Title: 2009 - JIEDDO Annual Report

Release Date: 2014-03-20

Text: Attackthe Network-Defeatt h o Device- Train theForce/&h'Annual ReportKUilLzUZfA'.ttPAa%'WKTIKA^Joint ImprovisedExplosiveDevice Hefeet Hitfanisetieii^AGE_ofattack thePAGESN e t w o r k — D e f e a t the Device —Train theForce'ameet-aThis Publication can be found online at:wvvw.jieddo.dod.miITable of ContentsMessage from the Director3Threats and TrendsIED Overview for Afghanistan and IraqGlobalU.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)U.S. African Command (AFRICOM)U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)U.S. European Command (EUCOM)U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)446677888JlEDDO Mission and Mission Areas9ResourcesFundingPersonnel and StaffingJlEDDO Enterprise Management System10101011FY 2009 Major AccomplishmentsAttack the NetworkDefeat the DeviceTrain the Force12121415Competitive Strategies Group18FY 2009 Transfers, Transitions, and Terminations19JlEDDO Field Teams22Science and Technology22Acronyms23. Message from the DirectorThe Depart:ment of Defense (DoD) established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JlEDDO)in February 2006 to meet an urgent and compelling need to counter improvised explosivedevices (lEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since then, JlEDDO has provided significantcapabilities to warfighters - enabling IED network attack, enabling IED detection and defeat,and providing leading-edge counter-IED training to our men and women in uniform.This Annual Report provides an accounting of JIEDDO's significant efforts in Fiscal Year2009. Highlights include:e Orchestrating a $3.1 billion effort to develop and deliver counter-IEDcapabilities on abbreviated timelines.• Improving effectiveness in developing and fusing information to understandand enable attacks against IED networks - and pushing that information forwardto troops in theater.e Posturing JlEDDO to meet long-term DoD needs to counter lEDs as weaponsof strategic influence.At the end of 2009, JlEDDO continued to deliver urgently needed counter-IED capabilitiesto U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, where IED use dramatically escalated in 2009. On a positivenote, IED use continued to decline in Iraq. Elsewhere in the world, violent extremistsemployed, on average, more than 250 lEDs per month. Notably, IED networks continuedto (Jemonstrate remarkably rapid IED innovation cycles.We are in an extended era of persistent conflict that spans the globe. lEDs figure prominentlyas the weak adversary's weapon of choice - continuing a several-century trend. To counterthe persistent IED threat, our nation needs new and improved counter-IED capabilities withan eye toward leaping beyond the terrorists' next innovation.As we move forward in 2010 and beyond, the men and women of JlEDDO remain committedto putting improved counter-IED capabilities in the hands of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, andAirmen wherever they serve.c::Pl^.GjcrMichael L, OatesLTG, U.S. ArmyDirectorHPThreats and TrendsIED Overview for Afghanistan and IraqlEDs continued to be a significant threat in both Afghanistanand Iraq in FY 2009, with overall incidents against U.5. andCoalition Forces (CF) decreasing in Iraq, and increasing inAfghanistan. As reflected in Figure-1, while the numberof casualties caused by lEDs in Iraq has followed FY 2008trends, IED casualties in Afghanistan began to increase inMay 2009, lEDs in Iraq accounted for more than 14,400casualties in FY 2009, a 31 percent decline from nearly19,000 such casualties in FY 2008. In contrast, the numberof casualties caused in Afghanistan increased 39 percentto almost 6,200 casualties in FY 2009 from approximately3,800 casualties in FY 2008.6,800 IED incidents in FY 2009, 52 percent were found andsafely cleared; 26 percent detonated but failed to produce acasualty; and 22 percent detonated and caused a CF, NonCF, or Host Nation casualty. As measured by CF casualtiesper incident, lEDs were 14 percent more effective in FY 2009over FY 2008. Coupled with the significant correspondingincrease in IED incidents, this resulted in over twice thenumber of CF casualties that were suffered in FY 2008.lEDs in Afghanistan continued to present a significant threatto CF, Most lEDs encountered in Afghanistan continued toemploy simple, yet effective, technologies and designs suchas Victim Operated lEDs (VOIEDs) (e,g,, pressure plates)and Command Wire lEDs (CWIEDs) that often used largenet explosive weight (NEW) charges. These basic devicescircumvented many CF countermeasures due to theirsimplicity and difficulty of detection.6000Iraqs.0)U> 5000<4000&-in«ra 30003tf)raU2,o10001000y ' V v AfgTianTsfiBin^FY04FY05FY06FY07FY08FY09Figure-1: IED Casualties (Coalition Force, Non-Coalition Force, and Host Nation) in Iraq and AfghanistanAfghanistanlEDs were the most serious threat to Coalition Forces (CF)in Afghanistan in FY 2009. The use of lEDs in Afghanistandramatically increased in FY 2009, continuing its steadyclimb since 2005. Taliban, other insurgent groups, and alQaeda-aligned foreign fighters use lEDs to cause casualties,restrict CF Freedom of Maneuver, create insecurity in thepopulace, and separate CF from the civilian population.The increase in CF troop levels in Regional Commands(RC) South (S) and East (E) during FY 2009 resulted in asignificant increase in IED incidents as these units pushedinto areas formerly controlled by the Taliban ancj otherinsurgent groups. The influx of CF Into areas has led to thehighest rates of IED attacks on CF since the conflict beganin 2001,In FY 2009, the number of IED incidents in Afghanistannearly doubled from FY 2008 (Figure-2). Of the more thanThe incorporation of homemade explosives (HME) andother bulk explosives into large lEDs continued to be themost significant IED threat to CF in Afghanistan. HME, andother bulk explosives were used in the majority of IED maincharges in Afghanistan,In addition to targeting CF vehicles, insurgents alsoincreased targeting of dismounted forces in FY 2009 dueto the increase of dismounted operations by CF forces insupport of Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The lEDsused in these attacks often employed the same types ofsimple victim operated and command wire initiation used inattacks against mounted forces.Afghanistan Outlook: Driven largely by the increased CFpresence and expanded COIN operations in Afghanistan,IED activity and lED-related casualties will persist atelevated levels in the near term. IED activity will increaseas CF push into areas previously controlled by the Taliban,especially in traditional insurgent strongholds in RC-Southas well as traditional insurgent areas of RC-East.12001000800600mo A n t e t t m M nan Cf CMutltDn.4O0SO Attmdtt with CmMtkm Foic» C#MwAiw200tiit^tfvctfveFY06FY05fY07fillFY08Attitck^FY09Flgure-2: Afghanistan - IED Incident TrendsMost lEDs encountered by CF in Afghanistan will continueto employ simple, yet effective, technologies and designs.Insurgents will continue to target armored vehicles with largenet explosive weight lEDs in an attempt to cause significantcasualties. With increased COIN operations requiringdismounted tactics, insurgents will also increasingly focuson targeting dismounted troops. In addition, insurgentswill focus on conducting high-profile suicide attackssimilar to the multiple Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED)attacks against CF and Government of the Islamic State ofAfghanistan (GIRoA) targets in Kabul during FY 2009.IraqThe decline in IED activity in Iraq continued in FY 2009,with attacks at their lowest levels since May 2004; andIED incidents falling nearly 50 percent as compared to theprevious fiscal year (Figure-3). The withdrawal of themajority of U,S. Forces Iraq (USF-I) from Combat Outpostsin the cities to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in June2009 was a major contributing factor to the decline in theIED threat. As a result, insurgents shifted some of their IEDtargeting efforts to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), governmentand sectarian targets in attempts to reverse recent gains insecurity and stability.Due to the reduced operational posture of U.S, ForcesIraq (USF-I), many threat groups in Iraq have shifted asignificant portion of their IED targeting efforts to IraqiSecurity Forces and symbolic government and sectariantargets. However, despite a significant reduction in IEDincidents, lEDs continue to present a significant threat toUSF-I and will continue to threaten USF-I forces remainingin Iraq after the completion of the drawdown.Iraq Outlook: The overall decline in IED attacks againstUSF-I will likely continue, although there is potential thatinsurgents may attempt to increase attacks against USF-Idepending on the outcome of Iraqi elections in FY 20104000FY03FY04FY 07Figurs-3: Iraq - IED Incidents TrendsFY08FV09and during USF withdrawal operations. AlQaeda in Iraq(A0I)9ndShiaextremistswill continuetopropagatesectarian violence while A^Iwill attack Iraqi governmentand security targets using large SVBIEDs and Personborne lEDs(PBIEDs), Periodic spikes in IED violence canbe anticipated during post election government formation,religiousholidays,andassociated pilgrimages,thatgrowin sophistication, others will continueto relyon relatively simple, but effective TTPs until they areeffectively countered, IED events will increase in frequencyin many unstable areas of the globe as threat groups shareinformation,capitalizeon rapidly evolving global wirelesscommunicationstechnologies,homemadeexplosives(HME),and realize the potential psychological, social, and politicalimpact ofthis weapon, Thesetrends arealready beingseen in places such as Pakistan, North and East Africa, andSouth America(Colombia), No other widely available terrorweapon garners suchpotential for mass mediaattentionand strategic influence as does the IED.GloballEDs continued to be the weapon of choice for globalinsurgents and terrorists, FY 2009 saw an average ofover 250 IED incidents per month outside ofAfghanistanand Iraq as shown in ^ f B ^ ^ - ^ , Device effectiveness andlethality continued to improvein many areas outside ofAfghanistanand Iraq, Improvedglobal communicationsand coordination among threat groups has enabledproliferation of IED technology world wide ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ - ^ .Many global terrorist and insurgent groups outside oflraqandAfghanistan increasinglyreliedonlEDsandincorporatedsuccessful indigenous tactics,techniques, and procedures(TTPs)as well as those demonstrated by insurgents in IraqandAfghanistan,^.^.GentraiGomn^and(G5i^TGGi^)Threat groups in CENTCOM(outside Iraq andAfghanistan)employednearly every type of lEDin FY 2009, Suicideattacks in the form of SVBIEDs and PBIEDs were commonand caused significant casualties in countries such asPakistan, The proliferation of suicide IED tactics by alO^eda and their proxies inCENTCOM continued to beagrowing global threat,Pakistan continued to be thefocus o f a significant IEDcampaign in FY 2009 by al ^aedaandTalibanaffiliatedgroupsthatsoughttodestabilizethe Pakistani governmentand counter ongoing Pakistani military operations targetinglEDs will continue to threaten security forces throughouttheglobe, Whilesomethreatgroups will employ lEDsato*^ei iinHii• Advlnmg UnW*• TTP*«vii». . . . T T T !JCOE construction of an Iraqi village, JlEDDO PhotoIn FY 2009, the JCOE funded $290M in materiel traininginitiatives and $123M on technical, non-materiel C-IEDtraining solutions. Through FY 2009, the JCOE hassupported C-IED training for more than 65 Army brigadecombat teams and 60 Marine Corps battalions constitutingmore than 200,000 individual service members,FY 2009 C-IED training innovations developed and fundedthrough JCOE included:Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE). In a span of90 days, the JCOE produced an initial TSE capabilityat the Army's National Training Center (NTC), TSEtrains warfighters on search techniques, collectionmethods, and tactical questioning to ensure thatdocuments, material, and personnel are identified,collected, protected, and evaluated. This enablesrapid exploitation of information gained, facilitatingfurther investigation and action against IED networks.The TSE initiative included constructing a small villagecomplex modeled on Iraqi villages, where certifiedTSE instructors conducted search training.Capitalizing on the initial success, the JCOE expandedthe TSE training to the Joint Multinational ReadinessCenter (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and sevenother sites, including Camp Shelby, Camp Atterbury,Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, and Marine Corps Base inKaneohe Bay, Hawaii, In the aggregate, the JCOEinvested more than $7M in TSE and other searchtraining initiatives during FY 2009.Home Made Explosives (HME). In early FY2009, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Paladin,Afghanistan, identified an urgent need for warfightersto detect HME and unknown bulk explosives (UBE)being used in lEDs. Within five days of receiving16the requirement, the JCOE began training a joint,interagency, and coalition team to assist in HME/UBEtraining. In collaboration with Los Alamos NationalLaboratory explosives chemists, the JCOE developeda course to provide warfighters specialized knowledgeof the chemistry involved in producing HME - enablingthem to recognize HME production signatures,C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams(C-MATT). In FY 2009, the JCOE created C-MATTto provide focused C-IED training for units not havinga pre-deployment training opportunity at a combattraining center (CTC), The C-MATTs coached,mentored, and trained unit leaders and battle staffsto implement USCENTCOM's Counter-IED Trainingand Capabilities Guidance. C-MATT leveraged C-IEDhome station training lanes for units requiring thistraining, as identified by the Army's force generationprocess. During FY 2009, C-MATTs trained morethan 6,000 Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen.Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer. JlEDDO PhotoJoint Asymmetric Threat Awareness andC-IED Training Program (JATAC). In FY 2009,the JATAC training program, started in FY 2007,continued to address critical C-IED pre-deploymenttraining gaps, such as: embedding C-IED trainers andenablers in deploying units, training opposing forcerole players to provide relevant and realistic trainingto deploying units, training tactical site exploitationskills, and preparing EOD forces for theater-specificthreats. Through FY 2009, the JATAC program hastrained 8,500 service members at 27 locations fordeployment to Iraq or Afghanistan,MohileCIED Interactive Trainer (MCIT), TheMCITinitiative provided Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,and Marineswithself paced, interactive, adaptable,field configurable IED threat training specific toeach unit's anticipated area of operation. TheMClTconsists of four 40foot trailers equipped withinteractive multi media equipment that can rapidlybe adapted to evolving threats. The MCIT increaseswarfighterC-IED awareness with information aboutIED components, IED employment strategies, andIED network organization and functioning.In FY 2009,warfighters at Fort Bragg and CampPendelton provided enthusiastic support for theMCITsystem, JlEDDO anticipates delivering futuresystemsto CONUS and combat zone locations to meetwarfighter training requirements.MCIT training at Ft 8ragg. .^^^000 ^^0^0JointTraining Counter lED Operations IntegrationsCenter(JTCOIC). In FY2009,theJTCOICachieved initialoperating capability in Newport News, Virginia, as the singlesourcefortraining COIC tools and processes to the Servicesand Joint Forces forlED network attack, JlEDDO plansto fund the JTCOIC asaproofofconcept initiative for twoyearsbeforetransferringthecapability.During FY 2009, the JTCOIC supported active and reserveArmy,Navy,Air Force, and Marine Corps components. TheJTCOIC established training support cells at the Army'sCTCs in the U,S, and Germany,TheJTCOICinauguratedsupporttoJointForcesCommand(JFCOM)forthe United Endeavor exerciseseries, whichtrains Division, Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, andJoint Task Force headquarters deploying to Iraq andAfghanistan, JTCOIC's support included developing IEDnetwork scenarios and storylines to create appropriate,robust IED problem sets drawn from Iran and Afghanistanfor these headquarters. The JTCOIC alsomentored theJFCOM exerciseC IEDobservertrainerstofacilitate realistic,productive staff training,C IED training innovations developed and funded throughtheJTCOIC during FY 2009 included:Systems Integration and Modeling andSimulation (SIMS). In FY 2009, theJTCOICcontinued the development of training, modeling,and simulations capabilities through their SIMS team.The SIMS team employed innovative technologiesandmethods to recreate IED events as interactive,three-dimensional visualizations, JTCOICisabletoproducearealisticvisualizationasquickly as four days- a uniqueDoD capability. During the year, morethan 150 organizations downloaded these unclassifiedtraining products for deployment preparation,JTCOIC Central Training Datai^ase TheJTCOICcollected information from more than 50 data sourcesandarchivedthem in its central training databaseamassingmorethanonemillioncombatzonemessagesand reports,TheJTCOIC, JCOE, and other units drawupon this database to develop richCIED exercisesfor units at the operational and tactical levels. Theinformation drawn from the central training databaseprofoundlyimpactedtrainingenvironmentsbyenablingrealistic detail that was previously unattainable.1^^o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^o^^^^^^^The Competitive Strategies Group (CSG) extends theJlEDDO Director's strategic and critical thinking processby challenging JIEDDO's strategy and decisions withindependent, critical, and alternative perspectives that aretechnologically, culturally, and politically aware. Theseefforts enable JlEDDO to gain and maintainacompetitiveadvantage across the global operational environment,CSG is functionally aligned withaStrategic Influence Cell(SIC),aCultural and Political Perspectives Ceil(CPC), andaTechnology Exploitation Cell,Strategic Influence and Cultural Political Cell (SIC^CPC), The SIC^CPC provides an independent capability tofully explorealternatives in plans, operations, concepts,organizations, and capabilities in the context of theoperational environment and from the perspectives ofpartners, adversaries, and others. Over the past 12months, theSIC^CPC has published more than 70^^redteaming" information papers designed to provoke thoughtand generate discussion to help shape an understanding ofhow the adversary may view actions taken by Blue Forces,Topics included: ^^Coalition Force buildup in Afghanistan:What will be the response7"^^Whatwillhappen when CFdraws down in Iraq7" and ^^How does North Korea plan touseIEDs7"In response to the FY 2009 National Defense AuthorizationAct,theSIC^CPC collaborated with various organizationsand agencies to identify potential IED threats facing theCOCOMs in 2012 2018, JIEDDO's response highlighted theportability of knowledge and skills needed to construct anduselEDs, The report concluded that each COCOM facesdivergent and decentralized hostile actors with increasingcapability and lethality.Technology Exploitation Cell (TEC)The TECprovided an independent capability to create andexploit technical C IED defeat alternatives. The cellISconsidered ^^what'snext7" in thelED fight, reached outtothe commercial sector to identify newand emergingtechnologies, and leveraged relationships with othergovernment agencies, industry, and academia to discoverand mitigate vulnerabilities andpotential uses of currentand emerging technologies as lEDs, TheTEC is organizedinto three groups:Technical l^e^^^lue Team Assessment CroupDuring FY 2009, competing Technical Red^BlueTeams completed more than 65 ^^QuickLook" anddetailed assessments. These teams from JohnsHopkins University^Applied Physics Lab,GeorgiaTechResearch Institute, and Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology^Lincoln Labs theorized Red Force countercountermeasures (CCMs)to defeat Blue ForceCIEDsystems. In response, BlueTeams documented theexpected effectiveness of likely Red Force CCMs,identified system limitations and vulnerabilities, andoffered recommendations to improve the system'scapabilities. These efforts shaped the development ofService and JlEDDO initiatives, such as MANPOWER,C0UNTERB0MBER2, Shield, Laser Vibrometry IEDDetection, and theJointLightTactical Vehicle,Device Coordination Croup (DCC) The DCGreverse engineered and reproduced lEDs found in IraqandAfghanistan, These IED surrogate devices wereused for Joint Counter lED system testing and training.In 2009, DCG supported 15 test events and providedmore than 1,100 individual devices for DoD test rangesand laboratories.Device Innovation Croup (DIC) The DIG providedresearch in and production of emerging threats notyet seen, but likely to be used. During 2009, the DIGtraveled to international technology tradeshows andconferences andselectedconsumerelectronics to beevaluated as possible future lEDs,FY 2009 Transitions,Transfers,and TerminationsC-IED Initiative Transitions, Transfers, andTerminations (T3), Chartered by the DoD to rapidlyacquire C-IED capabilities, JlEDDO seeks to transition ortransfer proven C-IED initiatives to the Services, COCOMS,or government agencies for lifecycle management andsustainment within two years. Similarly, JlEDDO seeks toterminate initiatives that have met an urgent requirementand are no longer needed or have failed to deliver anticipatedresults. Timely initiative transition, transfer, or terminationavoids JlEDDO being saddled with long-term resourcecommitments and enables JlEDDO to apply limited resourcesto the most urgent emerging C-IED requirements.JlEDDO transitioned or transferred 48 C-IED capabilitiesand terminated 14 initiatives in FY 2009 (see Appendixbelow). JlEDDO transitions C-IED initiatives when thoseinitiatives are expected to provide an enduring capability forthe joint force and are expected to become a program of'ggggggrecord funded in the President's budget, JlEDDO transfersCIED initiativeswhenthesolution isnot expectedtoprovidean enduring capability, but will continue to be sustainedand used in the current conflict; transferred initiatives areexpected tobe sustained through Overseas ContingencyOperations supplemental funding requests,JlEDDO hosts monthly Transition andTransfer WorkingGroup meetings with Service, COCOM, and agencyrepresentativesfor processtransparency and to provideServices, COCOMs, and agencies time to program andotherwise plan for transitions and transfers. Annually in the3rd Quarter,JIEDDOformally briefs its T3 recommendationsto the Protection Functional Capabilities Board (P FCB)WorkingGroup, Joint CapabilitiesBoard(JCB),and JointRequirementsOversightCouncil(JR0C),BaseduponJR0C'sendorsement,aJROC Memorandum (JROCM) is preparedfor the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,informingthe Services and agencies of the JROC action, TheT3listalong with the JROCM is forwarded to the Deputy Secretaryof Defense (DSD) for T3 decision.WtKKKKBDSD 8/17/07(U) AMSTEL(U)H^daWiedCIEDsmoit(U) Backscatter X-raysof Personnel(U)Safe, non-inlrusive screening system that rapidly andaccurately images metallic and non-metallic objects concealedon a person s bodyDSD 8/17/07(U) Bloodhound(U)COTS EMI sensors and magnetometers to detect and locatedeeply buried weapons cachesDSD 8/17/071(U) CREW - Coalition JointSpectrum ManagementPlanning Tool(U)Sofiware designed to assist EWOs in the employment ofCounter Radto-Controlted IED Electronic Warfare (CREW)systems (jammers) in support of tactical operations.DSD 8/17/071(U) Eagle Eye(U)Mobile integrated sun/eiltance for force protection providing FullMotion Video from EO/IR sensor, with radar cueing & PSDS2.DSD 8/17/07(U) Explosive DetectionEquipment(U)Family of commercial systems to non-intrusively inspectvehicles and cargo for explosives and other contrabandassociated with lEDs.DSD 8/17/07 1(U) IED Detection andInterrogation Arm(U)A stand-off capability to RG-31 and Husky thai is similar to thearm on a Buffalo vehicle.DSD 8/17/07(U) Joint Trauma Analysis andPrevention of Injury inCombat,„ < -•.v -.7",,.„..i ,me^a(U) CREW - SM - JCREWTechnique Development(UlJoint JlEDDO and Navy Technique Development etfonDSD 8/17/07(U) CREW - SM - Mounted 2 1Sustainment / Support(U)Sustainment and support effort for CREW Mounted 2.1DSD 8/17/07(U) Bomb Suit NVGs(U)Night Vision GogglesDSD 8/17/07(U) EOD - Disposable FiringSystems(U)Remote Firing SystemsDSD 8/17/07(U) EOD Robotic SystemsData link(U)Communications upgrade for EOD robotsDSD 8/17/07(U) EOD SATCOM(U)Communications upgrade for EOD teamsDSD 8/17/07(U) EA-6B LITENING Pods(U)Modification of USMC ES-6B LITENING ISR Pods to provideEO/IR Capability.Marmo FY09 TransformDSDM 8/18/09Description(U) CREW - USMC •Sustainment^JIBDDU-WMP•ttmamm wwww**^ -wwncif^DAY K'JNDfIHAZNl'"'Wman*^Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization(JlEDDO)(877) 251-3337jieddowebmaster@hqda.army.mllwww.jleddo.dod.milHELMANDKANDAHARNIMROZA t t a c k t h e Net wo rk — D e f e a t t h e D e v i c e - Train t h eForce^

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