sensitive Compartmented Information, which the United States has no reason
to believe occurred.
The United States disputes any allegation, including those relating to whether, when, and
to what extent select agencies, departments and organizations reviewed the compromised
information, supported by unofficial public statements.
The United States took all necessary measures and precautions to ensure Defense
received efficient, yet accurate, discovery responses. The United States produced discoverable
information as immediate as possible to avoid any further delay, upon receipt of the appropriate
approvals for classified information, if applicable.
On 16 November 2011, Defense did not specifically request files completed with the
assistance of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. See Enclosure 4.
The Defense provides no evidence to support its proposition that an inspection of any
computers ''would have allowed the Defense to provide evidence that it was common for
[S]oldiers to add technically unauthorized computer programs to their computers."

20411

On 1 December 2011, the Defense did not specifically request any alleged information
completed by the WikiLeaks Task Force (WTF). See Enclosure 5.
The Defense provides no evidence to support its proposition relating to what the
Information Review Task Force (IRTF) concluded and from whom, if anyone, the Department of
Defense (DOD) sought assistance.
The Defense provides no evidence to support its proposition relating to what, if anything,
the alleged Department of State (DOS) task force concluded and that any alleged conclusions
were "at odds with the classification review."
The United States disputes that the Article 32 Investigating Officer (IO) should have
ordered production of evidence. The United States concurs with the IO's determination.
On 3 October 2011, the United States produced all enclosures to any Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) response, specifically BATES 00000772-00000851. See Enclosure 7.
Upon Defense request, the United States promptly preserved all Quantico videos
requested by Defense. See Enclosure 1. On 6 December 2011, the United States produced all
videos of the alleged Quantico incident, specifically BATES 00408902-00408903. See
Enclosures 1-3 and 8. The alleged video referenced by the Defense does not exist. See id.
On 21 September 2011- more than one year after the accused's unit redeployed back to
Fort Drum, New York- the Defense requested that the United States preserve these hard drives.
See Enclosure 9. The United States identified four commands or agencies that may possess hard
drives responsive to this request and promptly submitted a Request to Locate and Preserve
Evidence to each command or agency. Those entities included: (1) 2d Brigade Combat Team,
1Oth Mountain Division (2/10 MTN); (2) the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI); (3) Third
Army, United States Army Central (ARCENT); and (4) the Computer Crime Investigative Unit,
U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command (CCIU). See Enclosures 10-13.
The United States' request to 2110 MTN yielded the preservation of 181 hard drives, of
which the United States has identified thirteen as being located within the SCIF during the unit's
deployment to FOB Hammer. See Enclosures 15-16. None of those thirteen hard drives
contained the ''bradley.manning" user profile. See id.
The ARCENT Commander confirmed that the "command does not have possession of
any Theater Provided Equipment hard drives responsive to [the United States'] request," which
would account for any equipment which did not redeploy with the unit. Enclosure 17. Similarly,
the FBI confirmed it has no hard drives responsive to the United States' request, outside those
collected by Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID).
On 30 May 2010 and while at FOB Hammer, Iraq, CID recovered three hard drives from
the SCIF, including both Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) computers
assigned to the accused and the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)
computer assigned to SFC Adkins, the accused's Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge. See
2

20412

Enclosures 18-19. Only the two hard drives assigned to the accused contained the
"bradley.manning" user profile. See id. On 8 November 2011, the United States produced an
EnCase forensic image of all three hard drives, including both containing the ''bradley.manning"
user profile. See Enclosure 20; see also Enclosure 32 (Voucher 073-10).
On IO September 2010 and while at Fort Drum, New York, CCIU searched the Shipping
_
Containers (hereinafter "CONEX") from the accused's unit. See Enclosure 16. CCIU identified
ninety-one hard drives that were located in the SCIF during the accused's deployment. See id.
Only one hard drive contained the accused's user profile. See id. On 1 6 September 2010, CCIU
examined this hard drive and discovered that the computer was ''utilized by the assigned user
"bradley.manning" between 08:47:15, 04 Jun 09 and 14:20:00, 24 Sep 09." Enclosure 22. The
hard drive did not contain the accused's user profile during the accused's deployment. See id.;
see also Enclosure 23. On 8 November 2011, the United States produced an EnCase forensic
image of this hard drive. See Enclosure 20; see also Enclosure 32 (Voucher 132-10).
On 30 September 2010, CCIU requested that 2/10 MTN preserve "any additional hard
drives used during the deployment to Iraq." Enclosure 24. On 1 October 2010, pursuant to a
search authorization, CCIU searched ''the remaining drives in the 2/10 MTN SCIF." Enclosure
25. CCIU identified thirty-three hard drives that were located in the SCIF during the accused
deployment. See id. Only two hard drives contained the accused's user profile. See id.; see also
Enclosure 26. On 4 October 2010, CCIU created an EnCase forensic image of these hard drives.
See id. On 8 November 2011, the United States produced the EnCase forensic images of both
hard drives containing the accused's user profile. See Enclosure 20; see also Enclosure 32
(Voucher 147-10).
To date, the United States has produced 2,686 unclassified documents, totaling 80,026
pages, and 41,200 classified documents, totaling 331,340 pages, to the Defense. In sum, the
United States has produced a total of 43,886 documents, consisting of 411,366 pages. See
Enclosure 28 (most recent production of sequential discovery). 1
WITNESSES/EVIDENCE

The United States does not request any witnesses be produced for this response. The
United States respectfully requests that the Court consider the following enclosures to this
response:
1. Request for Prudential Search and Preservation oflnformation to Quantico, 28 April
2011
2. Response to Preservation Request from Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Chris Greer,
United States Marine Corps of Quantico, 20 December 2011
3. Sworn Statement, Master Sergeant (MSgt) Brian Papakie, United States Marine
Corps
1

For a detailed explanation of the number of classification authorities involved and the procedure/time necessary

for approval for production or alternatives under MRE 505, see Prosecution Supplement to Prosecution Proposed
Case Calendar, dated

8 March 2012.

3

20413

4. Defense Discovery Request, 16 November 2011
5. Defense Discovery Request, 1 December 2011
6. Prosecution Discovery Response, 31 January 2012
7. Delivery confirmation (BATES 00000001-00044864)
8. Delivery confirmation (BATES 00408202-00409678)
9. Defense Preservation Request, 21 September 2011
10. Prosecution Preservation Request (2/10 MTN), 04 October 2011
11. Prosecution Preservation Request (FBI), 04 October 2011
12. Prosecution Preservation Request (ARCENT), 06 October 2011
13. Prosecution Preservation Request (CCIU), 04 October 2011
14. Sworn Statement, MAJ Latendresse, 06 March 2012
15. Preservation List, 2/10 MTN
16. Agent's Investigation Report, SA Wilbur (BATES 00021963)
17. ARCENT response to Preservation Request, 20 October 2011
18. DA Form 4137 (BATES 00411038)
19. DA Form 4137 (BATES 00411040)
20. Delivery Confirmation, dated 8 November 2011
21. DA Form 4137 (BATES 00411124)
22. Agent's Investigation Report, SA Shaver, 17 September 2010 (BATES 00022379)
23. Enlisted Record Brief, PFC Bradley Manning, 20 January 2012 (BATES 00410877)
24. Preservation Request, CID, 30 September 2010 (BATES 00024504)
25. Agent's Investigation Report, SA Ellis, 01 October 2010 (BATES 00022135)
26. Agent's Investigation Report, SA Shaver, 4 October 2010 (BATES 00022422)
27. DA Form 4137 (BATES 00411147)
28. Delivery Confirmation, 27 January 2012
29. Defense Discovery Request, 13 October 2011
30. Defense Discovery Request, 8 December 2010
31. Defense Discovery Request, 13 May 2011
32. Images on Cube2
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

The United States respectfully request the Court deny Defense request to compel the
production of the following: (1) internal discussion of any FOIA request; (2) EnCase forensic
images of all preserved hard drives that do not contain the "bradley.manning" user profile; (3)
and damage assessments and records from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of
Defense (DOD) (including all agencies or departments referenced in Defense Motion, para.
1(d)(2)), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of State (DOS).

2

On 8 November 2011, the United States produced a "Cube" to the Defense. Enclosure 32lists those items

contained on the "Cube."

4

20414

I:

THE UNITED STATES BEARS AN OBLIGATION TO PRODUCE
UNCLASSIFIED DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO THE RULES FOR COURTS­
MARTIAL AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 703(f) and the Supreme Court ruling in Brady outline
the obligation of the United States to produce unclassified discovery. .See R.C.M. 703(f); see
also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
A. Rule for Courts-Martial 703(f) requires the United States to produce unclassified
information that is "relevant and necessary."
RCM 703(f) states that "[e]ach party is entitled to the production of evidence which is
relevant and necessary." R.C.M. 703(±)(1); see also R. C.M. 401 (relevant evidence "means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence"); see also R. C.M. 703(±)(1), Discussion ("[r]elevant evidence is necessary when it is
not cumulative and when it would contribute to a party's presentation of the case in some
positive way on a matter in issue"). The rule continues that "any defense request for the
production of evidence shall list the items of evidence to be produced and shall include a
description of each item sufficient to show its relevance and necessity." See R.C.M. 703(±)(3);
see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (the accused "has no constitutional right
to conduct his own search of the [government's] files to argue relevance").
The rule continues that "a party is not entitled to the production of evidence which is
destroyed, lost, or otherwise not subject to compulsory process." R.C.M. 703(±)(2) (only "if such
evidence is of such central importance to an issue that it is essential to a fair trial, and if there is
no adequate substitute for such evidence, the military judge shall grant a continuance or other
relief in order to attempt to produce the evidence"); see also United States v. Ellis, 57 M.J. 375
(C.A.A.F. 2002) (the inquiry hinges of whether the evidence is of "central importance to an
issue" absent adequate substitute).
The rule does not govern the production of classified information. See R.C.M. 701(f)
("nothing in this rule shall ...require the disclosure of information protected from disclosure by
[MRE 505]"); see also R.C.M. 703(f) analysis; see also Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, Mil. R. Evid. 505(a) (''this rule applies to all stages of the proceedings").
B. The Supreme Court ruling in Brady imposes a constitutional duty upon the United
States to produce any favorable evidence that is material to guilt or punishment.
The prosecution shall disclose evidence that is favorable to an accused and that is
material either to guilt or punishment. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 83. Favorable evidence includes
exculpatory and impeachment evidence. See id. at 83; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972). Favorable evidence "is subject to constitutionally mandated disclosure when it
'could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict."' Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 464 (2009) (citing Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)). Evidence "is 'material' within the meaning of Brady when there is a
_
5

20415

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Cone, 556 U.S. at 469 ("[e]vidence that is material to guilt will often be
material for sentencing purposes as well; the converse is not always true"); see also United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (''the proper standard of materiality must reflect our
overriding concern with the justice of the finding ofguilf') (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court ruling in Brady does not require the prosecutor ''to deliver his entire
file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed,
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial." See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
(an interpretation of Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery 'would
entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice"') (citing Giles
v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117 (1967)). An accused's "right to discover [Brady] evidence does
not include the unsupervised authority to search through the [government's] files." Ritchie, 480
U.S. at 39. This obligation does not require the United States ''to communicate preliminary,
challenged, or speculative information." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
The United States has "a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government's behalf in the case." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added). The
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) in Williams outlined the scope of the United
States' duty to search for Brady information. See United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 441
(C.A.A.F. 1999). The Court concluded that the United States must search its own files, the files
of law enforcement authorities that participated in the investigation of the subject matter of the
charged offense, the investigative files in a related case maintained by an entity closely aligned
with the prosecution, and other files, as designated in a defense request, that involve a specified
type of information within a specified entity. See id. at 441.
II:

THE UNITED STATES HAS PRODUCED ALL DISCOVERABLE
INFORMATION THAT IS REQUIRED UNDER RULE FOR COURTS­
MARTIAL 703 AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

In light of the facts and legal authority outlined above, the United States has produced all
discoverable information that is required under RCM 703 and the Constitution.
A. The United States produced all discoverable information responsive to Defense
request for FOIA materials. See Defense Motion. para. 1(a).
The United States disputes whether the requested information is "relevant and necessary."
See R.C.M. 703(±). This information is not relevant to any element of the charged offenses. See
R.C.M. 401; see also Article 104, UCMJ; see also Article 134, UCMJ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 641;
see also 18 U.S.C. § 793(e); see also 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1); see also Article 92, UCMJ. Further,
the Defense failed to articulate any basis why such information is discoverable. See id. (any
defense request "shall include a description of each item sufficient to show its relevance and
necessity''). However, on 3 October 2011, the United States produced all enclosures to the
CENTCOM FOIA response, specifically BATES 00000772-00000851. See Enclosure 7. The
United States intends to produce any remaining portions of the FOIA request, including the
actual Reuter's FOIA request, dated 25 July 2007, and any additional documents that were part
6

20416

of the FOIA response, including the CENTCOM FOIA response, dated 24 April 2009, to the
Defense, even though the United States disputes such information is "relevant and necessary."
See R.C.M. 703(f)(l).
The United States has not produced all "internal discussions of any such FOIA request."
The Defense failed to articulate any basis why "internal discussions of any such FOIA request"
are "relevant and necessary." The United States bears no obligation to produce such
"preliminary, challenged[,] or speculative information." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
B. The United States produced all discoverable information responsive to Defense
request for the alleged Quantico video. See Defense Motion, para. 1(b).
The alleged Quantico video does not exist. See Enclosures 2-3. The United States took
all reasonable measures to preserve any videos of the alleged incident. See Enclosure 1. LtCol
Chris Greer and MSgt Brian Papakie confirmed that all videos were properly provided to the
United States. See Enclosures 2-3. On 6 December 2011, the United States produced all such
videos to the Defense, specifically BATES 00408902-00408903. See Enclosure 8.
C. The United States has produced all discoverable information responsive to Defense
requests for EnCase forensic images of those computers located within the T-SCIF
and TOC. See Defense Motion, para. l(c).
The United States has produced all EnCase forensic images of those hard drives located
within the SCIF and TOC that are "relevant and necessary." See R.C.M. 703(f). The United
States identified four hard drives within the SCIF that contained the accused's user profile,
specifically ''bradley.manning," during the deployment. See Enclosures 18-19; see also
Enclosures 25-26. On 8 November 2011, the United States produced an EnCase forensic image
of all four hard drives with a "bradley.manning" user profile. See Enclosure 20; see also
Enclosure 32 (Voucher 073 and Voucher 147-10).
EnCase forensic images of hard drives that do not contain a "bradley.manning" user
profile are not "relevant and necessary," thus not discoverable. See R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense
argues these forensic images are discoverable ''to provide evidence that it was common for
[S]oldiers to add technically unauthorized computer programs to their computers." Even
assuming, arguendo, other Soldiers added unauthorized computer programs, this assumed fact is
not relevant to any element of the charged offenses. See R.C.M. 401; see also Article 104,
UCMJ; see also Article 134, UCMJ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 641; see also 18 U.S.C. § 793(e); see
also 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1); see also Article 92, UCMJ. Further, even if relevant, a forensic image
of each hard drive is cumulative, thus not necessary. See R.C.M. 703(f)(1) discussion. In the
alternative, even if "relevant and necessary," the fact these hard drives were collected from a
classified facility, namely the SCIF, confirms that the rules of production under Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 505 should govern whether these images are discoverable. See M.R.E. 505;
see also R.C.M. 703(f) discussion.
The United States took all reasonable measures to preserve any computer located within
the SCIF and TOC during the accused's deployment that were relevant to the investigation. See
7

20417

Enclosures 10-13; see also R.C.M. 703(f)(2) (only "if such evidence is of such central
importance to an issue that it is essential to a fair trial, and if there is no adequate substitute for
such evidence, the military judge shall grant a continuance or other relief in order to attempt to
produce the evidence"). The ARCENT Commander and the FBI confirmed they do not possess
any hard drives that were located within the SCIF. See Enclosure 17. The command at 2/10
MTN preserved 181 hard drives, thirteen of which the United States can confirm were located
within the SCIF and none of which contained the "bradley.manning" user profile. See
Enclosures 14-16. Lastly, CCIU prepared, and the United States produced on 8 November 2011,
EnCase forensic images for all hard drives located in the SCIF that contained a
''bradley.manning" user profile. See Enclosure 20; see also Enclosure 32 (Voucher 073 and
Voucher 147-10).
D. The United States intends to produce discoverable information within the Federal
Bureau oflnvestigations. See Defense Motion, para. l(b).
The FBI currently has an open law enforcement investigation, which includes some
information related to the accused. Based on the information being classified, the United States
intends to produce any information within the FBI's investigative files that is discoverable under
Brady and directly related to the accused, after the Court issues a protective order for classified
information, and based on the United States receiving proper approvals.
E. The Defense has failed to state a legal basis for the production of alleged damage
assessments. See Defense Motion, para. l(d)Cl,2,4).
For the reasons that follow, the United States respectfully requests the Court deny
Defense's request for damage assessments, if any should exist, from the WTF, IRTF, and DOS.
1. Background.
Information may be originally classified only if done so by an original classification
authority. Exec. Order No. 13526 § 1.1(a). Additionally, the information must be owned by,
produced by or for, or under the control of the United States Government and must fall within
one or more of the categories of following categories: military plans, weapons systems, or
operations; foreign government information; intelligence activities (including covert action),
intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; foreign relations or foreign activities of the
United States, including confidential sources; scientific, technological, or economic matters
relating to the national security; United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear
materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures,
projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security; o1· the development,
production, or use of weapons of mass destruction. See Exec. Order No. 13526 § § 1.1(a), 1.4(a)­
(h). Finally, the OCA must determine "that the unauthorized disclosure of the information
reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security" and be able to identify
or describe the expected damage. See Executive Order 13526 § 1.1(a) (emphasis added).
OCAs make their classification designations based on their authority under Executive
Order 13526, Classified National Security Information (signed by President Barack Obama on
8

20418

29 December 2009) or for materials classified prior to 27 June 2010 on Executive Order 12958
(signed by President Clinton on 17 April 1995 and amended by Executive Order 13292 signed
by President Bush on 25 March 2003), as well as relevant classification guides.
The authority to classifY information is limited to (1) the President and the Vice
President; (2) agency heads and officials designated by the President; and (3) United States
Government officials delegated this authority pursuant to paragraph (c) of section 1.3(a).
Executive Order 13526 § 1.3(a).
The President delegated the authority to make classification determinations to heads of
selection agencies and it remains an Executive function. Department ofNavy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 527 (1988) (''The authority to protect [classified] information falls on the President as head
of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief"). The authority has been held in the
relevant agencies because they have the expertise to review the information and determine the
potential impact the release of that information would have on the United States as well as who
can have access to that information. Id.; see, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) ("[A]
court's decision whether an intelligence source will be harmed if his identity is revealed will
often require complex political, historical, and psychological judgments. . . . There is no reason
for a potential intelligence source, whose welfare and safety may be at stake, to have great
confidence in the ability of the judges to make those judgments correctly.").
Once an OCA has made a classification determination it is presumed proper and it is not
the province of the court to question these determinations. See United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d
1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he government . . . may determine what information is
classified. A defendant cannot challenge this classification. A court cannot question it."),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985); see also United States v.
Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 703, 717 (E.D. Va. 2007) ("Of course, classification decisions are for the
Executive Branch . . . ."). The decision of owner of the information must be given great
deference. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 176 (''The decisions of the Director, who must of course be
familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the
magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake"); see also Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) ("Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are
rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention"); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1952) (such matters "are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference").
2. WikiLeaks Task Force.
The United States has not produced the alleged damage assessment by the WTF because
the Defense has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. See Defense Motion, para.
1(d)(1). The Defense failed to articulate how such information is "relevant and necessary." See
R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense merely speculates that an alleged assessment may be "at odds" with
a classification review. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59 (the accused "has no constitutional right to
conduct his own search of the [government's] files to argue relevance"). This argument confuses
the issues- classification reviews are prospective (i.e., "could damage occur"), whereas damage

9

20419

assessments are in hindsight (i.e., "did damage occur"). Additionally, Defense has not provided
any evidence that any OCA had any involvement with the WTF damage assessment.
The alleged damage assessment by the WTF is not "relevant and necessary." R.C.M.
703(f). Actual damage, if any, is not relevant to any element of the charged offenses. See
R.C.M. 401; see also Article 104, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); see also Article
134, UCMJ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 641; see also 18 U.S.C. § 793(e); see also 18 U.S.C.
1030(a)(1); see also Article 92, UCMJ. The United States need only prove that the compromised
information was classified; for example, if "SECRET", that the information "reasonably could be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security." See Exec. Order No. 13526.
Further, courts consistently reject Defense's proffered relevance of this information. See Smith,
750 F.2d at 1217 (a defendant cannot challenge this classification [determination]"); see also
Sims, 471 U.S. at 176 (''The decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with 'the
whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the
national security interests and potential risks at stake"). Therefore, such information is not
"relevant and necessary." R.C.M. 703(f).
3. Information Review Task Force.
The United States has not produced the alleged damage assessment by the IRTF because
the Defense has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. See Defense Motion, para.
1(d)(2). The Defense failed to articulate how such information is "relevant and necessary." See
R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense merely speculates that an alleged assessment may ''undercut the
testimony of[] the Original Classification Authority for the charged documents." See Ritchie,
480 U.S. at 59 (the accused "has no constitutional right to conduct his own search of the
[government's] files to argue relevance"). This argument confuses the issues- classification
reviews are prospective (i.e., "could damage occur"), whereas damage assessments are in
hindsight (i.e., "did damage occur"). Additionally, Defense has not provided any evidence that
any OCA had any involvement with the IRTF damage assessment.
The alleged damage assessment by the IRTF is not "relevant and necessary." R.C.M.
703(f). Actual damage, ifany, is not relevant to any element of the charged offenses. See
R.C.M. 401; see also Article 104, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); see also Article
134, UCMJ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 641; see also 18 U.S.C. § 793(e); see also 18 U.S.C.
1030(a)(l); see also Article 92, UCMJ. The United States need only prove that the compromised
information was classified; for example, if "SECRET", that the information "reasonably could be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security." See Executive Order 13526.
Further, courts consistently reject Defense's proffered relevance of this information. See Smith,
750 F.2d at 1217 (a defendant cannot challenge this classification [determination]"); see also
Sims, 471 U.S. at 176 (''The decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with 'the
whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the
national security interests and potential risks at stake"). Therefore, such information is not
"relevant and necessary." R.C.M. 703(f).

10

20420

4. Department of State.
The DOS has not completed a damage assessment.
5. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
The ONCIX has not completed a damage assessment.
F. The Defense has failed both to put the United States on notice of exactly what the
Defense desires and to state a legal basis for its production of records from closely
aligned investigations. See Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(1-4).
The United States responds as follows to the Defense request for "records from closely
aligned investigations." Defense Motion, para. 1(d).
1. WikiLeaks Task Force. 3
The United States denies the Defense request for "any report completed by the WTF" for
two reasons. See Defense Motion, para. 1 (d)(l). First, the Defense failed to provide an adequate
basis in its request, namely what information they seek and how such information is "relevant
and necessary." See R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense argues that it is "entitled to receive all forensic
results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation"
(emphasis added). The United States is not aware of any authority that identifies all reports by
all so-called cooperating agencies as relevant and necessary per se. Second, the Defense failed
to provide specificity in its request. The Defense's request for "[a]ny report completed by the
WTF" is identical to its request on 13 October 2011. See Enclosure 29. On 27 January 2012,
the United States requested "more specificity and an adequate basis for its request." See Defense
Enclosure M to its Motion. The Defense again failed to provide any specificity. Requesting
"any report completed by the WTF" does not put the United States on notice of exactly what it
desires. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (a request is specific when "it gives the prosecutor notice of
exactly what the defense desires"). The United States is unaware of any "forensic results and
investigative reports" from within WTF that contributed to any law enforcement investigation.
2. Information Review Task Force.
The United States denies the Defense request for "any report generated by the IRTF" for
two reasons. See Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(2). First, the Defense failed to provide an adequate
basis in its request, namely what information they seek and how such information is "relevant
and necessary." See R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense argues that it is "entitled to receive all forensic
results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation"
(emphasis added). The United States is not aware of any authority that identifies all reports by
all so-called cooperating agencies as relevant and necessary per se. Second, the Defense failed
3 Although the WTF is a subordinate organization of the Central Intelligence Agency, the United
States s�parated the defense request for information from both, based on defense's formatting of
their request.

11

20421

to provide specificity in its request. The Defense's request for ''any report generated by the
IRTF" is hardly more specific than its prior request for "[a]ll forensic results and investigative
reports by the Department of Defense," particularly in light of the Defense's knowledge that the
IRTF "review[ed] all items allegedly disclosed to WikiLeaks" on behalf of DOD, but outside of
law enforcement. See Enclosure 30. On 27 January 2012, the United States requested "more
specificity and an adequate basis for its request." See Defense Enclosure M to its Motion. The
Defense again failed to provide any specificity. Requesting "any report generated by the IRTF"
does not put the United States on notice of exactly what it desires. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (a
request is specific when "it gives the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desires").
The United States is unaware of any "forensic results and investigative reports" from within the
IRTF that contributed to any law enforcement investigation.
3. Department of State.
The United States denies the Defense request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative reports
by ...DOS" for two reasons. See Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(2). First, the Defense failed to
provide an adequate basis in its request, namely how such information is "relevant and
necessary." See R.C.M. 703(£). The Defense argues that it is "entitled to receive all forensic
results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation"
(emphasis added). The United States is not aware of any authority that identifies all reports by
all so-called cooperating agencies as relevant and necessary per se. Second, the Defense failed
to provide specificity in its request. The Defense's request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative
reports by ...DOS" is identical to its request on 8 December 2010. See Enclosure 30. On 27
January 2012, the United States noted that it has produced reports that are "relevant and
necessary'' to the request, specifically BATES 00408089-00408156 and 00376903 (documents
pertaining to the joint investigation between the Diplomatic Security Services (DSS) and CID),
but sought "more specificity and an adequate basis" for further discovery. See Defense
Enclosure M of its Motion (emphasis added). The Defense again failed to provide any
specificity. Requesting "[a]ll forensic and investigative reports by ...DOS" does not put the
United States on notice of exactly what it desires. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (a request is
specific when "it gives the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desires"). Absent the
DSS records previously referenced, the United States is unaware of any "forensic results and
investigative reports" from within the DOS that contributed to any law enforcement
investigation.
In addition to those reasons provided above, the United States denies the Defense request
for "any report or assessment by the DOS concerning the released diplomatic cables" for two
reasons. See Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(4); see also Prosecution's Response to Defense Motion,
para. II (D)(4). First, the Defense failed to provide an adequate basis in its request, namely how
such information is "relevant and necessary." See R.C.M. 703(£). The Defense argues that it is
"entitled to receive all forensic results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating
agencies in this investigation" (emphasis added). The United States is not aware of any authority
that identifies all reports by all so-called cooperating agencies as relevant and necessary per se.
Second, the Defense failed to provide specificity in its request. The Defense's request for "any
report or assessment by the DOS concerning the released diplomatic cables" is hardly more
specific than its prior request for "all forensic results and investigative reports by the DOS
12

20422

regarding the information obtained by WikiLeaks." See Enclosure 30. On 27 January 2012, the
United States noted that it has produced reports that are "relevant and necessary" to the request,
specifically BATES 00408089-00408156 and 00376903, but sought "more specificity and an
adequate basis" for further discovery. See Defense Enclosure M of its Motion. The Defense
again failed to provide any specificity. Requesting "any report or assessment by the D OS
concerning the released diplomatic cables" does not put the United States on notice of exactly
what it desires. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (a request is specific when "it gives the prosecutor
notice of exactly what the defense desires").
4. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
The United States denies the Defense request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative reports
by ...DIA'' for two reasons. See Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(2). First, the Defense failed to
provide an adequate basis in its request, namely how such information is "relevant and
necessary." See R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense argues that it is "entitled to receive all forensic
results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation"
(emphasis added). The United States is not aware of any authority that identifies all reports by
all so-called cooperating agencies as relevant and necessary per se. Second, the Defense failed
to provide specificity in its request. The Defense' s request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative
reports by ...DIA'' is hardly more specific than its prior request for "any and all documents ...and
reports...conducted by the DIA." See Enclosure 31. On 27 January 2012, the United States
requested "more specificity and an adequate basis for its request." See Defense Enclosure M of
its Motion. The Defense again failed to provide any specificity. Requesting "[a]ll forensic and
investigative reports by ...DIA'' does not put the United States on notice of exactly what it
desires. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (a request is specific when "it gives the prosecutor notice of
exactly what the defense desires"). The United States is unaware of any "forensic results and
investigative reports" from within the DIA, including the IRTF, that contributed to any law
enforcement investigation.
5. Office of National Counterintelligence Executive.
The United States denies the Defense request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative reports
by ...the ONCIX" for two reasons. See Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(2). First, the Defense failed
to provide an adequate basis in its request, namely how such information is "relevant and
necessary." See R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense argues that it is "entitled to receive all forensic
results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation"
(emphasis added). The United States is not aware of any authority that identifies all reports by
all so-called cooperating agencies as relevant and necessary per se. Second, the Defense failed
to provide specificity in its request. The Defense' s request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative
reports by ...ONCIX" is hardly more specific than its prior request for "any damage assessment
or review completed in this case either by or with the assistance of ONCIX." See Enclosure 4.
On 27 January 2012, the United States requested "more specificity and an adequate basis for its
request." See Defense Enclosure M of its Motion. The Defense again failed to provide any
specificity. Requesting "[a]ll forensic and investigative reports by ...ONCIX" does not put the
United States on notice of exactly what it desires. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (a request is
specific when "it gives the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desires"). The United
13

20423

States is unaware of any "forensic results and investigative reports" from within the ONCIX that
contributed to any law enforcement investigation.
6.

Central Intelligence Agency.

The United States denies the Defense request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative reports
by ... CIA" for two reasons. See Defense Motion, para. l(d)(2). First, the Defense failed to
provide an adequate basis in its request, namely how such information is "relevant and
necessary." See R.C.M. 703(f). The Defense argues that it is "entitled to receive all forensic
results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation"
(emphasis added). The United States is not aware of any authority that identifies all reports by
all so-called cooperating agencies as relevant and necessary per se. Second, the Defense failed
to provide specificity in its request. The Defense's request for "[a]ll forensic and investigative
reports by ... CIA" is hardly more specific than its prior request for "any and all documentation
related to the CIA investigation of WikiLeaks." See Enclosure 30. On 27 January 2012, the
United States requested "more specificity and an adequate basis for its request." See Defense
Enclosure M of its Motion. The Defense again failed to provide any specificity. Requesting
"[a]ll forensic and investigative reports by ... CIA" does not put the United States on notice of
exactly what it desires. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (a request is specific when "it gives the
prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desires"). The United States is unaware of any
"forensic results and investigative reports" from within the CIA that contributed to any law
enforcement investigation.
7. Department ofJustice.
On 20 September 2011, the United States produced information "relevant and necessary"
to Defense's request for "any information relating to any 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order or any
search warrant by the government of Twitter, Facebook, Google or any other social media
site[,]" specifically BATES 00022960-00023077, 00023607-00023623, 00036691-00036722.
See Enclosure 7; see also Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(3); see also R.C.M. 703(f). The United
States is in the process of producing all discovered information "relevant and necessarY' to
Defense's request that the United States has authority to disclose under the federal rules. The
United States disputes whether Defense provided a specific request, and adequate basis, for its
request for "any grand jury testimony." See Defense Motion, para. 1(d)(3). However, in an
abundance of caution, the United States intends to produce all grand jury materials, both
classified and unclassified, that are "relevant and necessary" and that the United States has
authority to disclose under the federal rules. See R.C.M. 703(f)(1). Absent the FBI law
enforcement files previously referenced, the United States is unaware of any "forensic results
and investigative reports" from within the DOS that contributed to any law enforcement
investigation.
CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the United States r�spectfully request the Court deny Defense
request to compel the production of the following: (1) internal discussion of any FOIA request;
(2) EnCase forensic images of all preserved hard drives that do not contain the
14

20424

"bradley.manning" user profile; (3) and damage assessments and records from the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD) (including all agencies or
departments referenced in Defense Motion, para. l(d)(2)), Department of Justice (DOJ), and
Department of State (DOS).

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

I certify that I served or caused to be served a true copy of the above on Mr. David
Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel and Major Matthew Kemkes, Senior Military Defense
Counsel, via electronic mail, on 8 March 2012.

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

15

20425

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 1
8 March 2012

20426

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OFWASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319-5013
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ANJA-CL

28 April 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR Col Daniel Choike, Commander, Marine Corps Base Quantico
SUBJECT: Request for Prudential Search and Preservation of Information - U.S. v. PFC
Bradley E. Manning
1. The U.S. Army Prosecutors in the above-referenced case ("prosecution") hereby make a twofold request to the Marine Corps Base Quantico ("command"). First, the prosecution requests
that your command take any and all reasonable and necessary steps to preserve any information
held by your command which concerns or references PFC Manning. Secondly, the prosecution
requests that your command conduct a thorough and comprehensive search of its records for
information which relates to PFC Manning's confinement at the Quantico Brig.
2. This request is designed to allow the prosecutors to assess the totality of information
available and held as records by your command. It is not intended to, nor should it be interpreted
as, ascribing any legal relevance, including whether such information may be provided in
discover)', to the information requested. The prosecutors require such materials immediately. In
order to expedite this process, please provide the requested information that is
"UNCLASSIFIED", "CONFIDENTIAL", or "SECRET" by 15 May 2011. on a CD or
DVD. Any information classified "TOP SECRET" or controlled as "sensitive compartmented
information", should be made available for inspection. We anticipate making future requests as
the need arises, and specifically before the trial, if the case is referred to court-martial.
3. As stated above, the prosecution requests that you preserve all documents and information,
including data stored on electronic media, pertaining to PFC Manning, whether or not such
information is directly responsive. Furthermore, please take steps to preserve materials related to
PFC Manningfromany routine data destruction practices. If you are unsure whether certain
materials should be preserved, please err on the side of caution and preserve the materials.
Failure to preserve and retain any pertinent materials, electronic or otherwise, may result in
sanctions against the United States, based on PFC Manning's rights under Article 46, UCMJ, the
Rules for Courts-Martial, and applicable case law.
4. The point of contact for this request is the undersigned at (202) 685-1975, ncr.ediscovery@
jfhqncr.northcom.mil, or ncr.ediscovery@jfhqncr.northcom.smil.mil (secure email).

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20427

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion toCompelDiseovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCU.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Enclosure2
8March2012

20428

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
3250 CATLIN AVENUE
MARINE CORPS BASE
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134
IN REPLY REFERTO:

5800
B052
20 Dec 11
From:
To:

S t a f f Judge Advocate
U.S Army T r i a l Counsel

Sub]:

DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC AND HARD COPY FILES ICO PRIVATE FIRST
CLASS BRADLEY MANNING U.S. ARMY

1. Pursuant t o t r i a l counsel request, a l l relevant e l e c t r o n i c
correspondence, e l e c t r o n i c f i l e s and hard copy documentary evidence
regarding t h e confinement o f PFC Manning i n t h e possession o f Marine
Corps base Quantico o f f i c i a l have been provided. T r i a l counsel were
p e r m i t t e d t o view and copy a l l relevant f i l e s maintained by t h e
Quantico P r e t r i a l Confinement F a c i l i t y .

OL4^
CHRIS
LtCol,GREER
USMC









UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 3
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 8 March 2012
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

0 20430

1. KATIE
NAW
DEPARTMENT OF uamico Base Brig
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT 1
2011 03 02
I, Brian R. Papalcie? make the following

free and voluntary statement to CWO2 Barnes, D. V.

whom I know to be Quantico PCF Officer In Charge

I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats or promises extended to me. I fully understand that this

statement is given oonceming my knowledge of

A conversation between detainee Manning, B. E. and myselfwith reference to the relinquishing of his personal
items and clothing prior to TAPS.

Previously Sanders, T. had explained to me that on 110228, approx 10 min before TAPS, SND did not
understand why he had to relinquish his personal item and clothing. Sanders reiterated the procedures in
regard to his status of POI and then explained that SND complied.

I asked SND if he understood and he stated "no, I do not understand." When asked what he did not understand, he
referred to giving up his personal items and clothing. I brie?y explained, due to his status he was not authorized
those items a?er TAPS. Ifurther explained that his status has not changed and that he is to comply with the
Marines and staff on security when given instructions. When asked again if he understood, he again said no and
that he does not understand why all of his items are taken with the exception of his underwear. He stated, "With
the elastic band, which is probably the most dangerous piece." At that time he chuckled brie?y as if the
conversation we were having was absurd. I referred back to the beginning of the conversation and asked again if
he understood everything I had explained. He looked at me for approx 10 sec and then said, I asked what .
part did he not understand. He looked again for approx the same amount of time and asked if I could explain
again. At that time I said, "Detainee Manning, do you understand that you will not question the guard staff and
that you will comply when told to do so and that if you have any questions about the orders or instructions given,
you are to bring it to the attention of the appropriate staff the next working day?" He waited a moment and stated,
understand Master Sergeant."

I told him carry on, I immediately approached the Brig OIC with regards to concerns that SND may have had
recent thoughts or ideas as to the uses of the elastic band from his underwear. As a result this statement was

written. -EOS-

B. R. Papakie I
USMC
I
I
i

i I
a
OPNAV 5527/2 (12-32) Designed Using FormFlow 2.15. May as

ManningB_0O408896





. 0 20431

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army, Enclosure 4
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 8 March 2012



Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

0 0 20432

UNITED STATES

DEFENSE DISCOVERY
v. REQUEST
MANNING, Bradley E., PFC

U.S. Army,

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 222l I

DATED: I6 November 20]

1. In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial and the Military Rules of Evidence, Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 2008, Article 46, Unifonn Code of Military Justice, and other
applicable law, request for discovery is hereby made for the charged offenses in the case of
United States v. Bradley E. Manning.

2. The Defense requests that the Government respond to each item listed in its previous
discovery requests and to also respond to the following additional discovery:

a) An EnCase forensic image of any computer seized by the government and all other
information relied upon by the government to claim information alleged to have been disclosed
in this case was in the possession of an unauthorized individual in December of 2009 (according
to the Government, this individual was a representative of Wikibeaks);

b) Any damage assessment or review completed in this case either by or with the assistance of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the O?ice of the National Counterintelligence Executive or
any other governmental agency;

3. The Defense requests that the Government provide notice in writing if it does not intend to
comply with any speci?c provision of this request.

4. It is understood that this is a continuing request.

5. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by email on I6 November 20l l.


DAVID EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20433

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 5

8 March 2012

. 0 20434

UNITED STATES
DEFENSE REQUEST TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION
OF EVIDENCE

V.

MANNING. Bradley E.. PFC

U.S. Amty.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Ilenderson Ilall,
Fort Myer, VA 2221 I

DATED: I December 2011



I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the Rules for Courts?Martial (R.C.M.) 405(l)(l0) and Manual
for ourts-Martial (M.C.M.), United States. 2008; Article 46. Uniform Code of Military Justice;
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. defense counsel in the
above entitled case respectfully request that the Investigating Officer compel production of
evidence.

II. BACKGROUND

2. PFC Bradley Manning is charged with various offenses under Article 92 and Article 134 of
the UCMJ. The offenses deal with the incorporation, under Article 134. of the Espionage Statute
18 U.S.C. 793(c). Public Money or Property Statute 18 U.S.C. 641. and Computer Fraud
Statute 18 .S.C . l030(a)(1). The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those
charges were dismissed by the convening authority on 18 March 20] l. The current charges were
preferred on 1 March 2011.

3. On 22 November 201 I. the defense submitted a request for production of evidence at the
Article 32 hearing under R.C.M. 405(g)(] The govemment responded to the defense
request for production of evidence on 30 November 20] 1.

DISCUSSION

4. Under R.C.M. 405 and 701. the defense may request materials that are within the possession.
custody. or control of military authorities. The govemment is obligated by law to turn over
evidence in its possession, as well as to retrieve from other govemment agencies and entities
outside of their immediate of?ce relevant evidence upon a defense request. United States v.
Williams. 50 M.J. 436 (C .A.A.F . 1999). This motion renews the defense?s request for the
previously mentioned items in the Defense Request For Production Of Evidence.

5. The standard set out in R.C.M. 405 and R.C.M. 70] requires the govemment to turn over
items that are within the control.? This requirement means that the trial counsel,

. 0 20435

upon defense request, has an a?innative obligation to seek out requested evidence that is in the
possession of the government even if that evidence is not already in its immediate possession.

Id. at 441. The ?prosecutor will be deemed to have knowledge of and access to anything in the
possession, custody, or control of any federal agency participating in the same investigation of
the defendant.? United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9?h Cir. 1989); Williams, 50 M.J. at
441. Furthermore, R.C.M. 405(g)(l and 703(a) establishes the standard for discovery in
military courts: the prosecution and defense ?shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses
and evidence.? See Article 46, UCMJ.

6. In the instant case, the defense requested the production of evidence at the Article 32 hearing.
Instead of responding to the defense request as envisioned under R.C.M. the
government simply treated the request as another request for discovery. Consistent with its
previous responses to discovery requests, the government provided one of the following
responses: a general denial; a statement that it had already provided all information in its
possession; or a statement that it was either unaware of any information or did not presently
have the authority to disclose the requested infonnation.

7. To ensure that R.C.M. 405 and 703 will have meaning at trial, ?[e]ach party shall have
adequate opporttmity to prepare its case and equal opportunity to interview witnesses and inspect
evidence.? R.C.M. 701 The accused is entitled to inspect both exculpatory and inculpatory
evidence. Braay v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Kern, 22 M.J. 49, 51
(C.M.A. 1986). Construing the due process clause, the Supreme Court in Braafv v. Maryland
established a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense: ?the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material, either to guilt or prmishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecutor.? Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). As the numerous cases deciding
Braafv v. Maryland claims indicate, ?favorable? is not the same as evidence that proves the
defendant to be totally innocent or establishes an unshal-table alibi. Anything that tends to assist
the defense, cast doubt on the government?s case, or impact on a potential punishment is
?evidence favorable to an accused.? See generally, Army Regulation 27-26, paragraph
United States v. Kinzer, 39 M.J. 559, 562 (A.C.M.R. 1994); United States v. Adens, 56 M.J. 724
(A.C.C.A. 2002). The defense has requested the following information be produced at the
Article 32 hearing:

a. The video of PFC Manning being ordered to surrender his clothing at the direction of
CW04 James Averhart and his subsequent interrogation on 18 January 2011. Given the fact the
defense ?led a preservation of evidence request on 19 January 201 1 - nearly one year ago the
government has no excuse for not providing the video. See Appendix A. The video is clearly
within the possession of the government and should have already been produced. The
government has responded that it ?will provide all matters requested that are it is possession no
later than 2 December 2011.

b. A copy of all adverse administrative or UCMJ actions, all supporting documentation and
any rebuttal materials to such action based upon the 15-6 investigation conducted by LTG Robert
L. Caslen Jr. The matters requested can easily be found by going to the speci?cally listed
servicemembers? official records. Williams, 50 M.J. at 441 (government, upon defense request,





0 0 20436

has an af?rtnative obligation to seek out requested evidence). It is without dispute that several
officers and enlisted members received adverse administrative actions as a result of their failure
to take appropriate action in this case. See Appendix B. Thus far, the defense believes it has
only received information on one of the ?fteen individuals recommended for adverse
administrative action. The government has responded that it ?has provided all matters requested
that are in its possession

c. An Encase forensic image of each computer from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and
Headquarters Company 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division,
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq. The lead investigative unit for the government
requested preservation of these items on 30 September 2010. See Appendix C. Given the
govemment?s own preservation request, it should easily be able to determine the location of
these items. The government responded to the defense request by stating that ?it is still actively
working to preserve related computer hard drives based on defense ?s preservation request dated
21 September 2011.

d. _The defense requested any Braafy or Jencks material in the govemment?s possession.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process requires the government to turn
over exculpatory evidence in its possession); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957)
(holding that in a criminal prosecution, the government may not withhold documents relied upon
by government witnesses, even where disclosure of those documents might damage national
security matters). Under military law, the trial counsel has an affirmative obligation to seek out
requested evidence by the defense that is in the possession of the government even if that
evidence is not already in the immediate possession of the trial counsel. United States v.
Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 441 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036
Cir. 1989); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (1992) (the government is considered
to have possession of information that is in the control of agencies that are ?closely aligned with
the prosecution?). The defense speci?cally requested the below listed information from the
government that is in control of agencies that are closely aligned with this prosecution. As is
apparent ?om the govemment?s responses, it has either purposefully chosen to not search for the
speci?cally requested information, or is shirking its responsibility to do so by saying it has ?no
knowledge?:

i) Mr. Russell Travers, National Security Staffs Senior Advisor for Information Access
and Security Policy was tasked to lead a comprehensive effort to review the alleged leaks in this
case. See Appendix D. The government responded to the defense request by stating that it "has
no knowledge of any Braafv or material [and] will make a determination whether to
provide the information if and when it becomes aware of such recor .

ii) A copy of any e-mail, report, assessment, directive, or discussion by President Obama
to the Department of Defense concerning this case in order to determine the presence of unlawful
command in?uence. See R.C.M. 405(e). Additionally, defense requests any e-mail, report,
assessment, directive, or discussion by President Obama to the Department of State or
Department of Justice concerning this case. The government responded to the defense request by
stating that it "has no knowledge of any Braafv or material [and] will make a

bu



0 0 20437

determination whether to provide the information i/and when it becomes aware of such
records.

The damage assessment conducted by the Information Review Task Force and by the
Office of Security. See Appendix and F. The government responded that it "has no
knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material [and] does not presently have the authority to
disclose damage assessments. if any. cited by the de ense and will make a determination whether
to provide the information i/and when it becomes available.

iv) The collateral investigations by the Department of State. the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency. the Office of the National ounterintelligence
Executive and the Central Intelligence Agency. The defense is entitled to receive any forensic
results and investigative reports by any of the cooperating agencies in this investigation. United
States v. Williams. 50 MJ. 436, 44] (C.AA.F. 1999); United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032,
1036 Cir. 1989); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, I503 (1992); Article 46, Unifonn
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The government responded that it ?has no knowledge of any
Brady or Jencks material [and] has provided all forensic results and investigative reports
requested that are in its possession and that the United States has authority to disclose.

v) The Department of Justice investigation into the alleged leaks by WikiLeaks as
referenced by Attorney General of the United States Eric H. Holder. to include any grandjury
testimony and any information relating to any 18 U.S.C . 2703(d) order or any search warrant
by the govemment of Twitter, Facebook. Google or any other social media site. Brady v.
Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (I 963); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (I957). The government
responded that it ?presently has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material and will
furnish said records to the defense should it become aware of such records.

vi) The Department of State damage assessment review conducted by its task force of over
120 individuals. This task force reviewed each released diplomatic cable. See Appendix G. The
government responded that it ?has no knowledge of any Brady or Jencks material [and] does
not presently have the authority to disclose damage assessments, if any, cited by the defense and
will make a determination whether to provide the information if and when it becomes available.

e. The Damage Assessment ofCompromised Information that is required to be submitted to
the Special Security Officer (SSO) under once an SCI Security Official
determines that a security violation has occurred. The defense also requested a copy of the ?nal
security violation investigation report submitted to the SSO Defense Intelligence Agency
under 51 05.2 1 The govemment had not previously responded to the defense
discovery requests for this information. The government's response confirms that the alleged
disclosures in this case did not involve any sensitive compartmented information. While this fact
alone is not dispositive of whether the alleged disclosures caused harm, it is an additional factor
supporting the defense request for production of the above damage assessments. In response to
the defense request/or production ofevidence, the government responded that it "there is
currently no evidence supporting a compromise ofsen.s'itivc compartmented information (SCI).



0 0 20438

8. Under R.C.M. upon receiving a defense request for production of evidence, the
investigating officer should make an initial determination whether the information requested is
"reasonably available." R.C.M. ?Evidence is reasonably available ifits
signi?cance outweighs the difficulty. expense. delay. and effect on operations of obtaining the
evidence.? R.C.M. Military courts recognize "a much more direct and generally
broader means of discovery by an accused than is normally available to him in civilian courts.?
United States V. Reece. 25 M.J. 93. 94 (C .M.A. 1987). Regarding discovery, ?military law has
been preeminent. jealously guaranteeing to the accused the right to be effectively represented by
counsel through affording every opportunity to prepare his case by openly disclosing the
Govemment?s evidence.? United States v. Enloe. 35 C.M.R. 228. 230 (C.M.A. 1965). The only
restrictions placed upon liberal defense discovery are that the information requested must be
relevant and necessary to the subject of the inquiry. and the request must be reasonable. Reece.
25 MJ. at 95. ?[D]etermination of the relevance and necessity of defense requested evidence
should be made by the court. not ex parte by the prosecutor." Id. at 94 n. 4. According to the
Court of Military Appeals, the Military Rules of Evidence establish ?a low threshold of
relevance." Id. at 95. Relevant evidence is ?any ?evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.? Id. at 95. quoting Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 401. In addition. the Court of Military Appeals stated in United States
Hart. 29 M.J. 407. 410 (C.M.A. 1990):

In his opinion at the court below. Judge Gilley adopted the premise that. under
Article 46, discovery available to the accused in courts?martial is broader than the
discovery rights granted to most civilian defendants. From this, he correctly
reasoned that. where prosecutorial misconduct is present or where the
Govemment fails to disclose information pursuant to a speci?c request. the
evidence will be considered ?material unless failure to disclose? can be
demonstrated to "be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

9. In accordance with these rules and law, the defense has requested the opportunity to inspect
or receive copies of the items listed above in multiple defense discovery requests and has also
requested that this information be produced at the Article 32 hearing. Thus far. the government
has consistently failed to adequately respond.

10. The govemment?s latest response is yet another example of its failure to exercise due
diligence in obtaining requested information. The govemment has failed to provide a detailed
account of its efforts to comply with its discovery obligations. Additionally, the govemment?s
response that it "does not presentl_ 1? have the authority to disclose damage assessments, i/any,
cited by the defense and will make a determination whether to provide the information and
when it becomes available? is either intentionally obstructionist or yet another example of its
failure to exercise due diligence.

. Under the rules, the government is not allowed to remain ignorant ofthe presence of
evidence favorable to the accused that is reasonably within its possession. United States v.
Williams. 50 M.J. 436 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v, Bryan. 868 F.2d 1032. 1036 (9th Cir.

'-Jr



0 20439

1989). Instead. if the Investigating Officer determines that the information requested by the
defense is reasonable available. one ofthe following must occur:

a. The Investigating Officer orders the custodian of the evidence to produce it at the Article
32 hearing and the custodian produces it. R.C.M. or

b. The Investigating Officer orders the custodian of the evidence to produce it at the Article
32 hearing and once ordered. the custodian of the evidence detennines the information is not
reasonably available. If this happens the lnvesti gating Officer and the accused are bound by the
determination. Ia?. However. the Investigating Officer must include a statement ofthe reasons
for that determination in the record of the investigation. R.C.M. Once the case is
referred. the accused is permitted under R.C.M. to move the militaryjudge to review
the determination during a pretrial session; or

c. The Investigating Officer orders the custodian of the evidence to produce it at the Article
32 hearing and once ordered, the convening authority detennines the evidence should be
withheld under Military Rule ofEvidence (M.R.E.) 505(d)(5) since production ofthe evidence
cannot be done without causing identifiable damage to national security; or

d. The Investigating Officer orders the custodian of the evidence to produce it at the Article
32 hearing and once ordered. the govemment objects to the production of the evidence on
grounds of privilege and an in?camera review is conducted by the Investigating Officer under
M.R.E. 505(i). A M.R.F.. 505(i) review is appropriate since the Investigating Officer has the
authority to perform those tasks that clearly impact the conduct of the Article 32 hearing. See
R.C.M. 405(i) (providing that rules of privilege in Section ofthe M.C.M. apply to the Article
32).

12. The govemment should not be permitted to detemiine what evidence will and will not be
produced at the Article 32 hearing. The requested information is necessary for the defense to
adequately prepare its case. Without the requested discovery. any Article 32 Investigation will
be deficient. Sec R.C.M. 905(b)(l) and 906(b)(3) (concerning motions for appropriate relief
relating to the pretrial investigation).

IV. RELIEF REQUESTED

I3. Pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 46
UCMJ. R.C.M. 405. 701. and 906(b)(7). the defense requests the Investigating Officer to issue
an order requiring the govemment to obtain the requested information. Failing to obtain the
information, the govemment should be required to provide a detailed account of its efforts for
review by the Investigating Officer.



EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel



20440

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCU.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure6
8March2012

20441

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY MIUTARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319.5013
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ANJA-CL

31 January 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. David E. Coombs, Civifian Defense Counsel
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Discovery - United States v. PFC Bradlev Manning
1. The below responses to the defense discovery request account for the ongoing national
security concems of this case, the ongoing law enforcement investigation(s), and comply with the
limitations of applicable Executive Orders.
2. Discovery Response.
a. All damage assessments conducted by Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). See
Discovery Request, 1 November 2010.
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. The defense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
b. Any specific damage assessment by the Department of State regarding the disclosures of
the diplomatic cables by Wikileaks. See Discovery Request, 8 December 2010, paragraph 2(b).
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. The defense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
c. Any specific damage assessment by the Department of Defense regarding the disclosure of
classified documents and videos, the subject of this case, by Wikileaks. See Discovery Request, 8
December 2010, paragraph 2(c).
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. The defense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
d. Access to all classified information that the govemment intends to use in this case. To
include any damage assessment or information review conducted by any govemmental agency or
at the direction of a govemmental agency. See Discovery Request, 16 Febmary 2011, paragraph
2(d).
RESPONSE: The United States has provided defense access to aU classified information
it intends to use in this case and will continue to comply: with this request.

20442

ANJACL
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Requestfor Discovery United Statesv.PFC Bradlev Manning

e. Any and all documents(swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (f^ooks, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority(OCA)determinations,etc.)conducted bythe United States Army.
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011, paragraph 3.
RESPONSE: The United States has provided three Army Regulation 15-6 investigations
and the CID case file. If information previously provided is not responsive, the defense is invited
to renew its request with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
f. Any and all documents(swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority(OCA) determinations, etc.)conducted bythe Department ofDefense.
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011, paragraph 3.
RESPONSE: The Urtited States has provided three Army Regulation 156investigations
and the CfD case file. If information previously provided is not responsive, the defense is invited
to renew its request with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
g. Any and all documents(swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority (OCA) detemtinations,etc.)conducted bythe Department ofjustice.
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011, paragraph 3.
RESPONSE: The United States has provided all grandjury information that is in its
possession and that the United States has authority todisclose. Ifinformation previouslyprovided
is not responsive, the defense is invited to renew its request with more specificity and an adequate
basis for its request.
h. Any and all documents(swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority(OCA)determinations,etc.)conducted bythe National Security Agency.
Discovery Request, 13May 2011,paragraph3.
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
i. Any and afi documents (swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), andreports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classificafion Authority(OCA)detemunations,etc.)conducted bythe Defense Intelhgence
Agency.
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011, paragraph 3.
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis forits request.

20443

ANJACL
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Discovery United Statesv.PFC Bradley Manning

j . Any and all documents(swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority(OCA) determinations, etc.)conducted by the Department ofHomeland
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011,paragraph 3.
Security Office oflntelligence and Analysis.
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested infbrmation. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
k. Any and all documents(swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority(OCA) determinations, etc.)conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011, paragraph 3.
RESPONSE:The UnitedStates provided twoclassificationreviews.^^^ BATES
0037814800378175and00410623^^10634. Ifinformationpreviouslyprovidedisnot
responsive, the defense is invited to renew its request with more specificity and an adequate basis
for its request.
L Any and all documents (swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority(OCA)determinations,etc.)conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011, paragraph 3.
RESPONSE: The Urtited States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis forits request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
m. Any and all documents(swom or signed statements, photographs, emails, etc.), tangible
items (books, papers, etc.), and reports (investigative summaries, damage assessments. Original
Classification Authority(OCA)determinations,etc.)conducted by the Bureau ofDiplomatic
Security.
Discovery Request, 13 May 2011, paragraph 3.
RESPONSE: The United States provided the Memorandum oflnterview reports.
BATES 0040808900408156.fi^informationpreviouslyprovided is not responsive, the defense is
invited to renew its request with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
n. Any report, damage assessment or recommendation by the Wikileaks Task Force or any
otherClA member conceming the alleged leaks in this case. Any intemal or extemal
memorandums addressingtiteinvestigation ofWikileaks, PFC Bradley Manning orthe nattue of
the Office ofSecurity'sinvestigation into these matters.^^^ Discovery Reques4 13 October 2011,
paragraph 1(c)(iii).
RESPONSE:The United States provided twoclassificationreviews.^^^ BATES
00378148 00378175 and00410623 00410634.Ifinfortnationprevious1yprovidedisnot

20444

ANJACL
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Discovery^United Statesv.PFC Bradley Manning
responsive, the defense is invited to renew its request with more specificity and an adequate basis
for its request.
o. Any specific damage assessment by the Department ofDefense regarding the disclosure of
classified documents and videos, the subject of this case, by Wikileaks, specifically any report by
the IRTF that was responsible for leadingacomprehensive DOD review of classified documents
obtained bythe Wikileaks website and any other associated materials.
Discovery Request, 13
October 2011, paragraph l(c)(iv).
RESPONSE: The United States witi not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
p. Any specific damage assessment by the Department of State regarding the disclosure of
diplomatic cables, the subject of this case, by Wikileaks.
Discovery Request, 13 October
2011,paragraph 1(c)(vi).
RESPONSE: The United States witi not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
q. Any and all documentation relating to any review or damage assessment conducted hy
ODNI or in cooperation with any other goverrunent agency.
Discovery Request, 13 October
2011, paragraph l(c)(vii).
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
r. Any and all documents relating to any task force or other govemmental intelhgence agency
review of the various alleged leaks in this case to include any damage assessment based upon the
afieged leaks. ^^^DiscoveryRequest, 13 October 2011, paragraph l(c)(vui).
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
s. Any damage assessment for documents related to Specification8of Charge B.
Discovery Request, 15 November 2011, paragraph 2(f).
RESPONSE:The United States will not provide the requested mfbrmation.Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
t. Any damage assessment for documents related to Specification9of Charge R.
Discovery Request, 15 November 2011, paragraph 2(f).

20445

ANJACL
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Discoverv United Statesv.PFC Bradlev Manning

RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
u. Any damage assessment forthe document related to Specification 15 of Charge 11.
Discovery Request, 15 November 2011, paragraph 2(g).
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
V. Any damage assessment or review completed in this case either by or with the assistance
ofDIA.
Discovery Request, 16Novemher 2011,paragraph 2(h).
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
w. Any damage assessment or review completed in this case either by or with the assistance
ofthe Office ofNational Counterintelhgence Executive.
Discovery Request, 16Novemher
201Lparagraph2(b).
RESPONSE: The United States will not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis for its request.
x. Any damage assessment or review completed in this case either by or with the assistance
of any govemment agency.
Discovery Request, 16November 2011,paragraph 2(h).
RESPONSE: The United States wifi not provide the requested information. Thedefense
has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The defense is invited to renew its request
with more specificity and an adequate basis forits request.
3. Response to Defense Questions.
a. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment or recommendation by the
WikiLeaks Task Force or any other CIA member conceming the alleged leaks in thiscase^ Ifyes,
please indicate why these items have not been provided to the Defense. If no, please indicate why
the Govermnent has failed to secure these items.
Discovery Request, 20 January 2012,
paragraph 3(a).
RESPONSE: The United States produced the requested information that is in its
possession and that it has authority to disclose, including two classification reviews.
BATES
00378148 00378175 and00410623 00410634.1finformationpreviouslyprovidedisnot

20446

ANJACL
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Request for Discoverv^United Statesv.PFC Bradlev Manrung
responsive, the United States will reconsiderarenewed defense request with more specificity and
an adequate basis.
b. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment, orrecommendation asa
result ofanyjoint investigation with the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) or any other
govemmental agency conceming the alleged leaks in thiscase^ If yes, please indicate why these
items have not been provided to the Defense. If no, please indicate whythe Govemment has
failed to secure these items.
Discovery Request, 20 January 2012, paragraph 3(h).
RESPONSE:The United States will not provide the requested information.The
defense has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The United States will reconsider
arenewed defense request with more specificity and an adequate basis.
c. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment, or recommendation by the
Information ReviewTask Force (IRTF) conceming the alleged leaks in this case7 If yes, please
indicate why these items have not been provided to the Defense. If no, please indicate why the
Govemmenthas failed to secure these items.
Discovery Request, 20 January 2012,
paragraph 3(c).
RESPONSE:The United States willnotprovideti^erequestedinformation.The
defense has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The United States will reconsider
arenewed defense request with more specificity and an adequate basis.
d. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment, orrecommendation by the
Department of Justice conceming the afieged leaks in this case7 If yes, please indicate why these
items have not been provided to the Defense. If no, please indicate whythe Govemmenthas
failed to secure these items.
Discovery Request, 20 January 2012, paragr^h 3(d).
RESPONSE: The United States has no knowledge of any report, damage assessment or
recommendation by the Department of Justice, specificafiy main justice, that is discoverable and
that concems the alleged leaks in this case. The United States will reconsiderarenewed defense
request with more specificity and an adequate basis.
e. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment, orreconunendation bythe
Department of State conceming the alleged leaks in this case7 If yes, please indicate why these
items have not been provided to the Defense. Ifno, please indicate why the Govemmenthas
failed to secure these items.
Discovery Request, 20 January 2012, paragraph 3(e).
RESPONSE: The United States produced the requested information that is in its
possession and that it has authority to disclose, includingaclassification review.
BATES
00376903 00376953. If information previously provided is not responsive, the United States
will reconsiderarenewed defense request with more specificity and an adequate basis.
f. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment, orrecommendation bythe
Office of the Director ofNational Intelhgence conceming the alleged leaks in this case7 Ifyes,
please indicate why these items have not been provided to the Defense. If no, please indicate

20447

ANJACL
SUBJECT: Response to Defense Requestfor Discoverv United Statesv.PFC Bradlev
Manning
why the Govemment has failed to secure these items.
paragraph 3(f).

Discovery Request, 20 January 2012,

RESPONSE: The United States produced the requested information that is in its
possession and that it has authority to disclose, includingaclassification review.
BATES
00410761-0(^10770. If information previously provided is not responsive, the United States
will reconsiderarenewed defense request with more specificity and an adequate basis.
g. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment, or recommendation by the
Defense Intelhgence Agency conceming the alleged leaks in thiscase^ If yes, please indicate
why these items have not been provided to the Defense. If no, please indicate why the
Govemment has failed to secure these iten^.
Discovery Request, 20 January 2012,
paragraph 3(g).
RESPONSE: The United States wifi not provide the requested information. The
defense has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The United States wfil reconsider
arenewed defense request with more specificity and an adequate basis.
h. Does the Govemment possess any report, damage assessment, or recommendation by the
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive concerrung the alleged leaks in this case^lf
yes, please indicate why these items have not been provided to the Defense. If no, please
indicate why the Govemment has failed to secure these items.
Discovery Request, 20
January 2012, paragraph 3(h).
RESPONSE:The United States will notprovide the requestedinformation.The
defense has failed to provide an adequate basis for its request. The United States wifi reconsider
arenewed defense request with more specificity and an adequate basis.
4. The United States understands its continuing discovery obligation and acknowledges its
requirements under Article 46, UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and relevant case law.

ASHDENFEIN
CPT,JA
Trial Counsel

20448

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCU.S.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure7
8March2012

20449
1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TRANSMITTAL RECORD
For use of this form, see AR 25-50; the proponent agency is DCSPER
3. TITLE/FILE IDENTIFICATION

2. SHIPMENT NO.

Unclassified
4. AS OF DATE

5 SHIPMENT DATE
(YYYYMMDD)

(VyyVIMJIDD)

ManningB 00000001-00044864

201 1/10/03

2011/10/03
6. AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT

7. NUMBER OF RECORDS TRANSMITTED

8. PERSON TO CONTACT (Narne and telephone)

9. REQUIREMENT CONTROL SYMBOL

1
(AR335-15)

SGT Beatriz Feito
10. SHIPPED FROM
US Army military District ofWashington
OfTice o f Ihe Staff Judge Advocate
103 3rd Avenue

11. SHIPPED TO

MAJ Kemkes
Senior Defense Counsel
Trial Defense Services
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall

Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319

1^]
10a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE
ITLE OF SEND;
SENDER

11a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF RECEIVER

H^fJt)

5 G r i '"foea10b. SIGNATURE OF SEhiBfA

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED (When t)ox is checked, sign
faetow and return copy lo sender.)

/%rTW,rJ.

(o^u^

11 b. SIGNATURE OF RECEIVER AND DATE

^^yWy^^L
HARD COPY

PUNCHED CARDS

CASSETTES

MICROFILM

PHOTO

FICHE

13. NUMBER OF BOXES

(Packages)

//

DVD IJnclassincd

1
14. NUMBER OF ITEMS

IDVD
15. METHOD OF SHIPMENT

y

COURIER

FIRST CLASS

EXPRESS MAIL

REGISTERED

1 PARCEL POST
i

USPS rcrtiHcd Mail

16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

17. TYPE COMPONENT USED

(For magnetically recorded data)

18. REMARKS

DA FORM 200, SEP 1998

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

APD PE vl.OOES

#

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Enclosure 8
8 March 2012

20450

20451
1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TRANSMITTAL RECORD
For use of this form, see AR 25-50; the proponent agency is DCSPER
3. TITLE/FILE IDENTIRCATION

2. SHIPMENT NO.

UNCLASSIFIED
4. AS OF DATE

ManningB_00408202-00409678 with Native Files, Brig
Recordings from 1 lDec-13Mar

5. SHIPMENT DATE
(YYYYMMDD)

(YYYYMMDD)

2011/12/06

2011/12/06

6. AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT

7. NUMBER OF RECORDS TRANSMITTED

8. PERSON TO CONTACT (Name and telephone)

9. REQUIREMENT CONTROL SYMBOL

4
(AR 335-15)

SGT Beatriz Feito
11. SHIPPED TO

10. SHIPPED FROM
US Army military District of Washington
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
103 3rd Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319

MAJ Kemkes
Senior Defense Counsel
Trial Defense Services
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
0

10a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF SENDER

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED (When t)OX is checked, sign
below and return copy to sender.)

11a. TYPED NAME ANtyftTLIE OF RECEIVER

SGT Beatriz Feito
10b. SIGNATURE OF SENDER

l i b . AGNATURE OF

DATE

(ihicrU
12. TYPE OF MEDIA TRANSMITTED
HARD COPY

PUNCHED CARDS

CASSETTES

MICROFILM

PHOTO

FICHE

13. NUMBER OF BOXES

0

3 D V D s & I CD

14. NUMBER OF ITEMS

(Packages)

3 DVD's & 1 CD
15. METHOD OF SHIPMENT
y i COURIER"
EXPRESS MAIL

FIRST CLASS

PARCEL POST

USPS Certified Mail

REGISTERED

16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

17. TYPE COMPONENT USED

(For magnetically recorded data)

18. REMARKS

DA FORM 200, SEP 1998

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

APO PE vl.OOES



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 9

8 March 2012



. . 20453

UNITED STATES
DEFENSE REQUEST TO

PRESERVE EVIDENCE

MANNING, Bradley E., PFC

U.S. Army,

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 2221 1

DATED: 21 September 2011



1. In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 701(a) and Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States, 2008, Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
other applicable law, defense counsel in the above entitled case respectfully request that
the U.S. preserve all computer forensic evidence obtained in this case.

2. The Defense speci?cally requests that the preserve all the hard drives
from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented lnforrnation Facility (T-SC IF) and the
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarter Company (HHC),
2nd Brigade Combat Team (BC T), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Hammer, Iraq and provide an F.nCase forensic image of each computer to the
defense for its inspection. The defense also requests an l?nCase forensic image of any
other computer seized by the in this case.

3. In accordance with R.C.M. 70l(e), ?[c]ach party shall have equal opportunity to
inspect evidence.? Defense counsel is requesting an equal opportunity to inspect the hard
drives from the T-SCIF and TOC of HHC. 2nd BCT. 10th Mountain Division, FOB
Hammer, Iraq. The defense believes the requested evidence constitutes Brady material
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

4. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by e-mail on 2] September

20: 1.
OMBS

Civilian Defense Counsel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 10

8 March 2012



20454



20455

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
u.s. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT or WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, nc 20319-5013

5. REPLY ro
nrnou or

ANJA-CL 4 October 20] I

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light
Infantry), Fort Drum, NY 13602

SUBJECT: Request to Located and Preserve Evidence United States v. PFC Bradley Manning

1. PURPOSE. The prosecution in the above-named case requests that your unit conduct a
thorough and comprehensive search for all hard drives used between 1 November 2009 and 27
May 2010 in the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility and the Tactical
Operations Center of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq. If you locate any
hard drives, then please take all reasonably and necessary steps to preserve such hard drives.

2. BACKGROUND. PFC Manning is the subject of an ongoing investigation and criminal
prosecution based on the alleged illegal collection and disclosure of national defense and foreign
relations information to the WikiLeaks_organization. WikiLeaks released national defense and
foreign relations information allegedly provided to them by PFC Manning on the intemet. PFC
Manning is currently charged with multiple violations of federal law under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), including violations of I 8 U.S.C. 793, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and 18
U.S.C. 641. PFC Manning is also charged with Aiding the Enemy by Giving Intelligence, in
violation of Article 104, UCMJ (l0 U.S.C. 904). See Enclosure 1. PFC Manning was
apprehended by CID in Iraq on 27 May 2010 and has been in pretrial con?nement since 29 May
2010.

3. S-USPENSE. Please acknowledge receipt of this request and notify the prosecution of the
results of your search and the steps you took to locate any hard drive by 12 October 20] 1.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

a. If you identify or locate any relevant hard drives, please take all reasonable and necessary
steps to preserve the hard drives. The prosecution will provide additional instructions on

disposition.

b. This request is designed to preserve materials and information requested by the defense
counsel for PFC Manning. See Enclosures 2 and 3. It is not intended, nor should it be
interpreted, to ascribe any legal relevance to the materials and information requested, including
whether or not such materials and information may be provided to the defense in discovery.

c. If you are unsure whether certain materials should be preserved, please err on the side of
caution and preserve the materials. Failure to preserve and retain any pertinent materials,

. . 20456
ANJA-CL

SUBJECT: Request to Located and Preserve Evidence United States Bradley Manning

electronic or otherwise, may result in sanctions against the United States, based on PFC
Manning?s rights under Article 46, UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and applicable case law.

5. The point of contact for this request is the undersigned Encls ASHDEN FEIN
1. Charge Sheet, 2 Mar 1 I CPT, IA
2. Defense Request, 21 Sep 1 Trial Counsel

3. Explanation Emails, 29 Sep 1 1

CF:
BJA, ZBCT, 10th MTN DIV (Ll)
SJA, l0th MTN DIV (LI)



CHARGE SHEET

I. PERSONAL DATA
1. NAME OF ACCUSED (Last. First, Mt) 2. SSN 3. GRADE OR RANK 4. PAY GRADE
MANNING, Bradley E. PFC

5. UNIT OR ORGANIZATION

6. CURRENT SERVICE

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3*??mLm?E 3
U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer?Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211 4 years

7. PAY PER MONTH

e. NATURE or RESTRAINT or 9. IMPOSED

ACCUSED
a sA$c
$1,950.00 None $1,950.00. Pre?Trial Confinement 29 May 10
ll. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS
10. ADDITIONAL CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 104.

THE SPECIFICATION: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, without proper authority,
knowingly give intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means.

ADDITIONAL CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, wrongfully and wantonly cause to
be published on the internet intelligence belonging to the United States
government, having knowledge that intelligence published on the internet is
accessible to the enemy, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces.

4

(See Continuation Sheet)

Ill. PREFERRAL

113

d. SIGNATURE if? ll

c.oRGA~mAnoNoFAccusER

HQ CMD BN, USA

e. DATE

I MAR ZUII

AFFIDAVIT: Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases ofthis character, personaliy appeared the
above named accuser this day of_ 201 I, and signed the foregoing charges and speci?cations

under oath that he/she is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that he/she either has personal knowledge of
or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the same are true to the best of hisfher knowledge and belief.

MDW OS A
Organization at Officer

Typed Name of Officer

Trial Counsel

Ot?ciat Capacity to Administer Oath
(See CM. 307(0) must be a commissioned officer}



igna ure

DD

FORM 458," MAY 2000 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.



20458

12.

Q9 t5'I$'mts
On 2011. the accused was informed of the charges against himiher and of the name(s) of
The accuser( known to me (See R.C.M. 308 {See ROM. 308 if noti?cation cannot be made.)

HQ CMD EN,

Typed Name of im mediate Commander Organization of immediate Commander



ignature

IV. RECEIPT BY SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL CONVEMNG AUTHORITY

13.
The sworn charges were received at hours, 2011 at HQ CMD USA
Designation of Command or
Officer Exercising Summary Court-Maitiai Jurisdiction (See M. 403}


Commanding
Officiai Capacity of Officer Signing

Typed Name or? Officer



V. REFERRAL: SERVICE OF CHARGES

14a. DESIGNATION OF COMMAND OF CONVENING AUTHORITY b. PLACE C. DATE

Referred for trial to the Court-martial convened by

20? .subjectto the following instructions:2

By Of
Command or Order
Typed Name of Officer Officiat Capacity or Officer Signing
Grade
Signature
15.
On 2011 I {caused to be) served a copy hereofon {each of) the above named accused.

Typed Name of Trial Counsei Grade or Rank of Trial Counset

Signature

FOOTNO 1- When an appropriate commander signs personaiiy, inappiicabie words are stricken.
2- See RC. M. 601(9) concerning instructions. if none, so state.

DD FORM 458 (BACK), MAY 2000

20459

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer~Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Item 10 (Cont?d):

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 5 April 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a video file named ?12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30
GC Anyone.avi", with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 22 March 2010 and on or about 26 March 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than one classified memorandum produced by a
United States government intelligence agency, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,
deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 5 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Iraq database containing more than 380,000 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

0 0 20460

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 13.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database, with reason
to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not
entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e),
such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.

SPECIFICATION 6: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Afghanistan database containing more than 90,000 records
belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than
$1,000, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.?

SPECIFICATION 7: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database, with
reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not
entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e),
such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.

0 0 20461

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 3.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 8: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 8 March 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another, a record or thing of value of the United States
or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: a United States
Southern Command database containing more than 700 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 9: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 8 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than three classified records from a United
States Southern Command database, with reason to believe such
information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation
of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good
order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 10: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 April 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than five classified records relating to a
military operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan occurring on or
about 4 May 2009, with reason to believe such information could be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any
foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to
be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

. 0 20462

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 3.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211 -

SPECIFICATION 11: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a file named PAX.zip" containing a video named
PAX.wmv?, with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 12: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 4 May 2010, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert another, a
record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Department of State Net?Centric Diplomacy
database containing more than 250,000 records belonging to the United
States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18
U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order
and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 13: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having obtained
information that has been determined by the United States government
pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations, to wit: more than seventy-five classified United
States Department of State cables, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(1), such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

0 1 . 20463

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S- Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer-Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 14: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 18 February 2010,
having knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet
Protocol Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having
obtained information that has been determined by the United States
government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
defense or foreign relations, to wit: a classified Department of
State cable titled "Reykjavik?13", willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(1), such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 15: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 15 March 2010,

?having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national

defense, to wit: a classified record produced by a United States Army
intelligence organization, dated 18 March 2008, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,

deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 16: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert another, a
record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the United States Forces Iraq Microsoft
Outlook SharePoint Exchange Server global address list belonging to
the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. -



20464

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

ADDITIONAL CHARGE VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 92.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 March 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by attempting to bypass
network or information system security mechanisms.

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 February 2010 and on or about 3 April 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by adding unauthorized
software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 4 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit:
paragraph Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by
adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network computer.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, violate a
lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph Army
Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by using an information system
in a manner other than its intended purpose.

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
divers occasions between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about
27 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
7-4, Army Regulation 380-5, dated 29 September 2000, by wrongfully
storing classified information.

20465

STATES
DEFENSE REQUEST TO
PRESERVE EVIDENCE

V.

MANNING. Bradley-' lj., PFC

US.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. US.
Army Garrison, .|oint Base Myer-Henderson Hall.
Fort M_ver. VA 2221

DATED: 2] September 201]



l. In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 70l(a) and Manual for
Courts-Martial. United States. 2008. Article 46. Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
other applicable law. defense counsel in the above entitled case respectfully request that
the US. Government preserve all computer forensic evidence obtained in this case.

2. The Defense specifically requests that the preserve all the hard drives
from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarter Company (HHC).
2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Hammer, Iraq and provide an l.inCase forensic image of each computer to the
defense for its inspection. The defense also requests an ljnCase forensic image of any
other computer seized by the Government in this case.

3. In accordance with R.C.M. 701 ?[e|aeh party shall have equal opportunity to
inspect evidence." Defense counsel is requesting an equal opportunity to inspect the hard
drives from the T-SCIF and of HHC. 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, FOB
Hammer, Iraq. The defense believes the requested evidence constitutes Brady material
under Brady v. Maryland. 373 US. 83 (1963).

4. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by e-mail on 21 September

20! 1.


Civilian Defense Counsel

20466

From:
To:



Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Prserve Evidence Request
Date: Thursday, September 29, 2011 4:42:49 PM
Importance: Low

Ashden,
Your understanding of the Defense request to preserve evidence is correct.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence. RI 02906
Toll Free:
Local:
Fax:






I
ma Ia eenSe.C0m .

Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain con?dential attomey-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA


Date: Thu, September 29. 2011 4:39 pm




"Tooman,Joshua CPT

"Melissa Santiaqo"

David,

Thanks for the chat this afternoon. To recap, you are requesting the
preservation of the following items:

1. All SIPR hard drives in the TOC and SCIF of 2/10 MTN, regardless if they
were seized or imaged

2. All EnCase forensic images of all computers seized by the United States

v/

0 20467

Ashden

Message??-?-

From
1
Sent: Thu ay, September 29, 2011 8:08 AM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA
Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow JoDean, CPT USA

Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA
Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request

Importance: Low






Ashden,
I am available between 1200 and 1300 or anytime after 1600 today.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angeli Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free:



ense.com

Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA


Date: W5, Septemgr 28, 2011 5:08 pm

To:
Cc: "Matthew kemkes"
MIL US USA










-, "Tooman,Joshua CPT

"Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
"Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA
"Ford, Arthur
D. W01 USA SJA
"Melissa Santiago"




David,

Are you available to discuss this request over the telephone?

Thanks.

20468

v/
Mhden

--??-Original

From:
I
Sent: Fri ay, Septem 23, 2011 10: AM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA

Cc: Matthew kemkes' Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow 111, JoDean, CPT USA

ergaar Ange M. A Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA

Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: [Suspected RE: Presen/e Evidence Request

Importance: Low





Ashden,

The defense request is for all hard drives that were located within the
T-SCIF
and the TOC.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906
Toll Free:




ense.com

Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

Original Message
Subject: RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA









Cc; a ew em es "Tooman,Joshua CPT
MIL US USA
0 an, CPT USA

"Over aard, Angel M. CPT USA

D. W01 USA JFHQ-NC
"Melissa Santiago"




David,

20469

Could you please clarify your request. Are you asking to have ALL harddrives
that were located in the TSCIF and TOC or only those that were collected by
CID and had Encase forensic images produced? Thank you.

v/r
Ashden



From:
I
Sent: Wedn y, September 21, 2011 1:52 PM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA

Cc: Matthew kemkes' Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow JoDean, CPT USA

ergaar M. Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA

Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: Preserve Evidence Request



Ashden,
Please see the attached request.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906



ense.com
Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211





Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure ll

8 March 2012



0 0 20471

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.s. ARMY mumnv DISTRICT or WASHINGTON
210 A smear
FORT LESLEY J. ucmun, DC 20319-5013

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF



October 4, 201 1
Criminal Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Mr. Matthew J. Perry

Office of General Counsel
National Security Law Branch
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Ave NW
Washington, DC 20535

Re: United States v, Private First Class (PFC)_Bradlev E. Manning

Dear Mr. Perry:

The U.S. Army prosecutors in the above-named case (hereinafter "the prosecution")
request the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) take all reasonable and necessary steps to
preserve any computer forensic evidence held or obtained by the FBI during the investigation of
PFC Manning?s alleged misconduct, including hard drives used between November 1, 2009 and
May 27, in the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Infonnation Facility and the Tactical
Operations Center of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq, and all forensic
images of all computers seized by the United States.

PFC Manning is the subject of an ongoing investigation and criminal prosecution based
on the alleged illegal collection and disclosure of national defense and foreign relations
information to the WikiLeaks organization. WikiLeaks released national defense and foreign
relations information allegedly provided to them by PFC Manning on the internet. PFC
Manning is currently charged with multiple violations of federal law under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), including violations of 8 U.S.C. 793, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and 18
U.S.C. 64]. PFC Manning is also charged with Aiding the Enemy by Giving Intelligence, in
violation of Article 104, UCMJ (l0 U.S.C. 904). Enclosed with this letter is a copy of the
charge sheet. PFC Manning was apprehended -by the U.S. Anny Criminal Investigative
Command in Iraq on May 27, 2010 and has been in pretrial con?nement since May 29, 2010.

Please acknowledge receipt of this preservation request and notify the prosecution by 12
October 2011 that you have complied with this request. If you are unsure whether certain
materials should be preserved, please err on the side of caution and preserve the materials.
Failure to preserve and retain any pertinent materials, electronic or otherwise, may result in
sanctions against the United States, based on PFC Manning?s rights under Article 46, UCMJ, the

. Rules for Courts?Ma11ial, and applicable case law.

0 20472

This request is designed to preserve materials and information requested by the defense
counsel for PFC Manning. Also enclosed with this letter is a copy of the defense request and a
series of explanation emails. This request is not intended, nor should it be interpreted, to ascribe
any legal relevance to the materials and information requested, including whether or not such
materials and information may be provided to the defense in discovery.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to Ms. Deborah Curtis, National Security Division,
Department of Justice, and Supervisory Special Agent Charles McGonigal, Washington Field

Office. The point of contact for this request is the undersigned at
0' (?Cure email)-

-

Ashden Fein
Captain, US. Army
Trial Counsel

Enclosures

0 20473

CHARGESHEET

I. PERSONAL DATA

1, NAME OF ACCUSED (Last, First, MI)

2. SSN 3. GRADE OR RANK 4. PAY GRADE

MANNING, Bradley E.

5. UNIT OR ORGANIZATION

PFC 3-3

5. CURRENT SERVICE

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a?N?mLD?m
U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer?Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211 4 years

7, PAY PER MONTH

a NATURE or RESTRAINT or 9. IMPOSED

ACCUSED
a.aAsC
$1,950.00 None $1,950.00 Pre~Trial Confinement 29 May 10 -
II. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS
10. ADDITIONAL CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE lO4.

THE SPECIFICATION: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, without proper authority,
knowingly give intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means.

ADDITIONAL CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, -ARTICLE 134-

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, wrongfully and wantonly cause to
be published on the internet intelligence belonging to the United States
government, having knowledge that intelligence published on the internet is
accessible to the enemy, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces.

(See Continuation Sheet)

Ill. PREFERRAL

113

d. SIGNATURE i

b. GRADE

C. ORGANIZATION OF ACCUSER
HQ CMD BN, USA

. NAME OF ACCUSER (Last, First. MI)

e. DATE

I MAR ZOII

AFFIDAVIT: Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases ofthis character, personally appeared the
above named accuser this I day of ZOI 1, and signed the foregoing charges and speci?cations

under oath that he/she is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that he/she either has personal knowledge of
or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the same are true to the best of hisfher knowiedge and belief.



MDW OS A
Organization of Of?cer

Typed Name of Officer

Trial Counsel

Officia! Capacity to Administer Oath
See CM. 307(0) - must be a commissioned officer)



DD

FORM 458, MAY 2000 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

0 0 20474

12. 5
On 2011. the accused was informed of the charges against himiher and of the name(s) of
The accuser( known to me (See R. CM. 308 (See R. C.M. 308 if noti?cation cannot be made.)

HQ CMD BN, USA

Typed Name of immediate Commander Organization of immediate Commander



ignature

IV. RECEIPT BY SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY

13.

The sworn charges were received at hours, 2011 at

HQ CMD BN, USA

Designation of Command or

Officer Exercising Summary Court-Mairiat Jurisdiction (See M. 403)


Commanding

Typed Name of Officer

Official Capacity of Officer Signing



V. SERVICE OF CHARGES

14a. DESIGNATION OF COMMAND OF CONVENING AUTHORITY b. PLACE c. DATE
Referred for triat to the Court?martiat convened by
30? subjecttothe following instructionsrz
By Of
Command or Order
Typed Name of Officer Ofrictai Capacity of Officer Signing
Grade
Signature
15.
On 2011 I (caused to be) served a copy hereof on (each of) the above named accused.
Typed Name of Trial Counsei Grade or Rank of Trial Counset
Signature

FOOTNO TES: 1 When an appropriate commander signs personatty. inappticabie words are stricken.
2 See R. C. M. 601 concerning instructions. if none, so state.

DD FORM 458 (BACK), MAY 2000

0 0 20475

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 453, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Item 10 (Cont'd):

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 5 April 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a video file named ?12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30
GC Anyone.avi", with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 22 March 2010 and on or about 26 March 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than one classified memorandum produced by a
United States government intelligence agency, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,
deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 5 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Iraq database containing more than 380,000 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

0 0 20476

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer-Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database, with reason
to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not
entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e),
such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.

SPECIFICATION 6: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Afghanistan database containing more than 90,000 records
belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than
$1,000, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 7: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database, with
reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or-cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not
entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e),
such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.



CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 8: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 8 March 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another, a record or thing of value of the United States
or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: a United States
Southern Command database containing more than 700 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 9: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 8 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than three classified records from a United
States Southern Command database, with reason to believe such
information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation
of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good
order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 10: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 April 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than five classified records relating to a
military operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan occurring on or
about 4 May 2009, with reason to believe such information could be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any
foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to
be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

0 0 20478

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 11: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a file named PAX.zip" containing a video named
PAX.wmv", with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 12: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 4 May 2010, steal,

-purloin, or knowingly convert another, a

record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Department of State Net?Centric Diplomacy
database containing more than 250,000 records belonging to the United
States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18
U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order
and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 13: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having obtained
information that has been determined by the United States government
pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations, to wit: more than seventy-five classified United
States Department of State cables, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(l), such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.



CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 14: In that Private First Class Bradley B. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 18 February 2010,
having knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet
Protocol Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having
obtained information that has been determined by the United States
government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
defense or foreign relations, to wit: a classified Department of
State cable titled "Reykjavik-13", willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(l), such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 15: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 15 March 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a classified record produced by a United States Army
intelligence organization, dated 18 March 2008, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,
deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 16: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert another, a
record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the United States Forces Iraq Microsoft
Outlook SharePoint Exchange Server global address list belonging to
the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.



0 0 20480

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

ADDITIONAL CHARGE VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 92.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 March 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by attempting to bypass
network or information system security mechanisms.

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 February 2010 and on or about 3 April 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by adding unauthorized
software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 4 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit:
paragraph Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by
adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network computer.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, violate a
lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph Army
Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by using an information system
in a manner other than its intended purpose.

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
divers occasions between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about
27 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
7-4, Army Regulation 380-5, dated 29 September 2000, by wrongfully
storing classified information.

0

20481

STATES
DEFENSE REQUEST TO
PRESERVE EVIDENCE

V.

MANNING. Bradley EX. PFC

US. Army.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. US.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall.
Fort Myer. 222]

DATED: 21 September



1. ln accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 70l(a) and Manual for
Courts-Martial. United States. 2008, Article 46. Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
other applicable law, defense counsel in the above entitled case respectfully request that
the 11.8. Government preserve all computer forensic evidence obtained in this case.

2. The Defense specifically requests that the Govemment preserve all the hard drives
from the Tactical Sensitive Information Facility and the
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarter Company (HHC).
2nd Brigade Combat Team (BC T). 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base
Hammer. Iraq and provide an linCase forensic image ofeach computer to the
defense for its inspection. The defense also requests an EnCase forensic image of any
other computer seized by the in this case.

3. In accordance with R.C.M. 701 ?[c]ach party shall have equal opportunity to
inspect evidence." I)cfensc counsel is requesting an equal opportunity to inspect the hard
drives from the and TOC of HHC. 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division. FOB
Hammer. lraq. The defense believes the requested evidence constitutes Brady material
under Brady v. 373 U.S. 83 (I963).

4. A copy of this request was served on Trial C.ounscl by e-mail on 21 September

2011.


Civilian Defense Counsel

0 20482

From:
To:



Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
Date: Thursday, September 29, 2011 4:42:49 PM
Importance: Low

Ashden,
Your understanding of the Defense request to preserve evidence is correct.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906





.


Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain con?dential attorney-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message

Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA


Date: u, September 29, 2011 4:39 pm
To:
Cc: "Matthew kemkes"
MIL US USA






'?Tooman,Joshua CPT








0 an, CPT USA
"Overqaard, Angel M. CPT USA
"Ford, Arthur



"Melissa Santiago" "Eric Lakes"



David,

Thanks for the chat this afternoon. To recap, you are requesting the
preservation of the following items:

1. All SIPR hard drives in the TOC and SCIF of 2/10 MTN, regardless if they
were seized or imaged

2. All EnCase forensic images of all computers seized by the United States

v/r

0 20483

Ashden


From:
.
Sent: ur ay, ptem 11 AM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA

Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow JoDean, CPT USA

ergaar nge . Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA

Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request

Importance: Low







Ashden,
I am available between 1200 and 1300 or anytime after 1600 today.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Goombs
11 South Angeli Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906
Toll Free



Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attorney?client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA








"Tooman,Joshua CPT


an, CPT USA
"Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA
"Ford, Arthur



"Melissa Santiaqo"

David,

Are you available to discuss this request over the telephone?

Thanks.

0 20484

v/
Ashden

--?--Original

From:
.
Sent: Fri ay, Septem 23, 2011 10:09 AM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA
Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
ergaar nge . A Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA

Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request

Importance: Low





Ashden,

The defense request is for all hard drives that were located within the
T-SCIF
and the TOC.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906
Toll Free:





ense.com

Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attorney-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA

law u, gp!eman, CPT USA
"Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA

D. W01 USA JFHQ-NC MDW SJA
"Melissa Santiaao"




David,



Could you please clarify your request. Are you asking to have ALL harddrives
that were located in the TSCIF and TOC or only those that were collected by
CID and had Encase forensic images produced? Thank you.



Sent: y, Septem 21, 2011 1:52 PM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA

Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA

Morrow JoDean, CPT USA

Overgaard, Ange M. CPT USA Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA
Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: Preserve Evidence Request

Ashden,
Please see the attached request.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angeli Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906



eense.com
Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attorney-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer?Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20486

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 12

8 March 2012



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
u.s. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
21 0 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR. DC 20319-5013

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF



ANJA-CL 6 October 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Third Army, United States Army Central
Shaw Air Force Base, SC 29152

SUBJECT: Request to Located and Preserve Evidence United States v. PFC Bradley Manning

1. PURPOSE. The prosecution in the above-named ease requests that you conduct a thorough
and comprehensive search for all theater provided equipment (TPE) hard drives used between 1
November 2009 and 27 May 2010 in the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
and the Tactical Operations Center of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade
Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq.
If you locate any TPE hard drives, then please take all reasonably and necessary steps to preserve
such hard drives.

2. BACKGROUND. PFC Manning is the subject of an ongoing investigation and criminal
prosecution based on the alleged illegal collection and disclosure of national defense and foreign
relations information to the WikiLeaks organization. WikiLeaks released national defense and
foreign relations information allegedly provided to them by PFC Manning on the intemet. PFC
Manning is currently charged with multiple violations of federal law under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), including violations of 8 U.S.C. 793, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and 18
U.S.C. 641. PFC Manning is also charged with Aiding the Enemy by Giving Intelligence, in
violation of Article 104, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. 904). See Enclosure 1. PFC Manning was
apprehended by CID in Iraq on 27 May 2010 and has been in pretrial con?nement since 29 May
2010.

3. SUSPENSE. Please acknowledge receipt of this request and notify the prosecution of the
results of your search and the steps you took to locate any hard drive by 12 October 2011.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

a. If you identify or locate any relevant hard drives, please take all reasonable and necessary
steps to preserve the hard drives. The prosecution will provide additional instructions on
disposition.

b. This request isdcsigned to preserve materials and information requested by the defense
counsel for PFC Manning. See Enclosures 2 and 3. It is not intended, nor should it be
interpreted, to ascribe any legal relevance to the materials and information requested, including
whether or not such materials and infonnation may be provided to the defense in discovery.

0 0 20488
ANJ A-C

SUBJECT: Request to located and Prcserve Evidence ?nited States v. PFC Bradley Manning

c. If you are unsure whether certain materials should be preserved, pleasc err on the side of
caution and preserve the materials. Failure to preserve and retain any pertinent materials,
electronic or otherwise, may result in sanctions against the United States, based on PFC
Manning?s rights under Article 46, UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and applicable case law.

5. The point of contact for this request is the undersigned at (202) 685-1975 (DSN 325),

0r



3 Encls
1. Charge Sheet, 2 Mar 1 JA
2. Defense Request, 2l Sep 1 I Trial Counsel

3. Explanation Emails, 29 Sep ll

I

CHARGESHEET
I.PERSONALDATA

2.SSN 3.GRADEORRANK 4.PAYGRADE

MANNING, Bradley E. I PFC E-3


Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer?Henderson Hall

Fort Myer, Virginia 22211 4 years
7. PAY PER MONTH 3. NATURE or RESTRAINT or 9. IMPOSED

ACCUSED

a. BASIC b. SEAJFOREIGN ourv c. TOTAL

$1,950.00 None $1,950.00 Pre?Trial Confinement 29 May 10

ll. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS

10. ADDITIONAL CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 104.

THE SPECIFICATION: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, without proper authority,
knowingly give intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means.

ADDITIONAL CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about?
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, wrongfully and wantonly cause to
be published on the internet intelligence belonging to the United States
government, having knowledge that intelligence published on the internet is
accessible to the enemy, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces.

(See Continuation Sheet)

PREFERRAL
11a. NAME OF ACCUSER (Last, First, b. GRADE c. ORGANIZATION OF ACCUSER



- SIGNATURE I

AFFIDAVIT: Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases ofthis character, personally appeared the
above named accuser this day 5x ?.0l 1, and signed the foregoing charges and speci?cations

under oath that he/she is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that he/she either has personal knowledge of
or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the same are true to the best of histher knowledge and belief.

MDW OSJ A
Typed Name of Officer Organization of Of?cer

Trial Counsel

Official Capacity to Administer Oath
{See CM. 307{b} - must be a commissioned officer)



rgnaue

DD FORM 458, MAY 2000 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

20490







12- e. lsvnim .
On 2011. the accused was informed of the charges against himiher and of the name(s) of
The accuser( known to me See R. C. M. 308 (See R. C. M. 308 if noti?cation cannot be made)
HQ MD EN USA
Typed Name of immediate Commander Organization of immediate Commander
ignature
N. RECEIPT BY SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY
13.
The sworn charges were received at hours. 7Zge_ f2? 2011 at HQ CMD EN, USA
Designation of Command or
Officer Exercising Siimmary Court-Martial Jurisdiction (See M. 403)

Commanding
Typed Name of Officer Official Capacity of Officer Signing
V. SERVICE OF CHARGES
14a. OF COMMAND OF CONVENING AUTHORITY b. PLACE c. DATE
Referred for trial to the Court-martial convened by
20? ,subjectto the following instructionsiz
By Of
Command or Order
Typed Name 01' Officer Official Capacity of Officer Signing
Grade
Signature
15.
On 2011 I (caused to be) served a copy hereof on (each of) the above named accused.
Typed Name of Trial Counsel Grade or Rank of Trial Counsel
Signature
FOOTNO TES: 1 When an appropriate commander signs personally. inapplicable words are stricken.
2 See R. C. M. 601(e) concerning instructions. if none, so state.

DD FORM 458 (BACK), MAY 2000

. . 20491
1 CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 4.58, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Item 10 (Cont'd):

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 5 April 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a video file named ?12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30
GC Anyone.avi", with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 22 March 2010 and on or about 26 March 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than one classified memorandum produced by a
United States government intelligence agency, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,
deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 5 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,a
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Iraq database containing more than 380,000 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.



.

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database, with reason
to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not
entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e),
such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.

SPECIFICATION 6: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Afghanistan database containing more than 90,000 records
belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than
$1,000, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 7: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database, with
reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the
United states or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not
entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e).
such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.

0 0 20493

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 3.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 8: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 8 March 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another, a record or thing of value of the United States
or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: a United States
Southern Command database containing more than 700 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 9: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 8 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than three classified records from a United
States Southern Command database, with reason to believe such
information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation
of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good
order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 10: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 April 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than five classified records relating to a
military operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan occurring on or
about 4 May 2009, with reason to believe such information could be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any
foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to
be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to at
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e}, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

0 0 20494

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 11: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a file named PAX.zip" containing a video named
PAX.wmv", with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 12: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 4 May 2010, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert another, a
record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Department of State Net?Centric Diplomacy
database containing more than 250,000 records belonging to the United
States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18
U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order
and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 13: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having obtained
information that has been determined by the United States government
pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations, to wit: more than seventy-five classified United
States Department of State cables, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(l), such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

0 0 20495

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 14:. In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 18 February 2010,
having knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet?
Protocol Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having
obtained information that has been determined by the United States
government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
defense or foreign relations, to wit: a classified Department of
State cable titled "Reykjavik?13", willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(1), such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 15: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 15 March 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a classified record produced by a United States Army
intelligence organization, dated 18 March 2008, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,
deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 16: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert another, a
record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the United States Forces Iraq Microsoft
Outlook SharePoint Exchange Server global address list belonging to
the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.



0 0 20496

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 3.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

ADDITIONAL CHARGE VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 92.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 March 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by attempting to bypass
network or information system security mechanisms.

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 February 2010 and on or about 3 April 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by adding unauthorized
software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network computer.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 4 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit:
paragraph Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by
adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network computer. -

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, violate a
lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph Army
Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by using an information system
in a manner other than its intended purpose.

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
divers occasions between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about
27 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
7-4, Army Regulation 380-5, dated 29 September 2000, by wrongfully
storing classified information.


DEFENSE REQUEST TO
PRESERVE EVIDENCE

MANNING. Bradley

US. Army.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. U.S.
Arm)? Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall.
Fort 222ll

DATED: 21 September 201 I



In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 70l(a) and Manual for
United States. 2008- Article 46. Uniform Code of Military Justice. and
other applicable law. defense counsel in the above entitled ease respectfully request that
the US. Government preserve all computer forensic evidence obtained in this case.

2. The Defense specifically requests that the Govemment preserve all the hard drives
from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarter Company (HHC).
2nd Brigade Combat Team (BC T), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Hammer. Iraq and provide an linCase forensic image of each computer to the
defense for its inspection. The defense also requests an forensic image ofany
other computer seized by the Govemment in this case.

3. In accordance with R.C.M. 701 ?[e|ach party shall have equal opportunity to
inspect evidence." Defense counsel is requesting an equal opportunity to inspect the hard
drives from the T-SCIF and of HHC. 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division_. FOB
Hammer. Iraq. The defense believes the requested evidence constitutes Brady material
under Brady v. Murylumi. 373 .S. 83 (1963).

-1. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by e-mail on 21 September

2011.
o.\ius

Civilian Defense Counsel

20497

0 0








To: -

Cc: -
?Ql:d..Al:ttl.uLQ.
En?.Lalse$

Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request

Date: Thursday, September 29, 2011 4:42:49 PM

Importance: Low

Ashden,
Your understanding of the Defense request to preserve evidence is correct.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906
Toll Free:
Local:
Fax:

I


Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain con?dential attorney-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is




-- Original Message
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA





Date: Thu. September 29. 2011 4:39 Dm
To:
Cc: "Matthew kemkes"
MIL US USA









"Tooman,Joshua



n, CPT USA
"Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA
"Ford, Arthur




D. wo1 USA JFHQ-NC
"Melissa Santiago"



David,

Thanks for the chat this afternoon. To recap, you are requesting the
preservation of the following items:

1. All SIPR hard drives in the TOC and SCIF of 2/10 MTN, regardless if they
were seized or imaged

2. All EnCase forensic images of all computers seized by the United States

v/r

0 20499

Ashden


From:




I
Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 8:08 AM
To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA
Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow 111, JoDean, USA

ergaar nge - Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA

Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
Importance: Low

Ashden,
I am available between 1200 and 1300 or anytime after 1600 today.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906



Notice; This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attorney-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this infomiation may be unlawful and is

Original Message
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA



"Tooman,Joshua CPT

MIL us USA




D. W01 USA JFHQ-NC
"Melissa Santiaao"




David,

Are you available to discuss this request over the telephone?

Thanks.

0 0 20500

v/r
Ashden



From:
- 1
Sent: Friday, Septem 23, 2011 10:09 AM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA

Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
Overgaar Ang M. PT USA Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA
Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes

Subject: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request

Importance: Low



Ashden,

The defense request is for all hard drives that were located within the
T-SCIF
and the TOC.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906



Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-dient information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all oopies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

Original Message
Subject: RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA




Date: u, ptem 11 pm
To:
Cc: "Matthew kemkes"
MIL US USA





"Tooman,Joshua CPT

-, "Morrow JoDean,' CPT USA
Angel M. CPT USA
"Ford, Arthur








D. W01 USA JFHQ-N
elissa Santjaao"



David,

0 20501

Could you please clarify your request. Are you asking to have ALL harddrives
that were located in the TSCIF and TOC or only those that were collected by
CID and had EnCase forensic images produced? Thank you.

v/r
Ashden


From:




t: ay, tem 1, 111:5
To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA
Cc: Matthew kemkes' Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA
Morrow JoDean, CPT USA

ergaar nge . A Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA

Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes
Subject: Preserve Evidence Request

Mhden,
Please see the attached request.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angeli Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free:



Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-client information and is intended for me
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



20502

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 13

8 March 2012

0 0 20503

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
u.s. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT or WASHINGTON
210 A STREET
FORT LESLEY J. NCNAIR. Dc 2o319.5o13

. REPLY To
ATTENTION or



4 October 201 1

MEMORANDUM FOR Director, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, U.S. Army Criminal
Investigative Command, Quantico, VA 22134

SUBJECT: Request to Preserve Evidence United States v. PFC Bradley Manning

1. PURPOSE. The prosecution in the above-named case requests that your organization take

I all reasonable and necessary steps to preserve any computer forensic evidence held or obtained
by your organization during the investigation of PFC Manning?s alleged misconduct, including
hard drives used between 1 November 2009 and 27 May 2010 in the Tactical Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility and the Tactical Operations Center of Headquarters and
Headquarters Company,2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry),
Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq, and all forensic images of all computers seized by the
United States.

2. BACKGROUND. PFC Manning is the subject of an ongoing investigation and criminal
prosecution based on the alleged illegal collection and disclosure of national defense and foreign
relations infonnation to the WikiLeaks organization. WikiLealforeign relations infomiation allegedly provided to them by PFC Manning on the intemet. PFC
Manning is currently charged with multiple violations of federal law under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), including violations of 8 U.S.C. 793, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and 18
U.S.C. 641. PFC Manning is also charged with Aiding the Enemy by Giving Intelligence, in
violation of Article 104, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. 904). See Enclosure 1. PFC Manning was
apprehended by CID in Iraq on 27 May 2010 and has been in pretrial con?nement since 29 May
2010.

3. SUSPENSE. Please acknowledge receipt of this preservation request and notify the
prosecution by 12 October 201.1 that you have complied with this request.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. This request is designed to -preserve materials and
information requested by the defense counsel for PFC Manning. See Enclosures 2 and 3. It is
not intended, nor should it be interpreted, to ascribe any legal relevance to the materials and
information requested, including whether or not such materials and information may be provided
to the defense in discovery. If you are unsure whether certain materials should be preserved,
please err on the side of caution and preserve the materials. Failure to preserve and" retain any
pertinent materials, electronic or otherwise, may result in sanctions against the United "States,

0, 20504


SUBJECT: Request to Preserve Evidence - United States v. PFC Bradley Manning

based on PFC Manning?s rights under Article 46, UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and
applicable case law.

5. The point ofcontact for this request is the undersigned at (DSN-




3 Encls ASHDEN FEIN
1. Charge Sheet, 2 Mar 1 CPT, JA
2. Defense Request, 2] Sep ll Trial Counsel

3. Explanation Emails, 29 Sep 1

CF:
Legal Advisor, CCIU



20505

CHARGESHEET
I. PERSONAL DATA

1. NAME or ACCUSED (Last, First, 2, SSN 3. GRADE OR RANK 4. PAY GRADE

MANNING, Bradley E. PFC E-3


Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer?Henderson Hall

Fort Myer, Virginia 22211 4 years
7, PAY PER MONTH a NATURE or RESTRAINT or 9. IMPOSED

ACCUSED

a. BASIC b. DUTY c. TOTAL

$1,950.00 None $1,950.00 Pre~Trial Confinement 29 May 10

ll. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS

10. ADDITIONAL CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 104.

THE SPECIFICATION: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, without proper authority,
knowingly give intelligence to the enemy, through indirect means.

ADDITIONAL CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S. Army,
did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, between on or about
1 November 2009 and on or about 27 May 2010, wrongfully and wantonly cause to
be published on the internet intelligence belonging to the United States
government, having knowledge that intelligence published on the internet is
accessible to the enemy, such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces.

(See Continuation Sheet)

Ill. PREFERRAL

11a. NAME OF ACCUSER (Last, First. b. GRADE c. ORGANIZATION OF ACCUSER

A I Ho cw: USA
e. DATE



d. SIGNATURE

A FFIDAVIT: Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases ofthis character, personally appeared the
above named accuser this day of Ck ?.0l 1, and signed the foregoing charges and speci?cations

under oath that he/she is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that hefshe either has personal knowledge of
or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the same are true to the best of hisfher knowledge and belief.

MDW OS A
Typed Name of Officer Organization of Officer

Trial Counsel

O?iciai Capacity to Administer Oath
(See CM. 307{b) must be a commissioned officer)



igna ure

DD FORM 458, MAY 2000 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE

0 0 20506





12- ea
On 2011. the accused was informed of the charges against himfher and of the name(s) of
The accuser( known to me (See R. C. M. 308 {See R. C. M. 308 ifnoti?cation cannot be made.)
HQ CMD BN USA
Typed Name of Immediate Commander Organization of immediate Commander
ignature
IV. RECEIPT BY SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL CONVENING AUTHORITY
13.
The sworn charges were received at hours, 2011 at HQ CMD BN, USA
Designation of Command or
Officer Exercising Summary Court-Martial Jurisdiction {See M. 403)

Commanding
Typed Name of Officer Official Capacity of Officer Signing
V. SERVICE OF CHARGES
14a? DESIGNATION OF COMMAND OF CONVENING AUTHORITY b. PLACE c. DATE
Referred for trial to the Court-martial convened by
20? . subjecttothe following instructions:
By Of
Command or Order
Typed Name of Officer Officiat Capacity of Officer Signing
Grade
Signature
15.
On 2011 I (caused to be) served a copy hereof on (each of) the above named accused.
Typed Name of Tina! Counsel Grade or Rank of Trial Counset
Signature
FOOTNOTES: 1- When an appropriate commander signs personatty, inappticabte words are stricken.
2 See RC. M. 601(9) concerning instructions. if none, so state.

DD FORM 458 (BACK), MAY 2000

0 0 20507

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Item 10 (Cont?d}:

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 5 April 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a video file named ?12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30
GC Anyone.avi", with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 22 March 2010 and on or about 26 March 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than one classified memorandum produced by a
United States government intelligence agency, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,
deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 5 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Iraq database containing more than 380,000 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 0

-entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e),

0 20508

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Iraq database, with reason
to believe such information could be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not
entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e),
such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.

SPECIFICATION 6: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another,
a record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Combined Information Data Network
Exchange Afghanistan database containing more than 90,000 records
belonging to the United States government, of a value of more than
$1,000, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 7: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 31 December 2009 and on or about 9 February 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than twenty classified records from the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange Afghanistan database,-with
reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully
communicate, deliver, transmit, or-cause to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a person not

such conduct being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the
armed forces and being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces.

20509

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 3.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 8: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 8 March 2010, steal, purloin, or knowingly convert another, a record or thing of value 0f the United States
or of a department or agency thereof, to wit: a United States
Southern Command database containing more than 700 records belonging
to the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 9: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 8 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than three classified records from a United
States Southern Command database, with reason to believe such
information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, in violation
of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good
order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 10: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 April 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: more than five classified records relating to a
military operation in Farah Province, Afghanistan occurring on or
about 4 May 2009, with reason to believe such information could be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any
foreign nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to
be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

2?51?)

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 3.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 11: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 January 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a file named PAX.zip" containing a video named
PAX.wmv", with reason to believe such information could be used
to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted, the said information, to a
person not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code
Section 793(e), such conduct being prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 12: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 4 May 2010, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert another, a
record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the Department of State Net?Centric Diplomacy
database containing more than 250,000 records belonging to the United
States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in violation of 18
U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial to good order
and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 13: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 28 March 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, having
knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having obtained
information that has been determined by the United States government
pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations, to wit: more than seventy-five classified United
States Department of State cables, willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(1), such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

0 0

CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley 1-2.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer?Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

SPECIFICATION 14: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 18 February 2010,
having knowingly exceeded authorized access on a Secret Internet
Protocol Router Network computer, and by means of such conduct having
obtained information that has been determined by the United States
government pursuant to an Executive Order or statute to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
defense or foreign relations, to wit: a classified Department of_
State cable titled "Reykjavik~13", willfully communicate, deliver,
transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the
said information, to a person not entitled to receive it, with reason
to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1030(a)(1). such conduct
being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and
being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 15: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 15 February 2010 and on or about 15 March 2010,
having unauthorized possession of information relating to the national
defense, to wit: a classified record produced by a United States Army
intelligence organization, dated 18 March 2008, with reason to believe
such information could be used to the injury of the United States or
to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicate,
deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, the said information, to a person not entitled to receive
it, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 793(e), such conduct being
prejudicial to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

SPECIFICATION 16: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, steal,
purloin, or knowingly convert another, a
record or thing of value of the United States or of a department or
agency thereof, to wit: the United States Forces - Iraq Microsoft
Outlook SharePoint Exchange Server global address list belonging to
the United States government, of a value of more than $1,000, in
violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 641, such conduct being prejudicial
to good order and discipline in the armed forces and being of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces.



CONTINUATION SHEET, DA FORM 458, MANNING, Bradley E.,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Joint Base
Myer-Henderson Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

ADDITIONAL CHARGE VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 92.

SPECIFICATION 1: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about 8 March 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by attempting to bypass
network or information system security mechanisms.

SPECIFICATION 2: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 February 2010 and on or about 3 April 2010,
violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
Army Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by adding unauthorized
software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network_computer.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
or about 4 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit:
paragraph Army Regulation dated 24 October 2007, by
adding unauthorized software to a Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network computer. -

SPECIFICATION 4: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq,
between on or about 11 May 2010 and on or about 27 May 2010, violate a
lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph Army
Regulation 25-2, dated 24 October 2007, by using an information system
in a manner other than its intended purpose.

SPECIFICATION 5: In that Private First Class Bradley E. Manning, U.S.
Army, did, at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq, on
divers occasions between on or about 1 November 2009 and on or about
27 May 2010, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: paragraph
7-4, Army Regulation 380-5, dated 29 September 2000, by wrongfully
storing classified information.

0 20513

STATES
DEFENSE REQUEST TO
v. PRESERVE EVIDENCE
MANNING. Bradley PFC

U.S. Army.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall.
Fort Myer, YA 222ll

DATED: 21 September 20|l



1. In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 701(a) and Manual for
Courts-Martial. United States. 2008. Article 46. Uniform Code of Military Justice. and
other applicable law. defense counsel in the above entitled case respectfully request that
the US. Government preserve all computer forensic evidence obtained in this case.

2. The Defense specifically requests that the Govemment preserve all the hard drives
from the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (T-SCIF) and the
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Headquarters and Headquarter Company (HHC),
2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Hammer, Iraq and provide an ljnCase forensic image of each computer to the
defense for its inspection. The defense also requests an EnCase forensic image of any
other computer seized by the Govemment in this case.

3. In accordance with R.C.M. 701 ?[e]aeh party shall have equal opportunity to
inspect evidence." Defense counsel is requesting an equal opportunity to inspect the hard
drives from the and TOC of HHC. 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, FOB
Hammer, Iraq. The defense believes the requested evidence constitutes Brady material
under Brady v. Maryluml. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

4. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by e-mail on 2l September

2011.


Civilian Defense Counsel

0 20514

From:
To:



Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
Date: Thursday, September 29, 20114242249 PM
Importance: Low

Ashden,
Your understanding of the Defense request to preserve evidence is correct.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence. RI 02906



ense.com

Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain confidential attomey-
client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or use of this
information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA








Date: Thu. September 29. 2011 4:39 om




"Tooman,Joshua CPT
MIL US USA
ean, CPT USA
-. "Overoaard. Angel M. CPT USA
"Ford. Arthur



D. W01 USA JFHQ
"Melissa Santiaao"

-NC

David,

Thanks for the dwat this afternoon. To recap, you are requesting the
preservation of the following items:

1. All SIPR hard drives in the TOC and SCIF of 2/10 MTN, regardless if they
were seized or imaged

2. All Encase forensic images of all computers seized by the United States

v/

. . 20515

Ashden


From:





I
Sent: ay, pem
To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA
Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA

Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
ergaar nge . A Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA

Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
Importance: Low



Ashden,
I am available between 1200 and 1300 or anytime after 1600 today.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906



Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-dient information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this infomiation may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: RE: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein, Ashden CPT USA









Cc? a ew em es ?Tooman,Joshua CPT

us USA






"Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA
Ford, Arthur
D. W01 USA JFHQ-N
"Melissa Santiaqo"




David,

Are you available to discuss this request over the telephone?

Thanks.

0 . 20516

v/r
Ashden


From:
.
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 10:09 AM
To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA
Cc: Matthew kemkes: Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA

Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
Overgaar Ange M. CPT USA Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA
Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes
Subject: [Suspected RE: Preserve Evidence Request
Importance: Low



Ashden,

The defense request is for all hard drives that were located within the

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906



ense.com

Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may
contain confidential attomey-client information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: RE: Preserve Evidence Request
From: "Fein. Ashden CPT USA







Cc: "Matt ew em es '"rooman,Joshua CPT

MIL us USA








"Ford, Arthur
D. W01 USA
"Mplicca Santiann"



David,

0 20517

Could you please clarify your request. Are you asking to have ALL harddrives
that were located in the TSCIF and TOC or only those that were collected by
CID and had EnCase forensic images produced? Thank you.

v/r
Ashden


From:






Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2011 1:52 PM
To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA
Cc: Matthew kemkes; Tooman,Joshua CPT MIL US USA

Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
Overgaar Ange M. CPT USA Ford, Arthur D. W01 USA
Melissa Santiago; Eric Lakes
Subject: Preserve Evidence Request

Ashden,
Please see the attached request.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.
Law Of?ce of David E. Coombs
11 South Angeli Street, #317
Providence, RI 02906



a ense.com

Notice: This transmission," including attachments, may
contain con?dential attomey-dient information and is intended for the
person(s) or company named. If you are not the intended recipient, please
notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized disclosure, copying or
use of this information may be unlawful and is



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20518

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 14

8 March 2012

20519

SWORN STATEMENT
Forusoofthislorm.

PRIVACVACTSTATEIENT
Titio 10. USC section 301; TMOS. USCSOCGOIIZDG1: E.0.93?78odnISoeuityNumbor (SSN).

PRINCIPALPURPOSE:


ROUHNEUSES:





DISCLOSURE:

1?mmw

:93 ?PefnL 2012/03/06 M00
5. LASTNAME, nest NAME. MIDDLE NAME 6. ssu 7. GRADEISTATUS
mmwk?sswos?m je 04

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort mum, New York

9.

u, MAJ JOSEPH LATENDRESSE mm TO MAKE me FOLLOWING STATEIENT unoea OATH-

Q:
A:

Q: Whendidyouarriveatz/I0
A: smo

Q:
A

What is you; current duty position at 2/10
51 .

Q: What was)/rourduty position at2/10 MTN from Septombet 2010 to March 2012?


Q2 didyou

A: d: 743- tag? 3619 (re
up
)4 J?a-?Cred: 0'-tr /I?/oer


.JfrIvQ;'_

Were you pmsentwbenthe ?Jl0MTNdeploymentCONEXes arrived axFonDnun,NY?
u4rfIu?J -941? 04/ Mcc? Laue, ?'51 04/

- Or.
If yes, wen: you past of the inspection of the

J/cf .

If yes, what. if any, materials were you searching for in the
2 CIC 441./? J7-arc?? 4: we /.91

47? f'O?7?f
7? xv "?lyA?l'7'



10. 11.
- /gr: PAGE 1 or 3 PAGES
ADDITIONAL mess uusr cormurv ms HEADING mcenmr 0.4150

THE BOTTOH OF EACH ADDITTONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEIGVT, AND PAGE MIME
MUST BE INDICA TED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE APO PE

20520

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED. PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF 11% FORK.

F955 ow?
STATEMENT 0.: LATENDRESSE, JOSEPH, 1' TAKEN AT DATED 2omo3/06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: When you unloaded the was US Army CID present? And if so. what did they do during the unloading?Kai? 4
.A .1 .
.-/0,1 7-

7:57
W4: vauf :4 xi 4 /55

.1/rs ref-
Q: After CID ?nished their tasks, did you received the attached request from CID, dated 30 September 2010, to preserve ?any
additional hard drives (classi?ed or unclassi?ed) used d1.u'ing the deployment to Iraq" and inform CID if additional hard drives wee

found?

A:

Q: Did you ?nd additional hard drivesafterCIDle? Fort Drum? Ifso,wha1didyoudowith thesoharddrives?

vi/Q.
5547: due, ftf/.z A la

-- 0-Jr xi? .4.-.-1

Q:
otherwiseobtained by
A: 3-14: ?gvej 5121?; 76?

iQ. If youtumed in,desuoyed, sent for reset,o1-otherwise discarded ?any of the didyouusetoselect which
hard drives you chose to keep? I
?re /4 /erg? ?20 44.?
F5 75 7(/ca.
W-at :43
65/ 79:? ICVJ we >6 r"Zr.a.

I
4'97? C-30 /[ea

Q: Did you record how many hard drives were kept? Ifso, how did you record this? Did you include the Model Number for end:

harddriveF/?yr? 41,. cu /99 fiery!


Cl.? .714

LQ: If no then why?
A: .4

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES


INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING

DA 2823,



. 20521

TAKEN I ya gA1'Eg 2012/0306

F05

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did you receive, or were you noti?ed about, the attached request from the prosecution, dated 4 October 2011, asking you to
take all reasonable and necessary steps to preserve any hard drives?

A: /4 2?
Q: If yes, did you perform this request?

A: //of

Q: Does 2!lO MTN currently have any stored hard drives or media devices that were located within the TOC or SCIF during the last
deployment to FOB Hammer, Iraq?

/u

Q: If yes, where are they stored?
A: 4/vd

.

s'f-ac;

Q: Whyarethey stored in the W1 fa33"? rs-
I a
_fcJ,,c_ 0,45 in-* 41-:




J0 3'1 4f
4-46? 741.?; I

Q: Was anyone authorized to tamper or alter the hard drives? -W
A: <3



AFFIDAVIT
3, LATENDRESSE. JOSEPH. ., HAVE manta on HAVE also new TO ME nus STATEMENT
wmcu seems on PAGE 1, mo ENDS on PAGE I u=uu.v uuoansmao ?rue courams or 11-as ENTIRE mos
av ME. THE as mus. I HAVE ALL connecnons mo HAVE mmneo THE aorrou or anon mes
coumwuc 11-re HAVE mos THIS mesa WITHOUT HOPE or on REWARD. WITHOUT

THREAT or-' PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature ofPerson ?aking Staternantl
wn-N53553:
L. 5: Le
77. I 5&2 atl-7.9, Rm;
.V - .
?3/vi, cf?5 ire 474- +2 /fr, 1. /3 no 1-: Cr.kLL1.a.r~r\
ORGANIZATKDN OR ADDRESS (Signature orPerson Administering oath)

3 \i

(Typed Name of Person Adrninistering Oath)



oacsamzanou on ADDRESS
or peasou wumuc STATEMENT
PAGE 3 or 3 PAGES
on FORM 2323, NOV zoos

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20522

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 15

8 March 2012

0 20523

Whyte, Jeffrey H. CPT USA JFHQ-NCRIMDW SJA

From: Fein, Ashden CPT USA SJA

Sent: Tuesday, February 28, 2012 7:59 AM

To: Whyte, Jeffrey H. CPT USA SJA

Subject: FW: Hard Drive (UNCLASSIFIED)

Attachments: Fort Drum Hard Drives - Defense Preservation Request Fort Drum Hard

Drives - Defense Preservation 143 - AIR of SA WILBUR 12 Sep 10.pdf

?-?Original

From: King, Kenneth A c1v (US) [mg

Sent: Wednesday, January 04, 2012 1:08 PM

To: Fein, Ashden CPT USA Feito, Beatriz SGT USA JFHQ- Ford,
Arthur D. W01 USA Morrow JoDean, CPT USA
Waybright, Daniel W. SGT USA SJA

Subject: FW: Hard Drive (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Attached is spreadsheet detailing all of the hard drives being preserved by Fort The highlighted version
shows which drives we examined back in Sep 10. The ones in Yellow are an exact match, the onw in Green
a close match. It was a cursory review using SA WILBUR's AIR ?'om 12 Sep 10. -

?--?Original

From: Latendresse, Joseph MIL USA FORSCOM
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2011 1:58 PM

To: King, Kermeth A USA CIV (US)

Subject: FW: Hard Drive (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Sir,

Our numbers have increased.

Attached is the running document; I believe this meets your intent and again, I apologize the ever-increasing
numbers.


MAJL



From: Anglea, Steven SSG USA FORSCOM

Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2011 1:56 PM

To: Latendresse, Joseph MAJ MIL USA Tolbert, Michael MSG MIL USA FORSCOM

Subject: Hard Drive (UNCLASSIFIED)
1

. I

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: FOUO

MAJ Latendresse and MSG Tolbert,

There are 181 iterm for CID.

Unclass x5

Collateral X95 (HDD X89, Ext HDD x5, Thumb Drive x1)

Unknown x86 (HDD x77, Ext HDD x4, Thumb Drive x4, Wireless Card xl)

The excel tracker is attached. There is a tab for each classi?cation and one for all the HDD.

Very Respectfully,
SSG Steven Anglea

SSR, 2BCT

051*?

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

Classi?cation: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

20524

20525

Appellate Exhibit 16
Enclosure 16
6 pages
ordered sealed for Reason 6
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the original Record
of Trial

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20526

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 17

8 March 2012



0 20527

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THIRD ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
1 GABRESKI DRIVE
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SC 29152

I0
ATTEONION OP

OCT 2 0


FOR Ashden Fein. Trial Counsel. United States Army Military District
of Washington. 210 A Street. Fort Lesley J. McNair, l)C 20319

SUBJECT: Request to Locate and Preserve Evidence United States v. PFC Bradley Manning

I. This command has received your request to locate and preserve evidence in the case ofUnited
States v. PFC Bradley Manning.

2. PFC Manning was taken into custody in May 20lO. and he departed theater on or about 29
July 2010. During this time period. CID agents conliscatcd all Theater Provided l-Equipment
or other electronic media devices relevant to the criminal investigation.

3. This command does not have possession ofany hard drives responsive to your request.

4. The point of contact for this action is MAJ Michael Bahm. Chicl'Military Justice at

or via email at

VINCENT K. BROOKS
Lieutenant General. USA
Commanding

20528

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion toCompelDiseovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCUSArmy,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Enelosurel^
^March2^I2

Ev:i)E\c K./r

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20529

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20531

Appellate Exhibit 16
Enclosure 19
5 pages
ordered sealed for Reason 6
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the original Record
of Trial

;v

20532

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 20
8 March 2012

20533
1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TRANSMITTAL RECORD
For use of this form, see AR 25-50; the proponent agency is DCSPER
3. TITLE/FILE IDENTIFICATION

2. SHIPMENT NO.

Unclassified
4. AS OF DATE

Mannings 00375130-00375182 & 00375198-00376953 &
ManningB 00378176-00378176

5. SHIPMENT DATE
(YYYYMMDD)

(YYYYMMDD)

2011/11/08

2011/11/08

6. AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT

7. NUMBER OF RECORDS TRANSMITTED

8. PERSON TO CONTACT (Name and telephone)

9. REQUIREMENT CONTROL SYMBOL

2
(AR 335-1^

W O l Arthur Ford
10. SHIPPED FROM
US Army military District ofWashington
Office o f the Staff Judge Advocate
103 3rd Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319

11. SHIPPED TO

MAJ Kemkes
Senior Defense Counsel
Trial Defense Services
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
\y/\

10a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF SENDER

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED (When tox is checked, sign
bekiw and return copy to sender.)

11a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF RECEIVER

^ ^ r O.^y

MfTDf^k ,1. A^^^B^

10b. SIGNATURE OF SENDER

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12. TYPE OF MEDIA TRANSMITTED
HARD COPY

PUNCHED CARDS

CASSETTES

MICROFILM

PHOTO

FICHE

13. NUMBER OF BOXES

y

CD

14. NUMBER OF ITEMS

(Packages)

2CD's
15. METHOD OF SHIPMENT

y

COURIER

FIRST CLASS

EXPRESS MAIL

REGISTERED

PARCEL POST

USPS Certified Mail

16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

17. TYPE COMPONENT USED

(For magnetically recorded data)

18. REMARKS

DA FORM 200, SEP 1998

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

APD PE vl.OOES

20534

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 21
8 March 2012

20535
MPR/CID SEQUENCE NUMBER

EVIDENCEff'RO. ,
002S-)0-C(D:2I
CRD REPORT/CID ROl NUMBER

For use of this form see AR 190-45 ami AR 195-5. the proponant agency is US Anny
Criminal InwoMigation Command
RECEIVING ACTIVITY

Washington Metro Resident Agency, CCIU, USACIDC

Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF PERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVED

OWNSR

10117

LOCATION
ADDRESS (Inclaiie Zip Code)

N/A fScHifQh Ambnri.7ation) ^.

N.'A (Sfiirch .'Vulhori'/iition)

-

K'


LOCATION FROM WHERE OBTAtMED

R=ASON OBTAINED

While within in SCIF of 2BC1. lOMTN DIV. located at 10200
X. Riva Ridge Loop. Fort Drum. NY 1.1602
ITEM
NO

TIME/DATE OBTAINED

Evidence

10

DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES
(Induds model, sernl number, condilion and unusual mart's or scratcties)

QUANTITY

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silver in mhv. pliistic aiui mewl ivpe consjTucticin. used and soiled m condiiloit. Cfassficd SI-.CRB T. citituiiniiig
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ManningB_00411124

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WE. GRADE OR TITLE

H e p U c r a D A FORM -113.M Aug

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20536
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FINALraSPOSAJ.ACTKDN

RELEASE TO OWNER OR OTHER (Name/Unit)
DESTROY
OTHER

(Spevfy)
FINAL DISPOSAL AUTHORITY
ON THIS DOCUMENT, PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INVOLVING

ITEM(S)

iGraae)
(ISf (ARE) NO LONGER
(Qrpanaaiion)

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(If arUcHKsi must be retainad. do not sign, but explaio in separate

tSignaturel

(Oate)

WITNESS TO DESTRUCTION Of EVIDENCE
THE ARTICLEfS) LISTED AT ITEM NUMBER(S)
CUSTODIAN. IN MY PRESENCE, ON THE DATE INDICATED ABOVE

ilypedrprimedName. Oiyanaatxjn)

(WAS) (WER~) DESTROYED 3Y THE EVIDENCE

(Signature)
API) PE vl Of;

ManningB_00411125

20537

Appellate Exhibit 16
Enclosure 22
2 pages
ordered sealed for Reason 6
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the original Record
of Trial



0 0 20538

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Enclosure 23

8 March 2012



20539

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.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 24

8 March 2012

20540

11??

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

.
or 20541
?t 9"

UNITED STATES ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND
COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATIVE UNIT
WASHINGTON METRO RESIDENT AGENCY
9805 LOWEN ROAD, BLILDING 193
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060-5598



CISA-CCI-WM 30 Sep 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), l0"? Mountain Division,
Fort Drum, NY 13602

SUBJECT: Seizure of Government Computers and Related Equipment

1. This office is investigating the unauthorized disclosure of classi?ed information and related
offenses, which occurred while 2d BCT_was deployed to Iraq. The investigation has identi?ed
numerous items of digital media that may hold evidence of the crime(s) or materially assist this
investigation.

2. Agents from this office have seized and/or will seize items of classified and unclassified
digital media such as servers, domain controllers, and hard drives believed to hold information
pertinent to this investigation.

3. Should your staff identify any additional hard drives (classi?ed or unclassi?ed) used during
the deployment to Iraq, I am informing you that these items represent potential evidence and
must be preserved as such. Please inform me immediately should additional hard drives be
found.

4. Agents will provide a receipt, DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document for all
items seized. This receipt may be used for inventory accountability purposes.

5. Most items collected as evidence should be processed and returned to you within the next few
weeks. Please note, the supporting Trial Counsel may identify certain items of evidence that are
required through the end of the trial.

6. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at commercial:

can: joremau:






CHARLES T. AM .
Acting Spec-ia ge tin Charge

ManningB_00024504

20542

Appellate Exhibit 16
Enclosure 25
5 pages
ordered sealed for Reason 6
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the original Record
of Trial

20543

Appellate Exhihitl^
Enclosure 2^
3pages
ordered sealed f^r Reasons
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated20August2013
stored in the original Record
ofTrial

20544

UNITED STATESOF AMERICA
Prosecntion Response to Defense
Motion toCompelDiseovery
Manning, Bradley E.
PFCUS.Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer,Virginia 222II

Enclosure 27
^March2012

MPR'CIO SEQUENCE NUMBER

EVIDENCE/PROPbKTY CUSTODY DOCUMENT
?o.* use o! ihis lorm see AR 190-«5 and AR 195.5,11% pfcoonent agency is US AriTiy
Crin«r.3l ifi^ssligalion Command
RECEIVING ACTIVITY

002S-I0-C'ID2:!
CRD REPORT/CiD ROl NUMBER

10117

LOCATION

WaslDiictoii Metro Residenl .A^OIICA. C'CIl,-. US.ACIDC

For! Belvoir. \ A 22060

NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF OERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVED

ADDRESS (incluae Zip Codi"

I OWNER MSti Paul 1). ADKIS'S
• ^.^
s-2 NCOIC
5C OTHER

Building 10200, N Riva Ridge Loop
Fon Drum. N \ IJ602

LOCATION rROM WHERE OBTAINED

REASON OBTAINED

Room 1|1M)2
iTEJi.-!
NO.

Evidence

TIM&'DATE OBTAINED

2238-2245 1 Oa

10

DESCRIPTION OFARTtGLES

QUANTITY

llnctude moael. serial number zondmon ana unusuiii maiKs or scratcnes:

luitd D,.^4,imkmnvi) c;ip,tv.;i.\ P.ViA. S'X KJdHYlDH. in
ascd CDHOiliun. iciKiiincd in )t.s \U-il. propi'ily o! HHC, 2ni3 Hiigaitr roitihai ic.im. Ii'ih Mouniain ',)i\iMm NLirkuti (wil)i:2.>K. i ijLl III, K.V1-.
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DA FORM 4137. 1 JUL 1976

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PURPOSE OF CHANGE
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FINAL DISPOSAL ACTION
RELEASE TO OWNER OR OTHER

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CUSTODIAN IN MY PR ES ENCe ON THE DATE INDICATED ABOVE

{Typfa^rinted

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:WAS/ (WERE; DESTROYED BY THE E'^DENCE

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APO PE .1

ManningB_00411148

i

20547

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery
Enclosure 28
8 March 2012

20548
1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TRANSMITTAL RECORD
For use of this form, see AR 25-50; the proponent agency is DCSPER
3. TITLE/FILE IDENTIFICATION

2. SHIPMENT NO.

Secret
4, AS OF DATE

(YYYYMMDD)

ManningB_00411343-00411366

S. SHIPMENT DATE
(YYYYMMDD)

2012/01/27

2012/01/27

6. AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT

7. NUMBER OF RECORDS TRANSMITTED

8. PERSON TO CONTACT

9. REQUIREMENT CONTROL SYMBOL

Z
(Name and telephone)

(L^f
(AR 335-15)

WOl Arthur Ford, 202-685-1975
10. SHIPPED FROM
US Army military District of Washington
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
103 3rd Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319

11. SHIPPED TO
M A J Kemkes
Senior Defense Counsel
T r i a l Defense Services
J o i n t Base M y e r - H e n d e r s o n H a l l

21
10a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF SENDER

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED (When box is checked, sign
betow and return copy to sender)

11a. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF RECEIVER

SCfT

/%(^4:

10b. SIGNATTJOE OFFENDER

17

l i b . SIGNATURiOF RECetVER AND DATE

9JU^

y%^^c:

T V P P O F M P n i A TRAN.tSMITTPn

f

HARD COPY

PUNCHED CARDS

CASSETTES

MICROFILM

PHOTO

FICHE

13. NUMBER OF BOXES

,

'

'

'

y

^

-

'

U

)

2CDs

14. NUMBER OF ITEMS

(Packages)

15. METHOD OF SHIPMENT

/

COURIER

FIRST CLASS

EXPRESS MAIL

REGISTERED

PARCEL POST

16. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

17. TYPE COMPONENT USED

(For magnetically recorded data)

18. REMARKS

DA FORM 200, SEP 1998

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

APD PE vl.OOES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 29

8 March 2012



0 20550

STATES
DEFENSE DISCOVERY
REQUEST

MANNING. Bradley E.. PFC

U.S. Army.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. U.S.
Army Garrison. Joint Base Myer-l lenderson Hall.
Fort Myer, VA 2221 I

DATED: 13 October 201]



l. In accordance with the Rules for Courts-Martial and the Military Rules of Evidence. Manual
for ourts-Martial. United States. 2008. Article 46, Ljnifonn Code of Military Justice. and other
applicable law. request for discovery is hereby made for the charged offenses in the case of
United States v. Bradley E. Manning.

a. A copy of any adverse administrative or UCMJ action. all supporting documentation, and any
rebuttal materials to such action based upon the 15-6 investigation conducted by LTG Robert
aslen .lr. or any other governmental investigation. with regards to any individual that was the
subject ofsuch an adverse action in relation to the alleged leak of classified infomtation in this
case. The request includes. but is not limited to. the following individuals: David M.
Miller, COL Paul R. Walter. l.'l'C Brian D. Kems. LTC Rodney Gar?eld. LTC Randolph
Wardle. MAJ Eric Davis. MAJ F,rie Graham. MAJ Jason A. Morrow. MAJ Clifford D. Clausen.
MAJ Elijah A PT Matthew W. l-?reeburg. ISG Eric ll. CPT Thomas M.

herepko. CPT Steven J. Lim. PT Barclay D. Keay. CPT Casey Martin, 1LT Tanya M. Gaag.
Elizabeth A. Fields. W2 Joshua D. Ehresman. W2 Chad ljastep, CW2 Alfred Lyons.
WOI Kyle J. Balonek. SFC Paul D. Adkins, SSG Lawrence W. Mitchell. SPC Daniel W.
Padgett. and PFC Jirleah W. Shovmtan.

b. An inspection of all seized governmental computers from the Tactical Sensitive
Compartmentcd Information Facility IF) and Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10
Mountain Division. Forward Operating Base (FOB) llammer. Iraq for the presence of any and all
unauthorized computer programs to include. but not limited to: (a full featured Internet
Relay Chat client for Windows that can be used to communicate. share, play or work with others
on IRC networks): Wget (a web crawler program designed for robustness over slow or unstable
network connections): GEOTRANS (an application program which allows a user to easily
convert geographic coordinates among a wide variety of coordinate systems. map projections
and datums): and Grid Extractor a binary executable capable of extracting MGRS grids from
multiple free text documents and importing them into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet).

c. The defense requests any Brady material in the govemmenfs possession. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (I963) (holding that due process requires the government to turn over exculpatory
evidence in its possession). '|?l1e defense also requests any material in the government?s

0 20551

Defense Discovery Request PFC Bradley E. Manning

possession. Jencks? v. United 353 US. 657 7) (holding that. in a criminal
prosecution. the government may not withhold documents relied upon by government witnesses.
even where disclosure of those documents might damage national security matters). The defense
specifically requests the following information:

i) White llouse: any report or recommendation concerning the allegedleaks in this case by
Mr. Russell Travers. National Security Staffs Senior Advisor for Information Access and
Security Policy. Mr. Travers was tasked to lead a comprehensive effort to review the alleged
leaks in this case. Any and all documentation related to President Baraek H. Obarna?s order for
an investigation and a government of how agencies safeguard sensitive information.
Additionally. any and all documents related to the steps the administration is considering
regarding these leaks and the nature of the criminal investigation underway into how the
documents were made public as referenced by former White House Press Secretary Robert
Gibbs. Any assessment given. or discussions conceming. the Wikileaks disclosures by any
member of the government to President Obama. Any e~mail._ report, assessment, directive. or
discussion by President Obama to the Department of Defense. Department of State or
Department of Justice:

ii) President?s Intelligence Advisory Board: any report or recommendation concerning the
alleged leaks in this case by Chairman Chuck Hagel or any other member ofthe lntelligenee
Advisory Board;

Central Intelligence Agency: any report, damage assessment or recommendation by the
Wikileaks Task Force or any other member concerning the alleged leaks in this case. Any
internal or external memorandums addressing the investigation of Wikileal-es. PFC. Bradley
Manning or the nature ofthe Office of Security-"s investigation into these matters;

iv) Department of Defense: All forensic results and investigative reports by the Department
of Defense regarding the information obtained by Wikileaks and the results of any joint
investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) re fereneed by Former Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates. Additionally. any specific damage assessment by the Department
of Defense regarding the disclosure of classi?ed documents and videos, the subject ofthis case.
by Wilresponsible for leading a comprehensive Department ofDefense review of classified documents
obtained by the Wikileaks website and any other associated materials;

v) Department of Justice: Any and all documentation related to the Department of Justice
investigation into the alleged leaks by WikiI_.eaks as referenced by Attorney General of the
United States Eric H. Holder;

vi) Department ofState: Any and all documentation relating to a review of the alleged leaks
in this case and any speci?c damage assessment by the Department of State regarding the
disclosure ofdiplomatic cables. the subject ofthis ease. by WikiLeaks:

0 20552

Defense Discovery Request PFC Bradley E. Manning

vii) Of?ce ofthe Director ofNational Intelligence (ODNI): Any and all documentation
relating to any review or damage assessment conducted by ODNI or in cooperation with any
other government a gency:

Other (iovemment Intelligence Agencies: Any and all documents relating to any task
force or other intelligence agency review of the various alleged leaks in this case
to include. but not limited to. any damage assessment based upon the alleged leaks or any
corrective action taken by the United States Govemment due to the alleged leaks: AND

ix) House of Representatives: Results ofany inquiry and testimony taken by House of
Representative oversight committee led by Representative Darrell Issa. The committee
discussed the actions of Wikilcaks. the actions of Attorney General Eric Holder. and the
investigation of PFC Bradley Manning.

d. The defense requests a copy fthe Preliminary Inquiry Report. According to Department of
Defense 5105.21-M-1. once an SCI Security Official detemiines that a security violation
has occurred. the SCI Security Official must report the violation within 72 hours of discovery to
the appropriate Senior Officials ofthe Intelligence Community (SOIC) or Senior Intelligence
Officer (SIO).

e. The defense requests a copy of the Damage Assessment of Compromiscd Information that is
required to be submitted to the Special Security Officer (SSO) under 5105.21-M-l once an
SCI Security Official determines that a security violation has occurred. The damage assessment
is supposed to contain the date of the assessment; the name and office symbol conducting the
assessment: subject/title- date. number. originator and original classi?cation of document;
whether the document can be declassi?ed or downgraded. either in whole or in part; justification
for classi?cation (the speci?c statements in the document which are classi?ed. the basis for
classification. and a complete bibliography of all classified source materials used in preparation
of the document); whether the classi?ed information identi?ed is accurate: whether the classi?ed
information identi?ed was the subject of any of?cial release: and whether the information
identi?ed as classi?ed can be edited for the purpose of prosecution.

f. The defense requests a copy ofthe ?nal security violation investigation report submitted to the
SSO Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under DOD 5105.21-M-1. The report is used to
assess intent. location ofthe incident. risk of compromise, sensitivity ofinformation. and
mitigating factors in arriving at a final analysis of the incident.

g. A copy of all SCI security management and self?inspcetion reports for the of HI-IC.
2nd BCT. 10 Mountain Division. FOB Hammer. Iraq.

2. The defense requests that the government informs the defense counsel ifit does not intend to
comply with any speci?c provision of this request.

3. It is understood that this is a continuing request.



Defense Discovery Request PFC Bradley I3. Manning

i 4. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by email on 13 October 201 .



IOMBS
Civilian Defense. Counsel



20553

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20554

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 30

8 March 2012

0 20555

UNITEDSTATES
DEFENSE DISCOVERY
REQUEST

MANNING. Bradley E.. PFC

US. Army.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company. U.S.
Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson I-lall.
Fort Myer, VA 222] I

8 December 201 0



I. In accordance with the Rules for and the .\/lilitary Rules of Evidence.
Manual for Courts-Martial. United States. 2008. Article 46. Uniform Code of Military
Justice. and other applicable law. request for supplemental discovery is hereby made for
the charged offenses in the case of United States v. Bradley E. Manning.

2. The defense requests that the government respond to each item listed in its 29 October
and I5 November 2010 discovery requests and the following additional discovery:

a) The names and contact information for all government investigators who have
participated or who are presently participating in the investigation of the case. previously
requested on 29 October and IS November 2010. Speci?cally. contact information for
SA Hyung Kim from the Department of Defense and SA Richard Bowen from the Army
Computer Crimes Unit and an inventory ofthe items seized from the home of Mr. Paul
Francia at 60] Hazelwood Terrace, Rochester. New York 14609.

b) All forensic results and investigative reports by the Department of State regarding the
information obtained by Wikileaks as referenced by Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs P.J. Crowley. Additionally. any specific damage assessment by the
Department of State regarding the disclosures of the diplomatic cables by WikiL,eaks.
Any assessment. report. e-mail. or document by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton regarding the disclosures of diplomatic cables by Wikileaks. Any report. e-mail.
or document discussing the need for the State Department to disconnect access to its files
from the govemmenfs classi?ed network.

c) All forensic results and investigative reports by the Department of Defense regarding
the information obtained by Wikileaks and the results of any joint investigation with the
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) as referenced by Secretary of Defense Robert M.
Gates. Additionally. any specific damage assessment by the Depanment of Defense
regarding the disclosure of classified documents and videos. the subject of this case. by
WikiLeaks.



Defense Discovery Request PFC Bradley E. Manning

d) Any and all documentation related to the Department of Justice investigation into the
alleged leaks by WikiLeaks as referenced by Attomey General of the United States Eric
H. Holder.

e) Any and all documentation related to President Barack H. Obama?s order for an
investigation and a government wide-review of how agencies safeguard sensitive
information. Additionally, any and all documents related to the steps the administration
is considering regarding these leaks and the nature of the criminal investigation underway
into how the documents were made public as referenced by Robert Gibbs. the White
House spokesman.

f) Any assessment given. or discussions concerning, the Wikileaks disclosures by any
member of the govemment to President Obama. Any e?mail, report, assessment.
directive. or discussion by President Obama to the Department of Defense. Department of
State or Department of Justice.

g) Any and all documents relating to the Government Task Force created to review the
various WikiLeaks releases for potentially damaging information prior to the actual
releases. This Task Force apparently had over 120 members reviewing the documents
that were either released or pending release to determine the possible harm to national
security.

h) The results of any investigation or review by Mr. Russell Travers who has been
appointed by President Obama to head an interagency committee assigned to assess the
damage caused WikiLeaks exposures and to organize efforts to tighten security measures
in government agencies.

i) Any and all documentation related to the Pentagon?s review on the policy and
technological shortfalls that led to the WikiLeaks disclosures as referenced by Pentagon
spokesman Bryan Whitman.

j) Any and all documentation related to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
investigation of Wikileaks announced by CIA Director Leon Panetta and any internal or
external memorandums addressing the investigation of Wikileaks, PFC Bradley Manning
or the nature ofthe Office of Security?s investigation into these matters.

k) Any and all documentation relating to the govemment?s p?sition oftaking a hard line
on unauthorized leaks of information, as demonstrated by the prosecutions of a former
National Security Agency official, a Federal Bureau of Investigation linguist, and a State.
Department contractor and referenced by CIA Director Leon Panetta. Additionally, any
and all memorandums, e-mails. or other references by Congressmen. Senators. or
government officials conceming the disposition of this case or the need to punish PFC
Bradley .-Vlanning.

0 20557

Defense Discovery Request PFC Bradley E. Manning

I) Any and all documentation. e-mails. or reports given to the Summary Court-Martial
Convening Authority, the General Court-Martial Convening Authority, or the Staff Judge
Advocate concerning the disposition of PFC Bradley Manning's case or the nature ofthe
charges or possible charges against PFC Manning. Speci?cally, any attempt to in?uence
the independent discretion of anyone involved in the military justice process.

m) Any and all documents or observation notes by employees of the Quantico
con?nement facility relating to PFC Bradley Manniitg.

n) The results ofthe 15-6 investigation into the govemmenfs improper release of
classi?ed information to the defense. Whether the 15-6 investigating officer looked into
the following additional potential spillage:

i. The disc allegedly found in PFC Manning?s Room indicated the contents were
SECRET. A photo ofthe disk can be found at 000293. Was the title on the disk
classi?ed or not??

ii. The photos of the T-SCIF show a map in the background that was partially
exposed (000301 and 000302).

The snapshots of the computer screens in the T-SCIF were exposed. Was there
classified information being viewed on the screen? (000305 and 000306).

iv. The snapshots of the computers had documentation on the table appear to show
classi?ed information. (000333, 000334, and 000335).

v. Was the investigating officer made aware of the government disclosure of the
original ?ve discs to the military defense counsel??

3. The defense requests that the government inform the defense counsel if it does not
intend to comply with any specific provision of this request.

4. It is understood that this is a continuing request.

5. A copy ofthis request was served on Trial Counsel by e-mail on 8 December 2010.

/i .
:5 pi i
n'AvIn COT..7MBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20558

Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 31

8 March 2012



STATES
DEFENSE DISCOVERY

I

v. i REQUEST

MANNING. Bradley 13.. PFC
Army.
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, U.S.



Army Garrison, Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,
Fort Myer, VA 22211

DATED: l3 May 20l

1. In accordance with the Rules for ourts-Martial and the Military Rules of Evidence,
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 2008, Article 46, Unifonn Code of Military
Justice. and other applicable law, request for supplemental discovery is hereby made for
the charged offenses in the case of United States v. Bradley E. Manning.

2. The defense requests that the government continue with its obligation to provide
discovery in response to each item listed in its previous discovery requests on 29 October
2010, l5 November 2010, 8 December 2010, 10 January 20] 1, and 16 February 2011 and
to also respond to the below requested discovery.

3. The defense requests that the government produce any and all documents (sworn or
signed statements, photographs, emails tangible items (books, papers, and
reports (investigative summaries. damage assessments, Original Classification Authority
(OCA) determinations, etc.,) conducted by the United States Army. the Department of
Defense. the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The trial counsel, upon defense request, has an
affirmative obligation to seek out requested evidence that is in the possession of the
government even if that evidence is not already in the immediate possession of the trial
counsel. United States v. Williams. 50 M.J. 436, 441 (C .A.A.F . United States v.
Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1036 Cir. l989)', United States? v. Brooks, 966 F.2d I500, 1503
(1992) (the government is considered to have possession of information that is in the
control of agencies that are "closely aligned with the prosecution?).

4. The defense requests any Brady material in the government's possession. Braafy v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process requires the government to turn
over exculpatory evidence in its possession). The defense also requests any Jencks
material in the govemmenrs possession. Jencks v. United States. 353 U.S. 657 (1957)
(holding that, in a criminal prosecution. the govemment may not withhold documents
relied upon by government witnesses, even where disclosure of those documents might
damage national security matters). Specifically, the defense requests copies of all
statements. oral or written, by any witnesses. The defense also requests any evidence in



20560

Defense Discovery Request PFC Bradley E. Manning

the government?s possession that contradicts or is inconsistent with the government?s
theory of the case.

5. The defense requests that the government inform the defense counsel if it does not
intend to comply with any speci?c provision of this request.

6. It is understood that this is a continuing request.

7. A copy of this request was served on Trial Counsel by e?mail on 13 May 2011.



DAVID EDWARD COOMBS
Civilian Defense Counsel

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Motion to Compel Discovery

Enclosure 32

8 March 2012

20561




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#20562



2o5c3

SWORN STATEMENT
Cor use 01 thus Inrm_ soc the proponent agency I: PMG.

AUTHORITY:

I PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
Tllie 10. USC Seelon 301; Title 5. USC Section 2951: E0. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

pRmc|pAj_ pu?posg; To document potential crimlnal activity Involving the U.SArmy, and to allow Army ollidala to mahtrin
law and order throum invullgatlon of and Indolent;

Information provlded may befurthor disclosed to federal. state. local, and Ionian government law enforcement
agencies. proaecutocs. courts, proteelve services. victims. winessea. the Department of Veterans and
the Ot?ea of Pasonnet Management. Information provided may be used for moaning judicial or
non1t:t.iIt.3ai aha? clears:-:25,
placement. Hid char personnel actions.

Dlsdoaum at your SSN and other Inlormalon Involuntary.

ROUTINE USES:

DISCLOSURE:

5. LAST NME. FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN

1. LOCATION 2. oars (ww/wuoo)
2012/02/17 1000

Fort Myer, Virginia

3. TM-E 4. Flu:

Papakie, Brian Robert

7. GRADEISTATUS

-

8. ORGANZATION OR ADDRESS

HQMC PSL Conections 755 S. Courthouse Rd. Suite 2000 Arlington, VA 22204-2478

9.
. WANT TO MNG THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

I, Brian Robert Papakic
On 18 January 2011, Two video recordings of PFC Bradley Manning were documented in the Con?nement
Facility. The two videos were recorded at the same time. The Camera was stopped and started again with an approximate time
lapse of 1 minute in an attempt to better the angle of the individual speaking with EC Manning. This was done by the camera man
walking around the oppisite hallway tothe other end of the Alpha Row if cells. The recordings were taken due to PFC Manning
becoming irrational in his cell by throwing his bodyaround and appeared to attempt self bodily harm. Under the Brig Commanding
0f?cer?s direction, PFC Manning was placed on Suicide Risk status. During the course of obtaining PFC Manning's clothing, a

video recording was conducted to document the occurrence. One video shows myself retriving PFC Manning's gear and the other .

video a conclusion of the incident with Blenistallcing with PFC Manning in an attempt to calm the situation. The

recordings were turned ova thethe Marine Corps Staff Judge Advocates Office on Marine Corps Base Quantico and no other
. videos of PFC Manning were taken duimg his con?nement at the Quantico Pre-trial Con?nement Facility.-End Of Statement-

10. EXHIBIT INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
. PAGE 1 OF


ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING TEMENT OF

TAKEV A DA TED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGEMUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THEPERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER

MUST BE INDICATED.

PAGES

DA FORM 2323, Nov 2006 . PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

MannmaB 00412612


APD PE V1.01 ES



20564?

5TATEMENT OF Robert Pupukie TAKEN AT Ft Myer DATED
9. STATEMENT (continued)
I

. AFFIDAVIT
I, M531 Brian .HAVE READ on HAVE HAD READ To ME THIS STATEMENT

BEGINS o'N PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE or THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE

BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE

CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT

THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT OOEROION. UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE. OR UNLAWFUL INDUC

(Signature of Perfon Making Statement)
and sworn to before me. a person aulhoI'Ized by law to
oaths, this day ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS I (Si?r'Iature won Administaing Oath)
j?)An Hebe?
(Typed Name of Person AdmI'm'sI?erI'ng O_ath)
(o o. s.c. [o?I=Ia.
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority To Admi?ster Oaths)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 9 or-' 3 PAGES
APD PE

FORM 2823, NOV 2008

MaDningB_O0412613



20565

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response
to Defense Request to
File Ex Parte Supplement
8 March 2012

RELIEF SOUGHT

The prosecution in the above case respectfully requests the Court deny the defense
request to file an ex parte supplement to its Motion to Compel.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

As the moving party, the defense has the burden of persuasion and must prove any factual
issues necessary to decide this motion by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule for Courts­
Martial (RCM) 905(c).
FACTS

On 14 February 2012, the defense submitted motions to the Court and the prosecution
and stated that it had an ex parte supplement to its motion to compel. Enclosure 1.
On 23 February 2012, at the arraignment the Court asked the prosecution if it objected to
the ex parte submission. Based on the above information, the prosecution had no objection to the
defense ex parte submission. At the arraignment, the prosecution learned that it had not received
emails from the Court and from the defense.
On 24 February 2012, the prosecution received the emails that it had not received from
the defense and the Court between 14 and 23 February 2012. See enclosure 2.
In emails dated 15 February 2012, the Court requested and defense provided additional
information regarding its ex parte supplement, as well as case law that purportedly supported
their filing of the supplement. See enclosure 3. The email stated in relevant part:
5. The Defense, in unusual situations is entitled to an ex parte hearing to justify a
motion for appropriate relief. United States v. Garries, 22 MJ 288, 291 (C.M.A.
1986) (recognizing the inherent authority in the military judge to permit an ex
parte proceeding in the unusual circumstance where it is necessary to ensure a fair
trial); United States v. Kaspers, 47 MJ 176 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (holding that a
military judge has broad discretion to protect the rights of the military accused to
include conducting an ex parte hearing).

In the instant case, the Defense is not

requesting an ex parte hearing. Instead, the Defense simply desires to present the
Court with an ex parte supplement to its motion to compel discovery.

20566

6.

Due to the Government's refusal to provide the requested discovery, the

Defense is placed in the position of having to disclose, to a partisan opponent,
why it believes certain evidence is relevant and should be produced for trial.

If

the Defense is required to disclose its theory of relevance, the Government will
receive an advance notice of the defense's theory and the opportunity to prepare to
rebut and counter the requested discovery. The Government simply has to refuse
to provide requested discovery in order to force the Defense to stand in open court
and explain how each request is relevant and necessary.

In meeting this

challenge, the Defense is forced to explain why the requested discovery is needed,
how the requested discovery is relevant to a fact in issue, and why the requested
discovery is necessary to the Defense. In doing so, the Defense must balance how
much of its trial strategy it will disclose to justifY the production of the requested
discovery.

This mandated disclosure of the Defense's case theory provides an

unfair advantage to the Government.
7. In order to avoid this unfair advantage, the Defense believes that this is one of
those unusual situations where an ex parte hearing would be appropriate. United
States v. Garries, 22 MJ 288, 291 (C.M.A. 1986) ; United States v. Kaspers, 47 MJ
176 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
Enclosure 3 (emphasis added).
The same day the prosecution received the above email, the prosecution emailed the
Court and requested the opportunity to object. See enclosure 2.
WITNESSES/EVIDENCE

1.

Email, Subject: Defense Motions, 14 Feb 12

2.

Email, Subject: Email Issues, 24 Feb 12

3.

Email, Subject: Government/Defense motions and arraignment, 15 Feb 12
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

The defense claims that it is unfair to require it to include a statement of relevance and
necessity in their requests for production of evidence. See enclosure 3.
RCM 703(f)(3) states, "any defense request for the production of evidence . . . shall
include a description of each item sufficient to show its relevance and necessity, a statement
where it can be obtained, and, if known, the name, address, and telephone number of the
custodian of the evidence."
To support its argument, the defense cites the unusual situations contemplated in United
States v. Garries, 22 M. J. 288, 291 (CMA 1986) and United States v. Kaspers, 47 M. J. 176
(CAAF 1997).

20567

In Garries, the defense alleged error because the trial court denied their request for
funding for independent investigative assistance. 22 M. J. at 290. The defense refused to specify
the reason for the requested funding and requested an ex parte hearing. Id. The judge denied the
request for the funding, as the defense did not make a showing of necessity on the request. Id. at
290-91. The trial court also denied the request for an ex parte hearing. Id. at 290. While the
Court recognized the inherent authority of the military judge to permit an ex parte proceeding in
the unusual circumstance where it is necessary to ensure. a fair trial, the Court noted that, by its
very nature, an ex parte proceeding may provide undue advantage to one party. Id. at 291. The
Court noted that "[u ]se of an ex parte hearing to obtain expert services would rarely be
appropriate in the military context . . . . " Id. Funding must be provided by the convening
authority and an ex parte hearing ''would deprive the Government of the opportunity to consider
and arrange alternative for the requested expert services. " Id. ; see also RCM 703(d).
Similarly, in Kaspers, the defense alleged error because the trial court denied their
request for funding to obtain their own expert. 47 M. J. at 179. The defense requested an ex
parte hearing to justify their request for their own expert at government expense. Id. The judge
denied the ex parte hearing, ruling that the defense had to state their justification in open court.
Id. ; see also RCM 703(d). The defense stated their reasons on the record and the judge ordered
the funding of the defense expert. Id. The Court reiterates that while

an

ex parte hearing can be

allowed in unusual circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
an ex parte hearing was not necessary. Id. at 180. In making its determination, the Court
acknowledged that "our rule may burden the defense to make a choice between justifying
necessary expert assistance and disclosing valuable trial strategy. " Id. The Court noted,
however, that ''the defense is not without a remedy, " and, in this case, the defense was able to
make a preliminary showing of necessity on the record without revealing the allegedly privileged
information which served as the basis for his ex parte request. Id. at 180-81.
In both cases, the Court found that the trial courts had not abused their discretion in
denying ex parte hearings. Both cases acknowledge that unusual circumstances exist that may
justify ex parte proceedings ; however, neither case included those unusual circumstances. The
case at bar also does not reveal an usual circumstance that would require an ex parte disclosure
of information. The defense's explanation email makes clear that the defense is claiming RCM
703(f)(3) is unfair and are trying to avoid the requirements ofthe rule. The defense contemplates
no usual circumstance, such as disclosing the defense's theory on how the defense is going to use
information or disclosing privileged information. The defense should not receive the benefit of
an ex parte filing without any justification.
Finally, this request is premature. The defense has not even attempted to make a
preliminary showing of relevance and necessity to the Court under RCM 703(f)(3) before
requesting an ex parte motion.
CONCLUSION

The defense has provided no unusual circumstance which would support its request to
circumvent RCM 703(f)(3) and file an ex parte supplement. The defense request, therefore,
should be denied.

20568

ANGELM. 0
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel
I certify that I served or caused to be served a true copy of the above on Defense Counsel,
via electronic mail, on 8 March 2012.

�L

QGAA

ANGEL M
CPT, JA

Trial Counsel

RD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



Prosecution Response to Defense
Request to File Ex Parte Supplement

Enclosure 1

8 March 2012

20569

. . 20570
From:
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2012 1:42 PM
To: Lind, Denise COL MIL USA OTJAG
Cc: Morrow Ill. JoDean, CPT USA JFHQ-NCRIMDW Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA
Whyte. Jeftrey H. CPT USA Ford, Arthur D.
W01 USA Matthew kemkes; Bouchard, Paul CPT USARMY
Tooman, Joshua CPT USARMY Santiago. Melissa 8 CW2 USARMY
Parra. Jairo A. W01 USA
- oston. Louis J. MAJ A JFHQ-NCRIMDW Autiy. Carolyn
Ms CIV Vi?lliams, Patricia CIV Fein, Ashden
CPT USA SJA
Subject: Defense Motions
Attachments: Def Bill of ParticuIars.pdf; Def Deposition Motion.pdf; Def Motion to Compel Discovery.pdf
COL Lind,

Please find attached the following: 1) Bill of Particulars Motion; 2) Motion to Compel
Discovery; and 3) Motion to Compel Depositions.

I will also be sending to you, under separate cover, an ex parte supplement to the Motion to
Compel Discovery explaining in further detail the relevance of the information sought.
Please note that the Attachments in support of the Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for
Oral Depositions were too large to send electronically. As such, I plan on couriering them
to you by Fed-Ex later today. I want to make sure that the following is the correct address
for you:

Office of the Circuit Judge, First Judicial Circuit
961 N. Stuart Street

Ballston Room 617

Arlington, VA 22263

All of the Attachments are documents that the Government already has in its possession, so I
had not planned on providing copies to the Government as well (though, I could, if the
Government needs them).

One final point: I mentioned last week that I would provide the Court with proposed
instructions for the 641, 793 and 1636 offenses. Although I have them drafted, it occurred
to me that the instructions would change depending on the Government's responses to the Bill
of Particulars. As such, I thought it made more sense to hold on to those instructions for
now, and provide them to you once the Government has provided the requested particulars.

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.


Dave

David E. Coombs, Esq.

Law office of David E. Coombs

11 South Angell Street, #317
Providence, RI 62966

Toll Free: 1-866-588-4156

Local: (568) 689-4616

Fax: (568) 689-9282






Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain confidential
attorney?client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are
not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized
disclosure, copying or use of this information may be unlawful and is

20572

UNITEDSTATESOF AMERICA
^.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U S Army,
HHC,U.S.ArmyCarrison,
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer,Virginia 22211

Prosecution Response to Delense
Request to File ExParte Supplement
Enclosure2
^March21^12

20573

Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA JFHQ-NCR/MDW SJA
From:
Seot:
To:
Cc:

Subject:

Fein, Ashden CPT USA JFHQ-NCR/MDW SJA
Friday, February 24, 2012 5:34 PM
Lind, Denise R COL USARMY (US)
coombs@armycourtmartialdefense.com; Matthew kemkes; Bouchard, Paul R CPT USARMY
(US); Santiago, Melissa S CW2 USARMY (US); Morrow III, JoDean, CPT USA JFHQNCR/MDW SJA; Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA JFHQ-NCR/MDW SJA; Whyte, Jeffrey H.
CPT USA JFHQ-NCR/MDW SJA; Ford, Arthur D. WOl USA JFHQ-NCR/MDW SJA;
Jefferson, DaShawn MSG MIL USA OTJAG
Email Issues

Importance:

High

COL Lind,
Good evening. Our ]6 thinks they figured out the email issue. Because of the new security
procedures being implemented DoD wide, the term "WlklLe.." is blocked from our email servers.
This is being implemented across a l l domains. From this point forward, the United States
recommend that a l l email content reference that term as "WL". The United States s t i l l
recommends that you, Mr. Coombs, and I send "ack" after receiving emails.
Now that the 36 released old emails that we did not receive, we are starting to go through
the slew of emails that we never received. At f i r s t glance, i t appears we did not receive
some emails from Mr. Coombs that he sent to you prior to yesterday's session. Specifically
the email, dated 15 Feb 12 at 1706 hours, focused on the ex parte f i l i n g and a hearing. At
the Article 39(a) hearing we were working with incomplete information that no other
communications on the subject occurred between the defense and you, and were not privy to the
defense's alleged facts and statements of the law purported in their email. Prior to your
actual consideration of their ex parte motion, the United States requests you allow us the
opportunity to object on the record, and provide the basis for our objection in a written
response on 8 March 2012 to be discussed on the record during the next session.
We intend to spend this weekend reviewing these emails and determining whether there is any
other information that was presented to the Court to which we might object.
Additionally, by Monday, I w i l l provide a l l parties with an accounting of a l l email
communications that we are tracking, including the six blocked emails we just received and
AKO emails, so that we can ensure a l l parties received each email and are working from the
same information.
Thank you.
v/r
CPT Fein

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

Manning, Bradley E.

PFC, U.S. Army,

HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211



0 20574

Prosecution Response to Defense
Request to File Ex Parte Supplement

Enclosure 3

8 March 2012



Over?aard, Angel M. CPT USA JFHQ-NCRIMDW SJA

From:

Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2012 2:08 PM

To: Lind. Denise COL MIL USA OTJAG

Cc: Morrow Ill. JoDean, CPT USA JFHQ-NCRIMDW Overgaard, Angel M. CPT USA

Whyte. Jeffrey H. CPT USA JFHQ-NCRIMDW SJA: Ford. Arthur D.
W01 USA Matthew kemkes; Bouchard, Paul CPT USARMY
Tooman. Joshua CPT USARMY Santiago. Melissa CW2 USARMY

Parra, Jairo A. W01 USA
Boston. Louis J. MAJ USA JFHQ-NCRIMDW Autry. Carolyn
Ms CIV Williams. Patricia CIV Hall Cassius
Mr FMMC (FT Ganiel, Charles CIV Lillian Smith; Fain, Ashden CPT USA
SJA

Subject: RE: Government/Defense motions and arraignment (UNCLASSIFIED)

COL Lind,

Here is the relevant authority from the ex parte motion itself:

5. The Defense, in unusual situations is entitled to an ex parte hearing to justify a motion
for appropriate relief. United States v. Garries, 22 M3 288, 291 (C.M.A. 1986) (recognizing
the inherent authority in the military judge to permit an ex parte proceeding in the unusual
circumstance where it is necessary to ensure a fair trial); United States v. Kaspers, 47 M3
176 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (holding that a military judge has broad discretion to protect the rights
of the military accused to include conducting an ex parte hearing). In the instant case, the
Defense is not requesting an ex parte hearing. Instead, the Defense simply desires to
present the Court with an ex parte supplement to its motion to compel discovery.

6. Due to the Government's refusal to provide the requested discovery, the Defense is placed
in the position of having to disclose, to a partisan opponent, why it believes certain
evidence is relevant and should be produced for trial. If the Defense is required to
disclose its theory of relevance, the Government will receive an advance notice of the
defense's theory and the opportunity to prepare to rebut and counter the requested discovery.
The Government simply has to refuse to provide requested discovery in order to force the
Defense to stand in open court and explain how each request is relevant and necessary. In
meeting this challenge, the Defense is forced to explain why the requested discovery is
needed, how the requested discovery is relevant to a fact in issue, and why the requested
discovery is necessary to the Defense. ?In doing so, the Defense must balance how much of its
trial strategy it will disclose to justify the production of the requested discovery. This
mandated disclosure of the Defense's case theory provides an unfair advantage to the
Government.

7. In order to avoid this unfair advantage, the Defense believes that this is one of those
unusual situations where an ex parte hearing would be appropriate. United States v. Garries,
22 288, 291 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Kaspers, 47 M3 176 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

Please let me know if the Court requires any additional information.

Best,
David

David E. Coombs, Esq.
Law Office of David E. Coombs
11 South Angell Street, #317



Providence, RI 02906

Toll Free: 1-860-588-4156

Local: (508) 689-4616

Fax: (sea) 689-9282





?**Confidentiality Notice: This transmission, including attachments, may contain confidential
attorney-client information and is intended for the person(s) or company named. If you are
not the intended recipient, please notify the sender and delete all copies. Unauthorized
disclosure, copying or use of this information may be unlawful and is

-- Original Message
Subject: Government/Defense motions and arraignment (UNCLASSIFIED)
From: "Lind, Denise COL USARMY
Date: wed, February 15, 2912 1:43 pm

To:


Cc: "Morrow JoDean CPT USA JFH -NCR MDW



Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

Counsel,

1. I have received, but not saved/read/forwarded any defense submissions. I
will not take any further action until I receive the classified package from
the Government tomorrow. Are there any classification/security issues with

the attachment package the defense has advised that I will be receiving by Fed
Ex today?

2. Trial Counsel - what, if any, procedures do I have to undertake to have
access to the materials that will be filed by the prosecution and defense?

Has the government verified that all parties to the trial have the appropriate
level of security clearance?

3. what is the telephone number for the Court Security Officer, Mr. Jay

2



Prather? Did the government provide the defense with a Defense Security
Officer? If yes, isn't the purpose of providing the defense a security
officer to ensure that the defense properly classifies information prior to
its release? At the arraignment, the government will propose a procedure to
the Court that will minimize delay, prevent inadvertent disclosure of
classified information, and ensure that the government, the defense, and the
Court are receiving the same guidance regarding classification and security.

4. From the government's description of the defense motions as well as the
discussion in the telephonic RCM 862 conference of 8 Feb 12, the government
was on notice of the motions the defense would file. The government request
for continuance to respond to the defense motion to compel depositions is
denied. The government will also provide the Court with its basic position in
response to the defense motion for a bill of particulars and motion to compel
discovery on 21 Feb 12 as agreed upon in the telephonic RCM 862 conference of
8 Feb 12. If the government moves for a continuance to fully respond to the
Defense motions, by COB on 21 Feb 12, the government will file a motion
setting forth with particularity the basis for any request for continuance in
fully responding to the above motions.

5. At the arraignment, the government will advise the Court whether it
anticipates invocation of the classified information privilege under MRE 565.

6. Defense Counsel - please provide authority for the Court to consider ex
parte submissions by the defense regarding the defense motion to compel

discovery?



Denise R. Lind
COL, JA
Chief Judge, 1st Judicial Circuit



20578

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supplement to
Prosecution Motion for Protective Order

8 March 2012

RELIEF SOUGHT

The United States in the above case requests that the Court adopt the enclosed Protective
Order, Supplement to the Protective Order Governing Classified Information, and select
procedures for closing the courtroom.
BURDEN OF PERSUASION AND BURDEN OF PROOF

The burden of proof on any factual issue the resolution of which is necessary to decide a
motion shall be by preponderance of the evidence. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, R.C.M. 905(c)(1) (2008). The burden of persuasion on any factual issue the resolution of
which is necessary to decide a motion shall be on the moving party. See R.C.M. 905(c)(2).
Although the defense is the original moving party, the United States is the appropriate moving
party for a protective order for classified information. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, Mil. R. Evid. 505(g)(1).
FACTS

The United States incorporates those facts contained in Prosecution Motion for a
Protective Order.
Based on the volume of classified information, which spans more than ten different
Original Classification Authorities (OCAs), and the complexities involved with determining
whether certain information is or is not classified, the United States has endeavored to develop a
process that will facilitate and expedite the filing process with minimizing the concern that a
spillage may occur by any party or the Court. See Enclosure 1 (providing just a small sampling
of classified information that might otherwise seem unclassified, but has been determined to be
classified by the appropriate OCAs).
On 1 March 2012, the United States requested that ''the defense security consultants be
granted access to Secret Internet Protocol Router Network ( SIPRNET) for the limited purpose of
communicating, on behalf of the defense team, with the military judge, court information
security officer, and the prosecution." Enclosure 2.
On 2 March 2012, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence approved the above request.
See id.

1

20579

WITNESSES/EVIDENCE

The United States does not request any witnesses be produced for this response. The
United States respectfully requests that the Court consider the following enclosures to this
response:
1. Evidence Classification Examples, 8 March 2012
2. Request and Approval for Limited Defense Access to SIPRNET, 1-2 March 2012
3. Protective Order (w/ Encl)
4. Supplement to the Protective Order Governing Classified Information, 8 March 2012
5. Script for Initial Closure Hearing
6. Close Courtroom Battle Drill
7. Bailiff Script for Closed Sessions
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

The United States relies upon the legal authority and argument advanced in Prosecution
Motion for a Protective Order.
I:

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THE COURT ADOPT A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE PROTECTIVE ORDER FOR THE EFFICIENT,
YET CAUTIOUS, HANDLING AND STORING OF INFORMATION.

In addition to the enclosed Protective Order, the United States proposes that the Court
implement a Supplement to the Protective Order Governing Classified Information (hereinafter
" Supplement") for certain facts and categories of information, which will ensure that all parties
and the Court are handling and storing classified information in a manner consistent with their
markings, classification reviews, and the protective order, without requiring an OCA's direct
involvement each time a substantive filing, communication, and other administrative decision is
made. See Enclosure 3-4.
This Supplement would require the parties, their security experts, and ultimately the court
security officer, to mark any substantive filing containing information listed on the Supplement
with the given classification level. For example: Assume the Supplement requires that "Fact A"
and any associated relationship with "Fact A" be treated as " SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN." If
during the filing process, as outlined in the protective order, the defense security experts or the
court security officer discover "Fact A" or a reference to "Fact A," then the expert and/or court
security officer will mark the entire document " Treat as SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN" and this
document will be stored and handled as if it was classified " SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN"
without requiring any unneeded delay by having the court security officer contact an OCA for a
classification decision.
If a topic arises that is not covered by the Supplement, then the defense security experts
will notify the court security officer of the potential for additional classified information that is
not covered by the current Supplement. In an abundance of caution, the information will be
tentatively treated as classified at the appropriate level, in order to not hinder any filing process.
2

20580

The court security officer will then coordinate through the trial counsel with the appropriate
OCA or their delegate for a determination whether this information should be treated as
classified. The prosecution will simply act as the conduit for efficient communications between
the court security officer and the OCA or their delegate, and will not make any classification
determinations based on the presented information.
Under the proposed Supplement, if the defense intends to use information that is marked
classified or treated as classified pursuant to this Supplement, then they will be required to give
notice under MRE 505(h), upon which the prosecution will initiate the procedures under MRE
505(h). If the prosecution intends to use information that is marked classified or treated as
classified pursuant to this Supplement, then the prosecution will coordinate with the OCA in a
manner consistent with its ongoing processes. Assuming OCAs provide use approval, then the
prosecution will obtain classification reviews which should suffice to provide the Court with a
factual background to make the appropriate findings to close the Court under RCM 806(b)(2)
and Grunden. See United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 121 (C.M.A. 1977).
Additionally, under the proposed Supplement, the Court will self-impose limitations on
what information should be considered classified for its own documents and orders. The court
security officer will be able to use the Supplement as the standard to ensure the Court does not
have accidental disclosures of classified information.
The Supplement will eliminate the need to have the prosecution or court security officer
directly coordinate with different OCAs for each filing or during an Article 39(a) session (if
unintended discussions occur) because all parties will be on notice as to what information should
be treated as classified. Additionally, this process will allow the parties to file their motions and
other substantive documents, pursuant to the protective order, without requiring the court
security officer or any other individual to coordinate with an OCA for each filing and each time
an issue arises for classification. The court security officer will be able to review documents
following the Supplement and make determinations, not based on what information is actually
classified, which requires OCA determinations, but rather err on the side of caution and not slow
the judicial process.
Based on input from relevant OCAs and upon motion by the government, this
Supplement can be updated as new information is introduced during the judicial process.
II:

THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT THE COURT
PROSPECTIVELY ADOPT PROCEDURES FOR CLOSING THE
COURTROOM UNDER GRUNDEN.

The United States anticipates that certain portions of evidentiary motions hearings and
the trial, particularly those focused on classified evidence, will cause both parties to move the
Court to conduct a closed session for purposes of taking classified evidence. The United States
anticipates two types of closed session - planned and unplanned closures.

3

20581

A.

The United States offers the underlying procedures for planned closures of the
courtroom.

The United States respectfully requests that the Court adopt the procedures that follow
for planned closures of the courtroom. Immediately prior to litigating classified evidentiary
motions at the designated Article 39(a) session, or during the Grunden hearing scheduled on the
court calendar, the United States and defense must file motions to request the Court to conduct a
Grunden hearing under RCM 806(b)(2) and provide the adequate basis for a court closure. The
purpose of this request is to motion the Court to review classified information or evidence that
each party anticipates to use during all future sessions. The purpose of this "Initial Closure
Hearing" will be for the Court to determine whether the information at bar warrants closure
under MRE 5050)(5), RCM 806(b)(2), and Grunden, and if so then make the requisite findings
on the record for all classified information to be considered. The "Initial Closure Hearing"
serves as an efficient method for the Court to place all required findings under RCM 806(b)(2)
on the record prior to the information being presented. After the "Initial Closure Hearing," the
normal motions practice or trial will begin. Once a party reaches the point in a session that they
intended to elicit classified testimony or reference classified information or evidence, then the
party will motion the Court to close the session based on the " Initial Closure Hearing" ruling.
The United States offers the enclosed scripts and processes for the " Initial Closure Hearing",
Opening the Courtroom, and Closing the Courtroom. See Enclosures 5-7.
B.

The United States offers the underlying procedures for unplanned closures of the
courtroom.

The United States respectfully requests that the Court adopt the below procedures for
unplanned closures of the courtroom. To best explain unplanned closures, the United States
offers the below excerpt from the United States Navy military justice primer for courts-martial
involving classified information. See United States Navy, Primer for Litigating Classified
Information Cases - Prosecuting, Defending, and Adjudicating Cases Involving Classified
Information, National Security and Intelligence Law Division (Code 17) (now Code 30), at 10-9

and 10-10, 2008.
An ''unplanned closure" will occur when counsel, the court
security officer, equity owner subject matter expert, witness, or
other individual informs the military judge of the need for a closed
session if testimony " strays toward disclosure of classified
information when testimony is given in open session." Denver Post
Corp. v. US., Army Misc. 20041215 (23 February 2005)(Unpub.
op. at 4). This may result from the person recognizing that a
question contains classified information or calls for a classified
answer. Often the security officer will have a pre-arranged signal
or device that can be used to indicate to the judge that this danger
is present. Witnesses should be advised that if they believe that an
answer to a question, or the question itself, may involve classified
information, to notify the military judge immediately in a discreet
manner.
4

20582

The military judge should then immediately halt the testimony,
questioning or argument. No reason should be given on the record
at that time as to the reason for halting the proceedings. The
military judge should proceed to hold a conference under RCM
802 with the security officer and the parties in order to determine
whether there is, in fact, suspected classified information at issue.
As counsel often do not have experience with the classified
information at issue, it may well be that they did not intend for the
question to evoke a classified answer. In such a case, a simple
reminder instruction to the witness to keep his answer unclassified
will usually be sufficient.
If there is, indeed, a desire on the part of one of the parties to
discuss classified information that has not previously been the
subject of a [Initial Closure Hearing], the military judge should
proceed with a 39(a) session outside the presence of the members
in order to make the determinations required by RCM 806(b)(2). If
the 39(a) session itself is closed, the military judge should be sure
to include an unclassified summary of his fmdings on the
unclassified record. Even in the middle of trial, it is necessary to
consider reasonable alternatives to the use of the classified
information. Generally, it is normally possible for the witness to
raise the factual level of his testimony so that the information is
more generic and the source is obscured, i.e., provide unclassified
testimony.
Finally, all parties at the trial should be aware of the possibility
that when members pose questions during a trial that involves
classified matters, a question could prompt an answer that is
classified. The better practice is to have all written members
questions reviewed by the court security officer before they are
provided to the judge so that the court security officer can alert the
judge of whether the question poses a risk in open court. This
allows the judge to remind the witness to answer in an unclassified
manner, and to instruct the witness to simply alert the judge if the
witness needs to answer with classified information. The court
security officer may be able to assist the judge in slight rewording
of questions to avoid these issues all together.
Given the inherent difficulties associated with unplanned courtroom closures, the United
States respectfully requests that the Court prospectively adopt the above procedures for
unplanned closures of the courtroom.

5

20583

CONCLUSION

The United States requests the Court enter an appropriate protective order to guard
against the compromise of classified information by the accused, defense counsel, and any
individual detailed to the defense team.

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

I certify that I served or caused to be served a true copy of the above on Mr. David
Coombs, Civilian Defense Counsel and Major Matthew Kemkes, Senior Military Defense
Counsel, via electronic mail, on 8 March 2012.

ASHDEN FEIN
CPT, JA
Trial Counsel

6

20584

Appellate Exhibit 18
Enclosure 1
4 pages
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed for Reason 2
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record of Trial

20585



i 3 $3

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101



22 February 2011

MEMORANDUM For Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
SUBJECT: PFC Manning (Wikileaks)Classii'1cation Review Request

1. In accordance with the request from the Staff Judge Advocate for the US Army District of
Washington dated 20 November 2010, USCENTCOM 3 conducted a classification
review of two PowerPoint presentations to determine: whether the information was
appropriately classified at the time of production; the current classi?cation level of the
documents; and whether or not disclosure of the documents would cause hami to the national
security of the US.

2. RADM Kevin Donegan signed an affidavit attesting to the correct classi?cation of the
documents both at the time of production as well as at the present time and the damage caused
by their unauthorized release.

3. The J3 POC for this memorandum is the undersigned, CCJ3-O-CAS,


4/
.31:
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Central Asian States Action Officer



ED

ManningB_00376871

20586



DECLARATION

I, Rear Admiral Kevin M. Donegan, declare and state:

I am a Naval Flag Officer, and I have served in various United
1 States Navy and joint service assignments for over 30 years. I am the
1 Director of Operations for United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and
1 I am responsible for planning, organizing, directing and controlling
joint and combined military operations at the direction of the Commander
United States Central Command. I advise the Commander on all matters
1 pertaining to the strategic and operational employment of assigned
forces, the conduct of joint and combined operations and other necessary
functions of the command required to accomplish our assigned tasks and
missions. As Director of Operations, I have been delegated Original
Classification Authority by the Secretary of Defense at the Secret level.
I have held my current position for seven months.

PURPOSE OF DECLARATION

I submit this declaration, in the matter of United States v.
Private First Class Bradley Manning, to demonstrate to the best of my
knowledge and belief that disclosure of the information identified below
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security of the United States. In making the following statement
regarding the classification information in this case, I rely on my
personal knowledge and experience, upon information made available to me
in my official capacity, upon advice and conclusions reached and
determinations made in accordance therewith.

I deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified form
to facilitate its handling and use during any judicial proceeding.

DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION

Information which requires protection in the interest of national
security of the United States is designated CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION per Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security
Information, signed by President Obama on December 29, 2009. The prior
Executive Order concerning classification was Executive Order 12958
signed by President Clinton on April 20, 1995 as amended by President
George W. Bush on March 25, 2003. As specified at Section 1.2 of E0
13526, information is classified in levels commensurate with the
assessment that unauthorized disclosure could cause the following
expected damage to national security:

a. Top Secret information exceptionally grave damage

b. Secret information - serious damage
c. Confidential information - damage

ManningB__003T6872



20587

Unclassified information does not require a security clearance for
access, but nonetheless may be of a sensitive nature.

CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION

I reviewed the material related to this case which was provided by
the Staff Judge Advocate for Military District of Washington. The
documents in question are two PowerPoint slide presentations of official
reports originated by USCENTCOM. The documents are currently classified
at the SECRET level. The documents were appropriately classified at the
SECRET level at the time they were generated. They remain currently and
properly classified SECRET under sections l.4(a) and 1.4(c) of
Executive Order 13526. Both PowerPoint slide presentations describe the
After Action Review of the Farah CIVCAS Investigation to General David
Petraeus. The file names of these two presentations have the dates 25 May
2009 and 8 June 2009 respectively.

IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IF INFORMATION RELEASED

Unauthorized disclosure of the classified material specified above
would reveal intelligence sources and methods, CJSOTF-A techniques and
procedures, as well as sensitive information that could affect relations
between the US and its allies in the region.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ?1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the
information provided herein is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge.



KEVIN M. DONEGAN
RADM, USN
Director of Operations

Executed this 15th day of February 2011.



20588

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY

P. 0 BOX 549
FORT MEADE. MARYLAND 20755-0549



ChiefofStaff(DS) JUN 0 5 70?

MEMORANDUM FOR TRIAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE,
U.S. ARMY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, 210 A STREET,
FORT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20319-5013

SUBJECT: Classi?cation Review States v. Erjvate Ejgst gum Bradley E,
Manning

Reference: Your Memorandum, Subject: Request for Classi?cation Review, 14 March 20] I

I . As the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Chief of Staff, I am an original
classi?cation authority (OCA) with respect to DISA-generated data. I tasked technical staff

in our Network Services Directorate to assess CENTAUR logs provided to you earlier on

a compact disc. ENTAUR is one of several DISA system security functionalities used on
networks. The CENTAUR database, as a whole, aggregating extensive sensor information
about networks, is classi?ed. However, after assessment by DISA subject matter experts,
we have determined the extracted CENTAUR logs, a very limited subset of data logged relating
to the Secret lntemet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNCI), to be unclassi?ed. DISA regards
this data as sensitive, however, and asks that these speci?c logs not be released to the public.

2. With respect to data not created or owned by DISA, please note the is DoD's largest
interoperable command and control data network; it is a transport system. DOD and federal
organizations use transport to connect their independent classi?ed enclaves to other
entities. Within the various enclaves, data is ?owned? and classi?ed by the organization that
generates the data. DISA has no classi?cation authority over the data in those enclaves.

3. My technical point of contact for this classi?cation review is Mr. Dennis Ruth, at

. My legal point of contact for this matter is
s. 1 ary organ at .

/7
/r VL-






A. NDLER
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

ManningB_00376874

-, .

20589

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) DECLARATION
(IJ) I, ROnj:vR.T£...Bn'rZ. dec I lire nnd .state:
(U) BACKGROUND
(U) 1 (1111 a C'lassitlcatiim .Advisory Oftleer witli 6 years of experience. My euirent position is USCYBERCOM Chief
Ciassiiication .Advisory Officer, which is responsible for supporting and advising Commander and Deputy
Commander. USCYBIiRCOM as tlie command's senior classification expert. I report to the USCYBIiRCOM Chief
of Staff I have held my current position for 2 years, and have over 6 years of experience in evaluating and applying
national .security information classification regulations.
(U) PURPOSK OF DECLARATION
(IJ) I submit this declaration, in the matter of United States v. Private Hirst Class Bradioy Maiinin'i., lo demonstrate
to the best of my knowledge and belief that disclosure ofthe information identified below reasonably could be
expected to cause SHRIOIS DAVIAdii to the national security of the United States. In making the following
statement regarding the classified information in this ca.se, 1 rely on my personal knowledge and experience,
Executive Order 1.1526 Ciu.wsifieJ Nuliomil Securily inlnfiituiUin, Department ofDefense Instruction O-.36()0.02
Information Opcmlion.s' (10) Sccivily Clussifkulion Giiickince, Department of Defense Regulation 520(1.1 -R
Inftinmilion Securily Fri>griiin, and additional information available to me in my official capacity.

(U) 1 deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified form to facilitate its handling and use during any
judicial proceeding.
(LI) DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
(U) Information which rcL|uircs protection in the interest ofnational security ofthe United States is designated
CI .ASSIFll-D NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive Order 1.1525. ClassifiedNatiwiulSwiirily
Infoririaiiiin, signed by President Obama on December 29, 200') [prior to June 27, 2010, refer to Executive Order
I295S signed by President Clinton on April 20, 1995 as amended by President Cleorge W. Bush on March 25, 200.3].
Information is classified in levels commensurate with the assessment that unauthorized disclosure could cause the
Ibliowing expected damage to national security:
a. (U) Top Secret infonnation

exceptionally grave damage
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 1 of 4

ManningB_00376875

20590

UNCLASSIFIED

b, (U) Secret infonnation

sei ious damage

c. (U) Confidential information

damage

(U) Unclassified information docs not require a security clearance for access, but nonetheless may be ofa sensitive
nature.
(U) PROTECTION OE I N F O R M A T I O N
(U) Within the Department of Defense, classified information is handled and protected in accordance with
Department of Defense Regulation 5200.1 -R Infonnalion Securily Program. Classified information should be
handled and examined only under such conditions as are adequate to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining
access. Classified material may not be removed from designated work areas or moved from information systems,
e.g. classified databases, computer networks, servers, or computers, except in the performance ofofficial duties and
under special conditions which provide protection for the classified material.
(U) C L A S S I F I C A T I O N D E T E R M I N A T I O N
(U) I reviewed the material related to this case, which was provided by the Prosecution in a memorandum dated IS
March 201 I. The item in question is tl.Te.tcxtJ(!g_of a

I he log has no classification markings

but contains national security information properly classified at the SECRET level per Department of Defense
Instruction O-.'^600.02 infvriiiuiiiiii Operution.s (10) .Security CUissificiiiion Guidance dated 28 November 2005, and
Strategic Command Instruction (SI) 720-1 GlohulInjoiniaiuii) Grut(GIG) \'ET(JPSSecurity Classificaiion Guide
dated I 5 July 2009.The information in the log was classified SECRET at the time it was generated, and at no time
has it been decla,ssificd. It is currently and properly classified SECRET. It contains the following national security
information,


(U) U.S. (iovernment knowledge that a specific offensive cyber capability is operational in cyberspace and
under the control ofa specific adversary



(U) U.S. Government detailed knowledge of specific cyber activity being conducted against the U.S. by a
specific adversary



(U) U.S. (iovernment attribution of specific cyber activity conducted against the U.S. to a specific
adversary

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of 4

ManningB_00376876

20591

UNCLASSIFIED

^

(U)The association ofa^Tamilygioup^'ofUNCEASSIEIED cover teims(i.e. code words)with the
clas,sificd infoi mation they are intended to protect.

^

(U)Thea.s.sociation ofaspeeifie UNCLASSIFIED cover term(i.e.code word) w^ith the clas.sified
information it is intended to protect

^

(L^)The level and type of .success of specific cyber operations byaspeeific adversary again,stUS
information .systems

^

(U)The level of effort thcU^S.Govemment expends dealing with specific cyber activityofa.specific
adversary

^

(U)ThcUS.Governments assessment ofthe offensive cyber capability and capacity ofaspeeifie
adversary
(L)IMPACTONNATIONALSECIIRITYIFINFORMATIONREI.EASED

(U) Unauthorised disclosure ofthe clas.sitied material specified above would
^

(U)Rcvcal U.S.capability todetect sophisticated! cyber activity conducted against lheU..S.

^

(U)Reveal U.S capability to attribute cyber activity to sophisticated adversaries

^

(U) Reveal the level (.IS Government ofknowledge and tindeistanding ofaspeeifie cyber threat

^

(U)CausetheUS.Government to expend personnel andfinancialresources to apply new protections to
thcdi.sclo.scdclas.sifiedinfoimationandundi.sclo.sedbutielatcd information

^

(U)Crcateancgativc impact onUS.Goveittit^ent international relationships ba,scd on the as.se.s.sment that
spccificcyberactivityagainstthcUSisbcingcondtictedbyaspecifiedadversary

^

(U)Reduce U.S.allies'confidencein the U.S.Goveinment^sability to protect clas.sified information
affecting their own national .security.

(U) Pursuant to 2^ U.S.C.^17^6,Ideclarc tinder penalty ofpeijury that the infoimation provided herein is tr
correct to the besl ofmy knowledge.

B^^

^^^^^B^^^^^^^^^
B
RobcrtEBetB
ChiefClas.sificationAdvisoiyOfficer.U.S.CyberCommand

Ex^cut^dthi^ B^^^

d^yo^^^^B^^^^B

2(^J^^.
UNCLASSIFIED
Page3of4

^annlng8^0(^37^877

20592

UNCLASSIFIED
(U) As an Original Classificaiion Authority with control over the national security information discussed herein and
responsibility for its protection, I concur with the with the classification determination and impact statements made
herein. I fiirther endorse this declaration as the official statement of United States Cyber Command in regard to the
matter of United S tales v. Private First Class Bradlev Manning.

^.^jzri'zztz"/^
Robert E. Schmidle, Jr.
Lieutenant General. United States Marine Corps
Deputy Commander U.S. Cyber Command

Executed this

day of T t - ^ k /

f

2011.

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 4 of 4

ManningB_00376878

20593

UNCLASSIFIED
(U) DECLARATION
(U) I, VICE ADMIRAL ROBERT S. HARWARD, declare and state:
(U) BACKGROUND
(U) 1 am a Vice Admiral in the United States Navy with 32 years of active service. I currently serve as Deputy
Commander. U S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) at MacDill Air Force Base. I have held this position since 11
July 2011. My responsibilities include exercising TOP SECRET and below Original Classification authority, which
includes rendering a deieimination of USCENTCOM generated information for classification purposes pursuant to a
written delegation from the Deputy Secretary of Defense. (See Memorandum fr om the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Subject: Delegation of Top Secret Classification Authority, dated 5. May 2011 (Enclosure 1))
(U) PURPOSE OF DECLARATION
(LO I submit this declaration, in the matter ofUnited States v. Private First Class Bradlev Manning, to demonstrate
to the best ofmy knowledge and beliefthat disclosure ofthe information identified below reasonably could be
expected to cause SERIOUS DAMAGE to the national security ofthe United States. In making the following
statement regarding the classified information in this case, I rely on my personal knowledge and experience.
Executive Order 13526 Classified National Security Information or for materials classified prior to June 27, 2010,
on Executive Order 13292, and Central Command Regulation'iZQA^Security Classification Guide (ytxsxom 0501,
0109, and 0110). and additional information available to me in my official capacity.
(U) I deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified form to facilitate its handling and use during any
judicial proceeding,
(U) DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
(U) [nformation which requires protection in the interest of national security of the United States is designated
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security
Information, signed by President Barack Obama on December 29,2009 [prior to June 27,2010, refer to Executive
Order 12958 signed by President Clinton on April 17, 1995 as amended by President George W. Bush on March 25,
2003]. Information is classified in levels commensurate with the assessment that unauthorized disclosure could
cause the following expected damage to national security:
a. (U) Top Secret information - exceptionally grave damage

b, (U) Secret information - serious damage
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 1 of 3

ManningB_00376879

20594

UNCLASSIFIED
c.(U) Confidential information-^damage

(U) Unclassified information does not requireasecurity clearance for access, butnot^etheless may be ofasensitive
nature.
(U)PROTECTIONOFINFORl^A^ION
(U) Within the USCENTCOM, classified information is handle and protected in accordance with Executive Orders
13526 and 1295^, as amended and Central Command Regulation 3^(^l4,^^^^B^^^C^^^.^^^^^r^t^^^^^^^. The
USCENTCOM Special Security Ofiice (SSO) issues this guide and addresses int^uiries conceming its content and
interpretation. The national defense ret^uires that certain information be maintained in confidence in orderto protect
our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security,and our interaction with fi^reign nations. Classified
information should be handled and examined only und^r such conditions as are adequate to prevent unauthorised
persons from gaining access. Classified material may not be removed fiom designated work areas or moved from
infi:^rmation systems, e.g. classified databases, computernetworks, servers, orcomputers, except in the performance
ofofficial duties and under special conditions which provide prot^tion for the classifi^ material.
(U)CLASSIFICATIONDETERl^INA^ION
fU^lreviewed the material forwarded to USCENTCOM bv government t^rosecutors in the matter ofUnited States
vPrivate First Class 8r^dle^Mannit^^.which was providedbvLTCChrisFCallen. USAR. atthe USCENTCOM
Staff^Judge Advocate Office. This material was staffed through the following USCENTCOM Directorates:
Intelligence(J2), Operations(^3), and the Strategy, Plans, and Policy(,l5). The results ofthis statfmg were
provided to me and consolidated into this affidavit The resultsofthe review of these documents are located in
Enclosure2 CIDNE AfghanistanEvents, Enclosure3^CIDNEIrat^Events, Enclosures Other Briefings, and
Enclosure5^yideo. As identified in Enclosures2through5,itemscontain national securityinformationproperly
classifiedat the SECRETIevelperExecutiveOrder 13292, orExecutiveOrderI3526,andCCR380^14. The
inlormation contained within the listed items was properly classified SECRET atthetime it was generated, and at no
time h ^ it been declassified. It tscurrently and properly classified SECRET.As outlined i^Enclosures2through5,
the documents contain the following types ofnational security information:
^

(U)US Govemment intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or
cryptology

UNCLASSIFIED
P^ge2of3

l^anningB^0037^880

20595

UNCLASSIFIED


(U) U.S. Govemment military plans, weapons systems, or operations



(U) U.S. Govemment operational code words identified with mission operations



(U) Participating units, including types, vulnerabilities, locations, quantities, readiness status, deployments,
redeployments, and details of movement of USfi'iendlyforces



(U) Significant actions related to fact of and general type (vehicle-borne, etc) of improvised explosive
attacks



(U) Significant action event summaries



(U) Limitations and vulnerabilities of US forces in combat area



(U) Foreign govemment information
(U) IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IF INFORMATION RELEASED

(U) Unauthorized disclosure of the classified material specified above would;


(U) Cause the U.S. Govemment to expend personnel andfinancialresources to apply new protections to
the disclosed classified information and undisclosed but related information



(U) Reduce U.S. allies' confidence in the U.S. Government's ability to protect classified information
affecting their own national security



(U) Pose a threat to the security of US and coalition forces in the Iraq Combined/Joint Operations Area
(CJOA)



(U) Pose a threat to the security of US and coalition forces in the Afghanistan Combined/Joint Operations
Area (CJOA)



(U) Hinder on-going military operations, intelligence activities and sources and methods, and negatively
affect foreign govertiment intelligence and relations.

(U) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746,1 declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided herein is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge.

/^>'''^^^'^7'^,t:'^^6^*Z>*A.f^
Robert S. Harward
Vice Admiral, U.S, Navy
E.ec.„d»isii*Vof&t„.OH.

UNCLASSIFIED
Page 3 of 3

ManningB_00376881

20596

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1OI0 DEFENSE PCNTAOON
WASHINGTON, DC 2 0 3 0 1 1 0 1 0

NAY G 5 2011
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFHCER
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
EVALUATION
INSPECrOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR. ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT: Delegation of Top Secrert OrigLoal Clasdikation Authority
The tocumbcots ofthe positions identified in the attached listing are heicby authorized to
exercise Top Secret original classificaiion authority in accordance with Executive Otder 13526,
"Cla&sifled National Security In&nnation." This ownnfundum swpene&a %xcnoua delegations.

Attachment:
As stated

o
Enclosure 1
MannlngB_00376882

20597

ORIGINAL TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITIES

Otikt of the Secretary ofDefense fSecDelH
Secnrtary ofDefense
Deputy Secrrtary ofDefense
Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary ofDefense
Executive Secitlary
Under Secretary of Defeasa for PoBcv
Under Sectttary of DeGenseforPolicy
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy Integration & Chief of Staff
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Deputy Director, Defense Security Cwpcniicm Agency
Depu^ Under Secretary ofDefense for Strategy, Plans and Fwcea
Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Special Opcfatiooa and Low Intauity Conflict)
Principal Deputy Assistant SecxrlBry of Defense (Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict)
Assistant Scottary of Defense (Global Strategic Ailain)
Assistant Seortary ofDefense (Asian and Pacific Security Afbin)
Principal Deputy ASD (Asian md Pacific Security Affairs)
Assistant Secrrtary of Defeoae (Homeland Defense)
Principal Deputy ASD (Homeland Defense)
Assistant Secretary ofDefense (International Security Policy)
Principal Deputy ASD (Intemational Security Policy)
Under Secretary of Defense (AcqnisMoa, Technology A Logistics)
Under Secretary of Defense (iBtelilgeace)
Undo* Secretary of Defense (Penonnd and Readiness)
Under Secretary of Def em** (ComptroUcr)
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Asnstant Secretary of Defense (Healtii Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Le^slative Affairs)
Assistant to the Secretary ofDefense (Intelligence Oversight)
Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Networks and Infonnation Integratioo/DoD CIO
General Counid ofthe Deoartment of Defense
General Counsel
Principal Deputy General Counsel

>

Enclosure 1
MannlngB_00376883

20598

ORIGINAL TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITIES
Deputy General Counsel, Intemational A ^ i n
Deputy General Counsel, Intelligence
Iiipcctor General of the Dcpartmcot of Defease
Director, Adaiinlatration and Management, Washington Headqnartcn Scrvkci
DWdor, Operational Test and Evmkatkm (OT&E)
Director, Cost Assessment amd Program Evalnation (CAPE)
Director, Net Assessment
Chafrman of the Joint Chiefh of Staff fJCSI
Chairman, JCS (CJCS)
Vice Chairman, JCS (VCJCS)
Assistant to tbe Chaiiroan. JCS (ACJCS)
Director, Joint Staff (DJS)
Vice Director, Joint Staff (VDJS)
DirectorforManpower and Personnel (DJl)
Director oflntelligence (DJ2) - Position maintained by DIA
Vice Director of Intelligence (VDJ2) - Position maintained by DIA
Diraztor for Operations (DJ3)
Vice DirectorforOperations (VDJ3)
Deputy Director Special Operations (DDSO)
Director for Logistics (DJ4)
Director for Strategy Plans and Policy (DJS)
Vice Director for Strategy Plana and Policy (VDJS)
Chief of Staff. %ec(ofate for Strategic Plans and Policy
Director for Command, Control, Communications, & Computer (C4) Systems (DJ6)
Vice DirectorforC4 Systems (VDJ6)
Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (DJ7)
Vice DirectorforOperational Plans and Joint Force Development (VDJ7)
Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (DJS)
Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Requirements (VDJS)
Dcfene Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Defense IntelHgeace Agency fPIA)
Director (DR)
Deputy Director (DD)
Chief ofStaff(CS)
Chief, Financial Executive (FE)
DepuQr Director fbr Intelligence (J2)
Deputy Director, Analysis (DI)
Deputy Director for Human baelligence (DH)

Enclosure!
ManningB_00376884

20599

ORIGINAL TOP SECRET CLASSIFICAT ON AUTHOR TIES
Deputy Director for MASINT and Technical Collection (DT)
The Defense Attaches (DAO) (Total of 137)
Director, National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC)
Chief, National MASINT Management 0£Bce (NM)
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
Director, DISA
Vica Director, DISA
Chief of Staff; DISA
Principal DirectorforGIG Operations (GO)
Defense Threat Redaction Agency mTRAl
Director, DTRA
Deputy Director. DTRA
Director, Defe se Logistics Agency (DLA)
Director, Misdlc Defense Agency (MDA)
Director, National Geospatial-IntcUigcacc Agency (NGA)
Nationm* Secoritv Agency (NSAl
Director. NSA/Chief. Central Security Service
Deputy Director, NSA
Director's Chief of Staff
Dbneta^i Deputy Chief of Staff
SIGINT Director
SIGINTChiefofStaff
SIGINT Directorate Deputy ChiefforSIGINT Policy arW Corporate Issues
SIGINT Directorate Associate Deputy Chief for SIGINT Policy arxi Corporate Issues
Deputy DirectorforAnalysis and Production
Deputy Director for Data Acquisition
Chiefs Information Sharing Services
Chief, Cryptaoalysis and Exploitation Services
Director, National Security Operations Center (NSOC)
Director NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC)
Infonnation Assurance Director
Information Assurance Technical Director
Associate Director for Community Integration, Policy and Records
Deputy Associate DirectorforPolicy and Records
Associate DirectorforSecurity and Courtfaintelligence
Technology Director
Director for Foreign Af&ira
Associate Director for Installations and Logistics

Enclosure 1

ManningB_00376885

ORIGINAL TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION AUTHORmES
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO>
Director
Principal Deputy Director
Deputy Director
Director, Imagery Intelligence Systems Acquisition Directorate
Director. Signals Intelligence Systems Acquisition Directorate
Director, Communications Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate
Director. Advanced Systems and Technology
Director, Mission Operations Directorate
Director, Special Communications Ofiice
Director. Ground Enterprise Directorate
Director, Ofiice of Security and CouDtoinlelligence
Director, Ofiice of Space Launch
Director, Mission Support Directorate
President, National Defense University (NDU)
United States AlHea Command fUSAFRICOMI
Corrunander
Deputy to tbe Commander for Military Operations
Deputy to the Commander for Civil Military Activities
ChiefofStaff
Uaited States Central Command fUSCENTCOMI
Conunander
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
United States European Command fUSEUCOM^
CajDirande
Deputy Commander
ChiefofStaff
United States Joint Forces Command gJSJFCOMl
Commander
Deputy Commander
ChiefofStaff
Commander, NORAD and United States Northam Command (VSNORTHCOM)

Enclosure 1

ManningB_00376886

20600

ORIGINAL TOPSECRETCLASSIFICATIONAUTHORITIES
UBtted St,t# Pacific Command (USPACOM)
Commander
Deputy Commander
ChiefofStaff
Foreign Policy Advisor (Granted by Department of State)
Commander, US Forces Japan
Commander, US Forces Korea
United States Special Operations Command fUSSOCOM^
Commander
OcputyCommander
Commander, Joint Special Operations Cmnmand

s^athern Con;#Md (V»:?oqTH(;pM)
Commander
Military Deputy Conunander
ChiefofStaff
United States Strategic Command OISSTRATCOM^
Commander (JOCC)
Deputy CoamuntdcT (JOCD)
Umhed States Transnortatio, r n ^ ^ . - H niSTRANSCOMI
Commander (fCCQ
Deputy Commander (TCDC)
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM^
Commander
Deputy Commander

Enclosure 1

MannlngB_00376887

20601

20602

Enclosure 1: CIDNE AFGHANISTAN EVENTS
Information Classified
per CCR 380-14, EO
12958 as A m m ded,
Tab

Identified Document
053C4989-9747-41FD-94E5-

A

4BC2F788FEAO
3/2/2008
Page 1
253C4E50-E469-488D-9FDE-

B

60A42E7E12A7
12/4/2007
Page 4

2562 B1FF-E285-4699-9E91C

BFCBS5858186
7/2/2007
Page 6

29556796-D1B2-46FD-86670

264113A1FF42
2/9/2007
Pages

2A5CA12C-9579-4DAB-85E2E

39343BFE93C8
2/17/2007
Page 10

S

operations

operations; Foreign

S

government

occurred 12/28/2007 10:30
Page 20

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4(a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 8; EO 13526 Section
1.4(a)

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 {a>{b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations; Foreign

5

government

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 |a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

information
Mil tary plans,
weapons systems, or
operations; Foreign

S

government

EO 12958 as amended,
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

information
Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations; Foreign

S

government

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4(3)(b)

information

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, A-24; EO 12958 as

22, Item 6; Page A23, Item

amended. Section 1.4 (a)

11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14(0110), PageA23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (aHb)

1/15
ManningB_00376888

Basis for Current
Classiftcalron

information

Military plans,
4A860499-EB94-4F08-90A7weapons systems, or
6E6E0CF81F4C
operations; Foreign
3/4/2007
govemment
Page 21
information

4296-A783 O0B848B70E37

Basis for Or iginil
Oassification

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations. Foreign
government
Information

6/30/2009

ReportKey 42BCCB0A-E985

H

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

051D126F3051823D
Page 15

G

Classification

SIGACT Event
Summaries;
Operational code
word{s) when
Identified with mission
operations

36261792.F927-5439F

and/or EO 13526

CCR 380-14 (0110). Page A2 3 , I t e m l l ; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

20603

Enclosure 2: CIDNE AFGHANISTAN EVENTS Page 2
Information Classified
per CCR 3B0-14, EO

12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document
4FD83608-2053-4£90-8696-

1

7E48D32S207C
3/23/2007
Page 23
513BD1S6-C13F-4FD6-99AF-

J

6A1A5C1A5F64
8/15/2007
Page 25

K

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

Operational code

11/26/2009

identified with mission

Page 26

operations

Page 29

S

operations

word(s) when

2/10/2007

S

operations

9C123B787F29A3A9

84ABF4911B41

Oassification

Miltary plans,
weapons systems, or

5925531E-C90B-3E0E-

765D9B14-7558-47B2-89BB •
L

and/or EO 13526

SasisforOriginal

BasisforCurrent

•assification

Oassification

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 6; Page A-23, Item
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page AS

24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)

Section 1.4 (a)

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations; Foreign

S

government

EO 12958 as amended,
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

information
SIGACTs related to fact
of a r t general type
(vehicle borne, etc) of

M

8E99025D-1372-51C0

lED a n a & at specific

59D1DF3792D4DFBF;

location on specific

9/6/2009

date.

Page 31

Operational code

CCR 38014(0109), PagesA CCR 380-14 (0110), Page AS

23, A-24; EO 12958 as

22, Item 7; Page A-23 Item

amended. Section 1.4 (a)

11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

word(s) when
identified with mission
operations

N

Military plans,
BA67D1C4-261D-4934-801Cweapons systems, or
F194147D2260
operations; Foreign
2/12/2007
government
Page 33
information

S

EO 12958 as amended,
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)

SIGACTs related to fact
of and general type
(vehicle-borne, etc) of

0

C6A6DCD5-1372-51C0-

lED attacit at specific

59F719B11D1721C1

location on specific

9/17/2009

date;

Page 35

s

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission
operations

2/15
ManningB_00376889

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, A-24, EO 12958 as
22. Item 7; Page A-23, Item
amended. Section 1 4 (a)
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

20604

Tab

P

Q

R

s

T

U

V

w

identified Document

Information Classified
per CCR 380-14, EO
12958 as Amended,
and/or EO 13526
Classification

Military plans,
E87E01A4-99F5-466A-8D3Bweapons systems, or
8031D7B05933
operations; Foreign
5/9/2007
government
Page 37
information
ReportKey F9B227A4 28614EAC-A8CF-6D28C67DA78A
DateOccurred 10/13/2006 Foreign government
0:00
information
Page 41

ReportKey FADBDC1C-E59B7F41-27BEC0699A5A32D3
Military plans,
DateOccurred 10/14/2008
weapons systems, or
8:50
operations
Page 43

RepoitKey 08836010-91311CA0-1C5540A34263A618
Military plans,
DateOccurred 8/28/2008
weapons systems, or
7:55
operations
Page 1
ReportKey 09A6802C-D8F14288-837D8BC5A3A7FC0O
Military plans,
DateOccurred 7/9/2008
weapons systems, or
4:42
operations
Page 2
ReportKey 10CF802B-DO2O91E8-240C62696F67DDD7
Military plans,
DateOccurred 12/7/2008
weapons systems, or
5:12
operations
Page 3
ReportKey 1E14FO20-BDAFAB87-DE6E883CDDB45042
Military plans,
DateOccurred 12/9/2008
weapons systems, or
18:50
operations
Pages
ReportKey 5OBE089C-D00S74O6-A1BD6D9E97622EE0
Military plans,
DateOccurred 4/17/2008
weapons systems, or
15:22
operations
Page 6

Basisfor Original
Classification

Basts for Current
Classification

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (b)

EO 13526 Section 1.4 (b)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

5

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

3/15
ManningB_00376890

20605

Endosure 2: ClONE AFGHANISTAN EVENTS Page 4
Information Oassified
per CCR 380 14, EO
12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document

and/or E013526

Oassification

Basis for Original

Basis for Current

Oassification

Oassification

ReportKey 61FF7036-9FFBC7DS-510C59CB08EDD488
X

DateOccurred 11/3/2008
8:45
Page 7

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

operations

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

ReportKey 6E72B4E1-FD828C81-44570CFBE8563BO0
Y

DateOccurred 7/29/2008
6:40
Pages

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

operations

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4(a)

ReportKey 72F3668A-PDF456B9-2390E80808EC65S7
2

DateOccurred 7/30/2008
2:00
Page 9

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 1 1 ; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

ReportKey 73BEF45B-C7FB9501-A66798D209176352
AA

DateOccurred 2/14/2009
6:12
Page 10

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23; EO 12958 as amended. 22, Item 7; A-23, Item 1 1 ; EO
Section 1,4 (a)

operations

13526 Section 1.4(a)

ReportKey 7515D2A2 96B3O285-1B8E169C2E586C10
BB

DateOccurred 7/30/2008
3:15
Page 11

CC

DD

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations

ReportKey 89843A4D-0S738F32-20B3ADC3CE56C303
Military plans,
DateOccurred 4/26/2008
weapons systems, or
4:45
operations
Page 12
ReportKey 8C55D9O2-016O7457 AF585B240105EC04
Military plans,
DateOccurred 12/31/2008
weapons systems, or
6:55
operations
Page 13

S

S

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 SecUon 1.4(a)

RepoitKey 9A1EC6C6-CDC9
7A05-75AA98A9D1B62S60
EE

DateOccurred 6/18/2008
2:30
Page 14

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

s

operations

4/15
ManningB_00376891

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A
22. ltem7;A-23, i t e m l l ; £ 0
13526 Section 1.4(a)

20606

Enclosure 2: CIDNE AFGHANISTAN EVENTS Page 5

Tab

FF

GG

HH

II

JJ

KK

U.

Identified Document

Information Classified
per CCR 380-14, EO
12958 as Amended,
and/or EO 13526
Oassification

ReportKey 84EDA65C.C7145FA6-42AEE135755CAD7F
Military plans,
DateOccurred 1/8/2009
vireapons systems, or
4:52
operations
Page 15
ReportKey 8552CD02-0E116493-E62E77C8D68BCD9D
Military plans,
DateOccurred 11/19/2008
weapons systems, or
10:55
operations
Page 16
ReportKey CC07 FD07-06C AC21B-6240D396E62CC899
Military plans,
DateOccurred 8/16/2008
weapons systems, or
13:50
operations
Page 17
ReportKey CDBA48C6 A66B8EB5-9C7E62077BF80759
Military plans,
DateOccurred 6/28/2008
weapons systems, or
4:17
operations
Page 18
ReportKey E43C1C21-0FD1313F-BC4DSB9CFB2BA03D
Military plans,
DateOccurred 1/6/2009
weapons systems, or
5:30
operations
Page 20
ReportKey F584AAE4 C46B865F-45BFCD8E6395307F
Military plans,
DateOccurred 10/13/2008
weapons systems, or
7:00
operations
Page 21
ReportKey FADBDC1C-E59B7F41-27BEC0B99A5A32D3
Military plans,
DateOccurred 10/14/2008
weapons systems, or
8:50
operations
Page 22

Basis for Original
Oassification

Basis for Current
Oassification

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

S

EO 12958 as amended,
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4(a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

s

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

5/15
ManningB_00376892

20607

Enclosure 3: ClONE IRAQ EVENTS
Information Classified
per CCR 380 14. EO
12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document

and/or EO13526

072A8443-OACC-4E47-A328A

309FC84524B2

Military plans,
vreapons systems, or

5/4/2006

Oassification

S

operations

Page 1

Basis fbr Original

Basis for Current

Oassification

Classification

EO 12958 as amended,
Section 1,4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 9; EO 13526 Section
1 4 (a)

SIGACTs related to fact

B

0A07EE58-C792-EB6E-

of and general type

1F31CD97EC38C10A

(vehicle-bome, etc) of

6/23/2009

lED attack at specific

Page 3

location on specific

s

CCR 380-14 (0109), PageA- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23; EO 12958 as amended, 22, Item 7; EO 13526 Section
Section 1.4 (a)

1.4(a)

date
SIGACTs related to fact

C

1259C04A-F394-1AD1-

of and general type

39360A2F53BA767F

(vehicle-borne, etc) of

11/20/2009

lED attack at specific

Pages

location on specific

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

s

23; EO 12958 as amended. 22, Item 7; EO 13526 Section
Section 1.4(a)

1.4 (a)

date
13D4FAC8-290C 4623-B36CD

3540E8D30E2C

weapons systems, or

11/30/2004

ReportKey 1D19ACD4-1E6844EC-9D10-5D9586E51A4F
DateOccurred 10/23/2005
0:04

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A
23. Item 9; EO 13526 Section
1.4(a)

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations; Foreign

s

govemment

Page 7

F

s

operations

Page 6

E

Military plans,

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 9; EO 13526 Section
1.4(a)(b)

information

ReportKey 22ABF58E F6184A1A-BFD7-29BBD8125499
DateOccurred 9/14/2006
14:48
Page 10

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

s

operations

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; EO 13526 Section
14 (a)

SIGACTs related to fact

G

ReportKey 28628224-A67f-

of and general type

1CF4-0045D88D3FFF86AF

(vehicle-borne, etc) of

DateOccurred 6/28/2009

lED attacic at specific

20.31

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A5

23, EO 12958 as amended. 22. Item 7; EO 13526 Section
Section 1.4 (a)

Page 13 location on specific

1.4(a)

date
ReportKey 2974CC00-CE79-

H

02D7 OE92D63C5E0443C6

Operational code

DateOccurred 11/24/2009

word(s) when

22:30

identified with mission

Page 16

operations

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110). Page A-

s

e/15
ManningB_00376893

24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Item 9; EO 13526 Section
Section 1.4 (a)

1.4 (a)

20608

Enclosure 3: OONE IRAQ EVENTS Page 2
Information Classified
per CCR 380-14, EO

12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document
ReportKey 2FBD7A50-FE40CE03-9401D7643A455299
DateOccurred 6/30/2009
6:03
Page 17

and/or EO13526

Classification

Operational code

Basis for Original

Basis for Current

Classification

Oassification

CCR 380-14 (0109), PageA- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

word(s)when

24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO

identified with mission

Section 1.4 (a)

operations

13526 Section 1.4 (a)

ReportKey 31D33B9C-423D4561-5E60C4F966A7AC4A
DateOccurred 7/16/2008
21:00
Page 20

ReportKey 31FFBCDE-934691A1-8AAAFA4EE2946AC6
DateOccurred 10/7/2009
16:32
Page 22

Military plans,

EO 12958 as amended.

weapons systems, or

Section 1.4 (a)

operations

Operational code

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (01091, Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

word(s) when

24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO

identified with mission

Section 1.4 (a)

operations

13526 Section 1.4 (a)

ReportKey 45A88ACB-423C4561-50A42E5A6516F886
DateOccurred 10/28/2008
15:30
Page 24

Military plans,

EO 12958 as amended.

weapons systems, or

Section 1.4 (a)

operations

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A
23, Item 9; EO 13526 Section
1.4(a)

RepoitKey 4BF346FD-00C8M

817C-7F8C9OF1692A10A0

Militarv plans,

DateOccurred 12/18/2008

weapons systems, or

20:38

operations

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; Page A23, Item
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

Page 26
RepoitKey 5910353A-924BE44 A-4D8D2 BSD 1CF6D4EB
DateOccurred 8/26/2009
23:29
Page 29

SIGACTs related to fact
of and general type
(vehicle-borne, etc) of
I ED attack at specific
location on specific
date; SIGACTS related
to fact of and type of
terrorist

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A
23, A-24; EO 12958 as
amended. Section 1,4 (a)

insurgent/attack at
specfic location on
specific date;
Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission
operations

7/15
ManningB_00376894

CCR 380-14(0110), Page A22, Item 7; Page A23, Items
9 and 11; EO 13526 Section
1,4 (a)

20609

Enclosure 3: CIDNE IRAQ EVENTS Page 3
Information Oassified
per CCR 380-14, EO

12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document

and/or EO 13526

Basis for Original
Oassification

Classification

Basis for Current
Oassification

SIGACTs related t o fact
of and general type

0

(vehicle-bome, etc) of
ReportKey 5EA9604D-07e3lED attack at specific
16AF-F833103576729E32
location on specific
DateOccurred 8/28/2009
date;
2:20 Page 31
Operational code

S

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, A-24; EO 12958 as
22. Item 7; Page A-23, Item
amended. Section 1.4(a)

11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

word(s) when
identified with mission
operations
SKSACTs related to fact
of and general type
RepoitKey 63530D56-A1FAD60E-332D4A7A0945F9BF
P

DateOccurred 5/21/2009
10:38

Page 33

(vehicle-borne, etc) of
lEO attack at specific
location on specific
date;

CCR 380-14(0109), PagesA CCR 380-14 (0110). PageA-

s

Operational code

23, A-24; EO 12958 as

22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item

amended. Section 1.4 (a)

11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

word(s) when
identified with mission
operations
SK5ACTS related to fact
of and general type
RepoitKey 6687D323-0F27ABE1-85899AD306525333
Q

DateOccurred 12/6/2009
23:20

Page 35

(vehicle-bome, etc) of
lED attack at specific
location on specific
date;

s

CCR 380-14 (0109), PagesA CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, A-24; EO 12958 as
22, Item 7; Page A-23. Item
amended. Section 1.4 (a)

Operational code

11; £0 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

word(s) when
Wentif ied w i t h mission
operations

R

ReportKey 682B8A77-08A1- Operational code
word(s) when
829B-8604DFC885232519
identified with mission
DateOccurred 12/7/2009
operations
1:28 Page 37

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

s

24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO
Section 14 (a)

13525 Section 1.4 (a)

SKJACTS related to fact
of and general type

S

(vehicle-borne, etc) of
ReportKey 6BOA16AB-873CED attack at specific
FC8C-0220277732025A4B
location on specific
DateOccurred 8/30/2009
date;
15:31
Page 4 1
Operational code

CCR380-14 (0109). PagesA CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA-

s

word(s) when
idend'fied with mission
operations

8/15
ManningB_00376895

23.A-24;EO 12958 as

22, Item 7; A-23, Item 11; EO

amended. Section 1.4 (a)

13526 Section 1.4 (a)

20610

Enclosure 3: CIDNE WAQ EVENTS Page 4
Information Oassified
per CCR 380-14. EO
12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document

and/or EO 13526

Oassification

Basis for Original

Basis for Current

Oassification

Oassification

ReportKey 6E901583-47594EB0- 94D0-4F865IBCDDEA
T

DateOccurred 2/7/2005
23:45

Militery plans,
weapons systems, or

S

operations

Page43

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1,4 (a)

CCR 380 14 (0110), PageA23, items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

SIGACTs related t o f a c t
of and general type
ReportKey 6EAE58O8-D470- (vehicle-bome, etc) of
05A6-571D9EC60AC3523C
IED attack at specific
U

DateOccurred 10/19/2009
21:56

date;

Page 44

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

location on specific
S

Operational code

23, A-24; EO 12958 as

22, Item 7; PageA-23, Item

amended,Section 1.4 (a)

1 1 ; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

word(s) when
identified with mission
operations
ReportKey 719ABD5C-85A142E5-81B2-FE334B6E469D
V

DateOccurred 10/15/2006
21:07
Page 46

ReportKey 74509F9D-80A94FC6- B976-08CB96363C66

w

DateOccurred 10/20/2006
14:00

ReportKey 789FC769-C9A6DateOccurred 10/21/2009
Page 52

ReportKey 799E74FB-10E04ESE-8E6C-6A649C2A49A7

z

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22,Item 7; PageA-23, item
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations; Foreign

ReportKey 784D1EF4-FCAC4F2D-A7CB-B9BSE4DF8258
Military plans,
DateOccurred 10/26/2005
weapons systems, or
15:30
operations
Page 51

13:15

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1 4 (a)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1,4 (a)(b)

information

COEA 8B6199717B6D3D22
y

S

government

Page 49

X

MSrtary plans,
weapons systems, or
operations

OateOccun-ed 10/22/2005
23:58
Page 54

S

Operational code
word(s)when
identified w i t h mission

CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA23, Item 9; EO 13526 Section
1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page AS

24; EO 12958 as amended, 23, Items 8 and 11; EO
Section 1.4 (a)

operations

13526 Section 1.4 (a)

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations; Foreign

S

govemment
information

WIS
ManningB_00376896

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1,4 (a)

EO 12958 as amended,
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA23, Items 9; EO 13526

Section 1.4 (aXb)

20611

Enclosure 3: ClONE IRAQ EVENTS Page 5
Information Classified
per CCR 380-14, EO

12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document

and/or EG 13526

Classification

Basis for Original

Sasis for Current

Oassification

Classification

ReportKey 7F12262C-5056
9023 5831E165A5AE2457
AA

DateOccurred 5/12/2007
4:44

CCR 380-14 (0110), Pages A-

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

operations

Page 56

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item
1 1 ; EO 13526 Section 1.4
(a)(b)

SIGACTs related to fact
of and general type
ReportKey 818F138E-829ED68C-1548F72F771D019D
BB

DateOccurred 5/27/2009
10:17

Page 64

(vehicle-borne, etc) of
IED attack at specific
location on specific
date;

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

s

Operational code

23, A-24; EO 12958 as

22, Item 7; Page A-23. Item

amended. Section 1.4 (a)

ll;E013526SectIonl.4(a)

word(s) when
identified with mission
operations
SIGACTs related to fact
of and general type

CC

ReportKey 8694704B-F3B6ED65-E1EC959B8746520C
DateOccurred 7/16/2009
21:18
Page 66

(vehicle borne, etc) of
IED attack at specific
location on specific
date;

5

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, A-24: EO 12958 as
22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item
amended. Section 1.4 (a)
11; EO 13526 Section 1,4 (a)

S

23, A-24; EO 12958 as

22, Item 7; PageA-23, Item

amended. Section 1.4 (a)

11; EO 13526Section 1,4 (a)

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission
operations

ReportKey 884E3D11-07676BBC-FAA6SSF6C87380CO
DD

DateOccurred 7/17/2009
12:00

Page 68

SIGACT Event
Summaries;
Operational code
word(s) when

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A. CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

identified with mission
operations

EE

ReportKey 8D8C4118-FCB6Operational code
A935 B6EDE2C6D75EFCC5
word!s) when
DateOccurred 9/6/2009
identified with mission
4:05
Page 72
operations

Repot tKey 8EE0DS55-B6FFOE4B-5CC7109B02A929EB
FF

DateOccurred 10/25/2009
20:04 Page 74

s

CCR 380-14(0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 1 1 ; EO
Section 1.4(a)
13526 Section 1 4 (a)

5

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4 (a)
Section 1.4 (a)

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission
operations

10/15
ManningB_00376897

20612

Enclosure 3: CIDNE IRAQ EVEWT5 Page 6
Information Oassified
per CCR 380-14, EO
12958 as A m e n d e d
Tab

Identified Document

and/or EO 13526

Oassification

Basis for Ordinal

Basis for Current

Oassification

Classification

SIGACTs related to fact
of and general type
ReportKey 99C3B66B-F7BB4FAF-B3B9DAAS081A6B18
GG

DateOccurred 9/8/2009
11:35

Page 77

(vehide-tjorne, etc) of
IED attack at specific
location on specific
date;

CCR380-14 (0109),PagesA CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)
amended. Section 1,4 (a)

S

23, A-24; EO 12958 as

S

23, A-24; EO 12958 as

22. Item 7; Page A-23, Item

amended. Section 1.4 (a)

11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

Operational code
word(s) when
identified With mission
operations
SIGACrs related to fact
of and general type

ReportKey 9A037F66-D9D3E779-A3B1025D2C7A685A
HH

DateOccurred 9/8/2009
10:00

Page 79

(vehicle-borne, etc) of
IED attack at specific
location on specific
date;

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A-

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission
operations
SIGACTS related to fact
of and type of terrorist

ReportKey A2AB1EB0-ACDD- insurgent/attack at
specfic location on

EF19-BFAA52006ACCEC1D
II

DateOccurred 9/9/2009

specific date;

5

Page 81 Operational code
word(s) when

11:23

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO
Section 1.4 (a)

13526 Section 1.4(a)

identified with mission
operations
ReportKey A2C1B415-A2EBJJ

5806-4138A3FDB7FE8C89

Military plans,

DateOccurred 3/12/2008

weapons systems, or

10:30

operations

Page 83

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

RepoitKey 8068D03D-8564KK

B59E 9C81187491806597

Military plans,

DateOccurred 1/7/2009

weapons systems, or

11:28 Page 85

operations

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR380-14(0110), PageA23, Item5 9 a n d l l ; EO
13526 Secti on 1.4 (a)

ReportKey B27B576F-D215LL

3CEC C704715A7DACE23D

Military plans,

DateOccurred 9/30/2008

weapons systems, or

9:51

operations

Page 87

s

11/15
ManningB_00376898

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110). Page A22, Item 7; Page A-23, Item
11; EO 13526 Section 1.4 (a)

20613

Endosure 3: ClONE IRAQ EVENTS Pa :e7
Information Oassified
per CCR 380-14. EO
12958 as Amended,
T^

Identified Document

and/or EO 13526

Classification

Basis for Original

Basis for Current

Oassification

Classification

ReportKey B4FSA679-78D2- Military plans,
MM

4065-B153-7372476EEE77

weapons systems, or

DateOccurred 10/23/2005

operations; Foreign

0:25

govemment

Page 89

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

information

RepoitKey B5406DD2-A1A21B2C-507A500EDF4C4412
NN

DateOccurred 9/13/2009
14:14

Page 91

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission

CCR 380-14(0109), PageA- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page AS

24; E012958as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO
Section 1.4 (a)

operations

13526 Section 1.4 (a)

RepoitKey BE0A29E9-DC2000

PP

456E-9D31-3DA1F1A1453B

Military plans,

DateOccurred 3/11/2006

weapons systems, or

19:08

operations

Page 93

ReportKey BF80E4C9-A390Operational code
F64B-AD090F08AEF99486
word(s) when
DateOccurred 11/4/2009
identified with mission
2:16
Page 95
operations

S

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA23. Item 8; EO 13526 Section
1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0109), PageA- CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA24; E012958as amended. 23, Items 9 and 1 1 ; EO
Section 1.4 (a)
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

ReportKey C29675F2-C99E
QQ

RR

BBO2B494FA60186A8O78

Military plans,

DateOccurred 10/3/2008

weapons systems, or

9:55

operations

Page 96

RepoitKey C43B43C3-DB67- Military plans,
weapons systems, or
43E6-8694-627703FE38A9
operations; Foreign
DateOccurred 10/22/2005
government
21:48 Page 98
information

RepoitKey C476C534-0E62E828-1E7959612A44868F
55

DateOccurred 12/25/2009
7:16

Page 99

S

S

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4(a)

EO 12958 as amended,
Sectton 1.4(a)(b)

CCR380-14(0110), PageA23, Items 8 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)(b)

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A5

24; EO 12958as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4(a)

Section 1.4 (a)

operations

ReportKey D1E6C48B-EE20-

TT

1F09-5571AE995A6B1F63

Operational code

DateOccurred 11/7/2009

word(s) when

21:45

Page

101

idenkfied wiTh mission

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page AS

Section 1.4 (a)

operations

12/15
ManningB_00376899

24;EO 12958as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

20614

Endosure 3: CIDNE IRAQ EVEffTS Page 8
Information Oass ified
per CCR 380-14. EO
12958 as Amended,
Tab

Ident ified Document
RepoitKey 0637F898-F52BE5C8-FDFA312483CB9A49

UU

DateOccurred 1/14/2009
5:00

Page 102

C65B-F917CFD9AC2BE71B
DateOccurred 8/2/2009
8:00

Page 105

ReportKey DF4783E0-9056B43F 60BD1DOBAEB59OB8
WW

DateOccurred 1/16/2009
7:30

XX

Basis for Original
Classification

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission

S

Page 106

Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission

Operational code
word(s) when
identif led with mission
operations

13526 Section 1.4(a)

S

24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR380-14(0110), PageASection 1,4 (a)

operations

ReportKey OF6BE80E-0553C2FC-01A7E6ED190D3AFA
DateOccurred 4/25/2009
13:40 Page 107

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24; EO 12958 as amended. 23, Items 9 and 11; EO
13526 Section 1,4 (a)
Section 1.4 (a)

Operational code
identified with mission

BsIs for Current
Oassification

S

operations

worths) when

Classification

Section 1.4 (a)

operations

ReportKey DAAE0E88-A4F1-

w

and/or EO13526

S

13526 Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24; EO 12958 as amended, 23. Items 8 and 11; EO
Section 1.4 (a)
13526 Section 1.4 (a)

ReportKey E30AO025-E1OB4020-99E5-DAC80ECF8748
YY

DateOccurred 8/8/2006
21:57

Page

109

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

operations

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110). Page A23. Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)

SIGACTs related to fact
of and general type

ZZ

ReportKey E7EFF3A8-A1F71D2B-8D128EB372D2AC54
DateOccurred 6/16/2009
7:59
Page 112

(vehicle-borne, etc) of
IED attack at specific
location oo specific
date;

s

Operational code
word(i) when
identified with mission
operations

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22,Item 7; Page A-23, item
23,A-24; EO 12958 as
11; EO 13526 Section 1,4 (a)
amended. Section 1.4 (a)

ReportKey F1F1FEFB-B274AAA

F765-5A47F5C322B64FB4

Military plans,

DateOccurred 9/11/2007

weapons systems, or

1:34

s

Page 114 operations

13/15
ManningB_00376900

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4(a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Items 9 and 1 1 ; EO
13526 Sectksn 1.4 (a)

20615

En dosuie 4: Otlier Bn efings
Information Oassified
per CCR 380-14, EO
12958 as Amended,
Tab
A

Identified Document
Chat Logs (CENTCOM)
(No date but 2008 or later)

and/or EO 13526

Classification

Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

operations
Operational code

8

Farah Brief FINAL v l 22 May word(s) when
09

identi fied w i t h mission

S

C

09

identified with mission

Bass for Current

Classification

Classification

EO 12958 as amended,
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A22. Item 6; EO 13526 Section
1.4(a)

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24; EO 12958a5 amended. 23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)

operations
Operational code
Farah Brief FINAL v8 24 May word(s) when

Basis for Orginal

Sectton 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page AS

24; £ 0 12958 as amended, 23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1,4 (a)

operations

Section 1.4 (a)

Partkripating units,
including types,
vulnerabilities,
locations, quantities,
readiness status,
Strategic Intel brief, 10 May
D

2009 "Farah INS Probably
Deiiberatley Instigated"

dep oyments,
redeployments, and
details of movement of

S

US friendly forces;

CCR 380-14, (0109) Page A- CCR 380-14, (0110), Page A39; EO 12958 as amended, 39, Item 13; EO 13526
Section 1,4 (a) (c)
Section 1.4 (a)(c)

Intelligence activities
(including covert
action), intelligence
sources or methods, or
cryptology

Concept of operati ons
E

FINAL- IO'S REPORT (OS

(CONOPS). Operations

20O0ZJUN09)

Orders (OPORD) or

(SIGNED)(minimzed) (3)

Fragmentary Orders

S

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A25; EO 12958 as amended, 24, Item 12; EO 13526
Sectton 1 4 (a)

Section 1.4 (a)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4(a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24, Item 12; EO 13526
Section 1.4(a)

S

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1,4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110). PageA24, Item 12; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)

(FRAGOs)

F

TAB A Appendix 1 (C)SOTF
FRAGO 02 - OPERATIONAL
GUIDANCE)
2 9 Jan
09

G

TAB AAppendixS
(USCENTCOM Tactical
Directive - OEF AFG)
12 Sep 08

H

TAB A Appendix 10 (USFORAFRAGO08-003-CIVCAS
PROCEDURES)

SepOS

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations

Militaiy plans,
weapons systems, or
operations
Military plans,
weapons systems, or

S

operations
Operati onal code

TAB D Appendix 6 (8213QKF word($) when
CONOP)

4 May09

identified with mission

Section 1,4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A24, Item 12; EO 13526
Sectton 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0109), Page A- CCR 380-14(0110), PageAS

24, EO 12958as amended, 23, Item 11; EO 13526
Sectton 1.4 (a)

operations

14/15
ManningB_00376901

EO 12958 as amended.

Section 1.4 (a)

20616

Enclosure 4 ; Other Briefings Page 2
Information Oassified
per CCR 380-14, EO
12958 as Amended,
Tab

Identified Document

and/or£013526

Classification

Baas for Grighal

Basis for Current

Classification

Classification

Operational code
J

word(s) when
TAB D Appendix 7 (8141

identified w i t h mission

Initial TIC Slide) 4 May 09

operations

S

CCR 380-14 (0109), Pages A
24; EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)

Military plans,
weapons systems, or
operations;
Vulnerabilities or
TAB A Appendix 2 (FRAGO
K

capabilities of systems,

429-2008 COMISAf TAC OIR) installat'ions,
infrastructures,

CCR 380-14, (0105) Pages A

s

8 Dec 08

12,A-13;EO 12958 as
amended. Section 1.4 (a)(g)

projects, plans, or

CCR 380-14, (0110). Page A38- Items 2, 3, and 8; Page A39, Items 9 and 12; EO
13526 Sectton 1,4 (a)(g)

protection services
relating to the natkjnal
security
TAB A Appendix 12
(USCENTCOM
CONSOLIDATED SERIAL ONE Military plans,
L

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

weapons systems, or

5

FOR OPERATION ENDURING operations

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

CCR 380-14 (0110), Page A26, Item 19; EO 13526
Sectton 1.4 (a)

FREEDOM MOD 002)
15 Dec 06

M

Brief To GEN P Findings and

Military plans,

Recs

weapons systems, or

8

June, No year found
QRF SUPPORT FARAH ETT
N

(8141) PowerPoint
document

5

operations

CCR 380-14 (0110), PageA24, Item 12; EO 13526
Section 1.4 (a)

Limitattons and
CCR 380-14, (0109) PageA- CCR 380-14, (0110), PageA-

vulnerabilities of US
forces in the combat

s

area/Operation Code

May 2009

EO 12958 as amended.
Section 1.4 (a)

39; EO 12958 as amended. 39, Items 9 and 12; EO
Section 1.4 (a)(g)

13526 Section 1.4 (a)(g)

Basis f o r Original
Oassification

Basis for Current
Oassification

Words

Enclosure S. Video

Tab

Identified Document

VIDEO (BE 22 PAX), May
2009

Information Oassified
per CCR 38014. EO
12958 as Amended,
and/or EO 13526
Oassification
Operational code
word(s) when
identified with mission
operations

CCR 380-14 (0109), PageAS

Section 1.4 la)

15/15
ManningB_00376902

24; EO 12958 as amended.

CCR 380 14 (0110) Page A23, Item 11; EO 13526
Section 1,4 (a)

20617

DECLARATION
I, Patrick F. Kennedy, declare and state:
BACKGROUND
I am a Career Minister in the Foreign Service with 38 years of experience with the United
States Govemment specializing in national security and foreign affairs. My current position is
Under Secretary ofState for Management, which is responsible for the activities of ten bureaus
and offices that are responsible for management improvement initiatives; diplomatic security and
foreign missions; information resources management; support services for domestic and overseas
operations; consular affairs; human resources; the Foreign Service Institute; overseas buildings;
medical services andfinancialresources management. I report to Hillary Rodham Clinton, the
Secretary ofState. I have held my current position for four years, and have over 18 years of
experience in classification management of national security information, security, and
intelligence, including serving as the State Department Senior Agency Official for Classification
in addition to the Deputy Director ofNational Intelligence for Management for two years and
heading the Transition Team that set up the newly created Office of the Director ofNational
Intelligence.
PURPOSE OF DECLARATION
I submit this declaration, in the matter ofUnited States v. Private First Class Bradlev
Manning, to demonstrate, to the best of my knowledge and belief that disclosure of the
information identified below as classified reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security of the United States. In making the following statement regarding the classified
information in this case, I rely on my personal knowledge and experience, E.O. 13526 on
Classified National Security Information and the Department of State Classification Guide, and
additional information available to me in my official capacity as the State Department's
designated Senior Agency Official responsible for directing and administering the Department's
program for classifying national security information.
I deliberately structured this declaration in an unclassified form to facilitate its handling
and use during any judicial proceeding.
DESIGNATION OF INFORMATION
Information which requires protection in the interest of national security of the United
States is designated CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION per Executive
Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, signed by President Obama on December
29, 2009 [prior to June 27, 2010, refer to Executive Order 12958 signed by President Clinton on
April 20, 1995 as amended by President George W. Bush on March 25,2003]. Information is

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20618

classified in levels commensuratewith the assessment that unauthorized disclosure could cause
the allowing expected damage to national security:
a. Top Secret in^rmation exceptionally grave damage
b. Secret in^rmation serious damage
c. Confidential in^rmation damage
TheMission ofthe Department ofState encompasses the conduct of^reign relations of
the United States which dictates that the Department relies particularly upon two classification
categories when protecting national securityin^rmation. These are described in Sectionl.^of
E.O. 13526 which states in pertinentpart:
Information shall not be considered for classification unless it
concerns:...^b^foreigngovemment information;...^d^^reign
relations or ^reign activities ofthe United States, including
confidential sources....
Forei^ government information, defined in part as in^rmation provided to the United
States Govemment bya^reigngovemment or governments or an intemational organization of
governments is contained in many ofthe documents described in this declaration and is classified
under Sectionl.^^b^ofE.O.13526. An essential understanding thatgoverns all diplomatic
intercourse, and that constitutes an essential element in all successfiil diplomatic exchanges, is
that confidentialitywill be observed. Mutual trustin thisrealm is vital forthedevelopmentof
cordial and productive diplomatic relations. Unwillingness or inability to maintain
confidentiality in diplomatic exchanges would inevitably chill our relations with other countries
and lead to diminished access to sourcesofin^rmation important to the successful ^rmulation
and implementation ofU.S.^reign policy, and therebywould damage the national security.
The abilityto obtain informationfi^mforeign governments is essential to the ^rmulation
and successful implementation ofU.S.^reign policy. Disclosureofforeign govemment
information provided in confidence would cause ^reign officials to believe thatU.S.officials
^^tiot^bl^^r^illiti^to^b^^rv^th^^otifid^titi^lity^^p^^t^diti^ut^bitit^r^h^^^^.

Governments would become less willing in thefiituretofiimishinformation important to the
conduct ofU.S.fi^reign relations, and in general less disposed to cooperate with the United
States in the achievementoffi^reign policy objectives of common interest. Disclosureofthis
in^rmation ^treasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security" ^Section
ll^a^^^^,E0 13526^
Information in almost all ofthe documents described in this declaration have been
classified under Sectionl.^^d^ofE.O. 13526, which protects in^rmation conceming ^^oreig^
relations or ^ r e i ^ activities ofthe United States, including confidential sources. Documents
described below recount details of the relationship between the United States andanumber of
Page^D^^l

I^^ooing8^(^037^90^

20619

Ibreign countries. The documents cover not only the traditional diplomatic, political and
economic relations, but also include important areas such as human rights protection and security
cooperation. Manyofthedocumentsare intended to inlbrm policy makers in Washington ofthe
true situation on the ground and therelbre containfi^ankcomments and criticisms, as well as
analyses that, ifreleased, reasonably could damageU.S.relations with the countries concemed.
Otherdocumentscontaininlbrmation derivedfi^omsources who provided the inlbrmation with
the expectation that theiridentitieswill be protected. Release ofthis infbrmationreasonably
could risk the lile or safetyofthe confidentialsources. Failure to preserve the expected
confidentiality could risk future access not only to these sources, but also to others who might
provide sensitive inlbrmation to U.S. officials. Thisclassificationcategoryhas also been applied
to Ibreign govemment inlbrmation in addition to thel.^^b^ category, as release ofin^rmation
fi^om Ibreign governments could damage U.S. fbreign relations.
Documents described in this declaration have also been protected under classification
categoriesl.^^a^ ^military plans, weapons systems or operations^, l.^^e^ ^scientific,
technological or economic matters^andl.^^g^,vulnerabilities and capabilities ofsystems and
installations.^ The reason Ibr application ofthese categories is included with the document
descriptions.
PROTECTION OFINFORMATION
within the Department ofState, classifiedinlbrmationis handled and protected in
accordancewith:!.^ E.O. 13526^and predecessor orders^on Classified National Security
Inlbrmation, 2.^InIbrmation Security Oversight Office ^ISOO^ Implementing Directive,
Classified National Security Information, 32 CFRParts2001 and 2003, and3^the 12^^ volume
ofthe Foreign Aflairs Manual ^FAM^, section 500, titled Inlbrmation Security. Classified
inlbrmation should be handled and examined only under such conditions as are adequate to
prevent unauthorized personsfi^omgaining access. Classified material may not be removed fiom
designated work areas or movedfi^ominlbrmation systems, e.g. classified databases, computer
networks, servers, or computers, except in the perlbrmance ofofficial duties and under special
conditions which provideprotectionlbrthe classifiedmaterial.
CLASSIFICATION I^ETERMINATION
Ireviewed the material related to this case, which was provided by the prosecution team
attheDepartmentoftheArmy.
1.

NCD Server Logs
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

NCD Server Logs ^^oucher07810, Item ^:l^consistofNetCentric Diplomacy ^NCD^
serveraccess,audit, and application activity logging IromJanuary,2009throughJune, 2010.
These logs reside onanational security system accredited to operate at the Secret level. They
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1^^0010^8^00375505

20620

contain application activity logging, user session and search activity inlbrmation, and extemal
browse-downdata. NCD logging isacontinuous,on^goingprocess based onsystem and user
activity. As such, no action to explicitly classifythe NCD server logs occurs while additional
activity logging is being appended and no original determination ofclassification was made
when the events that generated the log activitytook place. Asubsequentreview ofthe logs by
subject matter experts determined thatthe proper classification ofthe log activity data is
SECRETunderSectionsl.^^d^^g^ofE.O. 13526. The audit logs contain associations between
classified servernamesandTransmissionControlProtocol^IntemetProtocol^TCP^IP^ addresses.
Application logs include entries thatreveal intemal system application attributes. Access logs
contain associations between TCP/IP addresses, user names ^iflogged on through Passports, data
on telegrams being searched, and actual search terms.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would expose
capabilities and identitiesofclassifiednational security systems rendering them vulnerable to
hostile actions. The compilation ofusernames, telegram data, and actual search terms contains
associations that could damage Ibreign relations oftheU.S.and reveal confidential sources.
2.

NCDFirewallLogs
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION

FirewallLogs^^oucherl51^10, Item ^:l^consistofFirewall activity logging fi^om
November, 2009throughMay,2010. These logsreside onanational security system accredited
to operate at the Secret level. They contain inlbrmation regarding inbound and outbound access
sessions through the State Department'sperimetersecurity systems. Firewall logging isa
continuous, on^going process based on system and user activity. As such, no action to explicitly
classily the Firewall server logs occurs while additional activity logging is being appended and
no original determination ofclassification was made when the events that generated the log
activitytook place. Asubsequentreview ofthe logs by subject matter experts determined that
the proper classification ofthe log activity data is SECRET under Sectionl.^^g^ofE.O.13526.
The Firewall logscontain associations between classified hostnamesandTransmission Control
Protocol^ntemet Protocol ^TCP^IP^ addresses. Firewall logs also contain inlbrmation by site
name listing both inbound and outbound classified access activities and application usage along
with data that reveals intemal content^filtering policies.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would expose
capabilities and identities ofclassified national security systems rendering them vulnerable to
hostile actions. The compilation ofcontent-filtering transactions contains associations that
reveal protection services related to the national security.
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3

10REYI^A^IK13
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION

10REYK^A^IK13 is an official telegram Irom Embassy Reykjavik, datedJanuary 13,
2010to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALatthe time itwas generated.ThetelegramremainsCONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems an intemational dispute stemmingfi^omthe collapse ofan
Icelandic bank thathad ofleredhigh interest savings accounts^named^^Icesave"accounts^to
depositors in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. It reports on three conversations with
theU.S.Embassy'sCharged'Aflaires^CDA^ the person in chargeoftheEmbassyin the
absenceofthe Ambassador. Inonemeeting,theCDAspokewithtwo senior Icelandic officials.
In another, he spoke withasenior Icelandic diplomat. In the third, he spoke withaBritish
diplomat. The sources are named in the telegram. They oflered their views in confidence to the
U.S.govemment. The telegram reports theirpersonal views on this ongoing dispute and the
optionstheirgovemments were considering. Publicreleaseoftheoptionsunder consideration
could undermine the negotiating positionsofthe governments involved. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with Iceland
and the United Kingdom and diminish the willingness of Ibreign officials to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
^.

xl2^ Charging Documents
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION

99ISLAMABAD^95 is an official telegram Irom Embassy Islamabad, dated January 25,
1999 to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under Sectionl.^^d^ and those portions were
reclassified on August 9, 2011by an Original ClassificationAuthority^OCA^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram analyses public attitudes towards the messages ofmoderate and radical
Islam and increaBinglyanti American and anti-^estem attitudes in Pakistan. It describes the
sometimes unsatisfactory resultsofprevious public diplomacy eflbrts and makes proposals Ibr
fiiture public diplomacy policy actions. In doing so it expresses views of various potential
audiences and likely receptivity to various proposals. Unauthorized disclosure ofthis material
could be drawn upon, in or out of context, and used by our adversaries against us not onlyin

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Pakistan but in the wider Islamic world.Thus, it would be directly counterproductive to the
policy purposeofthe document.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
05ALGIERS1836 is an official telegramfii^omEmbassy Algiers, dated August 29, 2005 to
the DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions describe some of the responsesofthe U.S.Ambassador's
interlocutors during his confidential conversations with Govemmentof Algeria officials
Ibliowing the visit to the region ofSenatorLugar, who had conducted sensitive negotiations on
the releaseofPolisario prisoners long held by Morocco. The clear expectationofthe Algerian
officials in the Ambassador'smeetings was that their remarks, which included expressions of
private regret,were not Ibr public dissemination. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of Algeria and
diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business withU.S. officials
and visiting legislative branch persons.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06ALGIERS1961 is an official telegram Irom Embassy Algiers, dated November 12,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderEO 12958 atthetime itwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O 13526 underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions identilyanonofficial source who was speaking to U.S.officials
on intemal political and economic matters in the expectation of complete confidentiality. That
person'sabilityto function in that 80ciety,andpossiblythe ability ofhi8 associates to unction,
would be harmed byrevelation ofhis identity.Unauthorizeddisclosure of the classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the individual concemed and diminish his
and others'willingness to conductconfidential businesswithU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06 BAGHDAD26^6isanof^cial telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, datedJuly 2^, 2006
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder
E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.O. 13526
under Sectionl.^^d^.
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The report discussesasensitive intemal matter, the revelation ofwhich would to this day
create anger and instability amongasignificantsegmentofthe population in Iraq. In addition, it
is based on privileged inlbrmation obtained in strict confidence Irom sources who expected longterm protection. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish its officials' ^and other
private parties'^willingness to confide in U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06BAGHDAD^205 is an official telegram Irom Embassy Baghdad, dated NovemberlO,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIOENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionL^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document describesaconversation between two very senior U.S.officials and the
leadersofaleading Iraqi political group. Discussion centered on intemal politics and the Iraqi
participants clearly had the expectation that theywere speaking in complete confidentiality.
Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would cause harm to relations
with the important organization the interlocutorsrepresented and diminish its leaders'^ and
other Iraqi oppositionists' willingness to communicate Irankly with U.S.oIficials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
06BEIRUT3603 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Beirut, dated Novemberll,2006
totheDepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated.Thetelegramremains SECRET under E.O. 13526
under Sectionsl.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The reportdescribesthe U.S.Ambassador'sconversationswith visiting intemational
organization officials onanumberof sensitive issues inaregion then in confiict. The officials
spoke with candorin the clear expectation that the Ambassador would hold their comments in
strict confidence. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to U.S. relations with the concemed agency and other intemational organizations,
and diminish their officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
of^cials.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06BEIRUT360^ is an official telegram Irom Embassy Beirut, dated November 12, 2006
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram wasproperly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.O. 13526
under Sectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document reportsaconversation between the U.S.Ambassador andasenior and
still^active Lebanese politician, who spoke in the expectation of complete confidentiality.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause serious harm to
the United States by diminishingthewillingnessofthe individual and, by extension, other
Lebanese leaders to conduct confidential exchanges in candorwithU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06BEIRUT3703 is an official telegram Irom Embassy Beirut, dated November 27,2006
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. Portionsofthe telegram were properly classified
SECRETunder E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
SECRET under E.O. 13526 underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions describe the U.S.Ambassador'sconfidential conversation witha
prominent Lebanese person who is still alive. The conversation centers on sensitive issues and
personalities on the Lebanese political scene, and was conducted in the expectation ofcomplete
confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
serious harm to relations with the Ibllowers ofthe individual and diminish U.S.officials'ability
to commimicate with the various Lebanese lactions. In the extreme, it could also endanger his
lile in the volatile political^sectarian climate prevalent in that nation.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06BELGRADE1681 is an official telegram IromEmbaBsy Belgrade, dated Octoberl7,
2006 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIAL underE0 13526underSectionsl^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram severely criticizes the responseof senior Serbian olficials toaset of
proposals that the United States had made to the Serbian govemment designed to capture an
alleged war criminal wanted by the Intemational CriminalTribunal Ibr the IbrmerYugoslavia.
The telegram also reports inlbrmation provided by named Ibreign officials to the U.S.
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govemment in the expectation that it would be kept confidential. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would harm relations with the Govemment ofSerbia and
especiallywiththeinfiuential persons who are directly criticized. Its release would also
diminish the willingness of officials Irom Serbia, the Intemational CriminalTribunal for the
IbrmerYugoslavia,andelsewhereto conductconfidential diplomatic business withU.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06COLOMBO1889 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Colombo, dated November 10,
2006 to the Department ofState. Four pages. Thetelegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reportsadiscussion between the Ambassador and senior Sri Lankan
officialsabout the scope and intensityofrecentGovemmentofSri Lanka military action against
the rebelTamil Tigers towards the end ofthe long Ibught insurgency in thatcountry.
Descriptions ofthe actions and possible upcoming actions need no longer be classified in view of
the termination ofhostilities and the passageoftime. Material that remains classified reveals the
identities of theofficials and inlbrmation about military and capabilities^vulnerabilities. It also
expresses the Ambassador'sjudgment ofthe views expressed by the officials themselves and in
comparison to previously reported inlbrmation. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified
material could be used to politically damage theofficials involved and thereby cause damage to
relations with the GovemmentofSri Lanka.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5^20 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kabul, dated November 10, 2006
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram wasproperlyclassified
CONFIDENTIAL in part underEO. 12958 at the time it was generated Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFU^ENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under SectionslB^^^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the Ambassador'smeeting with President Karzai and senior security
officials about steps being taken to relbrm the Aighan National Police. Some portions that
remain CONFIDENTIAL report Karzai'semphasis on specific factors, including ethnic
representation and other sensitive matters. It also reports the Ambassador'simplicit evaluation
ofthosecomments.Otherportions reveal advicebeing given by specific participants including
one European allied official. Unauthorized disclosureofthis material would reveal the identities

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ofindividuals who were giving their views to the President and thereby would undermine the
confidenceofPresidentKarzai, and of otherpersons present, in fiiture such exchanges.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5^21 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kabul, dated NovemberlO, 2006
totheDepartmentofState. Seven pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderEO 12958 atthetimeitwas generated Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram reports on the actions ofarecently arrived GovemorofUruzgan Province
in creatingamilitiaand describes its use in several intervening events. It fiirther discusses the
possible integration ofthis and othermilitias into an auxiliary police. The portions that remain
classified describe confiictingversionsofthe events and allegations conceming motivations of
various parties. They also reveal the Embassy'sassessment of the events as they refiect on the
official who remains in high office. One portion also reveals related inlbrmation given in
confidence by allied personnel in Alghanistan. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material
withheld would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of Alghanistan and diminish the
willingness ofour allies to exchange confidences with us.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KABUL5^35 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kabul, dated November 12, 2006
totheDepartmentofState. Six pages. Thetelegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.0.12958 at the time it wasgenerated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsl^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thistelegramreports on actions taken byanew Acting Commanderofthe Aighan
Border PoliceinKhostProvinceafierawalkout by aboutone fifih ofthe Ibrce underthe
previouscommand^r^^^i^cu88e8pro8pect8 fbr the fiiture including likely personnel
movements, sometimes inapolitical context. Some portions report remarks by some Ibreign
official and non-official sources about the natureoftheprevious problems and the actions and
motivations ofindividuals and groups. The cable also gives the Embassy'sassessmentofthe
situation. Someofthe inlbrmation need no longer be classified. Unauthorized disclosure of
otherreported events, allegations and ofthe sources could be damaging to individuals identified
and the Embassy'srelations with them, and inhibit the Embassy'sabilityto elicit similarly
confidential inlbrmation fiom fiiture interlocutors.

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KAT^^MANDU3023 isanofficialtelegram fiomEmbassyKathmandu,dated
NovemberlO, 2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthetime it was generated. Portions of
the telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram describes the U.S.Ambassador'sdiscussions with the UN representative in
Nepal concemingaproposed UN role in the implementation of an impending agreement
between the Govemment ofNepal and Maoist insurgents to end their long confiict, including the
needfbraUN Security Council Resolution. Portions being withheld report the representative's
thinking about how he will proceed and what he envisions the UN role to be. It fiirther expresses
the ambassador'sviews which are at odds with some of that thinking. Representatives of the UN
and its constituent bodies expect that their discussions with us ofthis nature will be kept in
confidence. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specifiedabovecould be used
against us and thoseofficialsbypersons or governments of countries withastake in matters
being discussed. Thus it would adversely affect our diplomats'ability to conduct similar
discussions with all UN representativesworldwide, thereby damaging U.S.fbreignrelations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06KAT^^MANDU302^ is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kathmandu, dated
NovemberlO, 2006 to the DepartmentofState. Sevenpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 atthe time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIAL underE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram describes theU.S.Ambassador'sconfidential conversations with the
NepalesePrime Minister and his foreign policyadvisoraboutthe prospects fbr an agreement
with the Nepalese Maoists afieralong civil war and about the nature of the intemational
involvement. The portions that remain CONFIDENTIAL reveal the Prime Minister'sand the
Advisor'sexpressed personal views as well as Govemment ofNepal thinking about:l^the
natureofthe intemational involvement in reaching and implementing an agreement;2^attitudes
of certain otherparties;3^ intemal political and legal aspects and the likely attitude ofthe
insurgent elements. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterialspecifiedabovecould still
be used adversely by elementswithinNepalnot sympathetic with the govemment and would
betrayconfidentialitiesexpected by the Nepalese officials.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06KU^AIT^^30 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kuwait, dated November 10,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated.Portions ofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The still^exempted portions describe the Embassy'sassessmentofrumorsofthe
dissolution ofparliament and new elections. It draws on conversations with various Kuwaiti
officials and politicians, who spoke to U.S.diplomats in the expectation ofconfidentiality.
Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classified material would cause harm to the Embassy'srelations
with both the Govemment ofKuwait and Kuwaiti politicians, and diminish theirwillingness to
conduct confidential exchanges with U.S. officials in the fiiture.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
06KU^AIT^38 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kuwait, dated November 12,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderEO 12958 atthe time itwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL underEO 13526 underSectionlB^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions are part ofadiscussion betweenaU.S.andaKuwaiti ofiicial on
economic matters, especiallyastill-sensitive question conceming otherparties in the region.
The conversation was conducted in the expectation ofconfidentiality on both sides.
Unauthorizeddisclosure oftheexemptedmaterialwould cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofKuwait and diminish its officials'willingness to conductconfidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
06MADRID2955 is unofficial telegram from Embassy Madrid, dated November 27,
2006 to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly cla8sified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsl.^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the Deputy Chief ofMission'sprivateconversation withasenior
Spanish official aboutaterritorialdispute in another country. Thetelegram also reportsaremark
on the same topic that an even more senior Spanish official made toavisiting American
diplomat inaconfidential setting. The dispute in question has implications fbr the territorial
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integrityofSpain, making itaparticularlysensitiveissue in Spanish politics. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
GovemmentofSpain and diminish the willingnessofSpanish and otherofficials to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
06MADRID2956 is an official telegram from Embassy Madrid, dated November 27,
2006 to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL imder E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIAL underE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reportsaprivate conversation between the Deputy Chief ofMissionanda
senior Spanish official about the prospects fbr admitting another countryto the European Union
^EU^. The Spanish official comments on the attitudes ofother EU members on the issue.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofSpain and diminish the willingnessofSpanish and other officials to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06PRISTINA9^7isan official telegram fiom U.S. OfficePristina, dated Novemberll,
2006 to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated.Portions ofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems plans fbr the departureofthe United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
Classified portions report confidential criticisms fiom named sources about the performance of
an intemational organization andagovernment ministry and its chief. Unauthorizeddisclosure
ofthe classified materialspecifiedabove would diminish the willitigti^^^ ofofficials from
fbreigngovemments and intemationalorganizationsto speak fiankly with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06PRISTINA9^8 is an official telegram fiom U.S.OfficePristina, dated Novemberll,
2006 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^.

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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems plans Ibr refugee movements afieradecision on Kosovo'sfinal
status. Classified portions contain critical comments about the perfbrmanceofintemational
agencies, some of them offered in the expectation ofconfidentialitybyanamed fbreign of^cial
andsomemadeby U.S.Office Pristinaitself Unauthorized disclosure oftheclassifiedmaterial
specified above would cause harm to relations with intemational organizations and diminish the
willingness ofofficials fiom intemational organizations and fbreign governments to share their
views with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
06RJYADII8811is an official telegram fiom Embassy Riyadh, dated Novemberll,2006
totheDepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated.Thetelegramremains SECRET under E.O. 13526
under Sectionsl.^^a^,^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document reports highly sensitive conversations between U.S. Embassy officials and
visiting U.S.militaryofficialson the one side, and senior Saudi officialson theother. The
discussions, which involved very delicatepolitical and material matters, wereconducted in the
expectation oftotal secrecy. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe contentswouldcauseseriousharm
to relations with the Govemment ofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand seriously diminish its
officials'willingness to conduct sensitive diplomatic and security business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
06SEOUL3882 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Seoul, dated November 10, 2006 to
the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETimder
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions of the telegram remain SECRETimder E.O.
13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseclassified portionsdescribe theU.S.Charged'Affairs'diplomatic exchanges with
asenior fbreign ministry official ofthe Govemment ofthe Republic ofKorea conceming the
Proliferation Security Initiative ^PSI^,aglobalantiproliferation effbrt aimed at stopping the
trafficking ofweaponsof mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. This
effbrt is particularly important as it relates to North Korea. The PSI is highly controversial in the
Republic ofKorea and unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material could be seized upon by
opposition elements to imdermine supporters ofthe effbrt. In addition, compromise ofthis
diplomatic exchange would cause harm toU.S.relationswith the Govemment ofthe Republic of

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Korea and discourage its officials Irom conducting highly sensitive diplomatic business with
U.S. officials in the future.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06SEOUL3885 is an official telegram from Embassy Seoul, dated November 12, 2006 to
the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderEO 13526 underSections^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The classified portions describeadiscussionbetweenasenior South Korean political
figure andU.S.diplomatic officials coveringabroadrangeofhighly sensitive topics including
theU.S. Republic ofKorea Alliance, North Korea and the Six PartyTalks and domestic
political developments. Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classified material specified above would
cause embarrassment and harm to this highlyprominentpolitician and diminish the willingness
ofother Korean officials to discuss confidential sensitive subjects with U.S.officials in the
future. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would also cause harm
to relations with the Govemment ofthe Republic ofKorea and diminish its officials'willingness
to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06SU^A^89 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Suva, dated November 12, 2006 to the
DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIOENTIAL in part
underE.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The classified portions describe the embassy'sassessmentofacivil^military crisis in
whichFiji'sMilitary Forces Commander is pitted againstthecountry'sPrime Minister.
I^etailed comments from prominent loc9l80urce8 on the growing confrontation are also reported.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material would cause harm to U.S.relations with the
local authorities and injure the reputation of embassy sources resulting in an tmwillingnessof
these and othersources to meet with U.S.officials in the fiiture.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06TAIPEI3830isatelegram from the American InstituteTaiwan^AIT^, Taipei, dated
November 12,2006 to the Department ofState. Two pages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified SECRETunder E.0.12958 at the time itwas generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainSECRET under E.O. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^.
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describes an AIT officer'sconfidential discussion with an export control
authority inTaiwan conceming UN Security Council Resolutionl718, which imposed economic
and commercial sanctions on North Korea in the afiermath ofthat nation's claimed nuclear test
ofOctober9,2006. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material would cause harm to U.S.
relations with the authorities in Taiwan and diminishTaiwan officers'willingness to conduct
confidential business with the American Institute inTaiwan in the fiiture.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06TRIPOLI6^5isanofficialtelegramfiomEmbassyTripoli,datedNovemberlO,2006
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram wasproperly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The exempted portions describeaconversation between an Embassy officer anda
representative ofthe Libyan Ministry ofForeign Aflairs called at the behest ofthat Ministry.
The purpose was to convey Libya'sviews onaregional issue, and the GovemmentofLibya had
every expectation to believe that the United States Govemment would treat thesubject and the
detailsofthe discussion as confidential. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofLibya present or future
^and diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials. Itwouldalso be seen by otherstates,particularlythose in the region, ofalapse in U.S.
abilitytomaintainconfidentialityin its diplomatic exchanges.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
06TRIPOLI6^8 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Tripoli, dated November 10,2006
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages, The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionL^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions contain the Embassy'scandidanalysisofthe Libyan central bank's
attempts to enlist our help in settingupatrainingprogram. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
exempted material would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofLibya^present or
fiiture^anddiminishitsofficials'willingnesstoconductdiscussmattersinprivatewithU.S.
officials.

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07ADDISABABA2197 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Addis Ababa, dated July
13,2007 to the Department ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsremain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionL^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Itreportsaconversation with an NGO source who was speaking in confidence withU.S.
officials aboutsensitive matters inazoneof ongoing insurgency. Hemayhave been speaking
without the consent ofhis organization. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause serious harm to the individual and inhibit his and his organization's
ability to function in countries throughout the entire region. This in tum could have negative
impact on the ability ofUS.officials to communicate with non^govemment individuals.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07ANKAI^A^3is an official telegram fiom Embassy Ankara, dated January 8, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was classified CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated.Aportion ofthe telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL
underEO 13526 under SectionlB^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems Turkish impatience with American effbrts to counter the Kurdish
workers'Party ^PKK^,which is engaged in armed struggle with the Govemment ofTurkey.The
classified portion contains the Embassy'sspeculation about intemal pressures within theTurkish
govemment. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the Govemment ofTurkey.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07ANI^A^A^ ^68 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Ankara, dated October ^,2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram assesses the prospects fbrpolitical refbrm inTurkey. Classifiedportions
contain assessmentsofpolitical refbrm that official, nonofficial, and diplomatic sources, some
named and others identifiable, provided in confidence to Embassy staff One portion contains
the Embassy'sown assessment ofthe situation. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would subject some Embassy sources to retribution and would, in
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general, diminish the willingness of sources to share their views with U.S. officials.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe Embassy'sviews on the sensitive domestic issueofpolitical
refbrm would damage relations withTurkey.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07ASIIGABAT1359 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Ashgabat, dated December
1^,2007 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the accotmt given to the U.S. Ambassador by the Russian
Ambassador inTurkmenistanaboutarecent high level Russian^Turkmen visit which resulted in
agas export agreementandotherpublicly announced topics. The portions remaining
CONFIDENTIAL are the Russian Ambassador'sexplanations about the detailsofthe Russians
Turkmen arrangements, his rather extraordinaryinterpretationofU.S.policy in the region and of
Ttirkmenistan'srelations with the Chinese and other governments in the region. They also relay
the Embassy'sfiank comments abouttheRussian'sexpressed views. Unauthorized disclosureof
the classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Russian and the
Turkmen governments and diminish their officials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD35 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, datedJanuary 5,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.0.13526
underSection l.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The documenttransmits the Embassy'sanalysis ofastill^delicate intemal political
situation in the cotmtry. It contains candid assessmentsofthe motives and perlbrmanceofsenior
Iraqi officials, some still in power. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified
above would cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish its
officials'willingness to discuss delicate political matters withU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD36 is anofficialtelegram fiom EmbassyBaghdad,datedJanuary5,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properlyclassified SECRETunder

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E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.O. 13526
underSectionsl.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram contains the Embassy'sreportofaconversation between the Ambassador
andahighlyplaced Iraqi govemmentofficial on sensitive intemal and bilateral matters. The
conversation was conducted in the expectation ofstrict confidentiality. Unauthorizeddisclosure
ofthe contents would cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish
its officials'willingness to discuss delicate political and security matters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD37 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January5,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Sevenpages. Thetelegram wasproperlyclassified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwasgenerated.The telegramremainsSECRET under E.O. 13526
under Sectionsl.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocument contains the Embassy'sreport ofameetingbetweenaveryseniorvisiting
U.S. officials and senior Iraqi political and govemment persons on sensitive intemal and bilateral
matters. Severalofthe Iraqi participants are still in theirrespective positions. The conversation
was conducted in the expectation ofstrict confidentiality on the Iraqi side. Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause serious harm to relations with
both the Govemment oflraq and Iraqi politicalfigures,and diminish their willingness to discuss
delicate political and securitymatters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD^2 is an official telegram from Embassy Baghdad, dated January7,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. Thetelegram wasproperly classified SECRETunder
E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.0.13526
underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram contains the Embassy'sreportand analysis of an intemal security situation
andtheGovemmentoflraq'seffbrtstodealwithit. Itrefers to conversations with Iraqi
officials, some ofwhom senior and still serving, conducted in candor and the expectation of
strict confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would
cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and diminish itsofficials'
willingness to discuss delicatepolitical and securitymatters with U.S.officials.

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD53 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January7,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL imder E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIAL underE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document contains the Embassy'sreport ofacandid conversation on intemal
political and security matters withasenior Iraqi official, who is still serving, conducted in the
expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterialspecified above
would cause harm to relations with the individual and the Govemmentoflraq, and diminish its
officials'willingness to discuss political and securitymatters with U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD56 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January7,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIOENTIAL
in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526 under Section l.^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Exempted portions contain the Embassy'ssometimes critical assessment ofthe political
and security situation inaprovince in Iraq. It includes quotes fiom local political leaders who
were speaking in confidence to U.S.officials. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment oflraq and with political
leaders. Revelation would diminish those persons'willingness to discuss political and security
matters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHl^AI^63i8 an official telegram from Embassy Baghdad, datedJanuary7,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET under
E.O.12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.O. 13526
underSectionsl.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document contains the Embassy'sreportofasensitive conversation on intemal
political and regional and securitymatters between the Ambassador andasenior Iraqi official,
who also representsaminority faction. It was held in the expectation ofconfidentiality.
Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause serious harm to
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relations with Iraqi leaders and officials and diminish their willingness to discuss political and
security matters withU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGIIDAD6^ is an official telegram from Embassy Baghdad, dated January7,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Department ofState equities are no longer sensitive; butrelease would require
Department ofTreasury concurrence.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BAGHDAD70 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated January 8, 2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. Thetelegram wasproperlyclassified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated.Thetelegramremains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document contains the Embassy'sreportofaconversation on intemal political and
securitymatters withavery senior Iraqi official, who is still serving, conducted in the
expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classifiedmaterial specified above
would cause harm to relations with the Govemmentoflraq and diminish itsofficials'willingness
to discuss political and security matters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07BANGKOKlllis an official telegram fiom the Embassy in Bangkok, dated January 8,
2007 to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIOENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderEO 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThistelegramdescribestheU.S.Ambassador'sconfidential conversations with senior
Thai govemment officials conceming serious Thai domestic difficulties. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would result in serious embarrassment to the
seniorThai officials mentioned and would be seized on by some local critics as heavy-handed
U.S.interference in Thai intemalaffairs. Sucharevelation would cause overall harm to U.S.
relations with the GovemmentofThailand and would lessenU.S.effectiveness in our effort to
ameliorate fiiture problems.
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I^CUMENTII^ENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BASRAII3 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Office Basrah, datedJanuary5,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part
underE.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portions remain SECRETunder E.O. 13526
under Sectionsl.^^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isareportofakidnapping of an American citizen in Basrah and the
exempted passages include candid commentary on the backgroundofthe case, as well as
infbrmation provided in confidence by Iraqi security officials. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classifiadmaterial specified above would cause serious harm to relations with the Govemment of
Iraq and hinder future willingness oflraqi authorities to share infbrmation with US. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BEUING152 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Beijing, dated January 8, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properlyclassified CONFIOENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains CONFIDENTIAL tmder
E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describes theU.S.Charged'Affairs'conversation withaChinese
Assistant Foreign Minister held with an expectation ofconfidentiality conceming matters related
to the Taiwanese and their alleged ^^separatist activities." Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofChina and diminish its
officials'confidence in being able to discusscomplex diplomatic business with U.S. officials
without theirviews being publicized.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BEIRUT1958 is an official telegramfiomEmbassyBeiru4 dated December 1^,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
under E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526
under Sectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThetelegramreportstheEmbassy'sconversationswithpolitical leaders on sensitive
intemal issues conceming their movement. The leaders, many ofwhom are still active in
Lebanon'stempestuous politics, would expect their confidences to be strictly protected by U.S.
officials. Unauthorizeddisclosureoftheclassifiedmaterial specified above would causeharm to
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relations with the opposition political figures in Lebanon and diminish its leaders'willingness to
discuss policy matters with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BOGOTA101 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Bogota, datedJanuary 5,2007 to
the Department ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part tmder E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunder E.0 13526underSectionl^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This cable sets out Ibravisiting seniorU.S.military commander the political and security
situation in Colombia and describes the views ofseniorColombian officials on the country's
strained relations with several third countries. The withheld material speculates on new
directions in Ibreign policy fbllowingpolitical change. It discusses the country'srelations with
two other countries which have become particularly sensitive. Unauthorized disclostire ofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of
Colombia and with third countries and would diminish the willingness ofColombian officials to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.officials, to the detriment ofour interests in
the country.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07BOGOTA5118 is an of^cial telegram fiom Embassy Bogota, datedJuly 13, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionslBl^^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe ongoingnegotiations between the Govemment ofColombia and
aterrorist group and the Govemment'spriority objectives in those negotiations. The inlbrmation
was provided to us by ofiicials in confidence, and their identity deserves protection. The
inlbrmation includes strategies and tactics that the Govemment might still employ in
negotiations with dissidents and our own evaluation oftheir possible effectiveness.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the Govemment ofColombia and diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S.officials or to provide infbrmation, to the detriment ofour interests
in the cotmtry.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
07BRATISLA^A665 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Bratislava, dated December
1^,2007 to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 atthe time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram
remainCONFIDENTIALinpartunderEO. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Classified portionsreport onaprivatemeetingbetween the DeputyChiefofMission and
the DeputyForeignMinisterofSlovakiain which theydiscussedKosovo and Iran.
Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classifiedmaterialspecified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofSlovakia and diminish the willingness ofSlovak and other officials to
conduct confidential diplomatic business withU.S. representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BRIDGETO^^^23 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Bridgetown, datedJanuary 5,
2007to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe the impact in Grenada of recent elections inaneighboring
Caribbean country, the effbrts ofGrenadian political groups to use the outcome fortheir own
piu^oses, and the private comments ofleadingGrenadian politicalfigLu^esto U.S.Govemment
officials. The infbrmation was given with an expectation ofconfidentiality. The infbrmation
includesafrank analysis of weaknesses of various elements of the local political scene and the
media. It speculates on tactics to be used by various political groups. Unauthorizeddisclosure
ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with various Grenadian
political factions and leaders as well as Govemmentofficials and would discourage their
willingness to engage in candid and confidential diplomatic exchanges with U.S. officials, to the
detrimentofU.S.interests in the county.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07BUENOSAIRES13^1 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Buenos Aires, dated July
13, 2007 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionslBl^b^^d^

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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes theU.S.Ambassador'sconversations with Govemmentof
Argentinaofficials conceming differences within the Argentine Govemment on relations with
theU.S.Govemment. They tookplace inaconfidential environment that permitted each official
to speak fiankly. The message makes recommendationson improving strained bilateral and
regional ties. It proposes fiirther highlevel discussions with Department ofState principals.
Sensitive regional issues are raised in the conversations, withafiank exchange of views. Past
bilateral problems are discussed. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classifiedmaterial specified
above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofArgentina, diminish its officials'
willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials, and inhibit future
negotiations.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07CARACAS23^ is an official telegram fiom Embassy Caracas, dated December 1^,
2007 to the DepartmentofState, Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionlB^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes developments inakey^enezuelan economic sector,drawing on
the assessments ofmultiple industrial sector and official sources. It speculates on possible
malfeasance andreportsevidenceofmultiple financial difficulties relating toabulwark of the
country'seconomy. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified materialspecifiedabove would
seriously damage commercial andofficial interests ofthe various sources, diminish their
willingness to engage in candidexchangeswith U.S.officials, and open them toofficial
harassmentand commercialretaliation. Itwouldreduce the abilityofourofficials to protect
U.S. economic interests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07CARACAS35 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Caracas, datedJanuary 5,2007 to
the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describea^enezuelanGovemment'sinitiative to fbrmasingle
^^revolutionary" political party, the Embassy'sfiank assessment ofthe purposeofthe new
organization, and the reaction ofdiverse supporters ofPresident Chavez to being subject to
increased political discipline and stricter ideology. It speculates on tactics to be used by the
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Govemment. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the Govemment ofVenezuela and diminish the willingness of^enezuelan
political leaders and other sources to conduct confidential and candid discussions with U.S.
officials and to provide infbrmation.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07DHAKA2^is an official telegram fiom Embassy Dhaka, dated January7,2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Foiu^ pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
tmder E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIAL underE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the Ambassador'sconversation,togetherwithathird country
national, informing the head ofamajorBangladeshi political party ofhighly sensitive political
infbrmation that had come fiom confidential sources, whilethefactofthe Ambassador's
meetingwithapolitical leader is not sensitive, the unauthorized disclosure of the classified
material specified above could be explosive in the Bangladeshi domestic political scene and
cause harm to relations with the party leader and otherinfiuential persons in Bangladesh, and
therebyimpairtheEmbassy'sabilitytoeffectivelyrepresentU.S.national securityinterests in
thatcountry.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07KABUL68 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kabul, datedJanuary7,2007. Four
pages. The telegram was properlyclassifiedSECRET under E.O. 12958 at the time it was
generated.ThetelegramremainsSECRET under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegramdescribesameetingbetweenEmbassy Kabul andanumber of Afghan
officials discussing in detail matters concemingAfghan detainees held by theU.S. Portions
withheld describe various po88iblearrang^tii^m^ between the U.S.an^Afghatii^tan fbr the
possible movement and^orrelease ofparticularindividuals.lt reveals information about and
constraints perceived on this highly sensitive subject which i8amatter of concem not only to the
detainees and their families but also toawidespectrumofthe Afghan populace. Itsrelease
would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofAfghanistan and diminish its officials'
willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07KINGSTON25 is anofficial telegram fiom Embassy Kingston, dated January 5,2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIOENTIAL
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in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIAL underE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe sensitive comments byaleadingintemationalhealth official on
the efficacy of the Govemment of Jamaica'sresponsetoamalaria outbreak and the coimtry's
fiindingpriorities fbr public health. He speculates on the effect the outbreak mighthave ona
fiiture intemational sporting event to be hosted by Jamaica. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of
Jamaica, diminish the willingness ofintemational officials to conduct confidential businesswith
U.S. officials, and create strains in relations between an intemational entity and the Govemment
ofJamaica.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07KUALALUMPUR^0 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Kuala Lumpur, dated
January 8, 2007 to the DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describesaU.S.Embassyofficer'sconfidential conversations withasenior
Malaysian Foreign Affairs official concemingacontroversial matter to be considered by the UN
SecurityCouncil. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthisclassifiedmaterial would cause harm to
relations with the Govemment ofMalaysia and diminish its officials'confidence in discussing
sensitive intemational issues with theU.S., without fearoftheir views being publicized.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07LAGOS719is an official telegram fiom Embassy Lagos, dated November 1,2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofitremain CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O 13526 underSectionlBl^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
It is an Embassyreportonanew,highly publicized gubematorial appointment. Portions
o f i t draw on the sensitivecommentsofprivate sources who believed they were speaking in
confidence and whose identities need to be protected. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would cause harm to the Embassy'srelations with political leaders and
diminish theirwillingness to engage in candid discussions withU.S. officials in the future.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07LAPA^19^9 is an official telegram fiom Embassy La Paz, datedJuly 13, 2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
tmder E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe the commentsofleadingBolivian politicalfiguresabout an
attack on an indigenous leader and the Embassy'sfi^ank assessment ofthe political consequences
ofthe incident. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the Govemment ofBolivia and diminish the willingnessofleading
Bolivian politicians to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials, to the
detrimentofourinterests in the cotmtry.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07LIMA2^00 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Lima, dated July 13, 2007 to the
National SecurityCouncil and to the DepartmentofState.Fourpages, The telegram was
properlyclassified CONFIDENTIAL in part tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated.
Portionsofthetelegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under Sectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportionsdescribe U.S.officials'confidential conversations with Govemmentof
Peru officials and civic leaders duringaperiod ofincreased labor unrest and street
demonstrations. It includes the Embassy'sfiank assessment of the likely political consequences
ofthe unrest. Several sources are identifiedwhose opinions and infbrmation areofimportance
to the Embassy in protecting U.S. interests in the country. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofPeru
and diminish willingnessofitsofficialsandof civic leaders to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials and to provide infbrmation.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07MINSK1024 is an official telegram from Embassy Minsk, dated December 1^,2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram wa8 properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports onavisit by the Ambassador andarepresentative ofthe European
Union toahospitalized youth leaderwho had been beaten by police. Classified portions contain
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the viewsofthe hospitalized activist andarelative as well as infbrmation fiom another named
source about his condition. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above
would endanger Embassy contacts in Belarus and diminish the willingness ofsources
everywhere to speak fiankly with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07MOSCO^582^is anofficial telegram from Embassy Moscow,dated December 1^,
2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properlyclassified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsL^^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports whatasenior Russian diplomat told an embassy officer in
confidence onavarietyofcurrent issues. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofRussia and diminish the
willingnessofRussian and other officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business withU.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
07MOSCO^5825 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Moscow,dated December!^,
2007 totheDepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL imder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionL^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram discusses Russian politics, presenting the viewsofnumerous identified
sources who talked with Embassy officers in the expectation of confidentiality.Unauthorized
disclosure of the classified material specified above would endanger someofthe sources cited
and, ingeneral, diminish the willingness ofRussians and others to speak fiankly with U.S.
officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07NE^DELHI80 is an of^cial telegram fiom EmbassyNew Delhi, datedJanuary 8,
2007 tothe DepartmentofState. Threepages. Thetelegram wasproperlyclassified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderEO 12958 at the time it was generated Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSection l.^^d^.

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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the pas8ageofareligious conversion ban in one State in India.
Those portions that remain CONFIDENTIAL include the source of an opinion given bya
memberofaminority religious community and the Embassy'scomment on the political
significanceofthe measure to the central govemment in India. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
source could adversely impact the personal welfare ofthe interlocutor. Disclosure oftheU.S.
comment would likely be exploited bypoliticaland/orsectarian parties, thereby infiaming anti^
American feelings and causing harm to U.S. relations with India.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
07PANAMA1197 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Panama, dated July 13, 2007 to
the Department ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it wasgenerated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIAL underE0 13526underSectionslBl^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe confidential conversations between U.S. officials and
Govemment ofPanama officials and opposition leaders on infighting within Panama'spolitical
parties. These fiank discussions center on candidates fbr legislative leadership positions and fbr
the Presidency. There are also sensitive conversations onPanama'srelations with third countries
which directly affect U.S.interests. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified
above would cau8e harm to relations with the GovemmentofPanama and diminish the
willingness ofofficials and otherpolitical leaders to provide infbrmation and to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S.officials, to the detrimentofourinterests in the
country.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07PANAMA1198 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Panama, dated July 13, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 underSection8l.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes theU.S.Ambassador'sconversations with Govemmentof
Panama officials afier deliveringademarche on sensitive negotiations onadifficult regional
problem. They took place inaconfidential environment that permitted each official to speak
frankly. The message includes an Embassy assessment ofthe likely Panamanian response to
U.S.proposals. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause

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harm to relations with the Govemment ofPanama, diminish its officials'willingness to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials, and inhibit future negotiations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07PARIS^722 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Paris, dated December 1^,2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETunder E.O.
12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains SECRETunder E.O. 13526 under
SectionslB^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the views of two named fbreign officials aboutFrancoGerman
cooperation and Frenchofficials. ThecommentsweremadetoaU.S.Embassy officer in the
expectation of confidentiality.Unauthorized disclosureofthe classifiedmaterial specified above
would jeopardize the careerof one source and, in general, diminish the willingness of fbreign
officials to exchange views with U.S. representatives.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07PARIS^723 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Paris, dated December 14, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under
E 0 13526underSectionsl4^b^^d^^e^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems an intemational trade dispute between the United States and the
European Union. It provides the Embassy'sanalysis ofthe problem and its recommendations fbr
action, while also identifyingasourceofinfbrmation provided in confidence to the Embassy.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to the
economic interestsofthe United States and diminish the willingness of fbreign contacts to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07RANGOON22 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Rangoon, dated January 8, 2007
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl4^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describes sensitive infbrmation and analysis conceming the Burmese ruling
authorities and possible fiiturepolitical developments. In addition, it includes comments fiom
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multiple sources, includingathird country diplomat, provided with an expectation of
confidentiality conceming Burmese intemal matters. Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classified
material would damage relations with the host govemment and also jeopardize the abilityofthe
U.S.Embassy to obtain similarinfbrmation in the future fiom these and other sources.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
07REYKJA^IK203isan officialtelegram fiom EmbassyReykjavik,datedJuly 13, 2007
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsl4^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems an Icelandic inquiry into allegations that the CIA transported
detainees through Iceland. Classified portions report the Embassy'sanalysis of the situation and
the views ofnamedoridentifiablelcelandicofficials as provided to Embassy staffin the
expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above
would cause harm to relations with the Govemmentoflceland and diminish the willingnessof
Icelandic and otherofficials to conduct confidential diplomatic business withU.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07RIYADH21 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Riyadh, dated January 8, 2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properlyclassifiedSECRET tmder E.O.
12958 atthetimeitwas generated. ItremainsSECRETunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4
^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document reportsadiplomatic demarche by an Embassy Officer on an official of the
Saudi MinistryofForeign Affairs onaregional matter, including the response of the Saudi
official. The Saudi official 8poke in the expectation that the diplomatic exchange would be
treated as confidential. Unauthorized disclosure of the classified material specified above would
cause seriou8 harm to relations with the Govemment ofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand
diminish itsofficials'willingness to speak in confidence to U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
07RIYADH22 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Riyadh, dated January 8, 2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIOENTIAL tmder
E.O. 12958 atthe time it was generated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under
Sections 1.4^^and^d^.
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isareportofadiplomatic demarche by an Embassy Officer onasenior
official ofthe Saudi Ministry ofForeign Affairs conceming regional and bilateral matters. The
content ofthe demarche, as well as the response ofthe Saudi official, remain sensitive. The
Saudi official spoke in the expectation that the diplomatic exchange would be treated as
confidential. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the Govemment ofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand diminish its
officials'willingness to speak in confidence to U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07RIYADH23 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Riyadh, datedJanuary 8, 2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRETtmder E.O.
12958 at the time it was generated. ItremainsSECRETunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4^b^
and^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isareportofadiplomatic demarche by an Embassy Officer on an official
ofthe Saudi Ministry ofForeign Affairs onasensitive regional matter, and includes the response
ofthe Saudi official. The Saudi official spoke in the expectation that the diplomatic exchange
would be treated as confidential. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe exempted material would cause
serious harm toU.S.relationswith theGovemmentofthe Kingdom ofSaudiArabiaand would
diminish its of^cials'willingness to speak in confidence to U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07SANSAL^ADOR1375 is an official telegram fiom Embassy San Salvador, dated July
13,2007 to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsl.4^a^^d^^g^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describeproposedU.S.govemmental assistance programs aimed at
addressing Salvadoran vulnerabilities to intemational narcotics traffickers and terrorists. The
portions describe specific equipment and training and how certain equipmentcan bestmeet
Salvadorian needs. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would
expose vulnerabilities ofthe Salvadoran police and military to the operations of intemational
narcotics traffickers and terrorists, to the detriment ofU.S.interests.

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
07SANTODOMINGO28i8 an official telegram fiom Embassy Santo Domingo, dated
January 8, 2007 to the Department ofState. Ninepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe theU.S.Embassy'sassessmentofthe level of corruption in the
Dominican Republic, public attitudes toward the problem, effbrts ofthe Dominican Govemment
to confiont it, and the likelihood of success.The material includes reportsofpolitical
motivations fbrprosecutionofcorruption. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm torelationswith theGovemmentofthe DominicanRepublic
and diminish the willingness ofitsofficials and other sources to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S.officials and to provide infbrmation, to the detriment ofU.S. interests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07SU^A18is an official telegram fiom Embassy Suva, dated January7,2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.0.12958 at the time itwas generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526underSectionsl4^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The remaining classified portions of this telegram describe the fbrmationof an interim
govemmentinFiji fbllowingacoup carriad out by Fiji'smilitary commander. Commodore
Bainimarama. Many ofthe sources as well as the individuals mentioned continue to be
important active senior political figures in Fiji. Unauthorized disclosm^e ofthe classified
material would cause harm to U.S.relations with the GovemmentofFiji and diminish the trust
oflocal sources to share infbrmation with theU.S.Embassy.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07TUNIS^7 is an official telegram from EmbassyTunis, dated January5,2007 to the
DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part under
E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions remain SECRETtmder E.0.13526 under
Sectionsl.4^^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isabriefing paper fbr the upcoming visit toTunisiaofaU.S.official. The
exempted portions refer to an incident the details ofwhich were obtained by sensitive means. It
also reportsasensitive action by the GovemmentofTunisia conceming intemal security.
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Unauthorized disclosure ofthe exempted material would cause serious harm to sensitive sources,
and harm relations with the Govemment ofTunisia, including the present interim one, with the
result beingthatthatTunisianindividuals and officialswouldhave less trust in theirfiiture
exchangeswith U.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
07USUNNE^YORK573 is an official telegram fiom the United States UNMission,
dated July 13,2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsof
the telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 under Sections l.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportionsdescribe senior State Department and ^hiteHouseofficials'confidential
conversationswith the SecretaryGeneral ofthe United Nations on sensitive intemational
negotiationsconceming difficult regional problems. The fiank discussion took place with an
expectation ofconfidentiality. The give and take permitted each side to promote its objectives.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to sensitive
intemational negotiations and diminish the willingness ofUnited Nation officials to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07USUNNE^YORK575 is anofficial telegramfiom theU.S.Missionto the United
Nations, dated July 13,2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portions ofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL underE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems United Nations effbrts to establishaspecial tribtmal to investigate
theassassinationofapolitical leader and other attacks in Lebanon. Itreportsameeting in which
anamed UN official briefed representatives ofthe U.S.mission in the expectation of
confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the United Nations and diminish the willingne8sofUN and other officials
to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07USUNNE^YORK578 is anofficialtelegram fiom theU.SMission to the United
Nations, datedJuly 13,2007 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsof
thetelegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^.
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports onaprivate meeting of diplomats fiom seven countries to negotiate
aSecurityCouncilresolution on Kosovo. The classified portions are statements ofnational
positions, including verbatim quotations fiom fbreignAmbassadors, not always in accordance
withtheirinstructions. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above would
diminish the willingness of fbreign officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with
U.S. representatives and consequently damage relations with several fbreign governments.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07^^NTIANE12 is an official telegram fiom the American Embassy Vientiane, dated
January 8, 2007 to the DepartmentofState. Ninepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL underEO. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The classified portionsofthis telegram describeadiscussionbetweenaU.S.
Congressman anda^ice President ofthe Lao National Assembly, who is alsoaPolitburo
member. The embassy'sreporting contains sensitive candid comments conceming this senior
political figure in Laos. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material would cause harm to
U.S.relations with the Govemment ofLaos and would be likely to diminish Lao cooperation
with the American Embassy on issues important to theU.S.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
07^ILNIUS13is an official telegram fiom Embassy Vilnius, datedJanuary 8, 2007 to
the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems Lithuanian effbrts to 8atisfy the requirements fbr membership in
the ^^Schengen" group ofEuropean countries with open intemal borders. Classifiedportions
contain the Embassy'sanalysis and report the viewsofnamed Lithuanian officials that were
offered to Embassy staffin the expectation ofconfidentiality and were sometimes critical ofthe
Lithuanian govemment. Unauthorizeddisclosureoftheclassifiedmaterial specified above
wouldcause harm to relations with the GovemmentofLithuaniaand diminish the willingness of
Lithuanian and other officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
representatives.

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DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08AMMAN535 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Amman, dated February 20, 2008
totheDepartmentofState. Ten pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsl4^b^and^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocumentcontains the Embassy'sreportofthe actions of opposition politicians and
groups in the lead up to changes in political organization and parliamentary elections. Itreports
confidential contacts with senior Jordanian govemment officials on the elections, as well as
delicate Embassy analysis ofthe situation. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with officialsofthe Govemment of the Kingdom
ofJordan, and wouldhampertheEmbassy'sfuture ability to communicate in confidence with
non-govemmental political players.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08CAIRO569 is an official telegram fiomEmbassyCairo, datedMarch 23, 2008 to the
DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part under E.O.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionl4^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document isareportofaconversation between an Embassy officer and an Arab
League official whose name, and occasionallythe infbrmation he provided, must be protected
because he was at times speaking in confidence. The infbrmation concemed third countries, and
the source'sopinions that he clearly shared in expectation ofconfidentiality. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Embassyin itsrelations with the Arab League and impairthe abilityofU.S.officials to conduct
diplomatic exchanges withmembersofthat organization.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08DARESSALAAM206 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Dares Salaam, dated
April 1,2008 to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated. Portionsremain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. I3526underSectionsl.4^b^and^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thedocument reportsaconversation between our Ambassador and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, includingdiscussionof^imbabwe and other regional issues. Some topics
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covered were sensitive and the Minister spoke in the expectation ofconfidentiality.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the Govemment of theTanzania and would hinder fiiture interchanges between U.S.
officialsandtheTanzanian govemment.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08K^L^TOUM246 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Khartoum, dated February 20,
2008 totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofitremain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionsl4^b^and^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reportsaconversation between the U.S.Charged'Affaires and the
Commanding General oftheU.N.peacekeepingfbrce in Darfiir. The general shares his views
on the situation and briefs the Chargeon his plans. Some ofhis comments are sensitive and
wereofferedin the expectation ofconfidentiality. The documentalsooffersits own views on
the general'sremarks,someofwhich are not intended forthepublic. Unauthorized disclosureof
the classified material specifiedabovewouldcauseharm to relations with the United Nations
andhindertheabilityofU.S.officials in the fiiture to exchange views in fiill candor, especially
in peacekeepingsituations where the United Nationsis participating. Revelation of someofthe
U.S.analysis of the general'scomments, which was meant fbr intemal consumption,would also
be harmful toU.S.relationswith the United Nations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
08KHARTOUM^28 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Khartoimi, dated March 23,
2008 to the Department ofState. Ninepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSectionslB^^b^and^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Itreportsadiscussion between the US.Charged'Affaires in the courseofwhichasenior
official ofthe Sudanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs presented Sudan'sfbrmal response to an
earlierU.S.paper on bilateral relations. Someofthe exchangedealt with bilateral issues that
should not be discussed in public becauseoftheir sensitivity and because the expectation was
that theywouldbe held in confidence. Otherpassages contain fiank Embassy analysis ofthe
stateofplaythatwerenot intended to be revealed. Unauthorized disclosureof the classified
material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofSudan and
hinderthe abilityofU.S.officials in the fiiture to exchange views in fiill candor. Revelation of
U.S.analysisofSudanese motivations would be harmful to relations with that coimtry'sofficials.
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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09ADDISABABA1063 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Addis Ababa, dated May7,
2009to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofitremain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl4^b^and^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram transmitsabriefingpaper fbrthe upcoming visit ofthe U.S. Ambassadorto
the United Nations. It discusses bilateral and regional issues. Some portions ofit reveal
infbrmation passed in confidence bythe Ethiopian govemment, and some contain candid
Embassy analysisofEthiopian actions and policy not intended fbrpublic revelation.
Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofEthiopia and hinderthe abilityofU.S.officials to conduct daily business
with the leaders ofthat cotmtry.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
09BAGHDAD2390 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Baghdad, dated September 5,
2009 to the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.0.12958 atthetime itwas generated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526 under Sections l.^^^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document reports an Embassy Officer'sconversationwithastaffmemberofasenior
Iraqi official on intemal Iraqi politics and on itsrelations withathird country. The Iraqi official
spoke in the expectation that the exchange would be treated as confidential. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofthe Iraq and would impair ourrelations with the source, as well as the senior
official fbrwhom he works.
DOCUMENTII^ENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09BAMAKO85 is an official telegram from Embassy Bamako, dated February 12, 2009
totheDepartmentofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time itwas generated.Portions ofthe
telegram remain CONFIDENTIAL underEO. 13526 underSectionsl4^b^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThisdocumentcontainstheEmbassy'sassessmentinearly2009ofthemilitarystatusof
theTuareg rebellion in northem Mali,as well as effbrts by the Govemment ofMali to finda
negotiatedsolution Themajorityofthecableconsistsofi theEmbassy'sanalysisofthe
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military capabilityof govemment and rebel forces; the impact on regional security; the relation
ofthe Tuaregrebellion to AlO^^da activities inNorthAfi^ca; and potential actions by two
neighboring states. Someofthe infbrmation in the document was obtained from confidential
sources and its revelation couldrisk exposing them. Other portions involving Embassy
assessments would risk offending area governments. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified
material specified above would significantly damage relations with the Govemment ofMali and
with at least two neighboring states. Disclosure would greatly lessen the ability ofofficials at
Embassy Bamako to acquire sensitive infbrmation fiom Govemment ofMali civilian and
militaryofficials. It would also potentially disclose analytical procedures to organizations and
states which are attempting to overthrow,or supporting the overthrow,of friendly governments
in the region.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09BOGOTA2873 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Bogota, dated September 4, 2009
totheDepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
in part under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe conversations betweenaU.S.official andasenior official of an
Afio-Colombian organization on the arrest of two members ofthe Colombian Congress^who are
alsomembersofthe Afio-Colombian organizations becauseofalleged paramilitaryties.
Included is the Embassy's assessmentofthe impact ofthe arrests on the fiiture infiuence ofthe
Afio-Colombian organization. The fiank discussion tookplace with the expectation of
confidentiality. The message also discusses past U.S. assistance to the organization.
Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material specified above would diminish the
willingness ofprominent Colombian politicians and leaders to conduct confidential diplomatic
business withU.S.officials, to the detriment ofour interests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09BRASILIA1112 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Brasilia, dated September 4,
2009 to the DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526underSectionsl.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
It describesaU.S. official'sconfidential conversations with GovemmentofBrazil
officials on sensitive negotiations on possible Brazilian involvement inasensitive area ofthe
world. They took place inaconfidential environment thatpermitted each ofiicial to speak
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fiankly and to 8eek agreement on actions mutually beneficial to the interests ofthe two countries.
Thisopportunityprovidedafbrum fbr an exchange ofinfbrmation each side was seeking. Italso
facilitated the scheduling offiirthermeetings with experts conceming the area in question.
Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the GovemmentofBrazil, diminish itsofficials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomaticbusiness with U.S. officials, and inhibit futurenegotiations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09BRASILIA1113 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Brasilia, dated Septembers,
2009 to the Department ofState. Eightpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.0 13526 underSections 1.4^b^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe theU.S.National Security Advisor'svisit to Brazil and his
conversations with GovemmentofBrazil officials includingsensitive issues related to Brazil's
relations with third countries. These frank discussions took place with an expectation of
confidentiality. They centered on problems around theregionofLatinAmericain which both
cotmtries have considerable interest in finding solutions. Theyalso touched on traderelations,
non-proliferation, and trouble spotsoutside Latin America. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofBrazil
and diminish itsofficials'willingness to exchange infbrmation and to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09CARACAS1168 is an official telegram from Embassy Caracas, dated Septembers,
2009 to the DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.0 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionl.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describeaGovemmentof^enezuelainitiative to criminalize public
protests and the Embassy'sassessmentofthe impact this initiative will have on opposition
leaders andgroups. The message also explores fiiture implicationsofthis new initiative and its
possibleeffecton specificopposition leaders. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofVenezuela, result in the
harassment ofopposition leaders, and impede our abilityto obtain infbrmation in the fiiture fiom
these andsimilarsources.

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION
09LIMA1309 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Lima, dated September 4, 2009 to the
DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL tmder
E.0.12958 atthetimeitwas generated.The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under E.O.
13526 underSectionsl.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The messagedescribesasensitivehostagerescue effbrt, assesses possible political
ramifications, and discusses Peruvian vulnerabilities when undertaking such actions. The
message speculates on possible next StepsagainsttheSenderoLuminoso guerrillas and analyses
thegovemment'stactics. UnauthorizeddisclosLu^eoftheclassifiedmaterial specified above
would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofPeru and reveal police and military
vulnerabilities when confrontingterrorist organizations.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09ME^ICO2658 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Mexico City, dated Septembers,
2009 to the Department ofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderEO. 13526 underSections 1.4^^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describeaU.S.official'sconversationswithaGovemment ofMexico
official on Mexico'sposition onasensitive United Nationsrelated issue. Theytookplaceina
confidential environment that permitted each official to speak frankly. The issue relates to the
scheduling oflimited time fbr speakers atameetingof an intemational organization.
Unauthorizeddisclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the Govemment ofMexico and diminish itsofficials'willingness to conduct confidential
diplomatic business with U.S.officials, to the detriment ofour interests.
I^O^UMENTII^ENTIFICATIONANI^^LA^^IFI^ATION
09NE^^ELHI00267 is an official telegram fiom Embassy New Delhi, dated February
12,2009 to the Department ofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsof the
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL underEO 13526 under Sectionsl4^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reportsadiscussion between the Ambassador andahigh level Indian
official, primarily about theU.S.Indian nuclearcooperation program, at the begitmingofthe
thennewU.S.administration. Portions that remain CONFIDENTIAL reveal differences of
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views between the two governments on various implementation issues related to that program,
including discussion ofallegedly inequitable treatment. The telegram also briefiydiscusses
Afghanistan andPakistan, including the statusoflndia-Pakistan discussions on terrorist attacks.
Disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemmentsoflndia, Pakistan, and toalesser extent Afghanistan, and diminish those
governments'officials'confidence in their ability to conduct confidential diplomatic business
withU.S.officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09PARIS217is an official telegram fiom Embassy Paris, dated February 12, 2009 to the
DepartmentofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports the views ofanamed French diplomat conceming intemational
strategytoward the recognition ofKosovo. The French diplomat spoke with the expectation that
his remarks would be protected. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe classified material specified
above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofFrance and diminish the
willingness ofFrench and other officials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09PRAGUE88 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Prague, dated February 12, 2009 to
the DepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. The telegram remains CONFIDENTIAL under
E.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reportsaprivate di8cu88ion betweenanamedCzechofficial and an
Embassyofficeraboutaproposal advanced byathird country. The Czech Republic at the time
held the Presidency ofthe European Union ^EU^, and the discussion involved both Czech and
EUpolicy. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm
to relations with the Govemment ofthe Czech Republic and diminish the willingnessofCzech
and otherofficials to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09PRISTINA58 is an of^cial telegram fiomEmbassyPristinadated Febmary 12, 2009to
the Department ofState. Fivepages, The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
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part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram concems the Kosovo Property Agency ^KPA^, which is charged with
resolving real property claims resulting fiom the armed confiict in Kosovo. Classifiedportions
report the viewsofnamed fbreign officials who participated inaprivate meeting of stakeholders
in the KPAas well as the fiank personal viewsofanamed fbrmer intemational official.
Classified portions also contain Embassy comments, sometimes critical offbreign governments
and institutions. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the GovemmentsofKosovo and Serbia and diminish the willingnessof
officials fiom fbreign governments and intemational organizations toconductconfidential
diplomatic business with U.S. representatives,
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09RIYADH1156 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Riyadh, dated September 5, 2009
totheDepartmentofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL
underE.O. 13526 underSectionsl.4^^and^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document containsareportofaconversation between an Embassy Officer anda
seniorofficial ofthe Saudi MinistryofForeign Aflairs on bilateral and sensitive regional
matters. The Saudi of^cial spoke in the expectation that the diplomatic exchange would be
treated as confidential. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would
cause harm to relations with the GovemmentoftheKingdomofSaudi Arabia and inhibit the
abilityofU.S. officials to conduct confidential business with that govemment.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANTlAGO^31 i^ an official telegram from )^mba^8y Santiago, dated September 4,
2009 to the Department ofState. Threepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Thetelegramremains
CONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSection8l.4^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The messagedescribes theU.S.Ambassador'sconfidential conversation withaleading
Chilean politician whooffers candid views on OtherChileanpoliticians and onrelations with
third countries. The fiank discussion took place with an expectationofconfidentiality. The
subjects included sensitiveregionalissues and the local political scene. Unauthorizeddisclosure
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ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the Govemment of
Chile and diminish the willingness ofChilean political leaders to offer infbrmation and to
conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANTIAGO833 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Santiago, dated Septembers,
2009 to the Department ofState. Sevenpages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthe time itwas generated.Portions ofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^,
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe the U.S.Ambassador'sconversationwithaGovemment ofChile
official on Chilean relations with third cotmtries and Chilean views on sensitive regional
developments. It took place inaconfidential environmentthat permitted each official to speak
frankly. Most ofthe message deals with Chile'sparticipation in UNASUR, the Union ofSouth
American Nations, and the cotmtry'srelationship with other member states. Unauthorized
disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofChile and diminish its officials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic
businesswithU.S.officials, to the detriment of our interests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANTIAGO835 is an official telegram from Embassy Santiago, dated Septembers,
2009 to the DepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthetelegram
remainCONFIDENTIALunderE.O. 13526 underSectionl.4^b^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe the U.S.Ambassador'sconfidential conversation witha
prominent Chilean politician on the capabilitiesof another Chilean leader. The comments are
^eti8itive and weregiveti with the e^pe^tatioti ofcomplete confidentiality. Unatithori^ed

disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the
Govemment ofChile and diminish the willingnessofChilean leaders to conduct confidential
diplomatic business withU.S.officials.
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09SANTODOMINGO1017is an officialtelegramfiomEmbassySantoDomingo, dated
September ^,2009 to the Department ofState. Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 12958 atthetime itwas generated. Thetelegram
remains CONFIDENTIAL under E.0 13526 underSections l.^^b^^d^
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IMPACTOFRELEASE
The message describes the U.S,Charge'sconversationwithaGovemmentofthe
Dominican Republic official on Dominicanjudicial independence and refbrm and on sensitive
corruption and extradition cases. It took place inaconfidential environment that permitted each
official to speak frankly. Included are sensitive comments conceming the workingsofthe
judiciary and the Embassy'sassessment. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with theGovemmentofthe Dominican Republic
and diminish itsofficials'willingness to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials, to the detriment of ourinterests.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92632 is an official telegram fiom the Department, dated September 4, 2009 to
the Embassy in Moscow. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part
tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generatedPortionsof the telegram remain SECRETunder
E.O. 13526underSection l.^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram instructs the Embassy on behalfofthe Department ofDefense ^DOD^ to
presentadrafi text to theRussian Govemment pursuant toaportion ofarecentlyconcluded
U.S.-Russianagreementon goods transitingRussiaenroute to Afghanistan, Portionsremaining
SECRET reveal certain bases fbrthe U.S.positionas stated in the drafi text. ^Releaseof
portions ofpreviously classified portions would require DOD concurrence.^ Unauthorized
disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would adversely impact the U.S. abilityto
secure fiom the Russians important national security objectives in Afghanistan as well as our
diplomats'conduct of fiiture discussions^negotiations with the Russians.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92641is an official telegram fiom the Department, dated September 4, 2009 to
Embassy Colombo andanumber of otherposts. Six pages, Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in partunder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsof
thetelegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526underSectionl.4^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram instmcts EmbassyColombo to makeademarche to the GovemmentofSri
Lanka, with otherposts making supporting demarches toanumberofother governments,
conceming the situation ofpersonsdisplaced in Sri Lanka during the final days ofthe recently
concluded confiict withTamil Tiger rebels. The portions which remain CONFIDENTIAL
discuss the nattireoftheDepartment'sconcem and detail the specific diplomatic points to be
made to the GovemmentofSri Lanka and to otherrelevant governments ofwhom we request
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particular actions. Unauthorized disclosureofthis classified material would damage relations
not onlywith the GovemmentofSri Lanka but also potentially between other governments and
Sri Lanka.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92655 is an official telegram fiom the Department ofState, dated Septembers,
2009 to EmbassyTegucigalpa. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunderE.0.13526underSectionsl.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportions describe theU.S.Secretary ofState'sconfidential conversation with the
PresidentofHonduras on sensitive negotiations on the peaceful restoration ofdemocratic order
in Honduras and on the views ofthird countries on developments in Honduras. It took place ina
confidential environment that permitted each to speak fiankly. Commitments were made on
each side. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm
to relations with the GovemmentofHonduras and diminish itsofficials'willingness to conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09STATE92657 is an official telegram fiom the Department ofState, dated September 4,
2009 to the Embassies in Moscow,Kyiv,andAstana. Fourpages. Thetelegramwasproperly
classified CONFIDENTIAL in part under E.O. 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsof
thetelegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4^a^^b^^d^^e^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram instructs the recipients to deliveraconfidentialmessage to parties to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ^START^, which expired on December 5, 2009. Those
portions convey intemal commtmications ofthe Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
^JCIC^ created by START. Unauthorized disclo8tire ofthe classifiedmaterial specified above
would harm relations with the other membersofthe JCIC and would assist fbreign governments
that are not parties to START to obtain infbrmation about U.S. strategic mi88iles.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONAND CLASSIFICATION
09TEGUCIGALPA891 is an official telegram fiom EmbassyTegucigalpa, dated
September ^,2009 to the Department ofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIAL in part tmder E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremain CONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSections 1.4^b^^d^.

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IMPACTOFRELEASE
Those portions describe sensitive materials provided in confidence bymembersofthede
facto Govemment ofHondurastoU.S.officials and infbrmation about thede facto
Govemment'sinvestigationofofficialsofthe fbrmer govemment. It includes Embassy
speculation conceming charges made. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material
specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofHonduras and diminish
thewillingnessofpolitical contacts to conduct confidential diplomatic business with U.S.
officials and to provide infbrmation.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
09TEGUCIGALPA892 is an official telegram fiom EmbassyTegucigalpa, dated
September4, 2009 to the Department ofState. Two pages. The telegram was properly classified
CONFIDENTIALinpartunderEO 12958 atthetimeitwas generated. Portionsofthe
telegramremainCONFIDENTIALunder E.O. 13526 underSectionl.4^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
ThemessagedescribespossiblearrangementsfbraprominentEuropean leaderto visit
Honduras and the Embassy'srecommendationsregardingthe appropriateness of suchavisit.
The visit was planned by backersofthecoup which toppled the legitimate Honduran
Govemment in 2009. Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would
cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofHonduras and diminish the willingness of
prominent Honduran leaders to provide infbrmation and to conduct confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10BRUSSELS382 is an official telegram fiom the U.S. Mission to the European Union in
Bmssels, dated March 30, 2010to the Department ofState. Fourpages. Thetelegram was
properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in part tmder E.O.12958 at the time it was generated.
PortionsofthetelegramremainCONFIDENTIAL under E.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^b^^d^,
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Cla88ified portions report the views ofnamedEuropean Union ^EU^ officials about the
situation inYemen and plans fbr additional EU assistance. TheEUofficials'critical
assessments ofYemen were intended to be held in confidence by the U.S.govemment.
Unauthorized disclosureofthe classified material specified above would cause harm to relations
with the European Union and diminish the willingnessofEuropean Union and other fbreign
officials to conductconfidential diplomatic business with U.S.representatives.

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10GENE^A347is an official telegram fiom theU.S.Mission in Geneva, dated March
30, 2010to the Defense IntelligenceAgency^DIA^andotheraddressees. Thirteen pages. The
telegram was properly classified SECRET in part under E.O. 12958 at the time it was generated.
Portions ofthe telegram remain SECRET under E.O. 13526 underSectionsl.^^b^^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The telegram reports onameeting betweenU.S.and Russianrepresentatives negotiating
an agreement to limit strategic arms. The negotiations were conducted in the expectation of
confidentiality. Unauthorized disclosure ofthe classified material specified above would cause
harm to relations with the GovemmentofRussia and diminish the willingnessofRussian and
otherofficials to conduct confidentialdiplomatic businesswith U.S.representatives.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATIONANDCLASSIFICATION
10LIMA333 is an official telegram fiom Embassy Lima, dated March 29, 2010to the
DepartmentofState. Six pages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in part
tmder E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portionsofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526underSectionL^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
Thoseportionsprovide an overview,in preparation fbravisit by theU.S. Assistant
Secretary ofState fbr^estem Hemisphere Affairs, ofthe sensitive political, security and
economic challenges facing Pern and U.S.-Peruvian relations. It includes an assessment of
cotmter^narcoticprograms and the strength ofpublicinstitutions. Unauthorizeddisclosureofthe
classified material specified above would cause harm to relations with the GovemmentofPem
and diminish the willingnessofsources to continue to provide such infbrmation orto conduct
confidential diplomatic business with U.S. officials.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10PRETORIA636 isanofficialtelegramfiomEmbassy Pretoria, datedMarch30, 2010
totheDepartmentofState. Fivepages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL
underEO 12958 at the time itwas generated ItremainsCONFIDENTIAL underEO. 13526
underSection 1.4^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The cable reports onasensitive intemal matterinvolving issues within the ruling party,
and includes unusually candid Embassy analysis ofthose matters. Unauthorized disclosure of
the material would cause harm to relations with the Govemment ofSouth Afi^ca and hinder the
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abilityofUSofficialstoconductdailybusinesswithmembersofthehost govemment, aswell
as the leaders ofthe party.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10RABAT29^ is an official telegram from Embassy Rabat, datedMarch 30, 2010to the
DepartmentofState. Twelve pages. The telegram was properly classified SECRET in part
under E.O. 12958 at the time it wasgenerated. Portionsofthe telegram remain SECRET tmder
E.O. 13526 underSection 1.4^d^.
IMPACTOFRELEASE
The document describes the Embassy'sapproach to cooperation on counterterrorism with
the Govemment ofMorocco. Still^sensitive portions draw on intelligence and other delicate
infbrmation to describe the terrorist threat in Morocco. Also contained are some sensitive
measures theU.S.and Morocco are taking to cooperate in anti^terrorism activities. Unauthorized
disclostu^eofthe classified material specified above would cause serious harm to relations with
the GovemmentoftheKingdomofSaudi Arabia and hinder our effbrts to obtain fiirther
cooperation in the area of anti terrorism.
DOCUMENTIDENTIFICATION ANDCLASSIFICATION
10TOKYO627 is an official telegram fiom EmbassyTokyo, datedMarch 29,2010to the
DepartmentofState. Fourpages. The telegram was properly classified CONFIDENTIAL in
part tmder E.0.12958 at the time it was generated. Portions ofthe telegram remain
CONFIDENTIALunderE0 13526 underSections 1.4^b^^d^
IMPACTOFRELEASE
This telegram describes confidential discussions betweenaU.S.Assistant Secretary of
Defense andasenior Japanese Defense official conceming difficult bilateral defense
arrangements related to U.S.fbrces in Okinawa. TheGovemmentofJapan^GOJ^observesa30
year rule fbr declassification ofsensitive substantive diplomatic conversations and the
tinattthori^eddi^^lo^ttre ofthis ^la^^ift^d material would ^ati^^ harm to U.S.relations with the
GOJ and lessen Japanese officials'tm8t and confidence in conducting confidential diplomatic
business with U.S. officials.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.^17^6,Ideclareunderpenaltyofpetjurythat the infbrmation
provided herein is true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge.

^

2 0 dayof
day of
Executedthis^^

2011.

Page 51 of 51

Maoolog8_00375953

^

^

^

^

20668

Appellate Exhihitl8
Enelosurelf
28 pages
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed f^rReason2
and Reasons
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated20August2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record ofTrial

20669

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY

DECLARATION
I,Rear Admiral David^oods, declare and 8tate:
BACKGROUND
lamaRear Admiral in the United States Navy with 30 years of active service.
My current position is Commander, JointTaskForce-^ Guantanamo ^JTF^GTMO^, at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. My responsibilities include the review ofJTF^GTMO
infbrmation fbr classification purposes pursuant to Executive Order ^E0^ 13526
^^^ClassifiedNational Securityinformation^^^. Ihave held this position since 2^ August
2011and report to General Douglas Fraser, Commander, US Southem Command.
PURPOSEOFDECLARATION
Isubmitthis declaration in the matterofUnitedStatesv.Private First Class
Bradley Manning, to demonstrate to the best ofmy knowledge and beliefthat disclosure
ofthe infbrmation identified below reasonably could be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security ofthe United States. Inmakingthe fbllowing statement
regarding the classification ofinfbrmation in this case,Irely on mypersonal knowledge
and experience, upon the infbrmation made available to me in my official capacity,upon
the advice and conclusions reached, and determinations made in accordance therewith.
DE^IGNATIONOF INFORMATION
Infbrmation that requires protection in the interest ofnational security ofthe
UnitedStatesisdesignatedCLASSIFIEDNATlONALSECURITYINFORMATION
under Executive Orderl3526, Classified National Security Infbrmation, signed by
President Obama on December 29,2009. Information is classified in levels

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY
1^aooio^8^0037^54^

20670

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY

commensurate with the assessment that unauthorised disclosing could cause the
fbllowing expected damaged to national security:
a.

Top Secret information—exceptionally grave damage

b.

Secretinfbrmation—serious damage

c.

Confidential infbrmation—damage

Unclassified infbrmation does not requireasecurity clearance fbraccess, but
nonetheless may be ofasensitive nature.
The current basis for classification ofnational security information is found in
E0 13526. Sectionl.3 o f E 0 13526 authorizes an Original ClassificationAuthority
^OCA^ to classify infbrmation owned, produced, or controlled by the United States
govemment i f i t falls within certain classification categories. One such category,fbund
at Section l.^^c^ofE0 13526, concems infbrmation that pertains to an intelligence
activity ^including special activities^, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology.
Five documents, totaling twenty-two pages, have been provided to JTF-GTMO
fbraclassification review. These documents were originated by JTF-GTMO and are
identified as the enclosures to the prosecution requests, datedl8March2011and^
August2011. All five documents bear ^^SECRET^^ markings.
CLASSIFICATIONDETERMINATION
The five documents are classified pursuant to Section l.^^c^ofE013526,because
they contain infbrmation conceming intelligence sources and methods, and infbrmation
that, ifreleased, could cause 8eriou8 damage to national security. This infbrmation is
classifiedattheSECRETlevel,

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY
1^aooio^8^0037^547

20671

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY

The documents contain intelligence data compiled about detainees or summaries
ofsuch data. Intelligence data included in this category of withholdings typically
describesthe detainees biographical infbrmation, the circumstances ofhis capture and
what he had in his possession when he was captured, the circumstances and date ofhis
transfer to Guantanamo, his travel, his affiliations with individuals and organizations of
intelligence interest, and his activities in supportofthose organizations.The intelligence
data in this category also includes inlbrmation about other persons and organizations.
Ihave determined that the intelligence data contained in the documents reveal
details about intelligence we have gleaned regarding individuals and organizations of
intelligence interest. Additionally,this infbrmation reveals the sources of our
intelligence, as well as methods and approaches fbr collecting intelligence. At the time of
their creation, the documents and the intelligence data contained in them was classified at
theSECR^TlevelthroughtheactionoftheCommander,JTF^GTMO.
IMPACTONNATIONALSECURITYIFINFORMATIONRELEASED
Ihave determined that the documents and infbrmation remain properly classified,
and that their release reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security because it would reveal infbrmation conceming intelligence sources, the
specific infbrmation obtained fiom such sources, or both. Accordingly, this infbrmation
was and improperly classified at the SECRET level, pursuant to Section 1.4^c^ofEO
13526.

In accordance with 28U.S.C.^17^6,Ideclare under penalty ofpetjury that the fbregoing
is true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge.

FOROFFICIALUSEONLY
1^aooio^8^0037^54^

20672

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dated: }£_ November 2011
3AVID WOODS
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MaooiogB_00378649

20673

Appellate Exhihitl8
Enclosure Ih
12 pages
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed for Reason2
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated20August2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record ofTrial

20674

Appellate Exhihitl8
Enclosureli
3pages
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed for Reason2
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated20August2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record ofTrial

20675

UNCLASSIFIED
DECLARATION OF JOHN F. HACKETT,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,
CHIEF OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

I,

John F. H a c k e t t , d e c l a r e

t h e f o l l o w i n g t o be t r u e and

correct:
1.

I am t h e C h i e f o f I n f o r m a t i o n Management f o r t h e O f f i c e

of the D i r e c t o r of National
capacity

I n t e l l i g e n c e ("ODNI").

I oversee t h e ODNI I n f o r m a t i o n Management Program,

w h i c h p r o v i d e s g u i d a n c e and o v e r s i g h t

f o r the creation,

maintanence, use, p r o t e c t i o n , p r e s e r v a t i o n ,
release

I n this

d i s p o s i t i o n , and

o f t h e ODNI's r e c o r d s i n compliance w i t h a p p l i c a b l e

and r e g u l a t i o n s .

laws

As p a r t o f my o f f i c i a l d u t i e s , I s e r v e as t h e

ODNI f o c a l p o i n t f o r d e v e l o p i n g and i m p l e m e n t i n g p o l i c i e s and
p r o c e d u r e s t o ensure t h e s e c u r i t y , i n t e g r i t y , a u t h e n t i c i t y ,
o r g a n i z a t i o n , storage,

and a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f ODNI r e c o r d s .

a l s o s e r v e as an ODNI r e c o r d s c u s t o d i a n ,

which authorizes

I
me

access t o and r e v i e w o f a l l i n f o r m a t i o n h e l d w i t h i n t h e ODNI.
2.

I have TOP SECRET o r i g i n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a u t h o r i t y

d e l e g a t e d by t h e D i r e c t o r o f N a t i o n a l

I n t e l l i g e n c e ("DNI")

p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 1.3 o f E x e c u t i v e Order 13526.
authorized,

I am

t h e r e f o r e , t o conduct c l a s s i f i c a t i o n r e v i e w s and t o

make o r i g i n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s .

UNCLASSIFIED

MaooiogB_00410761

20676

UNCLASSIFIED
3.

I make t h e statements h e r e i n on t h e basis of my

personal knowledge as w e l l as on i n f o r m a t i o n made a v a i l a b l e t o
me i n the course o f performing my o f f i c i a l d u t i e s .
ODNI background
4.

Congress created the p o s i t i o n of the D i r e c t o r of

N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e (^^DNI^^) i n the I n t e l l i g e n c e Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act o f 2004, Pub. L. No. 10^^458,
1011(a) and 10^7, 118 S t a t . 3638, 3643 63, 3 6 ^ 8 ^ ^ (2004)
(amending sections 102 through 104 o f T i t l e I o f the N a t i o n a l
S e c u r i t y Act of 1^47).

Subject t o the a u t h o r i t y , d i r e c t i o n , and

c o n t r o l o f t h e President, the DNI serves as the head o f the
u n i t e d States I n t e l l i g e n c e Community (^^IC^) and as the p r i n c i p a l
advisor t o t h e President and the N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Council f o r
i n t e l l i g e n c e matters r e l a t e d t o the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .
^.S.C.
5.

403(b)(1),

50

(2).

The r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and a u t h o r i t i e s o f the DNI are s e t

f o r t h i n t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Act of 1947, as amended.

These

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s include ensuring t h a t n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e i s
provided t o the President, heads o f the departments and agencies
of the Executive branch, the Chairman of the J o i n t Chiefs o f
S t a f f and senior m i l i t a r y commanders, and the Senate and ^ouse
of Representatives and committees t h e r e o f .
403^1(a)(1).

50 ^.S.C.

The DNI i s charged w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g the

o b j e c t i v e s o f ^ determining the rec^uirements and p r i o r i t i e s f o r ^

UNCLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^004t0752

20677

UNCLASSIFIED
and managing and d i r e c t i n g the t a s k i n g , c o l l e c t i o n , a n a l y s i s ,
production, and dissemination

of n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e by

elements o f the I n t e l l i g e n c e Community.

50 ^.S.C.

403^

l ( f ) ( I ) ( A ) ( i ) and ( i i ) .
6.

I n a d d i t i o n , the National S e c u r i t y Act o f 1^47, as

amended, s t a t e s t h a t ^^^t^he D i r e c t o r o f N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e
s h a l l p r o t e c t i n t e l l i g e n c e sources and methods from
disclosure.50

^.S.C. ^ 403 I ( i ) ( l ) .

unauthorized

Consistent w i t h t h i s

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the DNI establishes and implements g u i d e l i n e s
f o r the I n t e l l i g e n c e Community f o r the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f
i n f o r m a t i o n under a p p l i c a b l e law. Executive Orders, o r other
P r e s i d e n t i a l d i r e c t i v e s and f o r access t o and dissemination o f
intelligence.
7.

50 ^.S.C. ^ 403 I ( i ) ( 2 ) ( A ) , ( 8 ) .

F i n a l l y , the National S e c u r i t y Act o f 1^47, as amended,

created an O f f i c e o f the D i r e c t o r of National I n t e l l i g e n c e . The
f u n c t i o n of t h i s O f f i c e i s t o a s s i s t the DNI i n c a r r y i n g out t h e
d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f the D i r e c t o r under the Act and
other a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n of law, and t o c a r r y out such other
d u t i e s as may be prescribed by the President
Purpose of t h i s
8.

o r by law.

Declaration

The purpose of t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n i s t o provide

background on the c l a s s i f i e d I n t e l i n k program and I n t e l i n k a u d i t
logs, and t o e x p l a i n the bases of my c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

decisions

pursuant t o Executive Order 13526, as amended, f o r i n f o r m a t i o n

UNCLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^004^0753

20678

UNCLASSIFIED
concerning the matter o f u n i t e d States v. P r i v a t e F i r s t Class
Bradley E. Manning.
^.

This d e c l a r a t i o n i s ^CLASSIFIED.

d e s c r i p t i o n s contained

herein have been generalized t o maintain

the ^CLASSIFIED designation.
associated

As a r e s u l t , t h e

Much o f the i n f o r m a t i o n

w i t h I n t e l i n k i s c l a s s i f i e d at the SECRET^BNOFORN

l e v e l but i s unnecessary f o r a general understanding of the
Intelinkprogramand

i t s a u d i t logs.

Information i s c l a s s i f i e d

a t the SECRET l e v e l i f i t s unauthorized

d i s c l o s u r e reasonably

could be expected t o cause ^eriou,s damage t o the n a t i o n a l
security.

NOFORN o r ^^NF^^ stands f o r ^No Foreign Dissemination^^

and means t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n can be disseminated t o ^.S.
persons only and cannot be disseminated t o f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s .
background on I n t e l i n k
10.

I n t e l i n k i s a s u i t e of web-based a p p l i c a t i o n s , t o o l s ,

and c o l l a b o r a t i v e services t h a t include w i k i s i t e s ,

blogs,

i n s t a n t messaging, and a search c a p a b i l i t y t h a t can be used t o
f i n d i n f o r m a t i o n hosted on the IC and Department o f Defense
networks.

These services are managed by the I n t e l i n k

o r g a n i z a t i o n and e x i s t on various c l a s s i f i e d and u n c l a s s i f i e d
networks i n c l u d i n g the s e c r e t ^ l e v e l Secure I n t e r n e t Protocol
Router Network (^^SIPRNet^^), t o which I have been informed t h a t
P r i v a t e F i r s t Class 8radley E. Manning (^^Manning^^) had access.

UNCLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^004^0754

20679

UNCLASSIFIED
11.

The I n t e l i n k o r g a n i z a t i o n has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and

c a p a b i l i t y o f a u d i t i n g the use of i t s services and t h i s
i n f o r m a t i o n i s captured i n I n t e l i n k logs.

I n t e l i n k logs contain

a u d i t data captured from proxy servers t h a t c o n t r o l access t o
I n t e l i n k services and show the a c t i v i t i e s of users and systems
t h a t connect t o and use the I n t e l i n k services w h i l e on
c l a s s i f i e d o r u n c l a s s i f i e d networks.
12.

The I n t e l i n k o r g a n i z a t i o n obtains, manages, and stores

i t s a u d i t data as necessary t o perform i t s day^to^day operations
of I n t e l i n k services on the c l a s s i f i e d and u n c l a s s i f i e d
networks.

Among i t s many r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,

i t responds t o user

i n ^ i r i e s , troubleshoots t e c h n i c a l problems, and monitors and
maintains t h e performance of t h e I n t e l i n k s u i t e of services.

To

do t h i s , t h e I n t e l i n k o r g a n i z a t i o n r e g u l a r l y reviews the a u d i t
data o f I n t e l i n k users as t h a t data provides t h e I n t e l i n k
o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n on how i t s services are used,
whether I n t e l i n k services are f u n c t i o n i n g p r o p e r l y , and whether
adjustments should be made t o these services.

The I n t e l i n k

o r g a n i z a t i o n also r o u t i n e l y reviews the a u d i t data t o solve
t e c h n i c a l o r s e c u r i t y issues, t o review data trends, and t o
develop a p p r o p r i a t e i n f o r m a t i o n management s t r a t e g i e s .
A u t h e n t i c a t i o n of business Records
13.

The I n t e l i n k o r g a n i z a t i o n maintains and stores t h e

I n t e l i n k Passport account p r o f i l e s o f r e g i s t e r e d I n t e l i n k users.

I^^CLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^004^0755

20680

UNCLASSIFIED
S p e c i f i c a l l y , an I n t e l i n k Passport account i s an I n t e l i n k user^s
unigue i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (^^ID^^) p r o f i l e and password-enabled
account t h a t permits the user t o a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e on many
I n t e l i n k s i t e s and s e r v i c e s . The passive viewing o f and
searching w i t h i n t h e I n t e l i n k s e r v i c e s , however, does not
r e g u i r e an I n t e l i n k Passport account.
14.

Army i n v e s t i g a t o r s reguested a copy o f Manning^s

Passport account p r o f i l e , which provides d e t a i l s concerning h i s
I n t e l i n k account such as h i s I n t e l i n k Passport ID and password.
The I n t e l i n k o r g a n i z a t i o n l o c a t e d a copy of Manning^s I n t e l i n k
Passport account p r o f i l e i n i t s databases and provided a copy t o
Army i n v e s t i g a t o r s .
15.

Army i n v e s t i g a t o r s a l s o reguested a u d i t data

p e r t a i n i n g t o Manning^s I n t e l i n k a c t i v i t i e s on SIPRNet from
October 1, 200^ t o June 1, 2010. Although Army i n v e s t i g a t o r s
s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d Manning^s I n t e r n e t P r o t o c o l (^IP^^)
addresses as 22.224.41.22 (^^.22^^) and 22.225.41.40 (^^.40^^), t h e
ODNI d i r e c t e d the I n t e l i n k o r g a n i z a t i o n t o d u p l i c a t e the SIPRNet
I n t e l i n k a u d i t data from proxy servers c o l l e c t e d between October
1, 200^ t o June 1, 2010 and t o provide i t t o Army i n v e s t i g a t o r s .
The e n t i r e set contained logs of a c t i v i t y from t h e .22 and .40
IP addresses as w e l l as a u d i t data not r e l e v a n t t o t h i s case.
Accordingly, the ODNI provided the I n t e l i n k a u d i t data on the

UNCLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^004^0755

20681

UNCLASSIFIED
c o n d i t i o n t h a t Army i n v e s t i g a t o r s e x t r a c t only those logs
belonging t o Manning^s .22 and .40 IP address a c t i v i t i e s .
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f I n t e l i n k Passport Account
16. An I n t e l i n k Passport account p r o f i l e contains general
user i d e n t i f y i n g i n f o r m a t i o n t y p i c a l o f a system directory^ which
includes name, email address, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l assignment, phone
nuttier, and i d e n t i f i e r s of other I n t e l i n k s e r v i c e s .
general i n f o r m a t i o n i s UNCLASSIFIED.

This

A P a s s p o r t p r o f i l e also

contains personalized i n f o r m a t i o n i n the form o f ^^secret^^
questions and answers used by the I n t e l i n k o f f i c e t o a s s i s t
users i n r e s e t t i n g access t o t h e i r Passport accounts.

This i s a

t y p i c a l process used i n some i n f o r m a t i o n systems t o a s s i s t users
i n the renewal o f passwords or g a i n i n g support desk assistance.
This guestion and answer method t y p i c a l l y asks questions t h a t
only the user would know.

This guestion and answer f e a t u r e

a s s i s t s i n v a l i d a t i n g a user^s i d e n t i t y when reguesting I n t e l i n k
support desk assistance,

because these guestions and answers

serve as mechanisms t o ensure c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and i n t e g r i t y o f
the c l a s s i f i e d network access process and could u l t i m a t e l y lead
t o d i r e c t access t o s e n s i t i v e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n f o r m a t i o n ,
they are p r o p e r l y c l a s s i f i e d a t the SECRETBBNOFORN l e v e l ,
^unauthorized d i s c l o s u r e o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n could reasonably be
expected t o cause ^ e r i o u ^ damage t o the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .

UNCLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^004^0757

20682

UNCLASSIFIED
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f I n t e l i n k Logs
17.

The ODNI reviewed a l i s t provided by Army

i n v e s t i g a t o r s o f search terms used by Manning and determined
t h a t some o f t h e search terms were c l a s s i f i e d and others were
u n c l a s s i f i e d but the o v e r a l l l i s t o f search terms was c l a s s i f i e d
at SECRETBBNOFORN.

The o v e r a l l l i s t o f search terms contains

s e n s i t i v e search terms t h a t Manning may have encountered i n t h e
course of h i s d u t i e s as a m i l i t a r y a n a l y s t who had access t o
c l a s s i f i e d information.

I n a d d i t i o n , some o f t h e search terms

i n the aggregate can be pieced together t o reveal i n s i g h t s i n t o
what t h e IC c o l l e c t e d o r sought t o c o l l e c t .

And f i n a l l y there

are i n d i v i d u a l search terms on the l i s t t h a t are unrelated t o
h i s duties as a m i l i t a r y a n a l y s t and u n c l a s s i f i e d such as
^^^ikileaks,^^
^^Iceland,^^

J u l i a n Assange,^^Assange,^^ ^ ^ 8 i r g i t t a

Jonsdottir,^^

Jokes,^^Funny Joke,^^ and ^^criminal i n v e s t i g a t i o n

d i v i s i o n . T h e s e terms are u n c l a s s i f i e d as they do not reveal
an i n t e l l i g e n c e source o r method.
18.

I n t e l i n k l o g s a r e c l a s s i f i e d a t S^CRETBBNOFORN

because

the f u l l content o f the a u d i t data contains i n f o r m a t i o n beyond
only t h e i n d i v i d u a l search terms.

The I n t e l i n k logs contain

search term r e s u l t s and a u d i t data t h a t reveal n a t i o n a l
information

i n the form o f c l a s s i f i e d i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n

and analysis,
information

s e n s i t i v e sources and methods, and s p e c i f i c

concerning the IC^s e l e c t r o n i c

UNCLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^00410758

defense

communications

20683

UNCLASSIFIED
network.

The data also contains

i n d i v i d u a l l y unclassified, or

o f f i c i a l o r otherwise c o n t r o l l e d u n c l a s s i f i e d data items t h a t i n
the aggregate would provide i n s i g h t i n t o the IC^s o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
functions, s t a f f i n g , a c t i v i t i e s , c a p a b i l i t i e s , v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s ,
or i n t e l l i g e n c e sources or methods.

Therefore, the .22 and .40

logs e x t r a c t e d by Army i n v e s t i g a t o r s from the I n t e l i n k a u d i t
data set are c l a s s i f i e d a t SECRET^^NOFORN and d e t a i l s concerning
a u d i t a c t i v i t y t h a t go beyond the d e s c r i p t i o n s i n t h i s
d e c l a r a t i o n would l i k e w i s e reveal s e n s i t i v e , c l a s s i f i e d
information.
1^.

The c l a s s i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n contained i n the I n t e l i n k

logs as described i n t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n contain e g u i t i e s belonging
t o various IC elements and the very sources and methods the DNI
i s entrusted t o p r o t e c t pursuant t o Executive Order 12333. Our
i n t e l l i g e n c e sources and methods are o f great i n t e r e s t t o
f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e services, t e r r o r i s t groups, and other
h o s t i l e groups who have an i n t e r e s t i n understanding what the IC
c o l l e c t s and what concerns the IC. F a i l u r e t o p r o t e c t t h i s
i n f o r m a t i o n from unauthorized d i s c l o s u r e reasonably could be
expected t o cause ^erioL^,s damage t o the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .

UNCLASSIFIED

1^aooiog8^004t0759

20684

UNCLASSIFIED

Conclusion
20.

I n the foregoing, I have attempted t o e x p l a i n the

background on I n t e l i n k and the bases f o r my judgment t h a t
d i s c l o s u r e o f the c l a s s i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n described

above

reasonably could be expected t o cause ,seriot^s^ damage t o the
national security.

I c e r t i f y under penalty of p e r j u r y t h a t t h e foregoing i s
t r u e and c o r r e c t t o the best of my knowledge and b e l i e f .

Executed t h i s ^^^^ day of December, 2011.

^

B^^

L,:.Y
L.^ .:...j:.:%c\(^
John F. Hackett
O f f i c e o f ^ t h e D i r e c t o r of National I n t e l l i g e n c e
Chief, Information Management

UNCLASSIFIED

ManoiogB_00410770



0 20685

0! ARMY
us may utrranv usmct or WASNINGTON
210 A STREET
com? LESLEV J. ucimn. DC aoais-sot:

lM 2012
4 arc

MEMORANDUMTHRU 411/

Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Military District of Washington (ANJA), 2l0 A Street. Fort
Lesley J. MeNair. DC 20319 .
Office of the Judge Advocate Ge AJA-I . a May?eld 2200 Army Pentagon.

Washington. DC 20310
$1

FOR Deputy Chiefof Staff (DAMI-ZB). 2
20310



bt?sgq
Washington. DC

SUBJECT: Request for Limited Defense Access to SIPRNET United States v. PFC Bradlev
Qning

I. REQUEST. The prosecution in the above-named case requests the defense security expert
consultants be granted access to SIPRNET for the limited purpose of communicating, on behalf of
the defense team. with the militaryjudge. court information security of?cer, and prosecution.

2. BACKGROUND. This court-martial involves volumes of classi?ed information and the military
judge directed the prosecution and defense to develop a filing process for unclassified and classi?ed
documents. For courts-martial that do not contain classi?ed information. the court and parties
communicate via unclassi?ed email, which includes the submission of court documents. Based on
the volume of classified information and the classi?ed nature of entities involved. the prosecution
must develop a process that allows for limited communications and submission of classi?ed
document to protect classi?ed information. On I7 September 20l0 and I2 October 2010.
respectively. Mr. Charles Ganiel (ATEC) and Mr. Cassius Hall (INSCOM) were appointed as
defense security expert consultants in the above-named case.

3. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED ON The
prosecution requests that you authorize the expert security consultants? access to the SIPRNET for
the purpose of submitting these court ?lings and communicating with the court. if
necessary. Each expert consultant will use their regular duty SIPRNET terminals to submit these
emails and documents. and will be required to create a separate email file to hold all court-
related emails.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum the undersigned at
.

.
Moe.? has
CPT . JA

Trial Counsel

20686

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES
PROTECTIVE ORDER
FOR
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
MANNING, Bradley E., PFC
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

DATED:

1. This matter comes before the Court upon motions by both defense and the prosecution for a
Protective Order to prevent the unauthorized disclosure or dissemination of classified national
security infbrmation which will be reviewed by, or made available to, or is otherwise in the
possession of, the accused and the defense in this case.
2. The Court finds this case will involve information that has been classified in the interest of
the national security. The storage, handling and control of this information will require special
security precautions mandated by statute, executive order, and regulation, and access to which
requires the appropriate security clearances and a "need-to-know." Under Executive Order
13526, "need-to-know" means a determination within the executive branch in accordance with
directives issued pursuant to this order that a prospective recipient requires access to specific
classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized govemmental
function.
3. Pursuant to the authority granted under Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 505; the general
supervisory authority of the Court; and in order to protect the national security, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Prosecution's Motion for a Protective Order under MRE 505(g)(1) is
GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that:
a. Purpose. The purpose of this Order is to establish the procedures that must be
followed by the accused, all defense counsel of record, members of the defense team, all other
counsel involved in this case, any Court personnel, and all other individuals who receive access
to, or otherwise are in possession of, classified documents or information in connection with this
case.
b. Application. The procedures set forth in this Protective Order and MRE 505 shall
apply to all pre-trial, post-trial, and appellate aspects of this case, and may be modified from time
to time by further order of the Court acting under MRE 505 and the Court's inherent supervisory
authority to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.
c. Definition. The following definitions apply.

20687

(1) As used herein, the terms "classified national security infbrmation and
documents,""classifiedinIbrmation,"and "classilied documents" refer to:
(a) Any classified document or inlbrmation which has been classified by
any Executive branch agency in the interests ofnational security or pursuant to Executive Order
13526oritspredecessorOrdersas"CONFlDENTlAL,'^"SECRET,"or"TOPSECRET,"or
additionallycontrolledas "SENSITIVECOMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI);"
(b) Any document or inlbrmation, regardless ofits physical Ibrm or
characteristics, now or formerly in the possession ofaprivateparty,which has been derived
from United States govemment information that has been classified by the United States
pursuant to Executive Order 13526 or its predecessor Orders as "CONFIDENTIAL,"
"SECRET,"or"TOPSECRET,"oradditionallycontrolledas"SENSlTIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI);"
(^c) Any other classified inlbrmation, in any Ibrm, previously known to the
accused or defense counsel;
(^d) Any document and inlbrmation, including non-written, aurally
acquired inIbrmation,which the accused or delense counsel have been notified orally or in
writing that such document or inlbrmation may be classified; or,
(e) Any inlbrmation, regardless ofplace or origin and including "fbreign
govemment infbrmation,"as that term is defined in Executive Order 13526, that could
reasonably be believed to contain classilied infbrmation, or that refers or relates to national
security or intelligence matters; and,
(f) Any inlbrmation obtained from any agency,department or other
govemmental entity,includingamember of the intelligence community,as defined in 50U.S.C.
^^Ola, that could reasonably be believed to contain classified inlbrmation or that refers to
national security or intelligence matters.
^2) As used herein, the words "documents" or "inlbrmation" shall include, but
are not limited to, all written or printed matter of any kind, fbrmal or inlbrmal, including
originals, confirming copies and non-conIbrmingcopies(whetherdifIerent from the original by
reason ofnotation made on such copies or otherwise), and ftirther include, but are not limited to:
(a) Papers, correspondence, memoranda, notes, letters, reports,
summaries, photographs, maps, charts and graphs, inter-office and intra-oflice communications,
notations ofany sort conceming conversations, meetings, or other communications, bulletins,
cables, telexes, telecopies, teletypes, telegrams, and telefacsimiles, invoices, accountings,
worksheets, and drafts, alterations, modifications, changes and amendments ofany kind to the
Ibregoing;

20688

(b) Graphic or oral records or representations ofany kind, including, but
not limited to, photographs, maps, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm,videotapes, sound
recordings ofany kind, and motion pictures;
(^c) Electronic, mechanical or electric records ofany kind, including, but
not limited to, tapes, cassettes, disks, recordings, films, typewriter ribbons, word processing or
other computer tapes or disks, and all manner ofelectronic data processing storage; and
(d) Inftormation acquired aurally,or in any other manner not detailed in
^a)through(c), above.
(3) As used herein, "Access to classified information" means having access to,
reviewing, reading, leaming, or otherwise coming to know in any manner any classified
infbrmation.
(^) As used herein,"govemment facility" shall mean theTrial Defense Service
Ofiice on Fort Myer, located in building 22^,Joint8ase Myer-Henderson Hall,Virginia; (2)the
Trial Defense Service Office on Fort Leavenworth, located in 8uilding2^^, Fort Leavenworth,
l^ansas;(3)Trial Delense Service Office on Fort Meade, located in building ^21^,Fort George
G.Meade, Maryland;(^) the defense trailer within the secure stmcture outside the courthouse,
when occupied byamember ofthe defense; and(5) the courthouse,when supervised by the
defense security experts or the court security officer in building ^^32, Fort George G.Meade,
Maryland.
^5) As used herein, the ^^court security officer'^ is Mr.JayPrather fbr this case, fbr
the purpose ofsupervising security arrangements necessary to protect from unauthorized
disclosure any classified documents or infbrmation submitted or made available to the Court in
connection with this case.
d. Declassification. All classified documents, and infbrmation contained therein, shall
remain classified unless the documents bearaclear indication that they have been declassified by
the agency or department that is the original classification authority's agency ofthe document or
the infbrmation contained therein (^hereinatter, the ^^originating agency^^).
e. Public Domain. Information in the public domain is ordinarily not classified.
However, ifclassified infbrmation is reported in the press or otherwise enters the public domain,
the infbrmation does not lose its classified status merely because it is in the public domain. And
infbrmation reported in the press or otherwise in the public domain may be considered classified
and subject to the provisions ofMRE 505 ifthe infbrmation infect remains classified and is
confirmed by any person who has, or had, such access to classified infbrmation and that
confirmation corroborates the infbrmation in question. Accordingly,any attempt by the accused
or defense counsel to have classified infbrmation that has been reported in the public domain
confirmed or denied at trial or in any public proceeding in this case shall be govemed by MRE
505 and all provisions ofthis Order.

20689

f Defense Security Experts. Detailed defense security experts shall only provide advice
conceming procedures governing the appropriate storage, handling, and transmittal of
presumptively classified documents and infbrmation, pursuant to this order and applicable
regulations and federal law. Detailed defense security experts are not authorized to make
independent classification determinations, that is,whether infbrmation is classified.
g. Trial Counsel. The Court has been advised that the fbllowing ^^trialcounsel^^ working
on this case. Captain Ashden Fein, Captain JoDean Morrow, Captain Angel Overgaard, and
CaptainJ.Hunter ^hyte, have the requisite security clearances to have access to the classified
documents and infbrmation that relates to this case. All references to trial counsel, as used in
this Order, refer onlyto the attomeys listed in this paragraph.
h. Protection ofclassified Infbrmation. The Court finds that, in order to protect the
classified documents and infbrmation involved in this case, no person, except the militaryjudge,
trial counsel,members ofthe prosecution team, appropriately cleared United States Govemment
personnel,personnel of the originating agency,defense counsel,the accused, and defense
counsel employees shall have access to the classified documents and information in this case.
No defense counsel or defense counsel employee shall have access to any classified documents
and infbrmation in this case unless that person shall first have:
(1) Signed the Memorandum ofUnderstanding in the form attached hereto,
agreeing to comply with the terms ofthis Order. The signed Memorandum ofUnderstanding
shall be filed with the Court and added to the appellate record. The substitution, departure, or
removal fbr any reason from this case ofdefense counsel, or anyone associated with the defense
as an employee or otherwise, shall not release that person from the provisions ofthis Order or the
Memorandum ofUnderstanding executed in connection with this Order.
(2) Persons other than trial counsel, appropriately cleared United States
Govemment personnel,and personnel of the originating agency,can only obtain access to
classified documents and infbrmation after having been grantedasecurity clearance through
coordination with the trial counsel and with permission ofthe Court, either through this Order
^fbr those named in paragraph 3(i) below), or byaseparate Order sought by the defense. The
Govemment shall have the opportunity to object to and litigate the appropriateness ofany
additional disclosures ofclassified information under MRE 505. I^efbre any person other than
trial counsel,appropriately cleared United States Govemment employees, and personnel ofthe
originating agency,are permitted by the Court to inspect and review classified documents or
infbrmation,that person must also sign the Memorandum ofUnderstanding.
i. DefenseCounsel. Subject to the provisions ofparagraph 3(h), the fbllowing attomeys
fbr the accused and their appointed team members (^collectively referred to herein as ^^the
defense^^ or "defense counsel^^) shall be given access to classified documents and infbrmation as
required by the govemment^s discovery obligations and otherwise as necessary to prepare fbr
proceedings in this case: Mr.David Coombs, Major Matthew l^emkes, and Captain Paul
Bouchard. This Order shall apply to any substituted counsel in the event that any ofthe abovenamed attomeys discontinue their involvement in this matter, so long they meet all requirements
under this order. Any additional person whose assistance the defense reasonably requires may

20690

only have access to classified documents and information in this case afl^er obtaining approval,
through the trial counsel,from the Deputy ChiefofStafffbr Intelligence, United States Army
pursuant to Army Regulation 3^0-67,^^^.^^^^^^^^^^^fi^^^^^^^, paragraph 3-23^ The
Govemment shall have the opportunity to object to and litigate the appropriateness ofany
additional disclosures ofclassified information under MRE 505.
j . Security Clearance. Unless already holding an appropriate security clearance and
approved fbr access to classified documents and infbrmation in this case, for the purpose of
establishing security clearances necessary fbr access to classified documents and infbrmation
that may be involved in this case, all persons whose assistance the defense or Court reasonably
requires in this case shall completeastandard Form ^6 (^^Security Investigation Data fbr
Sensitive Position^'), attached releases, and fingerprints, to be submitted to the trial counseL The
trial counsel shall take all reasonable steps to process all security clearance applications.
k. AreaofReview. Defense counsel shall only discuss, store, review.and otherwise
handle classified documents and infbrmation in an approved govemment facility. Defense
counsel shall prepare any and all pleadings or other documents, including substantive
communications,with the exception of purely administrative motions, such as extensions oftime
or continuances not containing information that is or may be classified or under seal,ina
govemment facility. Military defense counsel are responsible to ensure the govemment facilities
are available to all members ofthe defense. The trial counsel shall ensure the govemment
facility containsaseparate working area fbr the defense counsel to prepare court filings and will
be outfitted with any secure office equipment requested by the defense counsel that is reasonable
and necessary to the preparation of the accused'sdefense in this case. The security experts
detailed to the defense, in consultation with defense counsel, shall establish procedures to assttre
that the govemment facilities are maintained and operated in the most efficient manner
consistent with the protection ofclassified documents and infbrmation.
L Procedures fbr Handling ofclassified Information. Defense counsel and their
designated employees shall have access to classified documents and infbrmation only as follows:
(1) All classified documents and infbrmation produced by the United States to
the defense counsel, in discovery or otherwise, and all classified documents and information
possessed, created, or maintained by the defense counsel, shall be stored, maintained, and used
only in the govemment facility,as outlined in this ORDER.
(2) The defense counsel shall have free access to the classified documents and
infbrmation made available to them in the govemment facility,and shall be allowed to take notes
and prepare documents with respect to those materials. However, the defense shall not, except
under separate Court order, disclose the classified documents and infbrmation, either directly,
indirectly,or in any manner which would disclose the existence of such, to pursue leads or in the
defense ofthe accused;
^3) No person, including the defense counsel, shall copy or reproduce any
classified documents and infbrmation in any fbrm, except under the direct and on site
supervision ofthe security experts detailed to the defense.

20691

(^) All documents prepared by the defense and communications (including
without limitation, pleadings or other documents intended fbr filing with the Court,with the
exception ofpurely administrative motions, such as extensions oftime or continuances not
containing infbrmation that is or may be classified or under seal) that do or may contain
classified infbrmation, shall be transcribed, recorded, typed, duplicated, copied, or otherwise
prepared only by persons who have received an appropriate approval fbr access to classified
documents and infbrmation, and in the govemment facility on the three provided laptop
computers in accordance with the procedures approved by the security experts detailed to the
defense. All such documents and any associated materials(such as notes, drafts, copies,
typewriter ribbons, magnetic recordings, and exhibits)containing classified infbrmation shall be
maintained in the govemment facility. Notl^in^intl^isORDERsItalll^eeonstrtredto
atttl^orize trial eot^nsel access to any attorney-elient^rivile^edin^orntation;
(5) The defense counsel shall discuss classified documents and infbrmation only
within the govemment facility,and shall not discuss or attempt to discuss classified documents
or infbrmation over any standard commercial telephone instrument or office intercommunication
system,including but not limited to the Intemet. Additionally,defense counsel should consider
any infbrmation that is contained in the Supplemental Order, outlined in paragraph 3(^n)(^^), to be
classified fbr purposes of communications;
^6) The defense shall not disclose,without prior approval by the United States in
the first instance or by the Court upon notice to and opportunity to be heard by the United States,
the contents ofany classified documents or infbrmation to any person not authorized pursuant to
this Order, including defense witnesses, except the Court, Court personnel, and the trial counsel,
who have been identified by the court security officer as having the appropriate clearances and
the need to know that infbrmation. Trial counsel shall be given notice ofand an opportunity to
be heard by the Court in response to any defense request to the Court fbr disclosure toaperson
not named in this Order. Any person approved by the United States in the first instance or by the
Court upon notice to and an opportunity to be heard by the United States fbr disclosure under
this paragraph shall be required to obtain the appropriate security clearance as necessary,to sign
and submit to the Court the Memorandum ofUnderstanding appended to this Order, and to
comply with all terms and conditions ofthis Order. Ifpreparation ofthe defense requires that
classified documents or infbrmation be disclosed to persons not named in this Order, then, upon
approval bytheCourt,thetrialcounselshallpromptlyseektoobtainsecurityclearancesforthem
at the request ofdefense counsel.
(7) Iftrial counsel advises the defense counsel, in writing, that certain classified
infbrmation or documents may not be disclosed to the accused, then defense counsel shall not
disclose such infbrmation or documents to the accused without prior concurrence ofthe trial
counsel,absent such concurrence, approval ofthe Court. Trial counsel shall be given an
opportunity to be heard in response to any defense request fbr disclosure to the accused of
classified infbrmation.
m. Restrictions on Accused'Access to Classified Information The accused and defense
are not authorized to discuss, handle, review or otherwise transmit classified infbrmation outside

20692

ofan approved govemment facility. Ifit becomes necessary fbrthe accused to review or discuss
classified matters, or otherwise meet with defense counsel, then the trial counsel shall coordinate
this meeting. The defense counsel shall notify the trial counsel in writing, no less than ten
calendar days in advance.
n. Filings with the Court. The fbllowing rules apply with respect to filings.
(^1) Until ftirther order ofthis Court, any pleading or other document filed by the
defense counsel, with the only exception being purely administrative motions, such as extensions
oftime or continuances that do not contain any substantive infbrmation or any infbrmation that is
or may be classified, shall be filed under seal with the Court through the court security officer by
midnight on the day of filing. Pleadings filed under seal with the court security officer shall be
marked,^^Filed in Camera and Under Seal with the Court Securityofficer.^^ The date and time of
submission to the court security officer shall be considered the date and time of filing. Atthe
time of makingasubmission to the court security officer, trial counsel and defense counsel shall
notify the Court and other party via electronic communication thatasubmission was made to the
court security officer and provideatitle of the document,which does not disclose any potentially
classified infbrmation. The court security officer shall unseal, and promptly deliver to the Court
and trial counsel (ifex parte, only to the Court), any filing by the defense counsel that does not
contain classified infbrmation and that does not contain infbrmation under the "Supplemental^^
provision in para. 3(n)(^).
(2) The court security officer shall promptly examine any pleading or other
document, filed by the defense counsel, through their security experts, and determine whether the
pleading or document may contain classified infbrmation. Ifthe court security officer identifies
infbrmation as listed in para.(n)(^), the court security officer shall follow the procedures detailed
in(^n)(^). Ifthe court security officer identifies information he reasonably believes contains
classified infbrmation not listed in para.(n)(^), the court security officer shall promptly notify
the trial counsel and properly deliver such pleading or document to the trial counseL The trial
counsel shall then consult with the appropriate United States govemment agencies to determine
whether the pleading or document contains classified infbrmation. Ifthe appropriate agency
determines that the pleading or document contains classified infbrmation, the trial counsel, in
consultation with the appropriate agency,shall ensure that that portion of the pleading or
document, is marked with the appropriate classification marking, that the pleading or document
remains under seal, and that the pleading or other document is delivered under seal to the Court.
^3) In the event the defense counsel, upon an appropriate showing to the Court, is
permitted to file limited portions ofapleading or document ex parte and the court security
officer identifies infbrmation the court security officer reasonably believes contains classified
infbrmation not listed in para.(n)(^), then the court security officer shall direct the defense
counsel to excise the material believed to be classified, and fbr the defense counsel to providea
classified infbrmation supplement. The court security officer shall promptly notify the trial
counsel ofthe classified infbrmation supplement and properly deliver such supplement to the
trial counseL The trial counsel shall then consult with the appropriate agencies to determine
whether the supplement contains classified information. Ifthe appropriate agency determines
that the supplement contains classified information, the trial counsel, in consultation with the

20693

appropriate agency,shall ensure that that portion of the supplement, and only that portion, is
marked with the appropriate classification marking and that the supplement remains under seaL
The trial counsel shall immediately deliver under seal to the Court any supplement to be filed by
the defense counsel that contains classified infbrmation. All portions ofany supplement filed by
the defense counsel that does not contain classified infbrmation shall immediately be unsealed,
fbr classification purposes, by the court security officer. Nothing in this ORDER shall be
constmed to waive any Govemment objection to ex parte filings by the defense.
(^) Presumptive Classification. Until further order ofthis Court, any pleading or
other document filed by the trial counsel or defense counsel, or communication by members of
each party within each party,between parties, and with the Court,which contains facts or other
infbrmation that fall within the categories outlined in thcB^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^C^^^^^^^
.^^^^^^^^^^.^C^^.^.^^^^^^^^^^^^^ (hereinafter ^^Supplemental Order^^), shall be treated as
classified at the appropriate level as outlined in the Supplemental Order. The Supplemental
Order is notasubstituteforaclassif^cation review by an appropriate Original Classification
Authority(OCA); but ratheramethod to facilitate an efficient filing process that protects
classified infbrmation and requires both parties and the Court to err on the side of caution when
handling classified infbrmation with minimizing the possibility ofany unintentional disclosure of
classified infbrmation byaparty or the Court. The trial counsel, defense counsel through their
security experts, and the court security officer,will mark any substantive filing or
communication containing infbrmation in the Supplemental Order with the given classification
level, preceded by ^^Treatas^^(forexample,^^TreatasSECRETNOFORN^^). Ifafactortopic
arises that is not covered by the Supplemental Order, then the security experts will notify the
court security officer. In an abundance ofcaution, the infbrmation will be treated as classified.
If such infbrmation is identified by any party or the Court,which is not specifically included in
the Supplemental Order, then the trial counsel shall coordinate with the appropriate OCA. All
infbrmation in the Supplemental Order will be treated as presumptively classified infbrmation
underthis ORDER, unless or until such time as an OCA makesafinal determination as to the
classification level ofthe infbrmation.
(5) Defense counsel through their security experts shallsubmit all filings,with
the exception ofpurely administrative motions, such as extensions oftime or continuances not
containing infbrmation that is or may be classified or under seal, through hard copy delivery
properly couriered or using Secret Intemet Protocol Router Network emaiL to the court security
officer.
o. Govemment Filings. Any pleading or other document filed by the trial counsel
containing classified infbrmation shall be filed under seal with the Court through the court
security officer fbllowing the same procedures as outlined in paragraph 3(n). The date and time
ofphysical submission to the court security officer shall be considered the date and time ofthe
liling. The court security officer shall immediately deliver under seal to the Court and defense
counsel (sunless such filing is ex parte)any pleading or document to be filed by the govemment
that contains classified infbrmation.
p. Sealed Record. The court security officer shall maintainaseparate sealed record fbr
those materials which are classified, including that which is treated as classified under paragraph

20694

3(n)(^). The court security officer shall be responsible for also maintaining the secured records
fbr purposesoflater proceedings. Once all proceeding are concluded, the court security officer
shall transfer custody ofall secured records to the Criminal Law Division, Office ofthe Staff
Judge Advocate, U.S.Army Military District ofWashington, fbr post-trial processing.
q. Violations ofthis Order. Any unauthorized disclosure or dissemination ofclassified
documents or infbrmation may constitute violations ofUnited States criminal laws. In addition,
any violation ofthe terms ofthis Order shall be immediately brought to the attention ofthe Court
and may result inacharge of contempt of the Court and possible referral fbr criminal
prosecution. Any breach of this Order may also result in the termination ofaperson^s access to
classified documents or infbrmation andafbrmal complaint to that person'sstate bar association.
Persons subject to this Order are advised that direct or indirect unauthorized use, disclosure,
retention, or negligent handling ofclassified documents or infbrmation could cause serious
damage, and in some cases exceptionally grave damage, to the national security ofthe United
States or may be used to the advantage ofafbreign nation against the interests ofthe United
States. This Order is intended to ensure that those authorized by the Orderto receive classified
documents or infbrmation will never divulge the classified documents or infbrmation disclosed
to them in connection with this case to anyone who is not now authorized to receive it, or
otherwise use the classified documents or infbrmation, without prior written authorization from
the originating agency and in conformity with this Order.
r. Property ofthe United States. All classified documents and infbrmation to which
defense counsel and defense counsel employees have access in this case are now and will remain
the property ofthe United States. The defense counsel and defense counsel employees who
receive classified documents and infbrmation shall return all such classified documents and
infbrmation in their possession obtained through discovery from the United States in this case, or
fbr which they are responsible because ofaccess to classified documents and infbrmation, upon
demand ofthe court security officer. The notes, summaries, and other documents prepared by
the defense that do or may contain classified infbrmation shall remain at all times in the
govemment facility under the guidance ofthe security experts detailed to the defense for the
duration ofthis case. At the conclusion ofthis case, all such notes, summaries, and other
documents, which the defense counsel wants to be retained, will be sealed and provided to the
Criminal Law Division, Office ofthe StaffJudge Advocate, U.S.Army Military District of
Washington fbr proper storage during the appellate process, if applicable. Any other such
documentation shall be destroyed by the security experts detailed to the defense in the presence
ofdefense counseL
s. Further Protective Order. Nothing in this Order shall preclude the United States fi^om
seekingafttrther protective order pursuant to MRE 505 as to particular items of discoverable
materiaL
L Subsequent Action. Acopy ofthis Order shall be issued forthwith to counsel for the
accused,who shall be responsible fbr advising the accused and defense counsel employees of the
contents ofthis Order. The defense counsel and defense counsel employees to be provided
access to classified infbrmation shall execute the Memorandum ofUnderstanding appended to
this Order, and defense counsel shall file executed originals with the Court and the court security

20695

officer and serve executed originals ofsuch document upon the United States. The execution
and filing ofthe Memorandum ofUnderstanding isacondition precedent for defense counsel,
defense counsel employees, and any other person working fbrthe defense to have access to
classified infbrmation. It is alsoacondition precedent fbrthe accused and any defense witness
to have access to classified infbrmation pursuant to paragraph 3(o)above.
ORDERED, this the

dayofMarch20l2

DENISERLIND
COL,JA
ChiefJudge, IstJudicial Circuit

1^

20696

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY
FIRST JUDICIALCIRCUIT
UNITEDSTATES

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OE
UNDERSTANDING

^

MANNING,BradIeyE,PEC
HHC,U.S.ArmyGarrison
JointBaseMyerHendersonHall
FortMyer, Virginia22211

)
)
)
^

1. Having familiarized myself with the applicable laws,lunderstand thatlhave already received
and^or may be the ftiture recipient ofinfbrmation and documents which pertain to the national
security ofthe United States and which are the property ofthe United States, and that such
infbrmation and documents, together with the methods ofcollecting such infbrmation, are
classified according to security standards set by the United States govemment.
2. lagreethatlshall never divulge, publish, or reveal,either by word, conduct, or any other
means, such classified infbrmation or documents unless specifically authorized in writing to do
so by an authorized representative ofthe United States govemment, or as authorized by the Court
pursuant to Military Rule ofEvidence (^MRE) 505 orthe Protective Order entered in the abovecaptioned case, or as otherwise ordered by the Court,
3. lagree that this Memorandum ofUnderstanding and any other nondisclosure agreement
signed by me in connection with this case will remain forever binding upon me.
^. Ihave received, read, and understand the Protective Order entered by the First Judicial Circuit
in the above-captioned case, andlagree to comply with the provisions contained therein.
5. Ideclare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the fbregoing is true
and correct to the best of my knowledge, infbrmation, and belief
Name:
Date and Place of^irth:

(signature)
Date:

20697

Appellate Exhibit 18
Enclosure 4
3 pages
classified
"SECRET"
ordered sealed for Reason 2
Military Judge's Seal Order
dated 20 August 2013
stored in the classified
supplement to the original
Record of Trial

20698

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING AND ARRANGING RECORD OF TRIAL
USE OF FORM - Use this form and MCM, 1984,
Appendix 14, will be used by the trial counsel and
the reporter as a guide to the preparation of the
record of trial in general and special court-martial
cases in which a verbatim record is prepared. Air
Force uses this form and departmental
instructions as a guide to the preparation of the
record of trial in general and special court-martial
cases in which a summarized record is authorized.
Army and Navy use DD Form 491 for records of
trial in general and special court-martial cases in
which a summarized record is authorized.
Inapplicable words of the printed text will be
deleted.

8. Matters submitted by the accused pursuant to
Article 60 (MCM, 1984, RCM 1105).

COPIES - See MCM, 1984, RCM 1103(g). The
convening authority may direct the preparation of
additional copies.

12. Advice of staff judge advocate or legal officer,
when prepared pursuant to Article 34 or otherwise.

ARRANGEMENT - When forwarded to the
appropriate Judge Advocate General or for judge
advocate review pursuant to Article 64(a), the
record will be arranged and bound with allied
papers in the sequence indicated below. Trial
counsel is responsible for arranging the record as
indicated, except that items 6, 7, and 15e will be
inserted by the convening or reviewing authority,
as appropriate, and items 10 and 14 will be
inserted by either trial counsel or the convening or
reviewing authority, whichever has custody of
them.

13. Requests by counsel and action of the
convening authority taken thereon (e.g., requests
concerning delay, witnesses and depositions).

1. Front cover and inside front cover (chronology
sheet) of DD Form 490.
2. Judge advocate's review pursuant to Article
64(a), if any.
3. Request of accused for appellate defense
counsel, or waiver/withdrawal of appellate rights,
if applicable.
4. Briefs of counsel submitted after trial, if any
(Article 38(c)).
5. DD Form 494, "Court-Martial Data Sheet."

9. DD Form 458, "Charge Sheet" (unless included
at the point of arraignment in the record).
10. Congressional inquiries and replies, if any.
11. DD Form 457, "Investigating Officer's Report,"
pursuant to Article 32, if such investigation was
conducted, followed by any other papers which
accompanied the charges when referred for trial,
unless included in the record of trial proper.

14. Records of former trials.
15. Record of trial in the following order:
a. Errata sheet, if any.
b. Index sheet with reverse side containing
receipt of accused or defense counsel for copy of
record or certificate in lieu of receipt.
c. Record of proceedings in court, including
Article 39(a) sessions, if any.
d. Authentication sheet, followed by certificate
of correction, if any.
e. Action of convening authority and, if appropriate, action of officer exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction.
f. Exhibits admitted in evidence.

6. Court-martial orders promulgating the result of
trial as to each accused, in 10 copies when the
record is verbatim and in 4 copies when it is
summarized.

g. Exhibits not received in evidence. The page
of the record of trial where each exhibit was
offered and rejected will be noted on the front of
each exhibit.

7. When required, signed recommendation of
staff judge advocate or legal officer, in duplicate,
together with all clemency papers, including
clemency recommendations by court members.

h. Appellate exhibits, such as proposed instructions, written offers of proof or preliminary
evidence (real or documentary), and briefs of
counsel submitted at trial.

DD FORM 490, MAY 2000

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